Parliament and Scottish 'issues of conscience' in the 1970s : three case studies - licensing, divorce and homosexuality by Carnie, James K.
Parliament and Scottish 'issues of conscience' in the 1970s





I declare this thesis
and to contain all my
DECLARATION





The aim of the thesis is to examine the politics of Scottish law
reform and to explore what constitutes the 'Scottish dimension' in
certain areas of legislation which involve morality and conscience.
Specific attention is focused upon three Scottish 'issues of conscience'
of the 1970s - the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976, the Divorce (Scotland)
Act 1976 and the 'non-reform' in Scotland of the law pertaining to
homosexual conduct. Each of these issues requires separate Scottish
legislation and hence offer an interesting insight into the variations
that can exist in policy and the policy process for Scotland as compared
with England and Wales.
Chapters 1 to 4 review sore conceptual ideas through which the
case studies are to be examined. Chapter 1 considers the idea of a
'Scottish political system' and discusses Scotland's unusual historical
and political development. Cultural variations which have arisen are
then highlighted. Chapter 2 examines seme relevant approaches to
policy analysis. It considers the debate between 'rationalist' and
'incrementalist' analyses of policy development, group theory and
demand regulation, agenda control and non-decision-making, and values
in policy formulation. In Chapter 3 there is a discussion of the
philosophical debate on the legal enforcement of morals, a review of
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some empirical cases of moral issues, and an examination of Parliament's
influence in various areas of policy. Chapter 4 explains the research
methodology utilised.
Chapters 5 to 10 consider the case studies. Chapter 5 investigates
the role of the Departmental Committee on Scottish Licensing Law in
policy development. It looks at the social context of drink control
in Scotland and the Committee's approach to the problem of alcohol
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misuse. Policy development from the publication of the Report to the
1976 Act is traced in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concerns itself with
divorce and compares developments in England and Scotland in the 1950s
and 1960s. The Scottish divorce reform attempts of the 1970s are dis¬
cussed in Chapter 8 and some reasons as to why reform took longer in
Scotland are postulated. Chapter 9 deals with the case of homosexual
conduct. It is suggested that in Scotland throughout the 1970s the
homosexuality issue constituted an example of a 'non-decision'.
Chapter 10 brings the thesis full circle by relating in detail the
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of the thesis is to examine the politics of Scottish law
reform and to explore what constitutes the 'Scottish dimension' in
certain areas of legislation which involve morality and conscience.
Specific attention is focused upon three Scottish 'issues of conscience'
of the 1970s - the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976, the Divorce (Scotland)
Act 1976 and the 'non-reform' in Scotland of the law pertaining to
homosexual conduct in private between consenting adults. Each of these
issues, because of distinctive legal and cultural traditions, requires
separate Scottish legislation. Hence, they offer an interesting insight
into the variations that can exist in policy and the policy process for
Scotland as compared with England and Wales.
Chapter 1 of the thesis explores the idea of a 'Scottish political
system'. This idea, conceived by James Kellas, is based on Scotland's
historical independence as a nation-state and on the preservation of a
number of distinctive Scottish institutions after the Treaty of Union
with England in 1707. Although the Scottish Parliament was abolished
in 1707 the Church of Scotland, the Scottish legal system and the
Scottish education system remained intact. Later in the 19th century
the Scottish Office was established which had administrative autonomy
in certain areas of Scottish affairs. This unusual constitutional
arrangement has led Kellas to argue that a 'political system' still
exists in Scotland.
According to Tcm Nairn this political assimilation of the Scottish
state in conjunction with the preservation of Scottish 'civil society'
created a distorted 'cultural sub-nationalism'. The chapter continues
by locking at some of the ways this 'cultural sub-nationalism' mani¬
fests itself in modern Scottish society, for instance, in the Church,
the military, literature, sport and popular traditions. The apparent
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paradox that emerges in the Scottish identity is the awareness that
Scotland is not England combined with the opposing realisation that
Scotland and England are closely linked within a British entity.
It is suggested that seme kind of 'Scottish political system'
did persist post 1707, but that this Scottish system is both dependent
and independent within the larger British system. The problem lies in
defining the boundary of each system. The case studies on Scottish
'issues of conscience' - licensing, divorce and homosexuality - illus¬
trate this particular difficulty. Being issues which require separate
legislation they highlight the way in which the 'Scottish political
system' can operate in an independent capacity. However, they also
demonstrate that even when apparently operating in an 'independent'
capacity the Scottish system can still remain dependent on the British
system at key moments in the policy process. To illuminate this point
the thesis sets out to disaggregate and explore aspects of the
Scottish political system by identifying actors and organisations and
studying their interactions.
In Chapter 2 some approaches to policy analysis which appear
relevant to the case studies are considered. The approaches are
offered as a means to explore the component parts of the 'Scottish
political system'. The chapter opens with a review of the debate
between 'rationalist' and 'incrementalist' approaches to policy analy¬
sis. It is suggested that there is a confusion within this debate
between 'ideal' and 'real' states of affairs. A distinction needs to
be drawn between the normative value of rationalism and the explanatory
value of incrementalism.
The theme which the chapter seeks to develop is that there is no
one best way of explaining hew policies evolve. Consequently, a com¬
bination of approaches is expounded to assist in identifying the
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balance of forces which prevail in the different phases and different
types of policies which are under consideration. It is suggested
that a systems approach can provide a starting point from which to
explore further various perspectives on policy analysis.
A section follows on group theory and demand regulation. Here
it is noted how the 'package' of interests associated with a particu¬
lar policy option can affect whether that option is adopted or rejec¬
ted. This leads on to agenda management and 'non-decision making'
which looks at how the political agenda is set and asks not only why
seme issues emerge, but also why others do not. The scope of the
enquiry is thus widened to allow the more covert aspects of politics
to be examined and this opens up the question of values in policy
formulation. The chapter is brought to a close with an overview of
how some of these approaches to policy analysis relate to the Scottish
context.
The aim of Chapter 3 is to explore some of the philosophical and
practical considerations in legislating on moral questions. It exam¬
ines what types of activity and behaviour are appropriate for legal
restriction. The main problem lies in making a sufficiently clear
distinction between self-regarding and other regarding action and here
a section is devoted to the philosophical debate between Lord Devlin
and Professor^H. L. A. Hart.
The chapter goes on to review some existing case studies on issues
of morality and the law. These are considered in terms of the philo¬
sophical debate and are also related to the preceding chapters on
approaches to policy analysis and Scottish culture. The cases of
abortion, pornography, capital punishment and smoking are discussed
in some detail. Comparisons between these and our cases on Scottish
'issues of conscience' are made intermittently.
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Hie remainder of Chapter 3 examines some different conceptions
of Parliament's role in policy making. IWo main points of view
emerge, one advanced by Douglas Ashford and the other by Philip Norton.
The 'Ashford thesis' is the predominant one emphasising the primacy of
the Executive and its bureaucracy. It argues that the increased com¬
plexity of the structure of government has led to the decline in the
importance of direct democratic control through Parliament. The
'Norton thesis', on the other hand, questions the relevance of this
viewpoint to the analysis of policy formulation in the 1970s and 1980s.
Instead Norton points to a pattern of parliamentary behaviour in the
1970s which suggests that MPs have been more willing to dissent than
has previously been the case. Parliament, it is argued, does have a
role in policy-making, but it is up to MPs to put into effect the
powers of scrutiny and influence already available. The thesis con¬
siders later what the case studies might reveal about these two dif¬
fering analyses.
The methodology which was utilised in researching the thesis is
explained in Chapter 4. Seme of the arguments for and against a case
study approach are aired in the opening section and the view adopted
that the method is as effective as other approaches in suggesting gen¬
eral propositions about hew policy develops provided certain basic
safeguards are adhered to. An explanation of hew the cases came to
be selected is then given. A short section on sources of information
follows before the final section describes in detail how the interviews
were selected and undertaken.
Chapter 5 of the thesis deals with the first case study on the
1976 Scottish licensing reform. This chapter concentrates on the role
of the Departmental Cctrmittee on Scottish Licensing Law (the Clayson
Committee) in policy development.
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Historical differences in the evolution of the licensing systems
north and south of the border are mapped out before Scottish social
attitudes towards drink are discussed. Ambivalent perceptions of
drink prevail within Scottish popular tradition. On the one hand it
is seen as a "sign of sociability, but on the other it is viewed as a
dangerous and addictive drug. One of the problems created by this
ambivalent culture is the higher proportion of alcohol related problems
in Scotland than in England and Wales. This was the problem to which
the Clayson Committee had to address itself.
The chapter proceeds with a detailed breakdown of all aspects of
the Carmittee's operation - its appointment, its approach to the prob¬
lem, its assessment of the evidence presented, its mode of decision
making and the effectiveness of its participatory processes. The
ideas which are outlined in Chapter 2 on approaches to policy analysis
are drawn upon when these issues are discussed, the aim being to iden¬
tify the balance of forces which prevail in the different phases of
policy formulation. Of particular relevance are the concepts of group
theory and demand regulation.
The licensing study is continued in Chapter 6 where the transition
frcm the Report's policy recommendations to a concrete legislative
enactment is outlined. Here initial reactions to the recommendations
are considered and the Report's impact assessed. The bulk of the
chapter though, is taken up with an account of the Licensing Bill in
Parliament. Attention is focused on how some of the more important
decisions were arrived at and on the way in which pressure group acti¬
vity and the values of MPs influenced those decisions.
The case study on divorce reform appears in Chapters 7 and 8
where comparative developments on either side of the border over the
last few decades are investigated. The aim of the investigation is
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to ascertain hew and why the emergence of divorce policy differred
in Scotland and in England. This case study too, draws upon a num¬
ber of the concepts outlined in the earlier chapters.
Chapter 7 concerns itself with changing attitudes to divorce in
the 1950s and 1960s. The Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage
and Divorce (the Morton Commission) is reviewed and its inconclusive
recommendations criticised. The more decisive 'Putting Asunder1 by
the Archbishop's Group and 'The Field of Choice' by the Law Commission
are then contented upon. These last two papers formed the basis upon
which English law was subsequently revised. The 'polities' of English
divorce reform in the late 60s is discussed and the importance of
parliamentary time highlighted.
Scottish developments are examined and compared with the English
experience. It appears that for the most part Scotland followed in
the wake of the English debate. However, in the late 60s the Church
of Scotland shifted its ground dramatically and came out with the
radical proposal that separation for a continuous period of two years
should act as the sole ground for marriage breakdown. The Church
appealed to the Scottish Office for legislative action but no response
was forthcoming. Thus, the Scottish divorce issue moved into the 70s.
Chapter 8 examines the events in Scotland which led to the 1976
Divorce (Scotland) Act. It begins by outlining the different reform
attempts of the first half of the decade and notes the lack of avail¬
able parliamentary time despite consistent appeals from MPs and others.
Public opinion on the issue is then assessed in terms of pressure group
interest, MPs' appraisal and the media before the 'politics' of the 1976
reform is discussed. Some of the obstacles which presented themselves
in the path of Scottish reform are analysed and some reasons for the
apparent swing in opinion are offered.
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Like the other two studies the case of homosexual law reform is
concerned with comparative developments north and south of the border.
Once more in Chapter 9 the aim of the enquiry is to establish how and
why policy developments in Scotland and in England varied as they did.
And again this study will refer to several of the conceptual ideas
expounded at the beginning of the thesis.
After referring to the 19th century origins of the law the chapter
outlines sane of the shifts in thinking on homosexual conduct during
the 1950s and 1960s. Pressure from, amongst others, the Howard League
for Penal Reform helped to have the Coirmittee on Homosexual Offences
and Prostitution appointed. Its Report (the Wolfenden Report) , pub¬
lished in the mid-1950s, set the tone for liberal thinking on the
homosexuality issue. It recommended the decriminalisation of homo¬
sexual relations between consenting adults in private and it was this
recommendation which was to spark off the philosophical debate between
Devlin and Hart. Politically though, it was a sensitive issue which
not many MPs were prepared to take up. It also took time for public
opinion to coalesce so it was not until 1967 that a reform was achieved.
Ihe campaigning zeal of Leo Abse features prominently here.
Developments in Scotland are then compared. These include the
change in the attitude of the Church of Scotland in the late 60s frcm
its earlier pronouncements in the 50s, the Lord Advocate's policy of
'no prosecutions' against homosexual adults consenting in private, the
rise of the Scottish Minorities Group and its campaign for legislative
reform in the early 70s, the unusual anomalies raised by the 1976
Sexual Offences Consolidation Bill and the unsuccessful reform attempts
in Parliament in the late 70s. The chapter goes on to examine the
'politics' of the 1980 Scottish reform initiated by Robin Cook and
raises the question whether this is the way to reform important Scottish
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legislation. It is suggested that in Scotland throughout the 1970s
the homosexuality issue constituted an example of a 'non-decision'.
The thesis is drawn to a close with the conclusion in Chapter
10. This brings the thesis full circle by relating in detail the
conclusions of the case studies to the theoretical points raised in
the opening three chapters. There are three sections to the conclu¬
sion one corresponding to each of the first three chapters. Sequen¬
tially, each chapter is discussed in reverse order so that the thesis
may end with a statement on the 'Scottish dirrension'. Thus, the
implications of the case studies for law, morality and policy-making
in Parliament are discussed immediately after the chapter's brief
introduction. The next section considers how the findings of the
studies relate to the approaches to policy analysis outlined in
Chapter 2, and the final section examines what the cases reveal
about Scottish politics and culture generally. The thesis ends with
the observation that there is a great deal of truth in Nairn's
description of Scotland as an 'unclassifiable marginal aberration'.
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CHAPTER 1
The Scottish Political System
1 the case of Scotland cannot be fitted neatly into
any of the existing categories of political science.'1
1
an unclassifiable marginal aberration: an ex-nation
turned province, neither one thing nor another.'2
The position of Scotland as a political entity within the British
political system was increasingly brought into question throughout the
1970s as a result of the debate engendered by the steady rise of
nationalist sentiment and consciousness during the course of the
decade. The traditional conception of Britain as a unitary, multi-
nation state, characterised by political homogeneity and the sover¬
eignty of parliament came to be challenged by accounts which sought
to explain the modern tendency towards political disintegration in
terms of the particular historical development of the British state.
Accounts of Scotland's peculiar political status placed emphasis on
its historical constitutional position and on its distinctive politi¬
cal and social institutions. Thus, it was on this basis that Kellas
employed his notion of the 'Scottish political system' .
The central thesis of Kellas is that Scotland enjoys a strong
sense of national identity or 'nationhood' which derives partly frcm
the long history of Scotland's existence as an independent nation-
state before the union with England and partly frcm the fact that
many Scottish institutions have remained intact and distinctive since
the unicn. A distinction should be noted here between national self-
oonsciousness and nationalism in a political sense. While virtually
all Scotsmen are conscious of being Scottish not all of them are in¬
clined towards Nationalism as a political cause.
Although the Scottish Parliament was abolished with the Treaty
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of Union in 1707, Scotland did retain a number of its key institutions.
The Scottish legal system was preserved. This was important because
it preserved differences in law between the two countries and main¬
tained Edinburgh as the centre of Scottish legal practice. The
Presbyterian Church of Scotland remained the established church and
the English made no attempt, as they did in Ireland and Wales, to
impose the Church of England. The Scottish education system was also
retained with its separate principles and syllabuses, as was the
Scottish local government system.
The Scottish Office is another autonomous institution, but this
was not created until the late 19th century. Following the Union in
1707, both the offices of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the
Lord Advocate were to be found in existence, the former minister being
entrusted with the government of Scotland, while the latter was the
chief government law officer in Scotland. Hcwever, in 1746 the
Scottish Secretaryship was abolished and the Lord Advocate assumed the
responsibility for government business in Scotland.
During the 19th century the functions of government increased
especially at the local level: specialised local bodies became respon¬
sible for poor law relief, public health and education and the main
burghs became active in various forms of environmental improvement
such as water supply, drainage and tcwn planning. Some control was
needed and there thus arose a number of supervisory boards like the
Board of Supervision for Poor Relief (1845) and the Scottish Education
Board (1872) . The task of these Scottish administrative bodies was to
supervise the various local government functions.
In addition to the growth of government responsibility, the
latter half of the 19th century saw the steady rise of nationalist
sentiment in Scotland. These two factors eventually led to the
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creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 which was to be responsible
for a number of functions that were previously the responsibility of
the Hone Office. The Scottish Secretary was to be responsible to
Parliament for Scottish affairs, although the office did not carry
Cabinet status until 1892. Further, it was not until 1926 that the
Secretary for Scotland was elevated to the rank of a Principal
Secretary of State.
During the course of the 20th century the Scottish Office grew
steadily in size and in its range of functions until today in modern
Scotland it is the equivalent of several Whitehall departments. Since
the opening of St. Andrew's House in Edinburgh in 1939 there has been
a continual but piecemeal transfer of functions to and frcm the Office
involving a number of departmental reorganisations. The Scottish
Office currently has five departments consisting of Agriculture and
Fisheries, Development, Heme and Health, Education and Economic
Planning.
As well as the Secretary of State for Scotland, the ministerial
team at the Scottish Office usually consists of a Minister of State,
and three Under-Secretaries of State, although in the past other for¬
mations have been adopted. The three junior ministers are given
'subject briefs' while the Minister of State is generally responsible
for conducting Scottish business in the House of Lords. The Secretary
of State thus sits at the top of a complex administrative network res¬
ponsible for the running of Scottish affairs. In this he has a con¬
siderable amount of autonomy, but he is also a member of the Cabinet
and is therefore subject to collective responsibility. Consequently
his role is double edged in that he can speak for Scotland in London
but he can also speak for London in Scotland.
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Another innovation of the late 19th century was the setting up
of the Scottish Grand Ccnmittee in 1894. As parliamentary ti e became
increasingly valuable and the process of passing laws for Scotland
increasingly troublesome, the Committee, of which all Scottish MPs
were members, was seen as a means of relieving seme of the pressures
on the House. The Ccmmittee offered the time and means for Scottish
Members to debate issues and legislation which pertained solely to
Scotland. Apart from the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland
and in spite of its limited functions, G. E. Edwards has suggested
that the Scottish Grand Committee 'is the only institution which even
vaguely resembles a Scottish Parliament'.3
These institutions, then, have helped to preserve some of the dis¬
tinctions between Scottish and English society and to maintain a clear
sense of national self-consciousness in Scotland. According to Kellas
they became 'the transmitters of Scottish national identity from one
generation to the next' .4 Likewise, Drucker and Brcwn note that
'Scotland possessed officially recognised institutions through which
its nationalism could be expressed'. This gave Edinburgh 'the status
of a capital and administrative centre and allowed for the development
of a Scottish culture'.5
That Scotland has its own institutions is a widely accepted pro¬
position. A question arises, however, about how these institutions
may be understood to relate to the British political system. For
Kellas the answer lies in designating Scotland a 'political system' .
While he concedes that Scotland could be called a 'sub-system' of the
British system, he argues that such a description would be ambiguous
since any territorial local authority could be called a sub-system of
the central authority. As Scotland cannot be conceptualised as a local
authority, it would have to be considered some kind of 'super-sub-
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system'. His contention, however, is that the 'concept of system is
more appropriate, since it does justice to the scale and nature of
the phenomena which are found in Scottish politics'.6 This contention
will be examined more fully presently. But before doing so let us
lock at seme broader aspects of Scottish political culture in a his¬
torical context.
Perhaps one of the most sophisticated accounts of the develcpnent
of Scottish political culture comes frcm Tern Nairn. The ingenuity of
Nairn's analysis lies in his adoption of a Gramscian framework which
attempts to cperationalise the concept of 'civil society' in a
Scottish historical setting. His argument is that to understand any
society one must distinguish between its 'State' or political and
administrative structure, and its 'civil society', such as its most
characteristic non-political organisations, its religious and other
beliefs, its customs and way of life. Ray Burnett has expressed this
idea in the following way:
'To begin with, while we have a homogeneous British State
it must be noted that the organizations and institutions
in civil society which comprise its bulwarks and defences
have an azoic complexity the most significant feature of
which for us is that civil society in Scotland is funda¬
mentally different frcm that in England. What is more,
much of our shared 'British' ideology as it manifests
itself in Scotland, draws its vigour and strength frcm
a specifically Scottish heritage of myths, prejudices
and illusions.'7
Nairn contends that the pattern of Scotland's historical develop¬
ment has been unique. Its peculiarity stems from three inter-related
phenomena - frcm the lateness of Scotland's absorption into a larger
state, that is at the beginning of the 18th century, rather than in
the later Middle Ages; from the manner of the fusion itself, that is
a Treaty of Union between two ruling classes; and frcm the subsequent
results of the agreed bargain, that is 'a nationality which resigned
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statehood but preserved an extraordinary amount of the institutional
and psychological baggage normally associated with independence - a
decapitated national state, as it were, rather than an ordinary
"assimilated" nation.'8
Scotland's eccentricity lay in the fact that, apart from the
State itself, 'civil society' was guaranteed its independent existence
by the Union. So all the institutions aforementioned - the church,
law, education, royal burghs - and the dominant social classes linked
to them were safeguarded, as was the dominant social culture they rep¬
resented. Thus, in contrast to the usual models of nationalist devel¬
opment (of one political State and its society, or one distinguishable
ethnic society and its own State) the Scottish pattern was of a dis¬
tinct civil society not married to 'its' State.
With the passage of time Scotland's peculiarity was to became
firmly entrenched. Between the later 18th century and the middle of
the 19th, England was moving towards a socio-economic transformation
which would carry it to industrial and political supremacy. Through
the unusual circumstances of the Union and the development of Lowland
Scotland in the late 18th century, the Scots were able to establish a
singular subordinate position inside this expanding system of English
capitalism. Statehood had been sacrificed for participation in the
English and colonial markets of the day. Within this larger economic
area that Scotland had entered, an autonomous sub-system had been cre¬
ated, one borne along by English imperial expansion.
Nairn has carmented:
'Scottish civil society had advanced too far, too quickly.
The new bourgeois social classes inherited a socio¬
economic position in history vastly more favourable than
that of any other fringe or backward nationality. Hiey
were neither being ground down into industrial modernity,
nor excluded frcm it. Hence they did not perceive it as
alien, as a foreign threat or a withheld premise.
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Consequently, they were not forced to turn to
nationalism, to redress the situation. They
reacted to the inexorable and revolutionary
changes of the crucial period even more fiercely
than their English partners - with a conservatism
amplified, perhaps, by the uneasy sensation of
hew much more there was to repress and divert in
Scotland.'9
Under these conditions Scotland was 'stranded' . It was too much
of a nation and had too different a civil society to become a mere
province. Yet it could not develop its own nation-state on this basis
either, via nationalism. Cultural repercussions arising from such an
anomalous situation were inevitable. An anomalous historical situa¬
tion could not engender a 'normal' national cultural evolution.
Instead it produced a stunted caricature of it in the form of a
'cultural sub-nationalism'.
This 'cultural sub-nationalism' manifests itself in many ways in
modern Scotland, not least in the array of Kitsch symbols, slogans and
sentiments which have ccme to represent Scottish popular tradition.
As Nairn puts it:
'the popular consciousness of separate identity,
uncultivated by "national" experience or culture
in the usual sense, has became curiously fixed
or fossilised on the level of the image d'Epinal
and Auld Lang Syne, of the Scott Monument, Andy
Stewart and the "Sunday Post" - to the point of
forming a huge, virtually self-contained
universe of Kitsch'.10
The Kailyard school of literature is often cited as typifying
Scotland's cultural sub-nationalism. It has been perceptively defined
by Nairn as 'consisting wholly of small towns full of small town
"characters" given to bucolic intrigue and wise sayings.'11 This
tradition still manifests itself in modern day television programmes
like 'Dr. Finlay's Casebook' and in the publications of D. C. Thomson
of Dundee. Yet it is not only literary influences that have contribu¬
ted to Scotland's cultural sub-nationalism. The Church, the military
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and sport have all had a reinforcing effect. The Church has been one
institution if not the primary institution which has expressed the
Scottishness of Scottish society. It has consistently been determined
that Scottish life styles should be maintained and has pronounced at
regular intervals through the General Assembly deliverances concerning
the keeping of the Sabbath and the virtues of Calvinist theology. The
General Assembly has served as a forum for the expression of Scottish
opinion on social and political matters and indeed, on occasions it
has even been considered as a surrogate Scottish 'parliament'. Thus,
its weight within the complex of cultural sub-nationalism has been
considerable.
Popular militarism is also part of that culture. One of the
traditional images of the British army has been the Highland regiment
with its kilts and bagpipes, and its reputation, based partly in myth
and partly in fact, for outstanding courage. Quite apart frcm their
exploits in the field these military units played a large part in
Scottish life by contributing to the maintenance of national sentiment.
Highlanders, having at one time been viewed as barbarous nuisances,
became regarded in some ways as the very embodiment of the spirit of
Scotland. In Nairn's view this militarism represented the spontaneous
contribution of Scottish society to the State, and one which deeply
affected the masses.
No discussion of Scottish culture would be complete without ref¬
erence to sport, and to football in particular. Scotland's passion
for football is obsessional. The waving of Lion Rampant banners, the
singing of '0 Flower of Scotland' and the bellowing of national war-
cries accompany the Scottish side in their international encounters,
especially against the Auld Enemy England. "Why such super-patriotism
in the realm of sport ?", the standard enquiry runs.12 Again the
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answer is to be found in Scotland's historical and cultural evolution.
As Brand has noted:
'The ... point which makes football interesting is
the way in which it exemplifies the attitudes of
many Scottish people to England. The match between
Scotland and England is very much a David and Goliath
affair in that England has ten times the population
resources from which to draw her team and this
situation is recognised by the Scottish supporters.
Secondly, there is a feeling that Scotland is in
other ways inferior to England and must demonstrate
her superiority.'13
Hie English themselves tend to provoke this response through,
amongst other things, their use of the Union Jack as a symbol of
English nationality. Geoffrey Barrcw has pointed to the fact that
'the 1800 Union flag, carefully designed to symbolise the constitu¬
tional merging of the three realms of England, Ireland and Scotland,
has been adopted in recent times as the peculiar national flag of
England, thus converting an emblem of supposedly voluntary unity into
an arrogant symbol of suppression and extinction.'111
Janes Campbell, canmenting upon the way the game permeates
Scottish life, has argued that in Scotland football is a substitute
for politics:
'Scottish football teams, national and local, serve as
emblems of national identity in ways that are not true
of countries with a more secure sense of who they are
and why they exist. Deprived of a political "team"
which could compete in the international arena, we
depend upon performances in other areas: art or science
or sport. Never noted for serious attention to artistic
endeavour, and with the great days of Scottish medicine
and science behind us, it is no surprise that our
national self-esteem is most often at stake on a
football field.'15
Thus, in order to understand this issue of Scottish identity one
must take into consideration certain aspects of Scottish history since
the Union. Hie peculiar position of Scottish civil society, too dev¬
eloped and too distinct to be assimilated, yet no longer requiring to
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form a State of its cwn, led to an interrelated series of developmen¬
tal oddities. As Smout has noted:
"The history of the Union enshrines the continuing central
paradox of the Scottish identity. It bears witness to
the survival of an elemental nationalist consciousness
that Scotland is not England; and on the other hand it
carries the apparently opposing consciousness that
Scotland and England are linked within a national
British entity.115
Scottish development has been a case of assimilation in politics
but separation in social mores. For Kellas, as noted earlier, this
Scottish national identity lay in, and could be observed in, Scotland's
distinctive institutional structure. However, it has been suggested
here that this 'identity' has not been entirely institutional in
nature, involving as it does, wider questions of society and culture.
As Nairn argues:
'The "identity" which it is vital for us to understand
goes beyond these institutions, even in their mutual
interaction; it concerns "civil society" as a whole,
and the diverse ways in which this separate character
was articulated through both intellectual culture and
popular or mass culture. This made us what we are.
It is not a matter of the semi-autonomy of certain
institutions, nor of a straightforward contest between
a Scottish "social ethic" and assimilationist influences
pressuring it frcm without. It is a question, rather,
of the profound, lacerating contradictions forced upon
Scottish society by its anomalous mode of development.'17
Thus, Scottish society, by virtue of 'its anomalous mode of
development' can be said to possess a distinctive political culture.
Can it also be said to manifest a distinctive political system? Let
us at this point return to examine Kellas' notion of the 'Scottish
political system'. The use of the concept of system in social science
has been the subject of intense debate18, the scope and detail of
which is considerable. Consequently, only those aspects of the debate
which are of immediate and direct relevance to our discussion will be
referred to here.
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Peter Nettl has identified the essential features of the general
concept of system as follows:- a system is first of all a whole, not
merely an aggregate; secondly it consists of objects or elements in
interaction, not merely in randcm contact; and thirdly the system is
open, that is the behaviour of the system depends on external as well
as internal factors arising frcm a relationship with the environment.
Problems can arise though frcm the variety of uses to which the con¬
cept is put. A distinction is therefore usually drawn between the
use of the concept of system for bounded whole societies, that is
all-enbracing social systems, and the concept of system as a functional
crystallization of processes and structures within a society, that is
social sub-systems. Generally it is more common for sociologists to
use the concept in the former sense, while political scientists make
greater use of it in the latter sense. For the sake of clarity here
this differentiation of type will be maintained by referring to the
suprasystem as 'society' , while confining the term 'system' to its
political science usage to indicate that a political system is a sub¬
system of society.
The issue which is at the heart of the matter in the Scottish
context, and which preoccupies systems analysts generally, is the
question of system survival. Given Scotland's historical development
has a Scottish political system survived?
It is important here to consider the distinction made by Easton
between system-maintenance (maintenance of a -parti.aula? kind of poli¬
tical system) and system-persistence (persistence of some kind of
political system) . Easton says that 'to persist it may be necessary
for a system to have the capacity to transform its cwn internal struc¬
ture and processes'19. But how far can a political system change its
cwn structure before it becomes a totally different political system?
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When can we say that a system has, in fact, failed to persist?
Eastern responds, 'to say that a system has failed may mean one of
two things: that it has changed but continues to exist in some form;
or that it has disappeared entirely. As the first meaning indicates,
a system can be said to persist even if it changes' .20 Non-persistence
then, points to a condition which involves the ccmplete breakdown of
the political system. Thus, 'historical political systems have dis¬
appeared ... when they have been absorbed into alien systems' .21
According to Easton, Scotland is of this type.
However, Michael Evans has pointed out that the examples provided
by Easton to illustrate the disappearance of political systems, among
them Scotland, do not demonstrate the failure of political systems to
persist, but are examples of the failure to maintain a particular kind
of political system.22 Thus it can be argued that while the particu¬
lar pre-1707 Scottish political system failed to be maintained by the
Treaty of Union, a political system of some kind did persist post-1707,
given that the bulk of Scottish society remained intact as a result of
the process of assimilation discussed earlier. This, of course, begs
the question, what kind of political system?
Nettl has remarked that a political system 'is capable of identi¬
fication frcm actions, roles and institutions appertaining to goal
attainment',23 This is fine in as far as it goes, but what must also
be remembered in the Scottish context is the dualism subsumed in goal
attainment, that is in sane instances goals will be predominantly
Scottish, 'while in others they will be predominantly British. As
Kellas has pointed out the Scottish 'political system' acts as a means
of communication with the larger British system, as well as being a
ccmnunications and decision-making network within Scotland itself in
those areas of politics where British interests are not so involved.
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The concept of a 'political system' as applied to Scotland must, there¬
fore, take account of these two 'activity areas' - the Scottish and
the British.
The boundaries of the system are different in each case. The
Scottish system can act as a ccmmunications input to the larger
British system in areas which are essentially 'British', such as tax¬
ation and econcmic policy, making known the demands and needs of the
Scottish people (even although there may be a variety of interests
and opinions within the system) . Cn the other hand, within the sphere
of Scotland itself the Scottish political system covers all the acti¬
vities necessary for the functioning of the Scottish legal system and
Scottish Office administration. These activities act solely on the
population of Scotland. Thus the judicial process is contained en¬
tirely within the system and so in effect is the function of law re¬
form (though it is formally dependent on the British system in that
it must pass through Parliament) . As Kellas states:
'What has to be discovered is the range of activity
which is effectively Scottish, despite the formal
necessity for legislation or executive decision at
the British level For example, the activities
of the Scottish Office, the decision-making in
Scottish law reform, Scottish education, housing,
and local government are predominantly within the
Scottish system'.2t+
Thus the Scottish system can be seen as being both dependent and
independent within the British system. Michael Keating has emphasised
this point:
'The Scottish political system is both dependent and
independent within the British system and can at one
time be regarded as a sub-system of the Scottish
social system and, therefore, a political system in
its own right (as when legislation concerning Scots
law or local government is being enacted) and at
another time as a sub-system of the British political
system (as when UK legislation is being modified to
suit Scottish conditions, or demands are being made
upon the UK system) . No clear model then exists to
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which the Scottish political system conforms and
the system is indeed unique in trying to provide
for the maximum degree of autonomy within a uni¬
tary state and Parliament',25
Cne problem, however, is that of defining the boundary since it
is not always clear whether it is the British system which is deter¬
mining Scottish (i.e. applying only to Scotland) values, or the
Scottish. Nor is it clear how important Scottish (as opposed to
British) values are in Scotland. Thus, on the one hand, Kellas main¬
tains that the relationship between the Scottish legal and political
systems is perhaps the strongest single reason for the autonomy of the
latter. Separate laws engender separate politics and administration.
Yet, on the other, he notes:
'Even in areas of administration less dependent on
purely financial considerations such as law,
education and the structure of local government,
the need to conform with a pattern established by
the corresponding ministries in England is strongly
felt. Scotland cannot diverge too far from the
norms of the rest of the country if the general
desire for equality before the law, social justice
and the mobility of labour is to be satisfied' ,26
This problem of defining boundaries is one of the major issues
to which our case studies are addressed. Kellas, once again, neatly
summarizes the dilemma:
'At cne extreme there is the self-contained world of
the Scottish lawyer, with his ability to control the
technical aspects of Scottish law reform. At the
other, there is the political discourse between MPs
and the public on divorce, abortion and other "moral"
issues. While each process belongs inside the
Scottish political system, in the sense of being
primarily a matter of ccrrmunication among those in
Scotland with only incidental reference to England,
the boundaries break down to some extent through
the awareness of English practices, the increasing
assimilation of Scottish society to that of England,
and the desire in Great Britain to establish "equal
rights" for all citizens'.27
Richard Parry is one of the few to have addressed this problem.28
He has explored the idea of 'Scotland as a laboratory for public
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administration' - that Scotland's special circumstances and place
within the United Kingdcm have enabled it to play an experimental and
innovative role in the development of British policy and administra¬
tion. He suggests that there has been -
'confusion about just how much autonomy is enjoyed
by Scottish administration and about whether dif¬
ferences in practice are meaningful, have altered
over tine, extend over the range of public policy,
and offer any lessons for England. The picture
is one of considerably varying scope for discretion,
related to a notion of acceptable and unacceptable
areas which is not consistent or accurate, and of
an cbservable set of Scottish practices whose
distinctiveness and policy impact may be meaning¬
ful or trivial',29
Thus he is prompted to ask why Scottish administrative creativity
is 'safe' in some areas but intolerable in others. To illuminate this
three examples of Scottish administrative creativity are discussed in
detail - the organisation of the Scottish Office over the years; the
institutional reshaping of local government, social work and the
health services; and the introduction of policy planning and regional
reports to local government. Of these he identifies only the reorgan¬
isation of social work practice in the late sixties as being radically
different from English policy. Thus, he is pushed towards the conclu¬
sion that the concept of Scotland as a laboratory for new policy prac¬
tices is a limited one. He observes:
'At various times Scotland has acquired the scope
for autonomous political action, but its divergence
from United Kingdcm norms is one of administrative
distinctiveness rather than political substance'.30
The case studies which follow cn Scottish 'issues of conscience'
- licensing, divorce and homosexuality - have been selected to illus¬
trate these particular dilemmas. Being issues which require separate
legislation pertaining only to Scotland they highlight the way in
which the Scottish political system can operate in an independent
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capacity. Yet they also serve to demonstrate that even when operating
in this 'independent' capacity the Scottish political system is often
dependent upon the larger British political system at critical moments
in the policy process. Thus, in order to understand the development
of policy in the areas in question it will be necessary to disaggre¬
gate and explore the Scottish political system, identify actors and
organizations, and study their interactions.
Parliament itself highlights the interaction of the Scottish and
British political systems. Scottish MPs form a distinct group in the
House of Camions since interest in Scottish affairs is virtually non¬
existent amongst other MPs. Consequently a legislative procedure for
Scottish Bills has emerged (see Table 1.1) involving the Scottish Grand
Cormaittee (for general and second reading debates) and the First and
Second Scottish Standing Committees (for detailed scrutiny of legisla¬
tion) . In addition a Select Comiittee on Scottish Affairs which has
investigatory powers to scrutinise any aspect of Scottish business
through public examination of witnesses and documents, was reactivated
in 1979 as part of the Conservative's overhaul of Parliament's Select
Committee system. The Select Comnittee on Scottish Affairs had been
established by Harold Wilson in the late sixties but had fallen into
disuse.
While Scottish affairs interest mainly Scottish MPs, the boundary
of the Scottish 'political system' in Parliament is not as clear cut
as might first appear. The parliamentary system involves non-Scottish
MPs in purely Scottish affairs whether they like it or not, since
Scottish Bills are sometimes taken on the floor of the House, the
Scottish Grand Ccnmittee until 1979 sometimes had unwilling English
MPs co-opted on to it to preserve party balance, and Scottish question
time is in the House as a whole. So there exists a rather untidy
17
TABLE 1.1
House of Commons Procedure for Scottish Bills
Bill certified by Speaker as
relating exclusively to Scotland
Government motion to send Bill
to Scottish Grand Ccmmittee Bill taken on Floor of House
for second reading debate for second reading debate
(can be vetoed by 1CH- MPs)
Formal second reading in House
Government motion to ccmmit Bill
to a Scottish Standing Committee
(can be vetoed by 6+ MPs)
Government motion to send
Bill for Report stage to
Scottish Grand Committee*
(can be vetoed by 2CH- MPs)
Bill ccrrmitted to a Committee
of the whole House
Report stage in the House
Third reading in the House
*This procedure is available only for Bills considered previously in
the Scottish Grand Committee.
Source: Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 1975, p. 83.
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overlap between the Scottish and British systems at Westminster which
both Scottish and ncn-Soottish MPs at times find irritating.
Interaction between the two systems is also to be found in the
realm of pressure group politics. Since Scottish policy can be for¬
mulated at two centres of power, Edinburgh and London, pressure groups
have two points of 'access' through which to make their representations.
In matters which are primarily the concern of the British political
system, pressure will tend to be exerted directly on the relevant
Whitehall department. In matters -which fall wholly or largely within
the sphere of the Scottish political system, pressure is more likely
to focus on the Scottish Office. Thus in areas like education, the
law and medicine, Scottish organisations can communicate directly with
the Scottish Office. This has prompted Kellas to comment that
'outside the industrial arena, Scotland is remarkably self-contained
in its range of organised groups, and by inference its own decision¬
making network'.31
Hie Scottish Office, then, is of particular significance in the
Scottish political system. It will be seen in the next chapter that
bureaucracy can control the entry of demands into the political system
in such a way as to affect both the formulation and implementation of
policy. The control may not be overt but can be circumstantial and
situational in that adroinistrative 'style' can influence policy out¬
put. This is especially true of the Scottish Office as Kellas observes:
'A great number of Scottish political decisions
are taken under the shadow of, or actually in¬
side, the Scottish Office in Edinburgh. The
ministers and civil servants of St. Andrew's
House run Scotland in as centralised and
efficient a manner as Whitehall runs Britain.
Clearly, a focus for the Scottish ruling elite
is to be found in the corridors of St. Andrew's
House and a constant stream of councillors,
officials, pressure group deputations and
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individual citizens converge there to seek a
favourable decision for their cause. This is
a variant of the "corporate state", because
it operates without any democratically-
elected Scottish body. The interest groups
meet with the civil servants and ministers in
St. Andrew's House and they decide between
them what is to be done'.3*
Chris Allen has also drawn attention to the centralised and cor¬
porate nature of the Scottish system. He suggests that the Scottish
system is marked by six main features - centralisation, administrative
primacy, exclusiveness, secrecy, corporatism and authoritarianism.
While these features can be found in the British system in general,
Scotland, it is argued, is unique in the degree of their overall im¬
portance and in the pervasiveness of their influence. Here the impor¬
tance of administrative action in Scottish government is emphasised:
'The exclusiveness of the system lies in the res¬
triction of influence over decision-making to a
small body of fairly senior Civil Servants and
MPs, and a large but still modest group of per¬
sons regularly consulted or involved in the
various boards, committees and camiissions
established by the Scottish departments and
their appointed bodies. While the latter group
include a small proportion who ewe their selec¬
tion to having been elected to these or other
bodies, or who regard themselves as representing
a general interest, the bulk of the membership
consists of persons with a professional or sec¬
tional interest, accountable only to those who
appointed them'.3 3
Our case studies should enable us to see how far this claim can be
substantiated.
Clearly the Secretary of State for Scotland, who heads this ad¬
ministrative structure, will be in a powerful position to exercise
control over the types of issues which emerge onto the political agenda
for consideration and public discussion. As we shall see in the fol¬
lowing chapter, the values of those in pewer can be influential in the
setting of priorities and thus have a bearing on the emergence or ncn-
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emergence of issues. This is especially true in our case studies
on Scottish 'issues of conscience' where a 'tangled skein of values'
will have to be unravelled.
To understand the case studies it is important to appreciate the
socio-political context in which they were set. It was noted in the
opening paragraph of this chapter that the constitutional position of
Scotland within the British political system was hotly debated in the
1970s. This was the product of a rising national consciousness and
of a Scottish political climate in which the issue of devolution was
very much to the fore. Consequently, debate on matters arising in
our cases was often associated with the wider argument concerning
devolution. As Robin Cook pointed out, 'it was ... inevitable that
Parliament's handling of ... Scottish law reform should become part
of the rhetoric in the disputes over whether this function should be
devolved to a Scottish Assembly' ,3t+ The argument was made that desir¬
able social reforms in Scotland were lagging behind reforms in England
because of a congested legislative machine at Westminster. At this
juncture, then, let us turn and examine the wider political context of
the period.
Several features of British government can be identified as hav¬
ing helped to create the upsurge in nationalist sentiment in the lat¬
ter part of the sixties. According to Gunn and Lindley the origins
of the devolution moveitent of the seventies lay in such factors as
increasing centralisation; the grcwth of ad-hoc government agencies;
devaluation of the Scottish (and Welsh) way of life; British economic
stagnation; and the economic 'hope' offered by autonomous development.35
They suggest that the increasing centralisation of modem British
government with its functional division of responsibilities had resul¬
ted in an overloaded central administration, bureaucratic remoteness,
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concern with, national uniformity of provision, and failure to co¬
ordinate or relate central government programmes to one another or
to local conditions. In addition the tendency of post-war British
governments to 'hive-off' activities on a functional basis to a ple¬
thora of ad-hoc boards, commissions and agencies (a disproportionate
number of which were in Scotland) had given rise to problems of
accountability. In this respect, the centralised and corporate nature
of the Scottish Office made it particularly prone to criticisms con¬
cerning its accountability.
Centralisation had also led to feelings of ' anglicisation' amongst
the Soots and Welsh. As noted earlier the Scottish sense of identity
draws upon a history of separateness frcm England, and after the Union
of 1707, upon distinctive Scottish traditions and institutions in edu¬
cation, religion, law and much else (including even football) .
Nationalist sentiment among both the Scots and the Welsh tends to
feed upon real or imagined examples of English insensitivity to their
respective cultural heritages.
Perceptions of economic disadvantages such as lcwer earnings,
higher unemployment and declining traditional industries also played
their part in fuelling nationalist sentiments. Whether the economic
grievance corresponded to fact was not as important as the sense of
resentment and the belief that Scotland was materially worse off.
And, of course, on the other side of the coin lay the economic 'hope'
of autonomous development offered by the discovery of North Sea oil
in 'Scottish' waters.
The cumulative effect of these perceived grievances was to pro¬
duce a surge of nationalist feeling in the late sixties and early
seventies which resulted in unprecedented successes at local, general
and by-elections for the Scottish National Party and, to a lesser
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extent, Plaid Cymru in Wales.
The watershed in the electoral performance of the SNP is gen¬
erally regarded as being 1967. Prior to this Scottish electors had
voted, in much the same way as English electors, for one of the two
main governing parties, either Labour or Conservative, with any third
alternative being confined to the Liberals. That said though, in
both Scotland and Wales, Labour had traditionally been the dominant
foroe. Some indication of the SNP's limited electoral popularity can
be gauged frcm the 1959 General Election when, fielding 5 candidates,
they received a meagre 0.8% of the Scottish poll. Modest progress
was discernible when they fielded 15 candidates at the 1964 General
Election and managed to capture a 2.4% share of the Scottish poll.
This slew, but steady improvement was maintained and at the 1966
General Election, with 23 seats contested, they doubled their share
of the Scottish poll to 5%.
The SNP 'breakthrough' came in 1967. In March of that year, the
Nationalists came third at the Glasgcw Pollok by-election with 28.2%
of the poll and in November they won the Hamilton by-election with
46% of the vote. In 1968 these successes were reinforced by consid¬
erable SNP gains in the May municipal elections, but in 1969 there
was a slight fall back in the Nationalist position as the party
machine failed to cope with the increased demands on it.
The 1970 General Election gave the SNP moderate results. Although
doubling their 1966 vote to 11.4% of the Scottish poll, the party won
fewer votes per candidate, lost Hamilton and gained only a single vic¬
tory in the Western Isles. By-elections in the early seventies though,
saw continuing advances culminating in the winning of Glasgcw Govan in
November, 1973.
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The General Elections of February and October 1974 produced
major SNP successes. Although Govan was lost in February, the
Western Isles was held and a further six seats were gained. Hie SNP
share of the Scottish vote was again doubled, this time to 21.9%.
In October all 71 seats were contested, the SNP vote rose to 30.4%
of the Scottish poll, and the total of SNP seats rose from 7 to 11.
By 1974 the Scottish National Party had clearly 'arrived'.
The achievement of the SNP in Scotland was not simply an elect¬
oral feat. It was seen as a direct challenge to the continued exis¬
tence of the United Kingdom. Thus, the Nationalists' electoral suc¬
cesses initiated the progressive incorporation of the concept of de¬
volution into the platforms of both the Labour and Conservative
Parties. Drucker and Brcwn carment:
'The jcb for the British parties, when the
Nationalists had established themselves as
serious electoral competitors, was at once
to regain their own popularity and, thereby,
to reassert the dominance of the United
Kingdcm in the non-English nations. They
had to find seme way of convincing the
Scottish and Welsh people to vote for them
again. In the circumstances of the late
196Cs this was taken to mean they must learn
to portray themselves convincingly to the
people of Scotland and Wales as Scottish and
Welsh. It would not be an easy task' ,36
Accordingly, in May 1968, Mr. Heath asked a reluctant Scottish
Conservative Party Conference to consider the case for an elected
Scottish Assembly and in August he followed this up by establishing
a 'non-partisan' Scottish Constitutional Committee under; Sir Alec
Doug las-Home. The Labour Government's response was to appoint a
Royal Commission to be chaired by Lord Crowther (succeeded on his
death in 1972, by Lord Kilbrandon) . The Commission's main remit,
announced on 11th February, 1969, was 'to examine the present func¬
tions of the central legislature and government in relation to the
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several countries, nations and regions of the United Kingdom' .37
After sore four years the Kilbrandon Ccnrnission reported in
October 1973. It is generally accepted that the Catmission was used
by both Labour and Conservative Governments as an excuse to do nothing
in face of the continuing Nationalist success. The Report lacked im¬
pact because it did not contain a single, agreed set of recorrmenda-
tions. The Majority Report, which itself contained a bewildering
array of carpeting proposals, rejected separatism and federalism and
offered Scotland and Wales legislative devolution through directly
elected Asseirblies. The Memorandum of Dissent, however, favoured uni¬
form treatment for Scotland, Wales and five English regions in the
form of seven directly elected Assemblies which would have powers to
adjust UK policies to the special needs of their areas,
1974 saw two General Elections and the emergence of the SNP as
a major force in Scottish politics. The Labour Government which was
returned now had no option but to treat devolution seriously. Their
problem lay in constructing and obtaining agreement on any proposals.
A series of White Papers, outlining various alternatives and proposals
based on the main recommendations of the Majority Report, emanated
from the Government between 1974 and 1976 as it tried to thrash out
an acceptable fc 'rnula for devolution. Strong opposition within the
Labour Party and the traditional caution of the civil service were
proving to be difficult stumbling blocks for the Government in their
efforts to get devolution off the ground.38
Nevertheless, a devolution Bill - the Scotland and Wales Bill -
containing a version of the ideas proposed by Kilbrandcn, was presen¬
ted to the House of Commons in November 1976. However, the Government
was now facing another hurdle - Parliament itself. Drucker and Brcwn
have pointed out that the Government's ability to surmount this hurdle
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was limited by two major factors. Firstly, when the Bill approached
the House of Cannons the Government had only a small overall majority
(which it lost before the hurdle was cleared) . And secondly, many
English Labour MPs did not share the Government's camatment to devo¬
lution. They comment:
1 Throughout the debate en the Government's proposals
embodied first in a Scotland and Wales Bill, and
then, when that Bill was abandoned, in separate
Scotland and Wales Bills, there was a ghostly pre¬
sence: English nationalism. The Government was
attempting to reconcile the Scots and Welsh to
the British constitution. But it oould do this
only if English MPs - who are, after all, the over¬
whelming majority of the House of Commons - assented'. 39
Under mounting pressure frcm all sides, and caught in what Gunn
and Lindley describe as a 'blizzard of amendments' , the Scotland and
Wales Bill eventually had to be abandoned after the Government failed
to win a timetable motion in February 1977. The original Bill was
succeeded in the next Parliamentary Session by two separate and
slightly amended Bills - the Scotland Bill and the Wales Bill. The
passage of these was scarcely any easier, involving as it did delicate
political trade-offs between the Government and the liberals, but the
two Bills did reach the statute book, substantially intact, by the
summer of 1978.
Although the substance of the Bills remained largely unaffected,
the Government suffered a number of important defeats in Parliament.
The most significant of these was the '40% rule'. This required 40%
of the electorate in Scotland and Wales to vote 'Yes' in referenda
on their Acts.
The referenda were scheduled for 1st March 1979. The Welsh voted
overwhelmingly against their Act. Only 11.8% of Welsh voters voted
'Yes'; four times as many, 46.5% voted 'Mo'; and the rest, 41.7%,
stayed at heme. The result was overwhelming. In Scotland, ho/ever,
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the situation was more equivocal - 32.5% voted 'Yes', 30.4% voted 'No'
and 37.1% did not vote. The Soots had voted in favour of devolution,
but not in sufficient numbers. What happened next had more to do
with the Government's survival plan than it did with any concern to
salvage devolution. Stall and political bluff became the order of the
day as a decision was delayed on the Repeal Order vote and the offer
of all-party talks was made. The Callaghan administration, in the
midst of its 'winter of discontent', was desparately playing for time
in an attenpt to achieve a simmer election. Patience, though, wore
thin amongst opposition MPs, especially the SNP, and after a motion
of no confidence in late March, the Government fell, and along with
it, devolution.
It is against this background that our case studies are set.
From the late sixties cnwards British politics moved into a new era
as the growth of nationalism spread and the role of Parliament within
the centralised British state was criticised. One of the purposes of
this thesis is to examine whether in fact Parliament was, as its cri¬
tics alleged, unable to cope with the demands of Scottish legislation.
For instanoe, did Scotland suffer from unjustifiable 'delays' before
it obtained some of these social reforms? The thesis will consider
to what extent the Scottish 'political system' was acting 'indepen¬
dently' in dealing with the issues of conscience under consideration
and to what extent an element of dependence persisted when the
Scottish system came to make demands upon the British system for par¬
liamentary time. Further, the thesis will enquire into the state of
public opinion, among the citizenry in general and among specific in¬
terest groups, and examine hew MPs judged that opinion for themselves.
Cnly then might it be possible to ascertain the relative importance
of the factors under discussion.
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This chapter has demonstrated that Scotland does not fit neatly
into any of the standard categories of political science. It is
part of a unitary state yet it maintains a distinctiveness by virtue
of a nuirfoer of its social institutions. Through its historical devel¬
opment a Scottish political culture has evolved which manifests itself
in a number of different ways in the everyday lives of the Scottish
people. But to what extent Scotland has its cwn 'political system'
is a question which requires further consideration. There is new a
need to disaggregate the Scottish 'political system', to explore its
component parts, their relationship to each other and to the British
system. Our Scottish policy studies will provide an empirical means
for doing this. However, before that will be possible it is necessary
to examine some approaches to policy analysis through which both pol¬
icy and the system generating that policy can be considered. Thus,
the next chapter will examine some of the relevant approaches.
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CHAPTER 2
Approaches to Policy Analysis
I, Introduction
The analysis and conprehension of policies past and present is
currently seen by many as central to an understanding of political
life. In response to such questions as how policy is formed in poli¬
tical systems various models have been postulated. The purpose of
this chapter is to review the current state of policy analysis and to
highlight those theoretical ideas which are of particular relevance
to our policy studies on Scottish 'issues of conscience1. In the last
chapter a need to disaggregate the Scottish political system was sug¬
gested, Ihe approaches to be examined here will provide the means by
which to explore seme of these component parts.
In explaining policy development in the case studies, our approach
will be based on Banting's notion that the making of policy is both an
intellectual activity and an institutional process. Decisions that
influence policy are the products of individual minds in so far as
problems must be perceived and defined by individual policy-makers.
New policies can then be created on the basis of those perceptions.
Yet the making of public policy is also an institutional process where¬
by policy-makers possess authority to resolve public issues only by
virtue of their positions in political institutions. Policy often
does change in response to shifting intellectual currents, but insti¬
tutional realities can impinge upon the extent to which new ideas pen¬
etrate the political world and influence public policy. Thus, policy
innovations can also be the outcome of political conflict and of bar¬
gains struck between established political interests.
In the following section (Section II) the debate between the
'rationalist' and 'incrementalist' approaches to policy analysis will
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be reviewed. It will be suggested that much of this debate is in
fact sterile, because there is a confusion between real and ideal
states of affairs. As the two models address essentially different
social phencmena there is a need to distinguish between their explan¬
atory (descriptive) and normative (prescriptive) values. It is
because this distinction is rarely made that the debate can be viewed
as 'artificial'.1
The need to distinguish between policy analysis as a means of
assessing the cost and consequences of given alternatives and policy
analysis as a scholarly pursuit for increasing the understanding of
political reality has been highlighted by Richard Simeon.2 The em¬
phasis in this chapter will be upon the latter type of analysis.
The following sections will outline a number of approaches through
which it will be possible to explain why in the case studies certain
policy alternatives were chosen and others were not.
Thus Section III outlines a systems approach which provides a
starting point frcm which to explore a number of different perspec¬
tives on policy analysis. Working from the preposition that there
is no one best way of explaining how policies evolve, it attempts to
develop a combination of approaches which will assist in identifying
the balance of forces which prevail in the different phases and dif¬
ferent types of policy which are to be examined.
Section IV goes on to examine group theory and demand regulation.
Here it is noted how the 'package' of interests associated with a par¬
ticular policy cpticn can affect whether that cpticn is adopted or
rejected. Also since groups do not have uniform status consultation
is not always equitable. Various 'rules of the game' emerge to govern
the relationship between organisations and the bureaucracy and to reg¬
ulate demands. In this way the bureaucracy itself, being in a pivotal
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position in the channel of conmunication, can influence inputs into
the policy process.
This leads on in Section V to agenda management and non-decision
making. The section looks at how the political agenda is set and asks
not only why seme issues emerge, but also why others do not emerge.
Here the concept of 'non-decision making' is introduced. This widens
the scope of the analysis and allows the more covert aspects of poli¬
tics to be examined.
Closely related to this is the question of values in policy for¬
mulation. Section VI addresses itself to this issue, examining the
way in which problems are identified and defined. There is a need to
establish whose definitions of social reality are embodied in policy
determination. Such a perspective seeks to explain the development
of policy in terms of the meanings actors attach to social situations
and to their own actions. Thus the 'assumptive world' of political
actors is an important explanatory factor in understanding hew policy
priorities are determined.
Finally, Section VII will endeavour to draw together scne of the
themes outlined in the previous two chapters, that is, to relate same
of these approaches to policy analysis to the Scottish context.
II. Rationalism versus Incrementalism : An Artificial Debate?
Those who adhere to rationalist analysis defend its utility on
several grounds.3 Rationalist analysis, it is argued, promotes a
systematic and orderly approach to the study of policy problems which
is essential because of the contentiousness of policy issues, the
vast amount of data that may be involved, and the need for a rigorous
form of analysis to simplify complex reality for decision-makers. As
political issues seldom emerge cut and dried and ready for debate this
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systematic approach helps to define the problem, and indeed, redefine
the prcblem as more facets of it became apparent. It can generate
improved efficiency by bringing to the attention of decision-makers
costs and benefits which otherwise might have gone unnoticed. Thus,
it can help articulate and clarify the range of practical choice and
the consequences of various political choices. On this Michael Carley
contends:
'... rational analysis promotes explicitness in
presentation of data basic to a prcblem and in
causal linkages and transformations postulated
in the analysis. This reduces the incidence
of hidden value judgements, the effect of fashion
in prcblem resolution, and the incidence of im¬
plicit causality in the form of tenuous causal
relationships which may pervade less rigorous
forms of analysis'.4
Trie rationalist approach then, purports to offer a framework
which is at one and the same time both explanatory and normative.
Tie approach though, is not without its critics. Smith and May have
usefully summarised same of the main points of criticism made against
the rationalist case.
It is often regarded as being too narrow in the sense that it
neglects a whole range of political variables which limit the extent
of choice available. Coistraints in the form of pressure groups can
impinge upon the decision-maker's environment restricting the consid¬
eration of possible policy options to those generally acceptable to
the interests involved.
The approach is also seen as Utopian since most policy decisions
have numerous unanticipated consequences which are not as inconsequen¬
tial as the model tends to imply. Smith and May suggest that 'in the
real world ... ends are not that clear, decisions are not that neat
and evaluation is not that systematic'.5
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Further, there is the suggestion that the approach is value
biased as opponents dispute that rationality, in itself, represents
some universal good. Within an organisation there can be a tendency
to equate rationality with the smooth running of the organisation
itself. Thus, it is argued that rationalist analysis favours the
values of management and senior professions to the detriment of lower
ranking staff.
Another criticism levelled against the rationalist approach is
that the distinctions it draws between ends and means, values and
decisions, and facts and values are too sharp. As Smith and May
point out, what counts as 'fact' often tends to be subject to the
interests and values of the parties involved and they regard the
ambiguity of means and ends as substantially greater than the rational
model allcws, a point originally made by Lindblcm who contended that
means and ends are very often chosen simultaneously within the policy
process.
Finally, critics hold that the rationalist model is impractical
since a review and evaluation of all possible answers to a problem
in order to select the optimal solution is seldom feasible. Even in
situations where it might be possible, the cost of the search may well
exceed the savings achieved by the solution eventually discovered.
Cn the other hand, in the incrementalist model the policy-maker
chooses as relevant objectives only those worth considering in view
of the means actually at hand or likely to become available. Charles
Lindblcm and David Braybrooke state:
'While the conventional view of prcblem solving is
that means are adjusted to ends (policies are
sought that will attain certain objectives) , it is
a significant aspect of policy analysis as actually
practiced that, in certain specific ways, the
reverse adjustment also takes place. Since the
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reverse adjustment is superimposed on the
conventionally conceived adjustment of means
to end, the net result is a reciprocal rela¬
tionship between means and ends or between
policies and values that is different from
that envisaged in the synoptic ideal'.6
In this model the decision-maker starts not with sore ideal goal
but with the policies currently in force and decision-making entails
considering only incremental change, or changes at the 'margins'.
Hie number of policy alternatives reviewed is restricted and only a
limited number of consequences are envisaged and evaluated for any
given alternative. What constitutes 'the problem' is constantly sub¬
ject to redefinition in light of available means to solve it and in
this manner the subject of the decision may be transformed and rein¬
terpreted through the analysis. Thus evaluation is not viewed as a
separate activity but as taking place in series with decision-making.
Hie strategy is 'disjointed' as Braybrocke and Lindblcm explain:
'Analysis and evaluation are disjointed in the
sense that various aspects of public policy
and even various aspects of any one problem
or problem area are analyzed at various points
with no apparent co-ordination and without the
articulation of parts that ideally characterize
sub-division of topic in synoptic prcblem solv¬
ing' .7
Disjointed incrementalism then, takes into consideration the lim¬
ited cognitive capacities of decision-makers and the inevitable require¬
ment to limit the scope and cost of information collection and compila¬
tion. However, this approach too has been subjected to a number of
criticisms. These have emanated principally frcm Yehezkel Dror and
Amitai Etzioni.8
Dror's main accusation against the approach is that it is 'conser¬
vative', offering a rationalization for inertia. Further, the model
is criticised for being unjust since 'good' decisions are assessed not
by some objective criterion but simply by their acceptability in a
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particular situation.
Etzioni's main criticism is that incremental decisions take
place within the context of more fundamental decisions and that the
approach has little to say about how decisions of this more fundamen¬
tal kind are made. Although incremental decisions greatly outnumber
fundamental ones, the latter's significance is not comensurate with
their number. Henoe it is a mistake to relegate non-incremental deci¬
sions to a category of exceptions.
To counter these criticisms, and also to meet the ones made
against the rationalist model, both Etzioni and Dror have outlined
their own models which purport to offer a 'third' alternative by seek¬
ing to combine the strongest features of each of the two opposing
schools of thought. Etzioni advocates a 'mixed-scanning approach',
while Dror suggests a 'nornative-optimum model'.
Criticisms of both these alternatives have been made by Smith and
May. The important point to note though is that the shortcomings of
rationalism and incrementalism are not necessarily overccrre by these
'third' approaches.
It will be argued here, in agreement with Smith and May's thesis,
that the debate between the various schools of thought on policy¬
making is in certain important respects scmewhat artificial on the
grounds that it is not at all clear that the protagonists are actually
arguing about the same thing. Smith and May, in fact argue that 'in
spite of prolonged dissension between rationalist and incrementalist
models of decision-making, both they and the several versions of a
rapproacherrent, have in common epistemological features the significance
of which outweigh any specific points of variance'.9 Elsewhere
Richardson and Jordan have also emphasised 'the remarkable agreement
between both approaches on the description of how policies are actually
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made. The "rationalists" might at times wish to change the policy¬
making process, but their description of existing practices is at
times very near to that offered by Lindblan' .10
A prominent feature of all the models is that they should serve
both explanatory and normative purposes. However, as Smith and May
argue, it is ancmolous to presume a priori that 'is' and 'ought' in
modes of decision-making correlate. They feel that the authors who
adopt this position do not explain at all clearly hew a model is sup¬
posed to serve simultaneously as an accurate description of how deci¬
sions are made and as a description of how they might be made differ¬
ently by way of improvement. Consequently, it is suggested that
different frameworks may be required for explanatory and normative
discussion (although this is not to say that explanatory social re¬
search can have no prescriptive policy implications) . As the debate
is currently structured, concepts in use for analysis and practice are
confused. Cne way forward is the idea that contributors to the debate
are arguing about different kinds of things and that as such the term
'decision-making' is 'in danger of being applied insensitively to a
variety of phenomena and to confusing effect'.11
This point has also been emphasised by Simeon who considers it
important to rescue the study of policy frem what he calls the ' tech¬
nologists' whose main concern has been to develop aids to assist offi¬
cial decisicn-makers make 'better' decisions. In such a view policy
making is essentially a technical question, a matter of developing
more systematic means to canvass alternatives, assess costs and bene¬
fits, and implement choices. This approach is prescriptive since it
seeks primarily not to explain hew or why decisions are made, but to
prescribe more effective ways of doing it. In this light, he stresses,
it is essential, for a proper understanding of politics generally, to
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distinguish between 'policy analysis' which involves advice on the
choosing of alternatives (i.e. prescription) , and 'policy theory'
which involves the explanation of why certain alternatives are chosen
and others are not (i.e. description).
SnrLth and May wholeheartedly concur that there is a very definite
need to make such distinctions in the discussion of policy analysis.
It is upon the need to differentiate between prescriptive policy anal¬
ysis and descriptive policy analysis that they base their case that
the debate between rationalism and incrementalism is essentially an
artificial one.
Rationalism, it is argued, is coitmonly held as an image of ideal
decision-making procedures. As Gordon et al have noted, 'the main
explanation for its continuing existence must lie in its status as a
normative model and as a "dignified" myth which is often shared by
the policy-makers themselves'.12 The criticism of it centres on the
fact that rationalistic models are empirically inaccurate, or unreal¬
istic. 'That is not the way things ace'. Ch the other hand there is
a degree of sympathy for the view that the incrementalist approach
has much validity as an empirical model of hew policies are actually
made. Here criticism focuses on the claims of this approach to be
useful normatively. 'That is not the way things should be'. Thus
Smith and May argue:
'New viewed in this light it can be seen that the
debate between rationalistic and incrementalist
models is artificial in the sense that it is based
en ... the confusion of comparing real with ideal
states of affairs and expecting them to be the
same. The two models are about different social
phenomena and as such should seek to perform dif¬
ferent functions. We should not expect them to
agree. ...The problem is not to reconcile the
differences between contrasting rational and in¬
cremental models, nor to construct some third
alternative which combines the strongest features
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of each. The problem is to relate the two in the
sense of spelling out the relationship between
the social realities with which, each is concerned'.13
Smith and May are therefore pushed towards the conclusion that
we require more than one account to describe all the different aspects
of policy-making and organisational life. This idea is becoming in¬
creasingly popular in much of the newer policy literature where a
carbination of approaches is being utilised to explain policy devel¬
opments. Simeon, for instance, states that 'no one single clear and
simple explanation of scmething as many faceted and as huge as modern
government is likely to be possible'.111 He suggests that rather than
search for a very high level of abstraction and one or two 'crucial'
variables, our conception should allow us to group and make sense out
of a wide variety of determinants of policy. A similar sentiment is
echoed by Keith Banting who contends that:
'our understanding of policy determinants can be
refined further by abandoning the assumption
that there is a single "policy process" operat¬
ing identically throughout an individual policy
change and over all policies',15
He points out that the balance of forces at work seems to differ sys¬
tematically in different phases of the process and in different types
of policies. This is endorsed by Loma J. F. Smith in her study of
law emergence. She suggests a conceptual scheme which would permit
the location of different types of law emergence on a policy continuum,
their position being dependent upon whichever theory had most explana¬
tory power for that particular example.16 And W. I. Jenkins is also
convinced that there is no one best way to analyse policy since 'the
nature of the policy prcblem is such that a variety of approaches are
required to deal with the complexity of the process'.17 In support
of this he cites a significant statement from J. E. Anderson:
40
'Each (of the models) focuses attention on different
aspects of politics and policy making and seems
more useful for some purposes or situations than
others. Generally one should not permit oneself
to be bound too rigidly or too dogmatically to a
particular model. ... It is my belief that the
explanation of political behaviour, rather than
the validation of a given theoretical approach,
should be the main purpose of political enquiry
and analysis'.18
It is this theme then, and the line that any analysis of policy
and the policy process can only be achieved through the linking of a
number of different perspectives, that will be pursued for the remain¬
der of this chapter.
III. A Systems Approach
A systems approach can be a useful means by which to link a num¬
ber of different perspectives on policy analysis. The approach pro¬
vides a way of organising empirical material so as to highlight the
inter-related nature of certain political phenomena. In this respect,
a systems frameworx can act as a starting point for more detailed
analysis of particular parts of the policy process.
Simeon has made reference to the fact that policy-makers work
within a framework which greatly restricts the alternatives they con¬
sider and the range of innovations they make. He coitments:
"This framework, or set of constraints and oppor¬
tunities, defines a set of problems considered
to be important, a set of acceptable solutions
or policy responses, a set of procedures and
rules by which they will be considered. The
framework is made up of various characteristics
of the broad social and economic environment,
the system of power and influence, the dominant
ideas and values in the society, the formal
institutional structures. The policy process
itself - the interaction of formal and informal
actors such as politicians, bureaucrats, pressure
groups, and the media bargaining with each other
- reflects and is shaped by this broader frame¬
work and by the pattern of problems, precedents,
and policies received from the past'.*9
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Che of the earliest exponents of the systems approach was David
Easton and his model is often taken as the foundation upon which to
build a more sophisticated account.20 This approach views the policy
process in terms of an input-output model, the focus being placed on
the dynamics and processes of the political system in its environment.
Differentiation is made between policy demands (demands for action
arising from both inside and outside the political system) , policy
decisions (authoritative decisions by the political authorities) ,
policy outputs (what the system actually does - e.g. provide goods
and services) and policy outcomes or impacts (intended or unintended
consequences resulting frcm political action or inaction) .
In this way it becomes possible to explore the process of policy
formulation and implementation. Using Easton's terms, the present
study focuses an policy demands and policy decisions. Although
Easton's original model is perhaps a little too neat, via systems
approaches, policy analysis can be seen to involve disaggregating
and understanding the specific policy related aspects of the politi¬
cal process. What is required is the development of a more extensive
perspective and this has been provided by Jenkins. In the exploration
of the policy world Jenkins is of the opinion that an extended systems
framework can act as a useful heuristic map - useful in alerting one
to areas that need more attention (e.g. the environment, the political
system) and useful in emphasising links on which theory oould be use¬
fully brought to bear (e.g. the extent to which the political system
itself controls inputs rather than inputs determining political action).21
What then, are the areas in our case studies which might benefit
from a more detailed examination? Cne area is the interaction between
the political system and the environment. To understand the continual
interplay between the two one has to understand the balances of power
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and control which, operate at any time. So what political authorities
do not do may be as important as what they actually do in explaining
either the presence or absence of popular mobilisation and the varying
articulation of demands. Policy is not always a simple response to
articulated demand and therefore the question of how policy emerges
may only be properly understood by charting developments over time,
a move towards a dynamic perspective within which suppressed issues
may be found to be more common than at first appears.
Another area requiring more detailed exploration is the behaviour
of individuals both within and without the political system. As
Jenkins observes:
'To explain policy we need to explain behaviour
and the constraints that impact upon it. We
need to identify actors and organisations and
study their interactions. In particular we
are concerned with political behaviour taking
place within and amongst organisational networks' .22
Accordingly, the approach to be adopted here will focus both on
the internal dynamics of the political system itself and on the inter¬
action of the system with its wider environment. It will view the
essence of analysis as investigation of what goes on, or what does
not go on, inside the 'black box'. Chris Ham has endorsed this
approach, ccitmenting that 'policy analysis, like social policy, is an
ecletic field of study rather than a distinctive social science, and
as well as drawing car political science, it derives much of its intel¬
lectual basis from sociology and organizational theory' ,23 A primary
concern then, lies with the actors and organizations involved in the
initiation, formulation and implementation of policy.
Henae, to the process of issue resolution. How do people organise
and how do they relate to the political system? What influences the
nature and volume of demands and hew does the political system deal
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with shifts in demand patterns? Why do certain issues gain precedence
over others and to what extent are the outcomes of policy decisions
related to the form of decision structure by which they are processed?
IV. Group Theory and Demand Regulation
Advocates of group theory would suggest that the interplay of
group pressures is the dominant feature of the policy process. They
contend that a proper understanding of the ways in which issues arrive
on the political agenda, the ways in which policies are decided, their
content, and subsequent implementation, can only be reached by refer¬
ence to the group system. Hcwever, group theory, in its unadulterated
form, has a tendency to overstate the importance of groups and to
understate the importance of other factors such as ideology, reason
and individual initiative in the policy process. It is thus rather
misleading and inefficient to try to explain politics or policy for¬
mation solely in terms of group struggle. So in keeping with the
theme developed so far, that there is no one best way to explain the
policy process, it will be contended here that this sort of reduction-
ism, or unicausal explanation, should be avoided.
Nevertheless, group theory is a useful analytic tool for focusing
attention on one of the major elements in policy formulation.
Richardson and Jordan's account of what they describe as British
'post-parliamentary democracy' offers some interesting insights into
pressure group politics.
Ihey argue that as the matrix of carpeting group interests becomes
more carplex, public policies increasingly became the products of the
balance of pcwer between groups at any given time. This configuration
of group interests varies over time as groups gain and lose pcwer and
influence on issues, so that public policy will generally reflect the
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interests of the current dominant groups. Every government is influ¬
enced in its choice of policy options by the 'package' of interests
associated with them. In this sense pressure groups do not each re¬
late to government in isolation. Their interests and objectives
overlap, compete with and stand in opposition to each other. In form¬
ing alliances groups may increase their influence although they may
be forced to modify their position on the issue at stake. In compet¬
ing for influence groups may neutralise each other and can give poli¬
tical leaders the opportunity to enforce compromise or to follow
their cwn preferred line of action. Pressure groups may restrain
policy-makers, but the very number of groups active on some issues
may also free policy-makers to select and manipulate the interests to
which they ultimately respond. As Hall et al. comment:
'A group's ability to influence government is
determined by the way in which its demands
can be presented as well as by the number and
prestige of its supporters. To present demands
publicly and forcefully as a means of advancing
the collective good can oblige authorities to
take notice of them. Government is particularly
vulnerable to such a line of argument precisely
because it relates to what is seen as one of its
primary functions. Yet the main point remains:
governments underpin their specific support by
amassing diffuse support'.24
Divisions within groups can also have an effect on group influ¬
ence and activity since they may result in a change in objectives or
alter the style adopted by group leaders. These divisions reflect
the differing interests and opinions of members and generally the
wider the 'interests' a group seeks to represent the more difficult
it becomes for the group to adopt any clearly defined policy objec¬
tives. Also, the initial consensus upon which a group may be founded
can be seriously threatened, and may even evaporate, as members become
more politically aware and astute through exposure to the policy
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process itself and pressure group politics generally. We will see a
particularly good exanple of this later in the case involving the
Scottish Homosexual Rights Group (formerly the Scottish Minorities
Group) . It is important to stress then, the considerable importance
of internal group politics in determining group behaviour (especially
over time) . Some instances of group activity can be best understood
by reference to the group leaders' need to maintain internal cohesion
rather than by their desire to influence aspects of public policy.
Not only are pressure groups in capetition in Richardson and
Jordan's account, but so are 'official' organisations like government
departments which they see 'as behaving in almost exactly the sarre
way as more conventional external pressure groups'.2 5 Here Richardson
and Jordan draw attention to the internal divisions within government
itself and emphasize the degree to which 'government* is plural and
not singular. Ihey suggest that central government departments,
whilst often being the target of external pressure groups, are also
playing pressure group roles themselves - 'Understanding the divided
nature of the aentre and the manner in which policy is handled permits
the crucial understanding that pressure groups can be - and ... often
are - allies of departments'.26
The focus is placed on a government - civil service - pressure
group network in which policy-making is fragmented into sub-systems
where conceptual distinctions between government, agencies and pres¬
sure groups are broken down. Richardson and Jordan suggest that the
boundaries between government and groups are becoming less distinct
through a whole range of pragmatic developments so that policy is
'being made (and administered) between a myriad of interccnnecting,
interpenetrating organisations'. They contend that:
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'it is the relationships involved in carmittees,
the policy community of departments and groups,
the practices of co-option and the consensual
style, that perhaps better account for policy
outcomes than do examinations of party stances,
of manifestoes, or of parliamentary influence'.27
It was suggested in the last chapter that this was particularly true
of the Scottish Office. The case studies will consider this.
With the increasing specificity of government decisions the con¬
sultation process increased in importance during the 60s and 70s. A
number of reasons can be offered for this, such as a lack of confidence
by civil servants in their own legitimacy to enforce decisions; a rea¬
lisation that implementation of policies was affected by a cooperation
(or lack of it) by groups; a recognition that in other aspects of the
subject or at other times the department would depend on the interests
for political support, and in policy implementation or the provision
of detailed information; and a desire to maintain professional rela¬
tions with the officers of relevant groups. It should be noted, how¬
ever, that the present Conservative administration does not view this
matter quite in the same way as preceding governments. Since Mrs.
Thatcher took office the tendency has been towards less consultation
and less reliance on 'consensus politics'.
Consultation is not always equitable sinoe groups do not have
uniform status. Some principal 'inside' groups will be granted auto¬
matic consultative status while lesser 'outside' groups will be unable
to obtain (or may reject) such a close relationship. Richardson and
Jordan make this distinction between 'groups that are invited by cen¬
tral government departments to submit their views on topics related
to their concerns and those that are at best tolerated to the extent
that they are allowed to send occasional deputations'.28 In a certain
sense, it is suggested, consultation can even be a process of exclusion
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whereby consultation beyond a recognised 'core' of groups is more a
natter of disseminating information rather than of receiving views.
In the case study on liquor licensing it will be cbserved how cer¬
tain established groups were granted this automatic consultative
status.
There can be a problem here though, because if one views politi¬
cal life and the policy process as increasingly a struggle between
competing groups and between these groups and the government, then it
becomes difficult to make a clear theoretical distinction between the
government on the cue hand and groups on the other. This difficulty
is met by Richardson and Jordan with the argument that although the
apparatus of the state exhibits many of the characteristics of groups
outside the structure of government, government institutions are often
.In a privileged position vis-a-vis non-governmental groups and can be
distinguished frcm what are normally regarded as pressure groups by
the characteristics of 'officiality', 'authority' and 'legitimacy'.
The designation 'official' indicates that the government is 'authorised'
by social understanding ('legitimacy') to exercise certain powers
against and over all other groups and individuals in society.
The government then, has authority in its role as a regulator of
demands. It can assess the feasibility, political attractiveness and
ideological appropriateness of issues. It can reject or accept them
on these grounds and can indicate to those who present proposals what
is likely to find favour and gain support. However, demands present
each government with a dilenma. If it is not to lose its support in
the community it must respond to some of them. Yet the number and
complexity of demands will almost certainly be too great for all of
them to be met. Demands have to be managed since the resources needed
to meet them, such as finance, manpower, expertise and parliamentary
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time are always scarce.
Hall et al argue that demands are regulated by 'gatekeepers' -
interest groups, political parties, legislators and administrators -
who process demands at given points through a hierarchical chain in
the political system. Two important points are raised here by Hall
et al. The first concerns the prevailing 'values' in the political
system -
"Ihe gatekeepers of the political system are not
sinply reducing demands to manageable proportions
in a random way; they are making and transmitting
judgements about what demands can appropriately
be made on government via that particular channel
of communication' ,29
Hie second point concerns the way in which the political system can
exercise control orer demands:
'Demands that relate to similar problems are
grouped, co-ordinated and consequently become
an amalgam of policy proposals. This reduction
of demands not only removes some of the pressure
from the political process, it also greatly
increases the chance of the composite demand
being accepted by the authorities. For the
demands are not oily reduced, they are also
tailored to meet the authorities' needs and
interests. Policy proposals are shorn of some
of their most contentious features, compromises
are made to satisfy different interests and
emphases are changed to maximize the appeal
and feasibility of a policy, or to minimize
the less of support it will produce'.30
Examples will be seen in all three cases of how some of the more con¬
tentious proposals were 'reduced' in this way.
A relatively stable set of rules can emerge in a political system
through which organisations and individuals interact in regulating
demands. Although for the most part unwritten, these principles can
effectively govern the relationships between political actors in their
struggle for power. Cnce established and backed by precedent they can,
in part, determine the sources, kinds and uses of power considered to
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be appropriate in political life.
An important factor in setting these 'rules of the game' is the
bureaucracy itself. Civil servants are the main channel of communica¬
tion between interest groups and government and they are not only
aware of administrative constraints within government but also the
constraints imposed by these external groups. They therefore give
expression to the limits within which policy-making operates. Being
in a pivotal position in the channel of communication it is possible
for them to reflect their own policy preferences, through manipulation
of the information they either release or withhold frcm decision¬
makers .
Jenkins has made the observation that the administration is one
of the least explored areas of policy studies. He writes:
'The cubicle of the bureaucrat has indeed remained
securely locked, while the faceless men rarely
feature in any research findings. Such a state
of affairs may be explicable in terms of method¬
ological difficulties but has little theoretical
justification'.31
He suggests that the bureaucracy can control the entry of demands
into the political system as well as being involved in the formation
of policy and the way in which policy is implemented.32 Such control
need not necessarily be overt, but may be circumstantial in the sense
that administrative 'style' may influence policy. Our case studies
will examine to what extent this is true of the Scottish Office.
Implicit in the consideration of the question of where and how
policy issues originate and how they are regulated is the question of
who decides that seme issue is a problem requiring governmental action
and by what criteria? It has been noted that government departments
do not merely react to outside pressures. They plan their interven¬
tions with regard to numerous factors and, to a certain extent, move
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ahead of interest groups and other pressures on same issues whilst
responding slowly, if at all, on others. Priorities therefore, have
to be set against soime standard. But since issue definition is
neither perfectly efficient nor value free 'it is important to know
who makes the decisions about hew a problem is to be defined, which
possible solutions are to be studied, which aspects of each are going
to enter the calculation of merits and defects and how they are going
to be weighted'.33 In other words, hew is the political agenda set
and what values ave involved?
V. Agenda Management and Non-Decision Making
Tackling this problem not only raises the question of hew issues
emerge, but also hew they do not emerge. Thus, as well as consider¬
ing how issues arrive cn the political agenda it is equally important
to consider why scxme issues fail to reach the agenda, are delayed on
their way there, or are reimoved from it after having arrived. Of cen¬
tral importance is the extent to which policy making itself can be
avoided and resisted by those in (and out of) government.
Concern with the presence or absence of items en the political
agenda brings into consideration the extensive debate on the nature
of political pewer and conflict. This controversy revolves around
the nature of pewer and who, if anyone, has it. The debate has been
raging for over two decades and is a product of the dispute between
'elitists' and 'pluralists' in the U.S. Not all the aspects of this
complex debate need concern us here, but one concept which has emerged
and is of particular relevance in explaining some of the events in our
cases studies is the concept of 'non-decision-making'.
An oft-quoted reference cn 'non-decision-making' is Schattschneider's
comment on the ' .mobilisation of bias'. His central thesis was that:
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'All forms of political organisation have a bias
in favour of sore kinds of conflict and the
suppression of others because organisation is
the mobilisation of bias. Sane issues are
organised into politics while others are
organised out'.34
From this notion Bachrach and Baratz went on to develop the concept
of two faces of power.35 The pluralists, it was argued, by concen¬
trating on issues that generated open conflict of interest, were ig¬
noring a vital element in the power structure - the pcwer not to make
decisions. Power had two faces they said. Cne was the overt struggle
as viewed by the pluralists and the other, overlooked in the pluralist
model, was the mobilisation of bias within the system to keep issues
suppressed or to prevent their being raised at all. The 'other' faoe
of pcwer then, took into consideration not only issue emergence, but
also non-emergence or 'non-decision making'. Bachrach and Baratz
argue:
'Of course pcwer is exercised when A participates in
the making of decisions that affect B. But pcwer
is also exercised when A devotes his energies to
creating or reinforcing social and political values
and institutional practices that limit the scope of
the political process to public consideration of
only those issues which are comparatively innocuous
to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this,
B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from
bringing to the fore any issues that might in their
resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of
preferences.'36
Researchers, then, should interest themselves as much in those
areas where decisions are not made as where they are made. To ignore
ncn-decision making is to neglect one whole facet of power. Here
Bachrach and Baratz point to the possibility that an individual or
group my participate more vigorously in supporting the non-decision
making process than in participating in actual decisions within the
process. To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability
to initiate and veto proposals, they argue, is to ignore the possible
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exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation.
Later, in our policy study on Scottish homosexuality we will consider
to what extent this can be substantiated.
Perhaps the most widely known study of agenda control is Crenson'
study of the politics of air pollution in two U.S. cities.37 Although
the industrial cities of Gary and East Chicago standing side by side
on the shores of Lake Michigan were faced with similar air pollution
problems, they exhibited marked differences in the way in which they
dealt with them. While East Chicago passed legislation controlling
air pollution in 1949, it was not until the mid-50s that air pollution
became a public issue in Gary. Crenson's explanation was that indus¬
trial interests in Gary were more influential in preventing air pollu¬
tion becoming a public issue than were industrialists in East Chicago.
The subtlety of Crenson's analysis lies in his argument that it was
not simply a case of the industrialists in Gary applying pressure, it
was more a case of the mere existence of the industrialists influenc¬
ing the actions of decision-makers. Thus, it was held that a group
could exercise influence simply by being there; they did not necessar¬
ily have to take any action. Hence, the conclusion was that decision
making activity could be restricted by the process of non-decision
making and that the power and reputation of certain people within a
ccrrmunity could deter action cn sensitive or politically unprofitable
issues.
Governments too can limit the scope of initiation through their
influence over the content of the political agenda. Stringer and
Richardson have drawn attention to this notion of ' agenda management'.
They suggest that, through conscious agenda management, policies may
be formulated simply in order to remove an issue frcm the political
agenda and without any attempt to solve the problem. A distinction
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is made between the process of agenda management as a response to a
situation in which the problem has already 'arrived' and that which
seeks to prevent an issue from arriving on the political agenda at
all. For instance a prcblem can be excluded frcm the political agenda
by understating its extent, e.g. it is generally accepted that offi¬
cial statistics on drug addiction do not fully reflect the severity
of the problem. Alternatively, once a prcblem has 'arrived' they say,
seme form of governmental response beccnes necessary, 'even if that
response is only to redefine the prcblem in order to make it disappear' .39
An example here concerns environmental protection. Regulations for
heavy goods vehicles can be manipulated to allow heavier lorries onto
the road. In this way many 'problems' can be removed simply by redef¬
inition.
Hie utility of the concept of non-decision making, however, is
not universally accepted. Critics argue that it is more a theoretical
illusion than fact, an unnecessary and erroneous concept which is
impossible to test empirically.1+0 Wolfinger, for example, suggests
that the core of the problem is the difficulty of identifying non-
decisions , 'which seems generally to come back to determining people's
"real interests", as opposed to what they say they want or what they
are trying to get through political action'.1*1 Further, he argues
that in a number of important respects the criteria Bachrach and
Baratz propose require data that are difficult or impossible to obtain.
Examples of such impracticable requirements include measuring politi¬
cians' anticipations of responses to alternative courses of action;
defining abstention in such a way as to distinguish it from apathy
or unwillingness to participate; assessing the impact on participation
and on the distribution of governmental benefits of alternative values,
procedures and institutions; and identifying those responsible for
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contemporary values, procedures and institutions.
Similarly, Debnam doubts whether the concept has any empirical
value, since Bachrach and Baratz do not establish objective criteria
for identifying ncn-decisions. As for Crenson, Debnam feels that his
definition places too large an area of public discussion into the
'non-issue' category. Accordingly there is a need for more selective
criteria to determine what topics are kept off the political agenda
through non-decision making. He argues:
'After all, every issue, whether eventually
successful or not, must go through some peri¬
natal obscurity. We have no means of deter¬
mining that the alleged nondecision has been
kept out and is not, in fact, going through
a lengthy process of legitimation. Drawing
the political boundary in one place rather
than another has the effect of creating two
classes of event where there may be only one
... If Crenson wishes to establish the lexi¬
cal convention of calling neglected or nascent
topics 'ncn-issues', there can be no abjec¬
tion. What is objectionable is the claim
that this provides a new and empirically
viable form of political analysis',1+2
Consequently, Debnam is drawn to the conclusion that the concept 'non-
decision' offers nothing that is not already available through
decision-snaking analysis.
Needless to say, Bachrach and Baratz are not inclined to accept
this conclusion since they feel Debnam seriously misconstrues the
nature of non-decision making. They are concerned about how techniques
of decision-making analysis can adequately serve to identify non-
decisions, when the concepts of decision-making and non-decision mak¬
ing are grounded upcn different and conflicting assumptions - assump¬
tions pertaining to the scope and openness of the political arena,
the genuineness of consensus, the neutrality of political institutions,
and the concept of interest. By trying to rule out the phenomenon of
ncn-decision making and by limiting the scope of enquiry to what is
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empirically determinable, Debnam they say, runs the risk of seriously
misrepresenting political reality. Hie way out of the problem, they
concede, will be distasteful to enpiricists.
'It is to adept an analytic model that incorporates
hypotheses which, while difficult to verify
empirically, conpel the investigator to explore a
broader range of aspects of the polity within a
pcwer context. The product of the research may
well be impressionistic or ill-supported by data,
but better this than compounding the error by
ignoring altogether the elusive elements '.113
Frey, in a review of issues and non-issues, tends to ccme down
in favour of such an approach, but not without some qualification.
'Intuitively', he remarks, 'it seems that Bachrach and Baratz spot¬
light an absolutely vital area for investigation'. To him two ini¬
tial impressionistic judgements seem valid - that there are at least
seme settings of significance in which such implicit or covert aspects
of politics are crucial and that these latent aspects of politics are
sufficiently pervasive to necessitate political science developing an
adequate capacity for their empirical research.
In this area Steven Lukes has further refined the theory of non-
decision making, but far frcm making it easier to research empirically,
his conception increases the complexity of the analysis by adding
another 'dimension' to it.1+4 Lukes has considerable sympathy for
Bachrach and Baratz's theory of the two faces of power, but feels
that it does not go far enough. He suggests that the power to control
the agenda of politics and exclude potential issues should also be
seen as a function of collective forces, and that while organisations
are made up of individuals, the power they exercise should not be con¬
ceptualised solely in terms of individuals' decisions or behaviour.
Further, the emphasis which is placed on cases involving actual con¬
flict tends to ignore the important point that one of the most
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effective uses of power is to prevent conflict from arising in the
first place. So Lukes is unwilling to accept that actual conflict
is essential to pcwer. From this he moves to what he terms his
'three-dimensional view' which recognises that power may be exercised
through collectivities, may involve inaction rather than observable
action and may be exercised unwittingly.
While Lukes' analysis gives the concept of non-decision making
a greater theoretical sophistication it also poses even greater
empirical research problems in that it raises the difficulty of iden¬
tifying a latent conflict involving a contradiction between the in¬
terests of those exercising power and the 'real interests' of those
they exclude. But Lukes' contribution is of importance in that it
demonstrates the need to examine how demands are prevented from being
raised, the need to explore non-decision making outside perceived and
overt conflicts, and the need to consider institutional as well as
individual pcwer.
'As a concept, non-decision is frequently much like quicksand',
says Jenkins. 'May it, at one and the same time, mean everything
and nothing?'1+5 His contention though, is that given the work of
Crenson and of Bachrach and Baratz, it is possible to raise the status
of non-decision frcm that of a critical idea to that of a manageable
concept applicable to policy studies. While recognising the caveats
of the pluralist critique he argues:
'The adoption of a non-decision perspective offers
scope for a wider and more searching analysis of
the policy arena. In particular, it demands that
the investigator step back and probe in greater
depth "the world taken for granted", without
becoming ensnared in the false consciousness debate
which a total acceptance of Lukes' analysis might
involve' .l+6
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In this respect then, policy analysis has to broaden the scope
of its activity and realise that values can be of paramount import¬
ance in decisicn-making. A focus on non-decisions, therefore, can
be linked with a focus on values and policy content by posing wider
questions regarding actions and inactions within the political
system. As Jenkins rightly concludes, 'non-issues, non-decisions
and even nan-policies are necessary and legitimate subjects for exam¬
ination' .97 The relevance of this idea will be considered in our
policy studies, especially the case on homosexual law reform in
Scotland.
VI. Values in Policy Formulation
Questioning what happens to inputs on their way to becoming out¬
puts, why seme issues make it and others do not, why some are sub¬
stantially changed while others are merely ratified, leads on to
another thorny problem in policy analysis - the issue of values.
Here Rakoff and Schaefer postulate that what enters the political
process, the so-called black box, 'is not a single, unambiguous demand
from the environment, but a complex of conflicting demands derived
from the differing perceptions that individuals have of the environ¬
ment. Numerous examples of this are to be found in the case mat¬
erial where frequently different pressure groups would have different
perceptions of the same issue.
Carrier and Kendall make a very similar point.1'9 Ihey advocate
the need to examine the processes involved in the creation of 'social
problems', that is problem identification and definition, by consider¬
ing the possibility that there may not be a consensus about whether a
social phenomenon is a 'social problem' and also that even where such
a consensus exists the exact 'nature' of the problem may be in dispute.
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They suggest that in policy analysis one ought to take into consider¬
ation the processes involved in the 'creation and sustaining of social
reality' (i.e. hew a social phenomenon becomes classified as a social
problem?) and the possible existence of an infinite variety of social
realities (i.e. the variety of interpretations of any one social
phenomenon which can lead to one man's social problem being another's
satisfactory situation).
This perspective seeks to explain the development of policy in
terms of the meanings actors attach to social situations and account
for hew these meanings are generated and sustained. In such a scheme
the important thing to establish is whose definitions of social real¬
ity are embodied in policy determination. By establishing this,
recognition can then be given to the different frames of reference
and the different perspectives on the issue at stake. It is then the
participants' explanations of why things happened as they did and why
certain decisions were taken (and indeed, not taken) that becomes of
importance. In this way Carrier and Kendall lode to build up a range
of plausible accounts which will offer different viewpoints of the
same situation. The benefit of phenomenology, they claim, is that it
offers insights into a particular development which otherwise might
not have revealed itself had a single perspective been adopted. The
empirical data derived from our interviews with MPs demonstrates this
point nicely.
This idea that the meanings political actors ascribe to their cwn
actions is of importance in explaining policy formulation has been
further developed by Ken Young.50 He suggests the concept of 'the
assumptive world' as a means for examining policy-makers' 'values'.
The assumptive world is composed of four interdependent and
inseparable elements - the cognitive (existential, perceptual), the
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affective (or evaluative) , the cathectic (or relational) , and the
directive (or intentional). These refer, respectively, to man's
ability to recognise the facticity of his world, to evaluate aspects
of that facticity, to feel himself to be connected to and bound up
with it, and to be moved to act upon it.
The assurrptive world is also organised hierarchically. Ideology
is taken as the generalised symbolic representation of the world and
our relation to it; attitudes represent middle range constructs for
managing the world presented to us; and opinions are the circumstan¬
tial and specific responses to the everyday world we encounter. Lcwer
level opinions, beliefs or dispositions in part derive from, and may
be validated by, the more fundamental aspects of culture and person¬
ality. Thus while the higher level attributes are more enduring,
those at the lower level are more malleable or fragile, and are con¬
tinuously revised in light of experience.
Further, the assurrptive world is sustained by cultural transmis¬
sion and is influenced by class, ethnic, religious, regional, group
or familial diversities. It is reconstructed continuously by the
constant interaction of actors with the environment. In this respect
the cases will consider cultural influences which can be identified
as being particular to Scotland.
There can be no doubting that the analysis of values is a theo¬
retical and methodological minefield. It is clear that different
dimensions of belief and evaluation bear upon different policy areas,
that problems arise in the identification of whose values are potent
for policy and that decision outcomes often arise from the negotiation
of conflicting value positions within the decision system. As
Schoettle notes, 'a single policy conclusion may reflect a wide range
of personal opinions and attitude structures among those who reach
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it'.51 Hcwever, it is for this very reason Young argues that, 'the
tangled skein of "values" must be unravelled if we are to understand
better what government does'.52 The case studies will consider this
point.
How we are to unravel them is not without its difficulties
since there are empirical research prcblems in examining the assump¬
tive world. These will be discussed later in Chapter 4 (Methodology) .
Yet like the concept of nan-decision making, the concept of the assunp-
tive world is an important factor to take into consideration in attemp¬
ting to understand the policy process. Examining agenda management
and the setting of priorities must involve examining the values and
beliefs of those doing the setting (and those influencing the setting).
So an understanding of the values of political actors, as both Frey
and Jenkins suggest, is an important concomitant to understanding non-
decision making, for as Lukes argues the predominance of certain
values can prevent the emergence of conflict. To understand fully
the case studies it will be necessary to 'stand back and probe in
greater depth the world taken for granted'.
VII. Implications for the Case Studies
The underlying theme of this chapter has been that there is no
one best way to view the policy process and that there is a need to
link a number of different perspectives. By combining various
approaches to policy analysis it becores possible to identify the
balance of forces which prevail in different phases and different
types of policy. Sinoe what you see depends on where you are and
which way you are looking, a combination of approaches can provide
the means by which to disaggregate and explore some of the component
parts of the 'Scottish political system' as they manifest themselves
in our case studies.
It was noted in Chapter 1 that although Scotland has the admin¬
istrative capacity to initiate distinctive policies the achievement
in terms of substantive policy appears to be modest. Our case studies
will examine to what extent this is true of 'issues of conscience'.
While perhaps not wholly typical of independent Scottish policy formu¬
lation, the cases, because they reputedly fall within the 'Scottish
political system', nevertheless offer a means to explore, as compared
with the rest of Britain, what, if any, variations exist in the sub¬
stantive policy areas under consideration and in the political and
administrative processes by which those policies came to be formulated.
Hence, the case studies will address themselves to such questions as:-
What constitutes the 'Scottish dimension' in these particular moral
issues? In what way, if any, does Scottish legislation in this sphere
vary frcm that which prevails in England and for what reasons? What
organisations and actors were involved in the policy areas in question?
How did they reach their decisions on these issues and how were their
representations made? What was 'public opinion' (in its widest sense)
in each of the cases, against what criteria was it evaluated and what
influence did it have in policy formulation? Hew did MPs form their
opinions and in what way did they exert influence over policy? What
was the role of the Scottish Office in these free vote issues? Is
this type of policy, concerning issues of conscience and morality,
contained wholly within the 'Scottish political system'? Hew did the
legislative process for the issues in question actually cperate? Is
there any evidence to suggest inadequacies in procedure? If so, is
there sccpe for improvement in Parliament's handling of Scottish
affairs?
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Each of the measures under consideration gave rise to divisions
in which MPs were free to vote according to individual conscience
rather than by party whip, henoe they provide an interesting insight
into the social and moral attitudes which prevail in Scottish poli¬
tics. Hie cases will examine political actors' definitions of the
issues in question and assess their perceptions of the scope and need
for action. A consideration of actors' motivations can help in explai¬
ning not only action but also non-action. Here we need to examine the
individual response in relation to peer groups and institutions because
we are interested not only with actors as individuals but also with
hew their reality is constructed by the environment in which they
cperate. This leads us to consider the processes by which ideas,
beliefs and definitions of situations are constructed within and by
organisations.
Further, the origins and history of a particular policy can be
a crucial factor in shaping attitudes since expectations of what
policy will be about and its likely effects may derive frcm past
debate, experiences and practices. So the history and political sen¬
timents generated by that history can produce stances and attitudes
towards policy issues that may not be directly related to the speci¬
fic policy being promulgated, but nonetheless have an important
effect on reactions and responses to the policy itself. The point is
that attitudes and values are not necessarily generated by a specific
policy but are more deeply ingrained by virtue of the subject matter
itself, the polarization of views surrounding the subject and the
antecedents of the policy currently under debate. Thus, hew do actors
shift their definitions of the situation? Hew does the time-scale of
attitudinal change fit with political time-scales? And hew far are
institutional responses to change to do with personal or organisational
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insecurity or uncertainty rather than purposive resistance?
It is then, to these questions and the others enunciated in
this section that the empirical case material will address itself
in Chapters 5 to 9. Before that, however, we will consider in the
next chapter seme aspects of the relationship between morality and
the law and review seme instances of Parliament's handling of such
'issues of conscience1.
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CHAPTER 3
Morality, Law and Policy-Making in Parliament
I. Introduction
Before proceeding to examine our Scottish case studies concerning
'issues of conscience' against the background outlined in Chapters 1
and 2, we need to consider more fully how moral issues stand in rela¬
tion to the law. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to explore
seme of the philosophical and practical considerations in legislating
on moral questions.
Section II considers what types of activities and behaviour are
appropriate for legal restriction. The problem revolves around mak¬
ing a sufficiently clear distinction between self-regarding and other
regarding action, that is, between matters of private morality with
which the criminal law ought to have no direct concern and matters of
public order, decency and harm to others with which the criminal law
can quite properly be concerned. In the late 1950s and the 1960s
this issue of the regulation of moral conduct was fiercely debated by
Lord Devlin and Professor H. L. A. Hart. The crux of Devlin's posi¬
tion was that the state had a duty to uphold moral standards because
these were essential for the preservation of society itself. Hart,
on the other hand, contended that Devlin's critique was merely a dis¬
guised defence of the conventional moral order. He suggested that
not every act which contravened accepted morality was necessarily of
equal importance in damaging society. Moral feeling must be assessed
by more than a shew of hands, he argued. It has to be subjected to
critical appraisal as well. Other significant contributions to this
debate, for example, frcm Dworkin, Richards and Wasserstrcm will also
be noted before the philosophical abstractions are left to consider
some examples of moral issues which have involved legislation.
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Section III examines soma existing case studies on issues of
morality and the law. These are considered not only in terms of the
philosophical debate, but also in terms of the preceding chapters
where approaches to policy making and Scottish culture were discussed.
The cases of abortion, pornography, capital punishment and smoking
are reviewed in some detail. The issue of smoking, while not strictly
a moral matter, has been included because of a number of intriguing
similarities it has to the case of liquor licensing in Scotland.
Points of comparison and contrast between these studies and our own
are raised periodically.
Section IV focuses on the more general role of Parliament in
policy-making, the intention being to examine Parliament's seemingly
limited role in the development of government policy relating to
party political issues, and to compare this with its more prominent
role when 'issues of conscience' are at stake. The conclusion is
reached that for the most part Parliament's typical role is restricted,
the bulk of policies appearing before Parliament as 'fait acccmplis',
having been formulated by the Executive, its bureaucracy and inner
elites. Only when a broader societal consensus is required does
Parliarrent begin to be able to influence the shape of policy.
Section V in drawing the themes of the chapter to a close,
acknowledges that even when Parliament does make its mark on policy,
it is more often than not a mark which has already been sanctioned by
the government of the day. However, an alternative point of view is
then postulated which suggests that Parliament has had a much greater
influence in the 1970s than had hitherto been imagined. These differ-
end analyses are offered as alternatives against which our case stu¬
dies might eventually be judged.
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II. Ihe Philosophical Debate
Laws exist to protect people and society, most obviously frcm
physical harm, but also from psychic and emotional abuse. They func¬
tion to safeguard individual and societal rights and liberties. But
the law has two sides. By ensuring liberty to one set of persons,
the law may restrict the liberty of others. A law by its very func¬
tion places a limit on what was formerly a free exercise or action.
The acoeptibility of such limitation depends upon its justifiability.
When adequate justification is not forthcoming, most ccmmonly by ref¬
erence to majority opinion, then the law runs the risk of becoming
oppressive. This is especially the case when the law impinges upon
issues of morality. So which sorts of activities and which types of
behaviour are appropriate for legal restriction? In what instances
does insurance of the rights of individuals require that restrictions
be placed on the freedcm of others? Should the law be designed as a
safeguard, and if so to what extent, against the destruction of a
society's cherished moral beliefs? The question, then, is whether in
a pluralistic society the fact that certain conduct is thought to be
immoral by the majority is sufficient justification for limiting free¬
dcm by making such behaviour illegal.
Although many moral philosophers have been concerned with questions
about the legal enforcement of morals, John Stuart Mill's essay 'Cn
Liberty' (1859) has occupied and continues to occupy an especially
prcminent position. Mill inquired into the nature and limits of social
control over the individual. The following passage is Mill's cwn sum¬
mary of his central thesis:
'The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple
principle ... That principle is, that the sole end for
which mankind are warranted, individually or collec¬
tively, in interfering with the liberty of action of
any of their number, is self-protection. That the
70
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any meirber of a civilized ccmnunity, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He can¬
not rightfully be compelled to do or forebear because it
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because in the opinion of others, to do so would
be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remon¬
strating with him, or reasoning with him or persuading
him, or entreating him, but not for carpel ling him, or
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To
justify that, the conduct frcm which it is desired to
deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone
else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which
he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.
In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence
is, of right, absolute'.1
Unfortunately this distinction bebween self-regarding action and
other-regarding action produces acute difficulties of interpretation.
For instance, if someone wishes of his own accord to take a habit-
forming drug such as heroin, should he be stopped? Cn the one hand
it might be argued that any attempt to deter such behaviour is tanta¬
mount to an impertinent interference with the individual for which no
adequate justification can be produced. On the other it may be said
that the state has a paternalist function which provides justification
for preventing people frcm harming themselves and also frcm becoming
a burden on the state welfare services and, therefore, on the whole
cormunity. This would make drug-taking other-regarding action and so
liable to social control, although in Mill's day this conclusion would
be less certain since modern welfare provision had not been developed.
Few actions then, can be regarded as wholly self-regarding and
the dividing line is always open to argument. To take an example frcm
our case studies: should people in Scotland be prohibited from going
to a public house on Sunday because other people find such behaviour
offensive and feel that the values they uphold will be harmed if such
behaviour is permitted? For the strict Sabbatarian, the more recrea¬
tion is allowed on a Sunday, the more society offends against his
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principles. Can this degree of harm justify interference with the
liberty of those who wish to go to a pub on Sunday? If so, cannot
the potential pub-goer claim he is harmed by the organization of
religious services which tend to breed such intolerance of mind as
to lead to abjections to Sunday pubs?
In each particular case a calculation of various factors is
required: how far other people are adversely affected; whether the
behaviour concerned is in public; whether the harm done to others is
a matter of fact or opinion; whether the danger is to adults who can
appreciate the risks, or to children who may not. In assessing the
final balance weight has to be given to the value of individual free¬
doms: to justify interference with personal liberty it must be shown
that the harm resulting from freedom is greater than the harm ccming
from restrictions. In this way a type of cost-benefit analysis is
required based as far as possible on objective evaluation of the con¬
sequences of alternative forms of action. Hcwever, such measurements
are difficult to make and on which side the balance falls is a matter
which everyone must decide for himself.
In the late fifties an intense philosophical debate arose between
Lord Devlin and Professor H. L. A. Hart over the regulation of certain
areas of moral conduct. This was stimulated by the publication of the
Wolfenden Report on homosexuality and prostitution in 1957. As we
shall see in Chapter 9 it reccmmended that homosexual behaviour occur¬
ring in private no longer be punishable under the law, and that there
be no change in the existing law under which acts of prostitution
were not in themselves illegal. The Coirmittee's reooirmendations at
several points read as if they were an application of Mill's general
political-social theory. These recarmendations were based upon a dis¬
tinction between matters of private morality with which the criminal
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law ought to have no direct concern and matters of public order,
decency and harm to others with which the criminal law could quite
properly be concerned. The function of the criminal law according
to the Committee was 'to preserve public order and decency, to pro¬
tect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide
sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others'.2
It should not be considered the purpose of the law to intervene in
the private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any pattern of
behaviour unless the purposes of the law outlined above were shown
relevant.
The crux of Lord Devlin's position is that the state has a duty
to uphold moral standards because these are essential to the mainten¬
ance of society. In a modem society there are a variety of moral
principles which scxne men adopt for their own guidance and do not
attempt to impose upon others, for example the dictates of a particu¬
lar religion. There are also moral standards which the majority
places beyond toleration and imposes upon those who dissent. In our
society the practice of monogamy is an example of this type. Lord
Devlin's argument is that a society cannot survive unless some stan¬
dards are of the latter class, because scsme moral conformity is essen¬
tial to its existence.
' (S) ociety is not something that is kept together physi¬
cally; it is held by the invisible bonds of camion
thought. If the bonds were too far relaxed the members
would drift apart. A carmen morality is part of the
bondage. The bondage is part of the price of society;
and mankind, which needs society, must pay its price'.3
Thus, society has a right to preserve its cwn existence, and
therefore, the right to insist on some such conformity.
Now if society has such a right, then it has the right to use
the institutions and sanctions of its criminal law to enforce the
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right. Lord Devlin's argument continues:
1 (I) f society has the right to make a judgement and has
it on the basis that a recognized morality is as neces¬
sary to society as, say, a recognized government, then
society may use the law to preserve morality in the
same way as it uses it to safeguard anything else that
is essential to its existence' .1+
So in the same way as society may use its law to protect itself
against treason and sedition from within, it may use it to prevent a
corruption of that conformity which ties it together.
The third strand of Lord Devlin's argument concerns the circum¬
stances in which the state should exercise this power. Hew is the
law-maker to ascertain the moral judgments of society? For Lord
Devlin it is the opinion of the 'reasonable man'. The 'reasonable
man' is not in fact expected to 'reason' about anything since his
judgment may be largely a matter of 'feeling'.
'It is the viewpoint of the man in the street - or to use
an archaism familiar to all lawyers - the man in the
Clapham omnibus. He might also be called the right-
minded man. For my purpose I should like to call him
the man in the jury box, for the moral judgement of
society must be something about which any twelve men
or women drawn at random might after discussion be
expected to be unanimous '.5
When such people are moved to 'intolerance, indignation and dis¬
gust' by particular conduct, then such conduct should be the subject
of the criminal law. Hcwever, since the limits of tolerance can and
do shift there can be no hard and fast rules as to when the state
should intervene. Each particular case must be judged against the
principles outlined. If privately conducted imroral conduct is jud¬
ged by the standards of 'ccnmon sense' to be injurious to society by
endangering the moral order necessary for its preservation, then
society is justified, as a matter of principle, in legislating against
that conduct.
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Devlin's critique then, is both an attack on the specific recom¬
mendations of the Wolfenden Report and a more general comment on the
philosophy of J. S. Mill. In this light it is Devlin's contention
that homosexual behaviour and prostitution can be judged by the above
standards to undermine the moral fabric of society and so each can
properly be legislated against because the integrity and very exis¬
tence of society is threatened if such laws do not exist.
H. L. A. Hart has been Devlin's leading critic as well as a sel¬
ective defender of both Mill and the Wolfenden Report. He questions
Devlin's view of the nature of morality:
'much that he writes reads like an abjuration of the
notion that reasoning or thinking has much to do
with morality'.5
Hart accepts that laws against murder, theft and much else would be
of little use if they were not supported by a widely diffused convic¬
tion that what these laws forbid is also .immoral. However, it does
not follow that everything to which the moral vetoes of accepted
morality attach is of equal importance to society. Nor is there any
reason for thinking of morality as a 'seamless web' which will fall
to pieces bringing down society unless all conduct involving moral
considerations is enforced by law. Hart writes:
' (W) hy should we not summon all the resources of our
reason, sympathetic understanding, as well as critical
intelligence and insist that before general moral
feeling is turned into criminal law it is submitted
to a scm. tiny of a different kind from Sir Patrick's?
Surely, the legislator should ask whether the general
morality is based on ignorance, superstition, or
misunderstanding; whether there is a false conception
that those who practise what it condemns are in other
ways dangerous or hostile to society...'
He continues:
*(I)t is fatally easy to confuse the democratic
principle that power should be in the hands of the
majority with the utterly different claim that the
majority, with power in their hands, need respect
no limits'.7
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Hart suggests then, that Devlin's contention is merely a disgui¬
sed conservative defence of the conventional moral order.
Others too have made contributions to the continuing debate.
Ronald Dworkin, for instance, has criticised Devlin's position on the
grounds that what is wrong is not his idea that the camiunity's mor¬
ality counts, but his idea of what counts as the community's moral¬
ity. He advocates that a conscientious legislator who is told a
iroral consensus exists must test the credentials of that consensus.
Hie claim that a moral consensus exists cannot simply be based on a
poll on the 'Clapham omnibus'. Certainly it is based on an appeal to
the legislator's sense of how his coirxnunity reacts to some disfavoured
practice but this must include an awareness of the grounds on which
that reaction is generally supported. Eworkin argues:
'If there has been a public debate involving the
editorial columns, speeches of his colleagues,
the testimony of interested groups, and his own
correspondence, these will sharpen his awareness
of what arguments and positions are in the field.
He must sift these arguments and positions, trying
to determine which are prejudices or rationaliza¬
tions, which presuppose general principles or
theories vast parts of the population could not
be supposed to accept, and so on. It may be that
when he has finished this process of reflection
he will find that the claim of a moral consensus
has not been made out.'8
Of course, if a legislator shares the popular views he is less
likely to find them wanting, though if he is self-critical the exer¬
cise may convert him. His answer, in any event, will depend upon
his own understanding of what morality involves. This, emphasises
Dworkin, should not be misconstrued as "moral elitism' . The legis¬
lator is not rejecting the views of the public, merely placing them
under scrutiny.
Peter Richards has also reacted against Devlin's argument. He
considers Devlin's position as being 'basically anti-intellectual',
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but he does see hew 'it can be defended as a sensible, no-nonsense
system for the running of a successful, stable society' ,9 It is
this quality, he suggests, which appeals to many Ministers, senior
civil servants and police officers, as well as to a number of MPs.
As we shall see in our cases many of those in power and influence
staunchly defend Devlin's 'disintegration thesis'. Cn the issue of
homosexuality a number of MPs were to be found arguing that tolera¬
tion of such practices would lead to a moral decay which, would shake
society to its foundations.
Richard Wasserstran has made an interesting and important point
concerning the controversy. Since the Wolfenden Report provoked the
initial debate its focal point has tended to be the regulation of
sexual behaviour by the criminal law - with the paradigmatic case
being private, consensual homosexual acts between adults. Thus, the
fundamental issue was often described as whether the immorality of
an action could alone be a sufficient ground for making that action
illegal, and the problem was described as concerning the appropriate¬
ness of the enforcement of morality, or of morals, by the law.
Wasserstrcm has pointed out that this emphasis upon the regula¬
tion of sexual behaviour by the law constitutes a narrcwing of the
scope of Mill's enquiry and he suggests that problems of sexual moral¬
ity may be different in important respects frcm problems of morality
generally. He poses the question:
'are problems of sexual morality (and the corresponding
predicates) simply problems of morality as applied to
sexual relationships, or are problems of sexual moral¬
ity sui generis because, for example, sexual morality
is a very special, and in many ways unique, area of
human concern?'10
If problems of sexual morality are to any appreciable degree sui
generis , then, contemporary issues such as homosexuality and prostitution
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may have distorted the more general discussion of the enforcement of
morality by the law. The considerations most relevant to a rational
discussion of the enforcement of sexual morality by the law may not,
in fact, be the considerations most significant to the enforcement of
non-sexual morality by the law. If this is the case, then Wasserstrom
observes that the emphasis on sexual morality in contemporary discus¬
sions has to be taken into account and different paradigms for the
enforcement of morality have to be found and considered.
At this stage let us move away frcaxi the abstract philosophical
debate to consider some examples of moral issues which have involved
legislation. The remainder of the chapter will examine these issues
not only in terms of the above debate, but also in terms of the pre¬
ceding chapters where approaches to policy-making and Scottish cul¬
ture were discussed. The review will be looking to identify points
of comparison and contrast with our own case studies on moral issues
in Scotland.
III. Case Studies in Morality and the Law
a) Abortion
The fundamental issue in the abortion controversy concerns the
'sanctity of human life'.11 In what circumstances, if any, can the
act of aborting a human foetus be justified? Adequate criteria are
difficult to devise because it remains unclear precisely what counts
as human life and what, if anything, counts as an exceptional circum¬
stance allowing forms of life to be destroyed. Two central issues
therefore arise in the discussion of the ethical justifiability of
abortions I) the moral status of the unborn, and II) the question of
moral, priorities in abortion. Positions taken on the first question
have, a direct bearing on positions pertaining to the second. Pour
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points of view can be identified although many further gradations
exist between them.
The first position maintains that human life is the direct
result of fertilization of a human ovum by human sperm. Fran this
moment there is a process of maturation in which the foetus is regar¬
ded as a human lacking only certain functional capacities. The foe¬
tus, in this theory, is fully, not merely potentially, a human life.
Its intentional destruction is therefore iimoral. Roman Catholics
have traditionally expounded this theory, although they are by no
means its only advocates.
A second position maintains that the foetus has a special status
but that it is not a human being until some point later in pregnancy,
rather than at conception. For this reason it is held that abortions
after a specifiable stage of development are destructions of human
life and are morally permissible only if some paramount evil such as
the death of the mother is to be averted.
The third view partially agrees with this latter position in that
it takes the foetus to have a special status which precludes the mother
from adopting any treatment she wishes. But exponents of this view
also maintain that removal of the foetus is not at any specific stage
tantamount to a destruction of human life and that many reasons for
abortion override objections to it. For example cases of rape, pos¬
sible death of the mother, and drug-deformed foetuses are considered
by advocates of this position to be sufficiently serious to outweigh
other arguments against abortion. This stance has been favoured by
civil libertarians.
The final position holds that a foetus does not have an ethically
significant, special status, but is merely something a person posses¬
ses in the body. Consequently, when the foetus is unwanted, the wcman
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has a right to remove it. In this view an abortion is no more
reprehensible than say, an appendectomy. This position is commonly
promulgated by advocates of women's liberation who emphasise the
right of a woman to her own body.
These are the parameters in which the abortion debate has taken
place. The fundamental problem has been to draw a non-arbitrary line
between human and non-human existence, in the hope that a non-
arbitrary line can be drawn between the rights of the mother and the
at least postulated rights of the foetus.
Peter Richards has traced the history of the abortion issue from
the time of early Rome where it was approved, through the development
of Christian condemnation of the practice to Victorian ambivalence
and uncertainty. As a result of this ambivalent history the law in
the first half of the twentieth century was confused.12 Dissatisfac¬
tion with the operation of the law and a demand for reform began to
emerge, in the late fifties and early sixties. The climate of opinion
became more liberal and 'the idea that easier abortion would lead to
moral decay and sexual licence lost much of its power'.13 Reformers
pointed to the inadequacy of the law arguing that, the medical profes¬
sion were doubtful about what the law permitted, that there was one
law for the rich and another for the poor, and that the rate of legi¬
timate therapeutic abortions varied between different regions of the
country. A. formal restatement of the law was urged on the basis that
it would help to even out these inequalities in its application to
various income groups and in different areas.
The parliamentary campaign for reform began in the mid-sixties.
The ground was prepared with the introduction of three Private Member's
Bills in quick succession - by Mrs. Renee Short under the Tfen-Minute
Rule in June, 1965; by Lord Silkin in the Upper House in November,
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1965; and by Wingfield Digby under the ballot procedure in February,
1966. After the 1966 General Election, David Steel won third place,
in the ballot, and on being approached by the Abortion Law Reform
Association (ALRA), decided to promote their cause.
Steel's Bill was similar to earlier measures. Its original
draft provided for therapeutic and eugenic terminations and the social
clause - later rephrased - permitted abortion where a woman's capacity
as a mother would be severely overstrained. It had a rape clause, but
this was emitted during the committee stage. Concurrence of two reg¬
istered medical practitioners was required except where an emergency
operation was necessary to save a woman's life. All terminations
were to be carried out in a NHS hospital or other place approved by
the Minister of Health, and those not done in hospital were to be noti¬
fied.
The Bill passed its second reading by 223 votes to 29, but its
committee stage was protracted with twelve sittings. It did not appear
before the House for the report stage until June 1967, when one 'whole
Friday of private member's time proved utterly inadequate to deal with
the amendments tabled. However, as was the way of this particular
Labour administration, further time was allocated at the close of
Government business on two subsequent occasions so that the Bill might
complete its passage.
Richards identified the Abortion Law Reform Association as the
principal driving force behind the campaign. Their case was pressed
at public and private meetings, and MPs were lobbied in person and by
correspondence.14 They were a young, middle-class, intellectual group
whose strength came from the quality of their support rather than from
its size or financial power.15 In many respects it was similar to the
Divorce. Law Reform Union which, was so active on English Divorce Reform.
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This is in stark contrast to divorce reform in Scotland where there
was no such single purpose pressure group. Only the Scottish
Minorities Group in pressing for homosexual law reform in Scotland
can perhaps compare favourably, although even here the effectiveness
of the SMG was diminished because of its internal divisions.
In opposition to AURA was the Society for the Protection of the
Unborn Child (SPUC) . Hois was founded in January 1967 specifically
to oppose Steel's Bill, but, according to Richards, its policy was
unclear and its general tactic was to urge the need for further con¬
sideration and the appointment of a Royal Commission. It was very
late into the fray and consequently lacked the political skill of
ALRA. Hcwever, Colin Francome has suggested that one of the reasons
why the abortion issue has not disappeared frcm the political agenda
(the most recent attempt at limiting the availability of abortion
being Jchn Corrie's Private Merrier"s Bill of 1980) is that SPUC has
increased its efforts, learned pressure group politics, and establi¬
shed throughout the country a sound basis in the Catholic Church,
while ALRA has tended to wind dcwn its organisation and to concentrate
its resources on other issues such as birth control.16 He observes
that 'since the 1960s the liberalisation of sexual attitudes has slewed
somewhat and with the growth of such movements as the Festival of Light
there has been an attempt at a backlash.17
Richards has noted that while many bodies expressed opinions on
abortion law reform, their attitudes were not easy to categorise
because those which favoured change wanted particular types of change.
Thus acceptance for the need for reform by no means produced agreement
on the precise wording of the Bill. Ihis same broad range of opinion
is to be found in all three of our cwn case studies and is perhaps a
feature of moral legislation, where, often literally, every man has
his cwn opinion.
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Another feature which compares with our own cases concerns the
attitude of the nedical profession. Richards' account indicates that
the views of the British Medical Association and the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 'were not completely identical'.
This same variation in medical opinion is to be found in the case on
licensing reform, where the various medical bodies - the BMA, the
Royal Colleges of Edinburgh and Glasgow, the Institute of Psychiatrists
- could not agree on the likely effect of licensing laws on the misuse
of alcohol. Lack of evidence, they said, prevented them frcm reaching
any firm conclusions.
In terms of pressure group politics the abortion issue demonstra¬
tes the importance of having a well organised, single purpose group,
familiar with parliamentary procedure and lobbying techniques, to pro¬
mote the issue and influence MPs. 'ALRA, by winning acceptance for
its cwn draft Bill, established the terms on which other groups had
to fight', observes Bridget Pym.18 The issue also illustrates the
limited influence which a group may yield if it only enters the poli¬
tical fray at a late stage after an important vote has been taken.
MPs are usually reluctant to alter their positions onoe they have made
them public. Pym remarks that the SPUC were 'largely unsuccessful
except in so far as their intervention frustrated further liberalism'.19
We shall see instances of late lcbbying in our case study on licensing.
In the same way as the English divorce and homosexuality provi¬
sions, abortion was accorded government time in parliament. The suc¬
cess of all three reforms was undoubtedly due in great measure to the
benevolence of sympathetic Labour' Ministers. This was to provide one
of the most obvious contrasts with the reform of Scottish law in div¬
orce and homosexuality, where the question of adequate parliamentary
time for debate was one of the central issues.
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b) Pornography
0. R. McGregor has noted that the fifties and sixties 'witnessed
the cumulative removal of restraints both of custom and law upon cer¬
tain forms of sexual satisfaction and behaviour and upon their public
portrayal in print or in the visual arts or for oonmercial purposes' .20
For many, these developments constituted the emergence of 'the permis¬
sive society' and produced in them the considerable anxiety that
greater freedom of expression was causing a dangerous decline in moral
standards. Consequently, the very early seventies, with the initiation
of such movements as the Festival of Light, saw something of a backlash
against the increasingly liberal attitudes towards sex and especially
its protrayal in public: things were deemed to have 'gone too far' .
In this respect pornography and obscenity are slightly different
i
from the other moral issues of that period since the question was not
that the law was too restrictive but that it allowed too much freedom.
The limits of the law were continually being redefined as increasingly
explicit stage productions, films and publications were produced.
The stage production 'Ch! Calcutta]1, the film 'Beyond the Valley of
the Dolls', and the publication 'Schoolkids' OZ', all caused a public
outcry. Anti-pornography groups such as the National Viewers' and
Listeners' Association demanded revision of the legal criteria con¬
cerning obscenity to halt the downward spiral into moral decay.
The debate was set very much in the mould of the Devlin/Hart con¬
troversy over the enforcement of morals - to what extent should the
obscenity laws encroach upon an individual's freedom to consume sex¬
ually explicit material? David Holbrock has identified one of the
fundamental problems involved - 'the paradox ... is that liberal tol¬
erance is always faced with the problem of tolerating developments
which threaten those values in which tolerance is grounded'.21
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During the course of the last decade there have been two major
reports on pornography and obscenity - the Longford Report in the
early seventies and the Williams Report in the late seventies.22
Hie Longford Carmittee was an independent inquiry set up by Lord
Longford to investigate pornography and 'to see what means of tack¬
ling the prcblem of Pornography would command general support'.
Its report outlined the growth of public concern, examined the differ¬
ent facets of the highly profitable pornography trade, illustrated
the preponderance of violence in much pornographic material, and re¬
viewed the various outlets through which pornographic products could
be made available to the public - broadcasting, cinema and theatre,
and books, magazines and newspapers. Cn the role of law in questions
of morality the Report stated:
'... it is manifestly impossible to protect some
members of society without any restriction what¬
ever on the unfettered liberty of others, which
means, in this context, that the law must forbid
any exploitation of the young or any unnecessary
offence to those considerable number of citizens
who object to having pornographic material
thrust under their noses. And this, in turn
leads to the conclusion that there should be
legislation prohibiting any form of public dis¬
play of pornographic material, any unsolicited
distribution of it by post, and also any purvey¬
ance of it, in any way, to those under some
specified age'.24
The Report made a nuuber of recommendations along these lines and
outlined a draft Bill as a basis for legislative reform in England and
Wales of the Cbscene Publication Acts.
The legal position in Scotland relating to obscenity was based on
Common Law and on a variety of statutory provisions. In a separate
chapter devoted to Scotland the Report was pleased to note that, gen¬
erally speaking, the spread of pornography had not been so great in
Scotland as in other parts of the U.K. While in some aspects it had
85
been almost identical (e.g. in broadcasting, films, newspapers and
magazines which were available nationally) , in areas such as the
theatre liberalisation had not gone to the same extremes as in
London. Nor were sex shops widespread due to public protest.
Here we can see an example of the duality in Scottish culture -
on the one hand being influenced by the values of the metropolitan
South, while on the other exercising an element of Scottish 'restraint'.
The Report was moved to comment:
'It is our firm view that the cultural heritage of
the Scot is strongly moralistic and that there is
benefit to a nation frcm a standard of morality.
Anything which tarnishes or destroys that caimon
standard or which would diminish or denigrate the
personality of the constituent meirber of society
is not to be encouraged'.25
At the end of the decade the .Williams Reporh appeared. This was
an official inquiry set up by the Home Secretary into obscenity and
film censorship in England and Wales. Its recoirnendations were not
dissimilar to Longford's. It proposed that the existing cbscenity
laws be scrapped and a comprehensive new statute should start afresh.
The law should be recast to take into account both the harms caused
by the existence of certain material (since these alone could justify
prohibition) and the public's legitimate interest in not being offen¬
ded by the display and availability of the material. Ihe latter could
justify no more than the imposition of restrictions designed to pro¬
tect the ordinary citizen from unreasonable offence. Thus the princi¬
pal abject of the law should be to prevent certain kinds of material
being made available to young people or causing offence to reasonable
people.
The philosophical issue of the law's relationship to morality
again constituted the underlying theme of the Report. Chapter Five
was devoted to an inquiry into the law, morality and freedom of
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expression. Hie Report carrrrented that freedom of expression had to
be balanced against the possible harmful effects which could arise
should such freedom be abused. Thus the 'harm condition' was accepted
but it was noted that there were wide differences of opinion about
the harms publications and films might cause, and also about what
might count as a harm. Hie Williams Coimiittee therefore had the dif¬
ficult problem of establishing what the public thought about obscen¬
ity.
Cn this question of research into public opinion an interesting
comparison can be made between the attitude of the Williams Committee
and the attitude of the Clayson Committee on Scottish Licensing Law.
Both Williams and Clayson shared a scepticism about the usefulness
of the findings of survey polls. Hie results of several such polls
were made available to the Williams Gommittee but they found it dif¬
ficult to gain a clear idea from these of what people thought because
'contradictions and inconsistencies were evident in all of them' .
Hie Report stated:
'It seemed clear that even if questions were
framed with considerable care, the answers
could not be accepted at their face value.
... Questions about what people found to be
indecent produced only confusing results and
certainly were of no help to us in deciding
what the law should attempt to restrict" „2°
Hiis, as we shall see in a later chapter, is a remarkably similar
conclusion to the one reached by Dr. Clayson concerning the findings
of an OPCS poll on public attitudes to drinking and the licensing laws
in Scotland.
Rudolf Klein observed in an article in 1974 that there appeared
to be a new emphasis in the relationship between public policy and
public opinion.27 There was new much more stress on trying to estab¬
lish the state of public opinion as a preliminary to making decisions
87
about policy. This concern with public opinion can, though, involve
different estimates of its importance. Cn the one hand, there are
those who take the view that only public opinion can give legitimacy
to the acts of government, and on the other, there are those who see
public opinion as just one of the factors which must be taken into
account in the decision-making process, but which does not necessarily
determine its outcome. For Klein, 'the relationship between public
opinion and politics is a two-way one; the flow of influence certainly
does not always - if ever - run neatly frcm the former to the latter'.28
Klein illustrated this by referring to the state of public opin¬
ion on some reforms involving issues of morality. He pointed out that
the abolition of hanging was a clear-cut case of Parliament, backed by
elite opinion, ignoring the views of a majority of the country's inha¬
bitants , some two-thirds of whan wanted at the tine to keep the death
penalty. In contrast, public opinion in England an the divorce and
homosexuality issues appears to have been ahead of Parliament in its
willingness to accept liberal reforms. For instance, Klein has recor¬
ded that a 1965 NOP poll found that 63% were prepared to support the
Wolfenden Committee's reconxrendation that homosexual acts between con¬
senting adults in private should no longer be a criminal offence. In
our case studies on Scottish divorce and homosexuality we shall see
that one of the reasons offered for legislative inactivity was that
Scottish public opinion remained hostile to reform.
Klein's argument is that public opinion is 'an unreliable ally'.
Generally, though not always, it tends to be conservative in its
attitude towards change. Radical policies are thus the creation of
elites. Consequently, this suggests the paradox that 'it is precisely
those who want the greatest social changes who should be most elitist
in their approach'. He explains:
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'To stress unapologetically the role of elitism in
public policy-making is not to dismiss public
opinion. It is, however, to be realistic about
the relationship between the two. It is to accept
that an elitism which is neither paternalistic nor
authoritarian has a peculiarly difficult part to
play in today's circumstances - and one which
requires it to explain, educate and debate on a
scale far greater than contemplated hitherto'.29
These questions concerning the nature of public opinion, the role
of elites in policy formulation, and the role of Parliament in either
leading or following popular opinion, feature prominently in our
Scottish case studies.
This issue of pornography and obscenity offers another point of
comparison with our case studies - that there exists sep>arate legisla¬
tion on the same subject either side of the Border. A recent Church
of Scotland publication on cbscenity ccmplained that the existing
piecemeal Scottish legislation had been allowed to atrophy. It com¬
mented that 'to have any law on the statute book which is either held
in contenpt or inefficient in its operation lowers respect for the
whole body of the law' ,30 As the case study on homosexuality will
illustrate this was one of the main arguments put forward in the sev¬
enties for a legislative reform of the law relating to homosexual con¬
duct in Scotland. Retaining a statute which made homosexual acts in
private between consenting adults an offenoe while pursuing a policy
of 'no prosecutions' was deemed to be bringing the law into disrepute.
The Church of Scotland report further argued that there seemed
no good reason why in this field of law there should be any difference
in substance between England and Scotland in the offences involved.
It noted that as the Williams Coirmittee' s inquiry was confined to
England and Wales, any Bill brought before Parliament on the basis
of its reccirmendations was likely to be similarly limited. As a re¬
sult Scotland was faced with the possibility of a delay before any
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measures were brought forward. The Church carments:
'There seems to us to be no reason why any improvements
to the law in Scotland should await the end of this
predictably long delay. It should in our view be
possible to enact legislation applicable to Scotland
alone now 31
This sentiment was one that was frequently expressed during the
debates on Scottish divorce reform throughout the first half of the
1970s. It was argued in some quarters that after the successful en¬
actment of English divorce reform in 1969, Scotland suffered an unjus¬
tifiable 'delay' before it eventually achieved the corresponding reform.
Questions came to be raised about Parliament's handling of Scottish
business generally.
The subject of obscenity then, offers some interesting corrparisons
with our own case studies. Those questions outlined above, along with
others, will be examined at length in the later chapters of the thesis.
c) Capital Punishment
Of all the social issues which involve questions of morality none
has attracted more public attention than, capital punishment. Although
capital punishment is now abolished for all practical purposes, the
debate continues to arise in Parliament as periodic attempts are made
to reintroduce the death penalty, the most recent attempt on 11th May
1982 being defeated by 357 votes to 195. The subject has achieved a
compelling fascination and, in consequence, lingers on in the public
consciousness.
Morally, the issue is somewhat distinct because the regulation
of conduct applies to the state rather than the individual. However,
one is still able to ask the basic question - how far should the law
reflect public mores? The issue gives rise to philosophical questions
about the link between law and morals and about the nature of
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parliamentary representation. As Gavin Drewry has observed, the
interest in the subject over the years has stemmed 'not only from
the macabre aura of fascination surrounding the death cell and the
scaffold, but also frcm the opportunity it has given us to observe
how our elected representatives behave when their constituents are
known to have strong views and the whips are off' .32
Punishnent is generally held to have three principal purposes -
retribution, deterrence and reformation. Hie relative importance of
these three principles has been differently assessed at different
periods and by different authorities. Capital punishment though, can
have no reformative application, hence a defence of the death penalty
has to rest on either the principle of retribution or the principle
of deterrence or on some combination of the two. Hie case in favour
of the death penalty usually revolves around the following types of
argument - at least sore forms of crime are deterred by the threat of
death; society has a right to punish capital offences with similar
sentences; seme crimes deserve the death penalty; and capital punish¬
ment protects society by preventing recidivism in capital offenders.
Cn the other hand the case against the death penalty emphasises that
- capital punishment is a primitive form of retribution based on
revenge; judicial mistakes can lead to the death, of innocent persons;
no evidence shows capital punishment to have a deterrent effect; and
the right to life cannot legitimately be taken away frcm anyone.
Capital punishment laws have therefore usually been framed with
the dual intent that they be both retributive and preventive. Corres¬
pondingly, the challenge to those laws has been, based on the twin con¬
tentions that retribution is an outmoded principle upon which to found
the criminal law and that the deterrence claim is largely unsubstan¬
tiated.
91
Parliamentary preoccupation with capital punishment dates back
at least to the beginning of the 19th century to the canpaign led by
Sir Samuel Romelly to abolish hanging for minor offences against pro¬
perty. The modern debate, conoerning the appropriateness of the death
penalty as the punishment for murder, goes back to before the last
war. In 1938 the Commons debated a motion to abolish the death pen¬
alty and this established the precedent that the issue was one to be
decided without party whipping. After the war the compendious
Criminal Justice Bill of 1948 carried a backbench abolition amendment
which was eventually defeated in the House of Lords. 1949 saw the
appointment of a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Ernest
Gowers to examine the question of capital punishment. The Commission's
terms of reference precluded a straightforward recommendation for or
against the death penalty with the result that its report, published
in 1953, contained a broad variety of conclusions and proposals.33
Its publication though gave fresh impetus to the debate. Interest
was further stimulated in the mid-fifties by the publicity surround¬
ing a number of murder cases. Evidence suggested that certain of the
accused had been wrongfully sentenced to death and hanged. This
caused public concern about the administration of the existing law.
The outcome was the Homicide Act of 1957 which made a distinction
between capital and non-capital murder, i.e. only certain categories
of murder were henceforth to carry the death penalty, the remainder
carrying the sentence of life-imprisoranent. Ihis compromise was in¬
tended by the Conservative Government to take the steam of the grow¬
ing parliamentary clamour for outright abolition.
For a while the issue subsided but there was little doubt that
the law had been, left in an unsatisfactory condition. Inevitably
the anomalies inherent in the Homicide Act became a central feature
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of the abolitionist case. In response to growing concern, Harold
Wilson promised in 1964 parliamentary time for a free debate on the
issue. Here Richards has pointed to something of a 'constitutional
oddity' in that a Bill was mentioned in the Queen's Speech on which
the Government did not express an opinion and which was subsequently
introduced by a backbencher, Sydney Silverman. He remarks that
'there is no doubt that sore of the procedural wrangles that developed
over the Bill were due to its curious parentage".34 However, in spite
of these wrangles Sydney Silverman's Bill - the Murder (Abolition of
the Death Penalty) Bill - managed successfully to negotiate its way
through Parliament to reach the statute book in the middle of 1965,
although it did contain the proviso that the Act remain initially in
force for five years and thereafter should apply only as a result of
affirmative resolutions by both Houses of Parliament.
The debate on capital punishment in the post-war years was marked
by a gradual shift of opinion in both Houses of Parliament in favour
of abolition. However this trend was no reflection of popular feeling
in the country at large. Richards' research shows that in June 1962 a
Gallup Poll indicated that 19% supported the abolitionist cause; in
July 1964 the figure had risen to 21% and in February 1965 to only 23%.
Moreover in June 1966 76% thought that the death penalty should be re¬
introduced. He carments:
'Abolitionist Members could react to the unmistakable
evidence of the balance of opinion only by the asser¬
tion that it was the task of Parliament to lead
opinion, not merely to follow it. Ihe Burke theory
of representation always gives comfort, or excuse,
to a Member hard-pressed by his constituents'.35
Being an issue of 'conscience' MPs found themselves liberated
from the usual party constraints and as a consequence Parliament was
able to play an active part in the formulation of policy on capital
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punishment. Hcwever, this was only possible because of the Govern¬
ment's decision to allocate parliamentary time to allow the issue
to be debated and in this regard Drewry has noted that the Labour
Government's1 pretence at neutrality was patently spurious1,
The issue of capital punishment perhaps does not offer as many
cfovious comparisons with our own case studies as some of the other
issues of 'conscience'. But there are some. Witness again the impor¬
tance of the allocation of tine in Parliament. Note also how on some
issues Parliament prefers to lead public opinion while on others it
prefers to follow. And observe how MPs, free from the party whips,
must balance their own opinions and consciences against constituency
pressure and other influences.
d) Smoking
Strictly speaking smoking is not an issue of morality. In cer¬
tain circumstances it may be considered anti-social or impolite to
indulge, but few would go as far as to describe the practice as im¬
moral. Yet it is another of those issues which involve questions
concerning the freedom of the individual, and his liberty of action.
In what ways, if any, does society have a right to restrict an indi¬
vidual's freedom of choice to smoke? Gnce again the question of
self-regarding and other-regarding action arises. Should smoking be
controlled on paternalist grounds? Or is it sufficient to demonstrate
that an individual's freedom of choice to smoke can. impinge upon
another individual's freedom of choice to live in a smoke-free atmos¬
phere?
All the above questions can also be asked about drinking. In
this respect the cases of smoking and drinking are remarkably simi¬
lar. Not only do they raise similar philosophical questions about
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individual freedom of choice, they also bring to the fore similar
social and political questions concerning health policy, the raising
of public revenue, and the pcwer of vested interests. Here we shall
examine a study by G. T. Popham about policy-making and pressure
group activity on the smoking issue and highlight a number of the
similarities that are to be found by comparing it with our study on
the Scottish drink laws,35
Popham contends that the social costs of smoking; e.g. premature
deaths, still births attributable to smoking by pregnant women, the
financial costs; e.g. lost production through illnesses associated
with smoking; and the cost of treating smoking-related diseases, con¬
stitute powerful arguments in favour of curbing smoking. However,
these have to be weighed against the revenue and employment provided
by the tobacco industry. Groups such as FOREST (Freedom Organisation
for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco) might also add that an indi¬
vidual's freedom of choice must enter the equation somewhere. Thus,
there is an immediate parallel with drinking where similar heavy
social and financial costs have to be balanced against the economics
of the brewing and distilling industries, and where, somewhere in
the middle, the rights of the ordinary citizen to 'enjoy a drink'
have to be taken into consideration.
Hie vast disparity in financial resources between the health
promotion organisations and the respective industries is also another
canton feature. Popham shows that ASH (Action on Smoking and Health) ,
a group set up by the Royal College of Physicians in 1971 to keep the
issue of smoking and health politically alive and to press for poli¬
cies to discourage smoking, had in 1978-9 a total income of £80,000.
This compares rather unfavourably with the tobacco industry which was
spending £80 million on advertising in the mid-seventies. When set
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against the brewers' and distillers' expenditure on product promotion,
the Health Education Council's budget (£734,000 in Scotland in 1977-8)
is likewise a drop in the ocean. As Pcpham remarks, 'tobacco firms
know that the Treasury will not welcome policies which adversely
affect their annual contributions in duty and that Governments cannot,
lightly ignore the value of their exports or the jobs they provide' .37
This conclusion is equally applicable to the drink trade.
The advertising of products is also similar in style (although
T.V. advertising of cigarettes is banned). The product, whether it
be a drink or a brand of cigarette, is usually associated with a mat¬
erially successful and sophisticated life-style involving virility
and sexual conquest. Sponsorship of sport, with brand names subsidi¬
sing particular events, is another way in which the product is linked
to success.
As well as being concerned about their products' image both the
tobacco industry and the drink industry are concerned about their cwn
image. The tobacco industry can be found putting money into cancer
research and into research on lower-risk cigarettes, while the brewers
and distillers put money into nodical research, on alcoholism and alco¬
hol related disabilities. It is felt that a demonstration of concern
over the harmful effects of their products helps to soften the public's
image of these industries as hard-hearted profit-making conglomerates.
Policy-making on both smoking and drinking has thus been the out¬
come of a process in vhich pressure groups have played a particularly
important, role because these issues are carmonly regarded as being non¬
party political. From his research on the smoking issue Pcpham argues
that conflict, between the various pressure groups becomes a substitute
for antagonism between rival political parties. While group resources
are unevenly distributed in this conflict, and while the tobacco
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industry has traditionally identified with the Tory party, lack of a
party line has meant that 'pro- and anti-smoking groups have moved in
to fill the policy vacuum and have encouraged cross party alignments' .3 8
A similar pattern of pressure group activity and cross party align¬
ments is to be found in our case study on the Scottish drink laws.
These then, are some of the more cbvious comparisons between
Popham's study and our own. In both instances a number of competing
factors have to be balanced against each other. Thus, the issue of
the law's encroachment on personal freedom must be balanced against
health considerations which must themselves be balanced against eco¬
nomic interests which must in turn be balanced against prevailing
social trends.
IV. Parliament and Policy Making
In Part iv of this chapter on morality, law and Parliament we
shall turn our attention to the more general role of Parliament in
policy-making. Whereas our previous examples of case studies illus¬
trated aspects of the law's relationship to morality, the case studies
selected in this section will be drawn from a much, broader range of
research into policy formulation. The intention here is to examine
Parliament's seemingly limited role in the development of Government
policy on party-political issues, and to compare this with its more
prominent role when 'issues of conscience' are at stake. We will
also be paying particular attention to the manner in which these case
studies have been approached and presented in order to identify any
similarities in style that might exist between these and our cwn stu¬
dies.
There are seme issues though, which, fall rather uneasily between
the categories of 'party' and 'non-party' political issues. These
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somehow manage to invoke both ideological and moral considerations.
Cue such issue is immigration. Here Hannan Rose has undertaken
research into the Immigration Act 1971 as 'a case study in the work
of Parliament'.39
The starting point for Rose's study was the suggestion that much
of the time of MPs was wasted on debates which had no influence upon
policies that had already been decided. He felt though, that such
criticism tended to be abstract and academic. Therefore, he approached
the study of Parliament in a practical way by following the progress
of a piece of legislation. This would allcw the shortcomings of
Parliament to be assessed by examining the way in which particular
questions were handled. He recognised, however, that the subjects of
immigration and race relations were particularly delicate ones in
British politics, and that 'an example drawn frcm this area would not
necessarily be representative of the legislative process as a whole'.40
In stark contrast to the normative rational model of policy dev¬
elopment, legislation on race relations in Britain can be characteri¬
sed as a series of ad hoc Government responses to specific and imme¬
diate political controversies. Consequently, the aims of Rose's study
were to examine whether there was a rational basis for Government
policy so that action was taken to pursue "solutions' to 'problems',
whether Parliamentary debate enabled alternative views of what con¬
stituted the problem to be aired, and whether in dealing with the
Government's proposed legislation, that debate was effective in refin¬
ing and improving the draft law.41
The 1970 General Election saw the Conservative Party adopt a
'tough' policy on immigration and upon taking office this commitment
was fulfilled by the Immigration Act 1971. However, Rose has commen¬
ted that it was not at all clear hew the promise to the electorate
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came to be translated into Parliamentary legislation. Ihe confusion
lay in the fact that the Conservative Party had been concerned to
meet a difficult political situation vAiich demanded a policy to
' limit immigration' whether or not there was a real problem to be
solved. Thus, the Government had premised to remove any threat of
' further large-scale permanent immigration', but it appeared unable
to make clear what the policy would be or what considerations might
be behind it. This says Rose, 'created an impression that there was
no policy which had been thought out' .1+2
When the 1971 Bill reached Committee, party discipline played a
major part in resolving disputes with both parties retaining rigid
control over divisions. 'Voting strength rather than the importance
of contributions from the renters of the Committee to its debates
was the important consideration' , cbserved Rose.1+3 This, of (course,
was achieved by careful selection of the Committee's Conservative
membership by the Government Whips, since not all Conservatives
agreed with the Bill's provisions.
Research by Valentine Herman has illustrated the limited effect
of Cpposition and backbench amendments moved in Committee and on
Report on Government legislation.^ Analysing 768 amendments to 45
Bills in the 1968-9 session he found that most amendments were of a
minor and textual nature, the Government tidying up its own errors
and omissions; that only 5% of Opposition amendments succeeded,
these also being of a minor and technical nature; and that not a
single important amendment was accepted. He does not, however, paint
a totally negative picture of the Parliamentary process, pointing out
that successful Government amendments were often based on previous
Opposition points or those of Government backbenchers; that many amend¬
ments were not intended to be incorporated into legislation but rather
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to prcbe the Government's intentions or the meaning of legal phrasing;
and that Committees did point out flaws, anomalies and ambiguities
which, the Government then corrected.
Rose is much more optimistic about the value of the procedure in
the Upper House where 'a combination of informed debate and less rigid
Party discipline had a marked effect on the outcome'4 5 of the
Immigration Bill. He noted that the Lords did not have the same dis¬
tractions as MPs as far as constituency responsibilities, casework
and speech making were concerned. Also the slower pace of the Lords
made more measured discussion possible. However, he does warn that
the evidence of one measure must be treated with a degree of caution,
especially when the measure concerned might be considered to fall
rather ambiguously between party politics and 'moral1 politics.
The greater effectiveness of the Lords apart, Rose concludes:
'basic alternative views as to whether immigration
constitutes a "problem", and if it does, according
to what principles a solution should be sought
were not developed. Nor was the basis of the policy
which the machinery established by the Bill was
supposed to implement made clear at any stage in
the debates. The political process which pits
Government against Opposition rather than aiming
to reach coherent and intelligent policies is
obviously an important factor, for both Government
and Opposition are concerned to score points rather
than explore the complexities of an issue. This
obfuscates any real consideration of ... the basic
principles of a question ...' .lt6
Rose's case study then, offers a number of comparisons with our
own. For a start there is an immediate similarity in approach. Like
Rose we have approached the study of Parliament by following the pro¬
gress of certain pieces of legislation in order to assess whether
there have been any shortcomings in the way Parliament has handled
these particular Scottish questions. Further, the ad hoc policy res¬
ponse to the immigration issue that Rose unveiled is not dissimilar
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to the rather ad hoc evolution of policy on Scottish divorce and
homosexuality- Licensing differs slightly in this respect in that
policy was derived from a Departmental Committee' s recommendations.
In contrast to the immigration study where Parliament was deemed
to have had a very limited effect on policy, Parliament did affect in
seme important respects the outcome of policy in all three of our
case studies - although it has to be stressed that on each ocassion
there was a free vote. Thus, 'the cramping force of Party discipline'
which was so important in Rose's immigration study does not feature
nearly as prominently in our cases. So while Rose found that party
voting strength was the important factor in resolving issues in
Committee, our studies illustrate that individual contributions from
Ccmmittee members can affect the final shape of legislation. See for
example, the Committee vote to allow the Sunday opening of public
houses in Scotland.
Lastly, the. greater effectiveness of the House of Lords in influ¬
encing policy which Rose noted is also to be observed in our case
studies where in a number of instances their Lordships were responsi¬
ble for initiating policy or keeping an issue politically alive.
However, like Rose, we must be cautious about making generalisations
since our case studies all involve ' issues of conscience'. It is
commonly accepted that where moral issues are concerned the role and
importance of the Lords is increased. As J. R. Vincent commented in
1965:
"The House of Lords has taken up an executive and
legislative role regarding problems on which the
specialised opinion chiefly concerned has made
its mind up, and has gained the respectful neu¬
trality of the party managers and press, but where
action cannot be expected from the ordinary move¬
ments of opinion, and which politicians do not
wish to be concerned with. The procedural impasse
in the House of Commons aids this tendency
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considerably. In this important sense, then, the
House of Lords is government - it is, by consent,
and by default, the government department, as it
were, principally concerned with modifications of
moral tradition....'.7
These points will be considered in greater detail when our case
studies are discussed.
A series of studies which illustrate aspects of policy-making
and Parliament has been undertaken by Hall, Land, Parker and Webb.1*8
Under the collective title of Change, Choice and Conflict in Social
Policy, these case studies demonstrate the interaction between pres¬
sure groups, government departments and Parliament in policy formu¬
lation. The studies review a broad range of social issues such as
the introduction of family allowances, policy changes in the adminis¬
tration of assistance benefits, the creation of the Open University,
the development of health centres, the creation of detention centres
and the struggle for the Clean Air Act. This last study concerning
the politics of clean air offers some relevant comparisons with our
own.
The manner in which the study has been approached is very simi¬
lar to the style our own case studies follow. The 'polities' of
the reform is broken down into a number of different categories -
the background, the events, the participants, the context, the out¬
come and the conclusion. This allows the development of policy to
be examined over time and frcm a number of angles.
The study focuses on the events and circumstances which preceded
the Clean Air Act 1956. Hall et al. reveal that the campaign for
clean air was a struggle 'not so much against open opposition as
against the reluctance, apprehension and tardiness of government in
according the issue the priority it warranted',119 Legislation to
prevent or reduce air pollution was fragmentary and largely ineffective
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before 1956. The shortcomings had been noted by several coirmittees
of enquiry and, on various occasions, periods of high atmospheric
pollution had led to significant increases in morbidity and mortal¬
ity. Yet such evidence of the need for improved and co-ordinated
clear aim legislation was, to all intents and purposes, ignored by
successive governments.
In December 1952 London was subjected to a dense fog of cata¬
strophic proportions which was responsible for at least 4000 deaths.
Hcwever, reaction to the catastrophe was slew to develop. There
were several reasons why the government did not respond with any
sense of urgency - it took time to collate mortality returns, the
specific effect of the fog had to be established, ministerial res¬
ponsibility for air pollution was divided between a nunfoer of depart¬
ments and the post-war priority was housing production.
Mounting public concern though, in the form of articles in 'The
Times' , questions in Parliament and the campaigning of the National
Smoke Abatement Society, led to a caimittee of inquiry being appoin¬
ted in July, 1953. This committee, chaired by Sir Hugh Beaver,
worked particularly fast and reported in November 1954. The Report's
most important recommendation was that local authorities should have
the pewer under general legislation to establish smokeless zones in
which the emission of smoke frcm chimneys would be entirely prohibi¬
ted and smoke control areas in which the use of bituminous coal for
domestic purposes would be restricted.
The government indicated its acceptance of the principles of the
report at the end of January 1955. The government explained this two
month, delay by the need for consultations with interested parties.
Assurances that the government would introduce comprehensive clean
air legislation within the session were given by the Minister during
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the second reading debate of Gerald Nabarro's Private Members' measure
early in February 1955. Hie question Hall et al. ask is whether, with¬
out this additional pressure and embarrassment of a Private Members'
Bill, such assurances would have been given. They suggest that the
government's intentions were probably to leave the issue until the
next parliamentary session but that Nabarro's Bill did force speedier
action.
In their analysis Hall et al. place particular emphasis on the
role of the National Smoke Abatement Society which was the only group
with a well established and special commitment to clear air reform.
It was also the only body adequately prepared with ideas and informa¬
tion. Despite its limited resources it acted quickly in undertaking
and distributing the results of its cwn survey of the smog of 1952
and in formulating evidence to Beaver. Later, it was able to brief
Nabarro and provide him with a parliamentary adviser and, further,
to assist other MPs during the passage of the eventual government
Bill.
Parliament and backbench MPs were also important according to
Hall et al. They comment:
'The role of Parliament, and especially certain
backbench MPs of both parties, must not be under¬
estimated in the clean air campaign. Their
prominence in our story is a reflection of the
almost complete lack of interest and involvement
of either of the political parties'.50
Hall et al. suggest that two features of this backbench intervention
- parliamentary questioning and Nabarro' s Private Members' Bill -
were particularly important in helping to keep the issue alive.
Brookes and Richardson in their study of the environmental lobby
in Britain have come to a very similar conclusion with regard to the
backbench MP.51 They point out that one of the key characteristics
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of the environmental issue is its straddlingof conventional political
cleavages. Support for environmental causes is not confined to those
of a particular political persuasion so within Parliament a consider¬
able degree of all-party concern has emerged. Here a backbench MP
can undertake a number of important services on behalf of a group
which has won his synpathies. He can convince colleagues, raise mat¬
ters in backbench ccnmittees, and arrange meetings between group rep¬
resentatives and appropriate ministers. Also through his contact with
ministers on a group's behalf, an MP can not only press its case, but
can secure information unavailable, to the group frcm any other source.
Hcwever, Brookes and Richardson do not underestimate the importance
of making direct contact with the Government:
'It is ... essential for groups to compete for the
ear of the Government and to establish a consul¬
tative relationship whereby their views on parti¬
cular legislative proposals will be sought prior
to the crystallization of the Government's position.
Failure to influence policy formation at this stage
relegates the groups' role to that of fighting a
rearguard action at successive stages of the policy¬
making process',52
In explaining policy change, then, there are certain aspects of
these environmental case studies which can be coirpared with our cwn.
Hall et al. identify the 'event' of the 1952 London smog as being
crucial. Ihis caused a shift in public awareness of and tolerance
for a particular social risk. In our case studies on the Scottish
reform of the licensing, divorce and homosexuality laws, such concrete
'events' are perhaps a little more difficult to identify. Rather than
being illustrative of one major event which could be said to have been
a turning point or catalyst for reform, our studies tend to highlight
a series of lesser events over time which steadily established pres¬
sure for reform. In this respect they demonstrate trends in public
awareness and expections on an issue and emphasise the need to examine.
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policy development over a period of time and in the context of compet¬
ing political priorities. Per instance we shall find that a camion
feature of our cases is the 'sense of injustice' which appeared to
develop in Scotland in the seventies when it was realised by more and
more people that in respect of the law on these issues England and
Wales enjoyed a nunfoer of advantages over Scotland.
Hall et al. also note that the pressures for change appear to
have been generated outside the traditional bureaucracies; henoe the
importance of pressure groups , especially well informed single issue
groups such as the National Smoke Abatement Society. We have already
drawn comparisons between other single issue groups and some of those
which appear in the course of our case studies, e.g. the important
role of the Scottish Homosexual Rights Group in keeping the issue of
homosexual law reform alive. It has further been noted by Hall et al.
that a major problem in achieving change involved dispelling the appa¬
rent apathy of the government 'for without its concern and interven¬
tion little progress could be made'.5 3 When we come to develop our
case studies the significance of this statement will became increas¬
ingly apparent.
Lastly, taking up Brockes and Richardson's point concerning the
need for groups to make direct contact with the Government, we shall
see in our licensing study (a Government sponsored Bill but with a
free vote) how important it was for groups to be part of the Scottish
Office consultation network if their views were to be taken into con¬
sideration before or as legislation was being drafted.
The studies we have just outlined, then - on immigration and
atmospheric pollution - demonstrate the inconsistency of Parliament's
role in policy development. In the one instance it was seen how
party discipline was the. dominant factor in shaping the policy outcome
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while in the other backbench MPs and pressure groups were seen to
have a much more important role, at least in stimulating action.
But, what is Parliament's typical role?
It will be recalled that Pose's starting point was the sugges¬
tion that for the most part policies appear before Parliament as
'fait accomplis'. Certainly the bulk of political science literature
offering a critique of British government and administration has
cone to this conclusion. A recent series of policy studies by Douglas
Ashford has added weight to this view.54 Under the rubric Policy and
Politics in Britain Ashford has. examined a spectrum of policy issues
covering administrative reform, economic policy-making, industrial
relations, regional policies, social security and race and immigra¬
tion policies. The approach to each of the six policy cases follows
a ccrrmon format. The first section analyses the context of the prob¬
lem - its historical roots, competing perceptions of the problem, and
its interdependence with other problems; the second deals with the
agenda - the pressures generating action and the explicit and implicit
motives; the third deals with process - the formulation of the issue,
its attempted resolution, and the instruments involved in policy im¬
plementation; and the fourth traces the consequences of policy. It
will be seen that the manner in which these studies have been under¬
taken is similar to the approach utilised by Hall et al. and to the
approach utilised in this thesis.
The argument put forward by Ashford, though, is one which very
much points to the primacy of the Executive and its bureaucracy in
the formulation of policy. The increased importance of the government
as a regulatory economic force, the tendency tcwards corporate decision¬
making and the increased complexity of the entire structure of govern¬
ment have led to the decline in importance of direct democratic control
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through Parliament. The 'unique characteristic' of the British poli¬
tical system which Ashford notes is the high premium placed on adver¬
sarial behaviour at the uppermost levels of decision making. He
observes:
'Compared to most modern democracies, the Opposition
has relatively few ways to intervene in lawmaking
and policy choices, the supporters of the governing
majority in Parliament are themselves excluded from
policy making to a remarkable degree, and the inner
circle of cabinet and ministers operates under con¬
ditions of secrecy and other forms of insulation
frcm external political forces that probably exceeds
that of most democratic governments. The formulation,
implementation, and evaluation of policies are subject
to the judgement and priorities of a very small group
of tcp political leaders'.55
Ashford's view, then, is that 'parliament can do little more than
ccpe with the consequences of policy making as eventually perceived by
the public1.56 In so far as there is a 'deliberative' stage in the
legislative process, it tends to occur much earlier than the Parliamen¬
tary stages, in the interplay between political parties, pressure
groups, government departments and Cabinet, which together form a
complex decision-making structure involving a variety of social and
political forces. Thus, the British political system, Ashford suggests,
has two rather distinct sets of inputs affecting policy-making:
'... those of groups, officials, and social leaders
who directly ccarmunicate with the political elite
as part of the pattern of elite consensus; and a
second, more familiar pattern of conventional poli¬
tical inputs from elections, parties, and Parliament
that reflects societal consensus. So long as the
values represented in the two patterns are compatible,
there are not likely to be major breakdowns of govern¬
ment, and adversarial politics can continue to fulfill
the expectations of both structures'.57
However, while there may be two distinct sets of inputs which
can affect policy development, it is the former set, involving an
inner elite of politicians and officials, which is, generally speak¬
ing, paramount in determining policy. Parliament's typical role in
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policy-making, then, is restricted. Only occasionally and exception¬
ally when a broader consensus is required can Parliament begin to
influence the shape of policy.
V. Conclusion
In this chapter our purpose has been threefold - to outline the
philosophical debate concerning the relationship between morality and
the law; to illustrate through case studies some examples of 'moral'
legislation and to compare various aspects of these studies with our
own to highlight similarities and contrasts; and to examine Parliament's
role in policy-making by assessing a range of issues in order to dif¬
ferentiate between those circumstances in which. Parliament can be
identified as having a prominent policy function from those in which
it merely ratifies Government thinking.
We must care to the conclusion, already noted by many others,
that when party-political issues are at stake, and these constitute
by far the bulk of its business, Parliament is very limited in its
ability to influence legislation, the principles of which have already
been established by the Executive, government departments and relevant
interested parties. This corresponds to the adversarial politics des¬
cribed by Ashford. On the other hand, there are instances where
Parliament can come into its own in determining the shape of policy.
This is when issues of 'morality' are at stake and, being non-party
political, the whips are removed and a free vote is allowed.
Ostensibly, the Government is neutral on such occasions and does
not express any opinions. Rarely though does the Government have no
views whatsoever and it is important for a measure to succeed that
the Government's neutrality tends towards the 'benevolent'. We noted
in some of the above instances, and we will observe again in our own
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case studies, that for a measure to succeed the Government must gen¬
erally be sympathetic to the issue, even to the extent of allocating
additional parliamentary time to ensure the completion of debates.
So it might be said that, even where 'issues of conscience' are con¬
cerned, Parliament is still in many ways dependent upon the Govern¬
ment's appraisal of the merits (or more likely the public acceptabil¬
ity) of the particular issue in question. Consider for example the
revelations of Grossman's Diaries of 26th September, 1967:
'This afternoon Gerald Gardiner brought forward at
Home Affairs a Divorce Bill to implement the reforms
recommended by the Law Commission. He said rather
airily that he thought that this had been so widely
accepted not only by the Law Commission but by the
Archbishop's committee that it was bound to get
through, without any controversy. This was greeted
with a hearty roar of laughter by the Secretaries of
State for Wales and Scotland who said there'd be
plenty of disagreement. That brought us to a lcngish
discussion about how to handle it. The Lord
Chancellor said that it ought to be a Government
measure with a free vote. I had to point out that
it was an impossible operation from the point of view
of the Whips. The only sensible thing was to give it
to a Private Member and then provide Government time,
using the technique we'd evolved for abortion and
homosexuality. That requires Cabinet agreement.
Personally I think this is an extremely sensible and
skilful way of getting out of our difficulties in
dealing with social reforms of this sort. But there
are members of Cabinet who don't and that's why it
will come up to Cabinet next week' .58
Subsequent to that Cabinet meeting Crossman reports:
"The full details of the draft Bill are to be prepared
in Gerald Gardiner's office and handed to a back¬
bencher to take responsibility for it. We shall
apparently provide time whether the back-bencher
wins in the ballot or not. It's moving a stage
further with our new device for putting controversial
legislation to the House provided that, on a free
vote, the House really wants it'.59
Thus, even where Parliament does make its mark on policy it is
often a mark which already has the blessing of the Government of the
day. Parliament certainly can influence policy where morality impinges
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upon the law and where MPs demand to vote according to conscience,
but it is an influence which is very much under the watchful eye of
the Executive. Crossman has contented poignantly upon this relation¬
ship between the Executive, Parliament and the masses when issues
arousing emotional responses come to the fore. Referring to Enoch
Powell's famous Birmingham speech on race and immigration in April
1968 he observes:
'It's in these crises ... that the British constitution
is like a rock against which the tide of popular
emotion breaks, and one hopes after a time the tide
will go down and the rock stand untouched. This is
the strength of our system, that, though in one sense
we have plebiscitary democracy, actually the leader¬
ship is insulated frcm the masses by the existence of
Parliament. Parliament is the buffer which enables
our leadership to avoid saying yes or no to the
i that, given time, the situation
Here then, we can see Ashford's point concerning the two distinct
sets of inputs which affect policy-making. This relationship between
Government, Parliament and public opinion will be discussed again.
An alternative to Ashford's view however, lies in the 'Norton
view'.6 1 Norton is critical of the widespread view which sees the
House of Conrons as a body that provides unquestioning assent for the
decisions of Government. Further, he queries the idea that the ini¬
tiation and formulation of legislation is something largely, if not
almost exclusively, undertaken by Government. While this may have
been true for a good part of the twentieth century, he does not see
it as being particularly applicable to the politics of the 1970s and
early 1980s, which, it is suggested, have been of a rather different
character.
Various proposals for parliamentary reform originated in the 1960s
and were advanced in an attempt to make effective Parliament's function
of scrutiny and influence. These were based on 'the perceived lowly
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and inadequate role played by the Camions in the political process'
and sought to make internal changes to the workings of Parliament.62
However, by the 1970s there was marked dissatisfaction with this lim¬
ited internal approach to reform and as a result the pressure for re¬
form became much more far reaching. Norton contends:
'It was pressure that in some cases was generated
or reinforced by the indecisiveness of the 1974
general elections and the grcwth of minor parties,
interpreted by some as a demonstration of dissatis¬
faction with the existing party and parliamentary
system of Britain' .63
According to Norton at least five separate approaches could be
identified in the 1970s, although not all of them were new:
i) internal reform; ii) external reform through the introduction of
a new electoral system; iii) external reform through the enactment of
a Bill of Rights; iv) anti-reform (subdivided into two rather differ¬
ent perspectives - a) those who defended Parliament on the grounds
that it performed well the tasks demanded of it, and b) those who
perceived Parliament as an 'irrelevancy' in the wider socio-economic
scheme of things) ; and v) Norton's cwn thesis. To this might be added
another approach, that is, pressure for constitutional reform through
the creation of elected devolved Assemblies. However, that aside, it
is Norton's own view which is of interest here.
Norton's view emphasises the 'importance of attitudes within
Parliament, and the potential and actual power available already to
Members, as the basis on which the Commons might achieve an effective
role of scrutiny and influence'.6 ^ This view draws on the experience
of parliamentary behaviour in the 1970s which reveals MPs' increased
willingness to dissent against the Government line. The importance
of the approach he explains, is that it employs a recognition of what
is as the basis of what ought to be, that is, it seeks to encourage
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and promote parliamentary attitudes which have begun already to change.
Thus, despite the disparagement of Parliament, he argues that the
House of Cannons can and does have a role to play in the British poli¬
tical process. The key to more effective scrutiny and influence lies
with MPs themselves. Norton argues:
"The means by which the House can achieve a greater
degree of scrutiny and influence of that part of it
which forms the Government exist already, but those
ireans can be employed only if Members themselves
are willing to employ them. The two elements of
this approach - the powers available to the House,
and the willingness of Members to employ them -
have been ignored (or in some cases implicitly
and not so implicitly rejected) by both internal
and external reformers. Yet the House of Carnons
retains a basic pcwer. If a majority of Members
disagree with a proposal or motion advanced by the
Government, they can vote against it in the division
lobbies. The advent of party government and the
consequent degree of cohesion in the division lobbies
had led many to assume that this basic power had
fallen into disuse. It has not. It is a power
which can be, and in recent years has been, used by
Members1.6 5
Norton concedes that in the sixties such an argument would have
been dismissed. However, the strength of this approach, he suggests,
was to be demonstrated in the 1970s when Government backbenchers, under
both Conservative and Labour administrations, proved willing to enter
Opposition lobbies to impose defeats on their own front bench. And as
the decade progressed, the greater was the awareness on the part of
Members of what they could achieve. So much so that Norton is drawn
to the. rather ironic conclusion that had it not been for dissent in
the 1974-79 Parliament by a number of Labour- Members, Britain would
now in fact have a new constitutional framework involving a devolved
Scottish Assembly.
There exists, then, amongst political commentators differing
points of view as to the role of Parliament and this can give rise
to ambiguity and confusion concerning its functions of scrutiny and
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and influence over policy. That it has ceased to form a regular part
of the decision-making process is readily conceded by Norton. However,
he identifies it 'as occupying an unusual place in the British politi¬
cal process, having an important relationship with, yet not being a
major part of, the decision-making process'.66 It is the nature of
this (unusual) relationship which is to be explored in the forthcoming
empirical case studies.
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I. A Case Study Approach
The research for this thesis was undertaken by means of a case
study approach. As a research method, hcwever, the status of case
studies remains sorewhat dubious. The underlying doubt about the
method has been whether it is possible to utilise case studies in a
systematic way in order to advance theory. The criticism has been
levelled that there are too many variables in the processes of policy¬
making to be managed by a case approach.
Rcy Gregory, for instance, even though he utilised the method in
his five studies of controversial amenity policy in Britain, doubts
whether case-studies can be used for theory building:
'They may well suggest hypotheses of considerable
interest ... but it is hard to see how the scme-
what indeterminate variables that characterise
administrative situations could ever be rigour-
ously and scientifically controlled, or hew
hypotheses could ever be systematically tested
without replicating an enormous number of cases
so much alike as to becane insufferably boring'.1
Richard Simeon has also criticised the concentration on case
studies in much of the existing policy literature:
'... the most cannon framework sometimes appears
to consist of mandatory theoretical chapters at
the beginning and end which bear little relation¬
ship to the detailed historical reconstruction of
a set of events which takes up the bulk of the
book'.2
On the other hand, Hugh Heclo, while warning against the idea
that theory will grow naturally frcm a critical mass of cases, sug¬
gests that there is an untapped potential in the use of the method
for policy analysis. He contents:
'There appears to be nothing about the case study
technique which is inherently nontheoretical or
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unscientific; the problem lies in assuming that
theoretical contributions will emerge automati¬
cally from narrative ... Case studies may in
fact have unique advantages for theory construc¬
tion. Perhaps the greatest area of premise in
case studies concerns their ability to "move"
with the reality of dynamic factors'.3
So while the ability of the case study to test the validity of
hypotheses is open to seme doubt, this does not necessarily preclude,
as Hall et al. have pointed out, case material frcm being used to
begin conceptual analysis. The case study approach possesses quali¬
ties which can be particularly useful for policy analysis. By rela¬
ting events to antecedent contexts, the case study technique can
identify process and in this way tackle transformations in policy
development. Thus, it has the potential to highlight, in Heclo's
words, 'the successive differenticsns in a moving but forever incom¬
plete process of "becoming"'.^
Apart frcm this capacity to deal with policy change, another
facet of the method's potential usefulness is the richness and flex¬
ibility of analysis available to it. The approach can integrate,
for instance, existing historical studies, secondary sources, statis¬
tical data, surveys and interviews. Analytically, then, case studies
can enccmpass and bring to bear a remarkable variety of factors,
frcm individual motivations and perceptions to comprehensive socio¬
economic trends. And precisely because of this flexibility, case
studies are especially suited to ccnparative analysis.5
At a time when positivist social research is being increasingly
reappraised, the advantages of the case study may be better apprecia¬
ted. The method displays many of the qualities of Bell and Newby's
'decent methodological pluralism' .6 They contend that it is no longer
plausible to argue that there should be only one style of social re¬
search with one method which is to be the method, rather there should
be many.
119
For Hall et al., 'the method is as effective as other approaches
in suggesting general propositions about how policy develops'.7 They
suggest that it is particularly suited to exploring the meaning actors
attach to their behaviour in policy-snaking, an observation also made
by Hofferbert. He corrments that 'case studies, partly because of
their narrative mode, stress the actions, hopes and expectations of
individuals; it is one of their strengths that they bring to the cur¬
ious student a sense of the human dimension in policy-making' .8
Approached rigorously, the case study, according to Becker, can
force the investigator to deal with unexpected findings, and indeed,
requires him to reorientate his study in the light of such develop¬
ments. This requires him to consider, however crudely, the multiple
inter-relations of the particular phenomena under observation.
Adhering to a few basic safeguards can assist in obtaining this
necessary rigour in the case study approach. For example, Hall et
al. have identified a few essential groundrules.
i. There must be an acknowledged conceptual framework, however
modest or rudimentary, with reference to which, the cases are
studied and conclusions drawn. There should be a set of
questions which the cases are intended to help answer. In
other words there has to be a delimiting context.
ii. There needs to be a collection of cases sharing this ccmmon
framework and concerned with a reasonably similar order of
events.
iii. There should be a comparison of cases and a search for regu¬
larities .
iv. Since policy formation is a flow of events and actions over
time , the chosen cases should be set in the context of
other concurrent, overlapping and carpeting events.
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Thus, Hall et al. are drawn to the conclusion that:
'if there is a conceptual framework from which to
depart; if there is a reasonably similar set of
cases to provide the opportunity for some cautious
comparison; and if we strive to lock at policy-
inaking-through-time rather than at isolated
decisions, the use of the case study approach is
justifiable and profitable'.9
However, from a very large universe of issues or policies which
might be examined, the researcher must select for his study a manage¬
able subset of issue areas. This requires that the characteristics
of the type of issue selected be explained and specified.
Becker has noted that in the beginning the researcher may not be
sure what problem is the most deserving of study in the community he
is working in; hence he devotes his first analytic efforts to uncover¬
ing worthwhile problems and to developing prepositions that will
prove, most useful in tackling them.10 This experience was very much
a part of the research for this thesis.
As was noted in Chapter 1 the decade spanning the late sixties
to the late seventies was one of intense political flux in which the
constitutional conception of Britain as a unitary centralised state
was being seriously questioned. From the Scottish viewpoint criti¬
cisms were levelled that the Executive was unaccountable, bureaucracy
was over-centralised, and Parliament was unable to cope with the
demands of Scottish legislation. In the light of these criticisms a
number of broad questions were developed as a starting point to
enquire into some of the claims being made. 'These questions were
gradually refined until a specific focus was achieved. Hew did
Parliament operate in regard to policy issues which were specifically
Scottish? Did Scotland have its cwn 'political system' for dealing
with these issues? What was it about the issues which made them
particular to Scotland? Again as Becker has observed, researchers
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frequently discover that the problem they set out to study is not as
important as, or cannot be studied except in the context of, seme
other problem they had not anticipated studying,, In this way the
range of Scottish policy issues of the seventies was scanned and
considered in order to identify a case or cases through which it
would be possible to examine these broader considerations as well as
the substantive policy area involved.
In many respects the selection of cases was, like the decision¬
making process they were designed to illuminate, incremental. It
was established early on that in 5issues of conscience" there were a
number of differences in the policies which prevailed north and south
of the border. One such issue was liquor licensing. Here Scotland
and England not only had different licensing systems and different
hours, but also different patterns of drinking and different rates of
alcoholism. Scotland has traditionally had a much higher incidence
of alcohol related problems and this was increasingly becoming a
cause of concern. Hie case of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976,
then, seemed a legitimate case to pursue as a means of studying not
only a particularly serious Scottish social problem, but also the
"politics" of a specifically Scottish reform.
In selecting problems, propositions and concepts the investiga¬
tor works from findings made early in the research. So as this inves¬
tigator became familiar with Scottish law other law reforms began to
emerge as possible subjects of enquiry. In this way it was learned
that in the case of divorce, Scotland had taken some seven years
longer to obtain a reform than had England. Why should this have
been so? As no satisfactory explanation appeared readily available
it was decided to add the case of the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 to
the study. This was another sphere of the law where the substantive
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policy was of considerable importance to a great number of Scots.
The 'polities' of this reform had all the hallmarks of an intriguing
case study.
Continuing along this path of enlightenment it was further dis¬
covered that (at the tine the research was initiated) the law relat¬
ing to homosexual conduct in Scotland had not been reformed at all,
even although in England in 1967 a reform had been enacted permitting
homosexual conduct in private between consenting adults over the age
of 21. Although the law was subsequently reformed in 1980, through
a piece of political opportunism during the passage of the Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Act .1980, this could be considered to have been a
Scottish 'non-decision' throughout the course of the 1970s. As well
as being concerned with the rights of a Scottish minority, this case
again appeared to offer a means through which broader questions con¬
cerning Scottish politics could be raised.
Thus, the cases, as well as being concerned with the substantive
policy areas in question, were also selected to illustrate some
aspects of 'the politics of Scottish law reform' and to examine what,
if anything, constitutes the 'Scottish dimension' in such 'issues of
conscience'. The cases, focusing upon the development of policy in
three areas of social, and moral, concern in Scotland in the 1970s -
liquor licensing, divorce and homosexuality - offer an empirical means
by which a number of aspects of the 'Scottish, political system' can
be explored, political actors and organisations identified, and their
interactions highlighted. Each of the cases is intended to offer in¬
sights into policy formulation in Scotland by investigating policy
change as both 'an intellectual activity and an .institutional process*.
Not only do the cases afford a means of exploring Scottish cul¬
ture and Scottish administrative practice, they also offer a means
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for illuminating the interaction between the Scottish and British
'political systems'. These issues of conscience demonstrate, to same
extent, the duality apparent in. the Scottish system, which can appear
both dependent and independent within the larger British system. On
the one hand each of these cases has a distinct historical and legal
tradition and has required separate legislation, but on the other,
the need for social justice and equality before the law throughout
Britain, has meant there has been pressure to conform to patterns
already established in England.
The cases, then, have been chosen with as much regard as possible
to the groundrules suggested by Hall et. al. A combination of approa¬
ches, with reference to which the cases will be studied and conclu¬
sions drawn, has been outlined in Chapter 2. The cases form a collec¬
tion of 'issues of conscience5 in Scotland which reflect Scottish
social, moral and political ambiguities as cbserved in Chapter 1.
They have been compared in Chapter 3 with other similar studies, and
further comparisons will be drawn in the concluding chapter. And
the formulation of policy can be examined over time and in the con¬
text of other overlapping and competing events as suggested, again,
in Chapter 1.
II. Sources of Information
During the course of the research for this thesis several sources
of information were utilised. They can be categorised in the follow¬
ing manner:- i) existing literature; ii) Government and Parliamentary
Papers; iii) unpublished pressure group records and submissions;
iv) newspaper reports and articles; and v) interviews.
Categories i) and ii) are self-explanatory. Categories iii) and
iv) require a few words of explanation. Category v) will be dealt
with separately in the next section.
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The bulk of the pressure group records and submissions referred
to were those related to the Departmental Coirmittee on Scottish
Licensing Law. Excluding written evidence submitted by individual
members of the public there were around 150 representations made to
the Committee by interested organisations. Access to all these papers
was eventually achieved but not before a number of difficulties were
overcome.
An initial approach was made in early November 1979 to the
Assistant Secretary of the Criminal Justice and Licensing Division
of the Scottish Home and Health Department for permission to view the
Clayson papers in the Scottish Office files. This was met with the
official reply that as the submissions had not been made public they
fell within the '30 year rule'. Under this rule public access to
confidential Government documents was prchibited for thirty years,
after the original date of filing. It was regretted that permission
to view could not be granted, unless the consent of each organisation
was obtained.
Out of the 150 or so organisations the addresses of about 100
were traced. To them a letter was sent requesting permission to view
their submission in the Scottish Office files and enquiring as to
_ \
what additional information they themselves might have on record.
Virtually everyone replied in some form or another. Around 25 enclo¬
sed copies of their submission along with any other relevant material
they had, e.g. correspondence with the SHHD on the issue, minutes of
any internal group meetings. All the responses gave permission to
view whatever material of theirs was on file in the Scottish Office -
with the exception of one. The Crcwn Office refused to allow access
but gave no reason other than to state that the submission was
'confidential'.
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Armed with around 100 letters of consent and also the consent of
the Chairman of the Ccrrmittee, Dr. Clayson, another approach was made
to the Scottish Office. This time my acting supervisor wrote on my
behalf directly to the Minister responsible, Mr. Malcolm Rifkind,
explaining the situation in full and again requesting permission to
view the Clayson papers. In light of this representation the
Minister waived the 30 year ban and authorised access to the submis¬
sions made to the Clayson Contrattee.
The files that were made available to me contained all the evi¬
dence taken by the Committee. This consisted of both written and oral
evidence submitted by organisations and individual merrbers of the pub¬
lic. The quality of this evidence varied dramatically and this is
discussed in Chapter 5. As well as this evidence, correspondence
between pressure, groups and the SHHD was lodged in the files. Also
on hand were the carments of Mr. A. Simten, Secretary to the Committee.
He summarised each submission, drew the attention of the Committee to
any points of interest and made recommendations about the significance
and merit of each contribution.
The minutes of the Committee1s deliberations were not contained
in these files". At first this was considered to be a drawback but
subsequent information revealed that these minutes had been non-
attributive in that individual, views were not recorded. Information
concerning the Committee's deliberations was later obtained from
interviews with Committee members.
Access to Government deliberations and decisions after the
Clayson Report had been published and opinions canvassed was not
granted. In Chapter 1 we noted the general secrecy that pervades
the operation of the Scottish Office so access to the .internal decision¬
making process was not expected. This was something of a handicap
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since these records would have shed light on the influence of civil
servants in the policy process.
As far as the other two studies were concerned the nuniber of
interest groups involved was a great deal smaller since there were no
separate Scottish inquiries into either divorce or homosexuality.
Hence the material available was more limited in scope. Of particular
importance though, were the records obtained frcm the files of the
Church of Scotland which charted the development of Church policy on
divorce and homosexuality over the last two decades. Similarly, the
documents obtained from the Catholic Press and Media Office in Glasgow
were also important in understanding the views of the Reman Catholic
Church in Scotland on these issues.
Gaining access to newspaper records also proved difficult. It
was found that the University of Edinburgh Library had on microfilm
back issues of "Ihe Times', 'The Scotsman' and the 'Glasgcw Herald'.
Hcwever, of these the Library only possessed a catalogue for "Ihe
Times'. After enquiries it was discovered that the 'Glasgcw Herald'
catalogue had been discontinued in the early sixties, and that 'The
Scotsman' had never produced such a compendium. Without a subject
catalogue it was impossible to locate relevant articles unless their
date was already knewn. Randcm scanning to identify features was not
feasible given the sheer volume of material on hand. The irony, and
the frustration, was that the sources were available but the means to
utilise them (with the exception of 'The Times' catalogue) were not.
It was therefore decided to approach 'The Scotsman' for permis¬
sion to use its archives. An initial and informal approach was made
to a journalist friend on the staff of 'The Scotsman'. After enquir¬
ies he regretted to inform me that it was not normal practice to
allow 'external' researchers into "The Scotsman' Library. At this
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point a second and more formal approach was made by my supervisors on
my behalf to have normal regulations relaxed. However, the same
response was forthcoming - that the Librarian did not permit 'out¬
siders' to use the archive facilities within "Ihe Scotsman' offices.
Consideration was then given to approaching other Scottish news¬
papers. In the interim though, the visit to the Catholic Press
recorded above yielded an unexpected result, for not only did this
office have documents pertaining to Reman Catholic doctrine and
policy, it also possessed files of newspaper cuttings on various
social and moral issues in Scotland frcm the early 1970s onwards.
The relevant files on licensing, divorce and homosexuality contained
a good selection of press clippings and it is this material which
has been used in the thesis.
Such good fortune, however, did not continue when it cane to
gathering opinion poll data on our issues of conscience. Several
survey organisations were contacted, amongst them National Opinion
Polls (NOP), Opinion Research Centre (ORC), Social Surveys (Gallup
Poll), Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) and System
Three Scotland. All of these organisations replied courteously and
sent poll data which they though might be useful. The problem was
that the information applied, in the main, to British surveys on
moral issues. Very little, if any, separate Scottish opinion poll
materia], on moral issues appears to exist. This was a big disadvan¬
tage as one of the aims of the thesis was to compare Scottish and
English public opinion on our issues of conscience. Where the avail¬
able material was considered useful it has been included in the text.
Otherwise it has been left out.
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III. Ihe Interviews
Over a nine month period from July 1980 to March 1981 30 inter¬
views were conducted with a series of political actors who were sel¬
ected as being 'key informants'. In addition 2 supplementary inter¬
views were undertaken in November 1982 to check information and verify
particular points. Ihe selection of these particular respondents was
based en the significance of their contribution to policy development
in one or more of the cases under consideration. Significant contri¬
butions were identified by a process of elimination. While this in¬
volved a matter of personal judgement the assessment was carried out
as rigorously as possible using all the written information available
at the time.
For each case study a list was compiled of all those knewn to
have been involved in some way. Each list was then divided into pres¬
sure groups, Committee of Inquiry personnel (where applicable) , MPs
and members of the House of Lords. The size of these lists varied,
liquor licensing being the largest since it included the 150 or so
representations to the Clayson Committee. This had to be reduced to
manageable proportions. Minor submissions were easily identifiable
and these were eliminated at the outset. 'Those remaining were then
reduced by classifying under a single heading groups of a similar
kind, e.g. The British Medical Association, the Royal Colleges of
Edinburgh and of Glasgcw, and the Institute of Psychiatry were classi¬
fied under the collective .rubric 'medical interests'. Other catego¬
ries included the licensed trade, the churches, legal organisations,
the police, and youth organisations.. These were then considered for
possible interview (Table 4.1) .
ihe pressure group subdivisions of the other two lists, divorce
(Table 4.2) and homosexuality (Table 4.3) were much easier to handle.
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TABLE 4.1 Licensing - Provisional list of issues
A. 1. Misuse of alcohol - Scottish 'traditions' and rate of
alcoholism.
2. Licensing authority - administrative/judicial debate.
3. Licensing system and types of licence.
4. Permitted hours - Sunday opening, later closing, etc.
5. Protection of youth - abuse from off-sales, age limit,




9. Research and monitoring of change/public attitudes.
B. Pressure groups' interests:
Tourist bodies 4. 7.
Residential protection groups 3. 4. 6. 8.
Medical interests 1. 4. 5. 9.
Temperance bodies 1. 3. 4. 5. 6. 9.
Religious organisations and Churches 1. 3. 4. 5. 6. 8. 9.
Clubs 2. 3. 4. 5 . 8 .
Political/ecanomic/aciriinistrative bodies 3. 4. 5. 7. 8.
Consumer groups 1. 3. 4. 5. 8.
Youth groups 1. 4. 5. 6.
Trade - (a) Brewers and Distillers 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
(b) Managers and Staff 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Police 1. 3. 4. 5. 8. 9.
Legal societies 2. 3. 6. 8.
Sporting and leisure groups 3. 4.
Student associations 4. 8.
C. Provisional list of groups rated for possible interview
a) Tourist:
Scottish Tourist Board
British Hotels and Restaurants Association (Scottish Division)
British Transport Hotels Limited.
b) Residential:
Central New Tcwn Association of Edinburgh (or any similar
residents association) .
c) Medical:
British Medical Association (Scottish Division)
Institute of Psychiatry
Royal College of Physicians.
d) Tenperance:
Scottish Temperance Alliance.
e) Church of Scotland
Roman Catholic Bishops
Free Church of Scotland
Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland
United Free Church of Scotland.
f) Clubs:







Scottish league of Young Liberals
Scottish Young Conservatives
Association of County Councils (new C06LA)
Corporations of the 4 cities (new District Councils).
h) Consumer:
Scottish Council for Civil Liberties.
i) Youth:
Advisory Group on Youth-at-Risk
E.I.S.




1) Brewers Association of Scotland
International Distillers and Vintners Limited
2) Licensed Grocers' and Wine Merchants' Association
National Association of Licensed House Managers
Scottish Licensed Trade Association.
k) Police:
Association of Chief Police Officers.
1) Legal:
Faculty of Advocates
Law Society of Scotland
Scottish Law Agents Society
Scottish Law Ccmriission.
m) Sporting and leisure:




e.g. University of Edinburgh SRC.
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TABLE 4.2 Divorce - Provision list of issues
A. 1. Nunber of Bills presented and overall delay.
2. Parliamentary time allocated to English Bill but not to
Scottish.
3. Nature of public opinion/MPs and their information.
4. Procedure for private members' Bills, esp. Scottish Bills,
5. Irretrievable breakdown as sole ground.
6. Obstructionist stance of certain MPs.
7. 'Radicalism' of the proposals of the Church.
8. Law to be coitparable with, or different frcm, England.
9. Jurisdiction of courts.
B. Pressure groups' interests:
Churches 1. 3. 5. 7. 8.
Legal societies 1. 5. 7. 8. 9.
Equal rights groups 5. 8. 9.
TABLE 4.3 Hcnosexuality - Provisional list of issues
A. 1. 1967 English Act
2. Consenting adults in private - morality/criminality debate
3. Level of prosecutions Scotland/England
4. Scottish Consolidation Bill - Section 7.
5. Anomalies in law - Scotland/England
B. Pressure groups' interests:
Churches 2. 4. 5.
Legal societies 2. 3. 4. 5.
Scottish Minorities Group 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Police 2. 3. 4.
Equivalent English groups 1.
132
Here the nuirber of groups was much smaller involving only the churches,
legal organisations, and civil .liberty groups in each case. They
therefore virtually chose themselves.
As far as Ccmnittee of Inquiry personnel were concerned, only
those who sat on the Departmental Committee on Scottish Licensing Law
under the Chairmanship of Dr. Christopher Clayson, were involved
(Table 4.4) . Out of a Canmittee of twelve, five, including the Chair¬
man, were selected for interview. This selection was based as much
as anything on the current whereabouts and availability of the
Committee .members. Those who could be located and agreed to talk
were interviewed.
The selection of MPs for interview was again by a process of
elimination, but here the assessment was based on how prominently
they had featured in the parliamentary debates on each of the cases.
The list of MPs for each case included everyone who had made a con¬
tribution on Second Reading, in Committee, or on Report, as well as
those lords who had spcken in the Upper House. Minor contributions
involving perfunctory interjections on matters of detail were easily
identified and those MPs were eliminated frcm further consideration.
The remaining MPs in each list were then considered as possibles for
interview (Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7). These lists were then compared and
another list, based on cross reference, was drawn up (Table 4.8) .
MPs who were identified as having been involved in all three case
studies were marked accordingly. Similarly, MPs who participated in
any two studies were also identified and marked. And lastly some of
those who had been concerned with only one of the three cases were
recorded. In this way a list of 'key informants' was carpi led.
Interview plans were then drafted on the basis of whether the respon¬
dent would be. answering questions on all three, only two or just one
of the cases under consideration.
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TABLE 4.4 Departmental Carmittee on Scottish Licensing Law.
Dr. C. W. Clayson
Mr. W. M. Campbell
Mr. James F. Falconer
Miss Morag C. Faulds
Mr. E. Frizzell
Mr. A. W. Hardie




Dr. Jchn D. Sutherland
Mrs. A. S. Than
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TABIE 4.5 Licensing - MPs and Peers involved
Camiittee
Peter Doig (Lab. Dundee West)
Richard Buchanan (Lab. Glasgcw Springburn)
Alick Buchanan-Smith (Gens. North Angus and Mams)
Ian Carrpbell (Lab. Dumbartonshire West)
Robin Cock (Lab. Edinburgh Central)
John Corrie (Cons. North Ayrshire and Bute)
J. M, Craigen (Lab. Glasgow Maryhill)
James Douglas-Hamilton (Cons. Edinburgh West)
Harry Ewing (Lab. Stirling, Falkirk and Grangemouth)
Nicholas Fairbairn (Cons. Kinross and West Perthshire)
John Gilmour (Cons. Fife East)
James Hamilton (Lab. Bothwell)
Tcm McMillan (Lab. Glasgow Central)
M. S. Miller (Lab. East Kilbride)
Hector Munro (Cons. Dumfries)
Malcolm Rifkind (Cons. Edinburgh Pentlands)
Teddy Taylor (Cons. Glasgcw Cathcart)
Hamish Watt (SNP, Banffshire)
James White (Lab. Glasgow Pollok)
Alexander Wilson (Lab. Hamilton)
Others
Norman Buchan (Lab. West Renfrewshire)
Dennis Canavan (Lab. West Stirlingshire)
Alex Fletcher (Cons. Edinburgh North)
Robert Hughes (Lab. Aberdeen North)
Russell Johnston (Lib. Inverness)
Jchn Mackintosh (Lab. Berwick and East Lothian)
Bruce Millan (Lab. Glasgcw Craigton)
George Reid (Lab. East Stirlingshire and Clackmannan)
Jchn Robertson (Lab. Paisley)
Willie Ross (Lab. Kilmarnock)
Iain Sproat (Cons. Aberdeen South)
David Steel (Lib. Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles)
Donald Stewart (SNP Western Isles)





B. Delacourt-Smith of Altem









Wilson of High Wray
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TABLE 4.6 Divorce - MPs and Peers involved
Committee (1976 Bill)
Margaret Bain (SNP Dunbartonshire East)
Rcbin Cook (Lab. Edinburgh Central)
James Douglas Hamilton (Cons. Edinburgh West)
Harry Ewing (Lab. Stirling, Falkirk and Grangemouth)
Nicholas Fairbairn (Cons. Kinross and West Perthshire)
Tom Galbraith (Cons. Glasgow Hillhead)
Robert Hughes (Lab. Aberdeen North)
Douglas Henderson (SNP Aberdeenshire East)
Lord Advocate (Ronald King Murray) (Lab. Edinburgh Leith)
Iain MacCormick (SNP Argyll)
John Mackintosh (Lab, Berwick and East Lothian)
George Reid (SNP East Stirlingshire and Clackmannan)
Malcolm Rifkind (Cons. Edinburgh Pentlands)
Harry Selby (Lab. Glasgow Govan)
William Small (lab. Glasgow Garscadden)
Iain Sproat (Cons. Aberdeen South 1970- )
Others
Donald Dewar (Lab. Aberdeen South 1966-70)
Sir Myer Galpern (Lab. Glasgow Shettleston)
Sir John Gilmour (Cons. Fife East)
Hamish Gray (Cons. Ross and Cromarty)
Willie Hamilton (Lab. Fife Central)







TABLE 4.7 Homosexuality - 'non-reform of' - MPs and Peers involved
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Bill 1976 - consolidation
Leo Abse (Lab. Pontypool)
Robin Cock (Lab. Edinburgh Central)
Robert Hughes (Lab. Aberdeen North)
Lord Advocate (Ronald King Murray) (Lab. Edinburgh Leith)
Malcolm Rifkind (Cons. Edinburgh West)











TABLE 4.8 Provisional list of MPs rated for possible interview.
Robin Cock L. D. H
Robert Hughes L. D. H
Malcolm Rifkind L. D. H
David Steel L. H
James Douglas-Hamilton L. D.
Harry Ewing L. D.
Nicholas Fairbairn L. D.
George Reid L. D.













Campbell of Croy L. D. H




Once the 'key informants' had been identified they were then
approached by letter for an interview. Table 4.9 shows those who
were interviewed and Table 4.10 lists those who did not accept the
invitation. Interviews were declined on a number of grounds. Same
respondents said they were too busy, some thought their comments
would be of limited value, and some simply declared themselves un¬
available. All the refusals were polite with the exception of one
which was abrupt and discourteous. Nicholas Fairbairn wrote:
'I am astonished to learn that you have spent two years
developing a study into the campaigns to change the
legislation in Scotland on licensing, divorce and
homosexuality. I am sorry to say this seems to me a
grotesque waste of time and money and I see no purpose
in an interview' .11
Of those who agreed to an interview some replied offering a
definite time, date and location, while others requested that a
telephone call be made to specify the details of the meeting. Inter¬
views were always held at a time and date which was convenient for
the respondent. locations varied according to circumstances.
Generally, interviews with, pressure groups' representatives were held
at their office. Interviews with members of the Clayson Committee
were conducted at their present place of work, although Dr. Clayson
himself generously entertained me in his own heme. And interviews
with MPs were undertaken either at the MPs surgery or at the House of
Commons. TWO separate week, long visits were made to London to conduct
the interviews at the House of Commons, one in November 1980 and the
other in March 1981.
A 'specialised' approach to the interviews was adopted.12 This
meant simply that each respondent was given special, ncn-standardised
treatment which involved stressing the respondent's definition of the
situation and encouraging him to give his own account of that situation.
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TABIE 4.9 Persons Interviewed
A. Pressure Groups:
Dr. R. Parry, British Medical Association
Dr. D. Player, Scottish Health Education Group
Miss I. Grigor, Church of Scotland
Mr. N. Rose, Law Society of Scotland
Mr. K. McGregor, Law Society of Scotland
Mr. N. Whitty, Scottish Law Ccnmission
Mr. R. Thomasson, Educational Institute of Scotland
Supt. C. Bcwman, Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland)
Mr. E. Ridehalgh, Scottish Licensed Trade Association
Mr. G. Reed, Brewers Association of Scotland
Mr. A. Mcwat, Scottish and Newcastle Breweries
Mr. Marrison, Scottish Tourist Board
Mr. I. Dunn, Scottish Homosexual Rights Group
B. Departmental Committee on Scottish Licensing Law
Dr. C. Clayson (Chairman)




Mr. Leo Abse (Labour, Pontypool)
Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith (Conservative, North Angus and Mearns,
Under Secretary of State, Scottish Office 1970-74)
Mr. Neil Carmichael (Labour, Glasgcw Kelvinside)
Mr. Dennis Canavan (Labour, West Stirlingshire)
Mr. Robin Cock (Labour, Edinburgh Central)
Mr. Donald Dewar (Labour, Glasgcw Garscadden)
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton (Conservative, Edinburgh West)
Mr. Harry Ewing (Labour, Stirling, Falkirk and Grangemouth,
Under Secretary of State, Scottish Office 1974-79)
Mr. Robert Hughes (Labour, Aberdeen North)
Lord Kirkhill (Minister of State, Scottish Office 1975-78)
Mr. Bruce Millan (Labour, Glasgcw Craigton, Secretary of State
for Scotland 1976-79)
Mr. Malcolm Rifkind (Conservative, Edinburgh Pentlands, Under
Secretary of State, Scottish Office 1979-82)
Mr. Iain Sproat (Conservative, Aberdeen South)
D. Supplementary
D. J. Ccwperthwaite (Under Secretary, Scottish Home and Health
Department 1974-81)
Lord Murray (Lord Advocate 1974-79)
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TABLE 4.10 Persons unavailable for interview
1. Mr. TamDalyell (Labour, West Lothian) . Chosen because of his
involvement in Scottish affairs in the 1970s but declined
on the grounds that he had little to say about these
'issues of conscience'.
2. Mr. Nicholas Fairbairn (Conservative, Kinross and West Perthshire) .
Declined through lack of interest.
3. Mr. Tam Galbraith (Conservative, Glasgow Hillhead) . Declined
interview, but explained his position in letter.
4. Mr. Russell Johnston (Liberal, Inverness) . Declined through lack
of time.
5. Mr. David Steel (Liberal, Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles).
Declined through lack of time.
6. Mr. Teddy Taylor (Conservative, Glasgow Cathcart). Declined
through lack of time,
7. Lord Boothby. Graciously declined because at the age of 81 had
decided to retire from ' active politics' and was ' giving
no more interviews to anyone about anything'!
8. Lord Campbell of Croy (Secretary of State for Scotland 1970-74).
Declined through lack of time.
9. Lord Guest (Chairman of the Committee on Scottish Licensing Law
1960-62). Declined but stated no reason.
10. Lord McCluskey (Solicitor-General, 1974-79). No reply.
11. Lord Ross of Marnock (Secretary of State for Scotland, 1964-70;
1974-76) . Declined through lack of time.
12. Professor T. L. Jchnson (Member of Clayson Committee). No reply.
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In this way the respondent was allowed to introduce what he regarded
as relevant.
Thus, the aim of the interviews was to focus the respondent's
attention upon a given occasion and its effects. While each inter¬
view varied to meet the circumstances of the respondent, the inter¬
views were structured in so far as they adhered to a general pattern.
Firstly, the persons interviewed were, for the most part, known to
have been involved in one or more of the case studies. Secondly,
the political background and context, and the events and participants
in each case had been previously analysed, Frcm this analysis a set
of questions was developed to enquire into particular aspects of each
case. Thirdly, an interview plan was developed utilising questions
of both a general and specific nature to probe the respondent's sub¬
jective understanding of the issues. Here it was equally important
to consider what a respondent did not knew or did not think relevant,
as what he did. There were no hard and fast rules for this. In each
instance one had to measure the response against other testimonies
and available information.
While a formal interview plan with set questions and probes was
prepared for each interview, it was kept as flexible as possible to
allow questions to be interchanged as circumstances dictated. In
this respect the emphasis was always upon making the interview an
informal discussion. The length of the discussion usually ran some¬
where between 45 minutes and one hour.
Responses were .recorded by taking notes during the course of the
.interview. Space was left after each question to allow the reply to
be recorded directly next to it. Note taking was selective with par¬
ticular emphasis being placed on nuances and turns of phrase which
would indicate the respondent's opinions in his own words. A tape
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recorder was not used for three main reasons. Firstly, for the type
of information to be collected, it was felt that note taking was more
convenient and just, as effective as using a tape recorder. Secondly,
transcribing frcm tape recordings was considered to be too time con¬
suming. And thirdly, tape recorders were not allowed into the Houses
of Parliament where a nurrber of interviews were to take place. After
an interview had been conducted it was written up as quickly as pos¬
sible to minimise the risk of forgetting details.
Assessing what kind of 'truth' one obtains from an interview pre¬
sents , perhaps, one of the greatest difficulties involved in qualita¬
tive interviewing. The problem, though, is not insurmountable. One
might begin with the simple and charitable assumption that on the
whole people will seek to tell you the truth. Therefore, one might
be predisposed to believe them unless there were good reasons for not
doing so. However, the difficulties in interpreting informant's sub¬
jective reports are seriously increased when the informant is report¬
ing not his present feelings or attitudes but those he recollects
frcm the past. This is because of the widespread tendency we all
have to modify a recollection of past feelings in a selective way that
fits more comfortably into our current point of view. Philip Williams
has noted that this is especially true of politicians:
"More frequently, politicians subconsciously adapt
their views about the past to fit a stance they
have adopted later; for they like the rest of us
feel uncomfortable holding contradictory beliefs
side by side, they more than most people find that
such contradictions cause them to function less
effectively, and they above all must give immediate
battles primacy over the quarrels of the distant
past' .13
This propensity to interpret the past in light of the present
means that one cannot accept everything a respondent says at face
value. There are, hcwever, a ncnrfoer of checks which assist in
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detecting distortion. First of all, there is an important negative
check - implausibility. If an account strongly strains our credulity
and just does not seem at all plausible, then we are justified in
suspecting distortion. A second aid in detecting distortion is any
knowledge we have of the unreliability of the informant. A third is
our knowledge of an informant's assumptions and how they might influ¬
ence his perception and interpretation of events. However, the major
way to detect for distortion, and correct for it, is by comparing an
informant's account with the accounts given by other informants.
Dean and Whyte have commented:
'by the thoughtful use of the information revealed
in the account of one informant, the researcher
can guide other interviews toward data which will
reveal any distortions incorporated in the initial
account and usually will provide details which
give a more complete understanding of what actually
happened'.14
Therefore, a proper caution about accepting oral evidence can
justify seeking more of it for purposes of cross-checking. So up to
a point the method yields increasing returns. It happened on a num¬
ber of occasions during the course of the research, that a record of
an .informant's ccmment, which at the time had seemed unimportant or
hardly relevant, took on a new significance in the light of later
information, so that a subsequent re-reading and comparison of inter¬
views bearing on the same period or incidents would often shew them
to be much more useful and revealing than one had realised at the
tine of recording them.
Most of the doubts expressed about interview evidence can also
apply to some extent to other sources which social science researchers
do not spurn, from autobiographies to political speeches to government
reports. Therefore, as Philip Williams has noted:
144
'The wise interviewer may be wary of accepting in
full the uncorroborated evidence of a single
witness, but that is no reason for regarding
any written source as necessarily superior to
several items of oral testimony, properly
checked and cross-checked, which confirm and
complement one another'.16
By placing the emphasis on the respondent's subjective construc¬
tion of the situation a problem can arise over validity in inference.
It is, though, possible to protect against this by adopting the tech¬
nique of ' triangulation' , that is of employing a variety of methods
to approach the same data. Yet there still tend to remain doubts
about making judgements concerning the informant's 'values' or motives.
Ken Young, however, suggests that we are too much influenced and in¬
timidated by a standard of validity that arises frcm formalised mass
survey techniques. He points to the fact that a number of profession¬
als, such as doctors, personnel managers, and social workers, carry
out interviews and similar encounters with the aim of making judgements
about the respondent. Thus, for researching political actor's values
he advocates a 'diagnostic' form of interview. He asserts:
"... the intuitive standard of "validity" used by
the diagnostic professions - judgement, experience,
empathy - is probably more relevant to the task of
researching the assumptive world of political
actors than standards associated with other more
technical constructions of the term'.16
Despite Young's clever way around the issue subjectivist approaches
do remain problematic as instruments for understanding the policy pro¬
cess. Nevertheless, provided they are used in conjunction with other
methods they can help to illuminate some assertions about policy-making
and the motivations and behaviour of those involved in the policy-
process. Jchn Edwards contends that it is in this respect that subjec¬
tivist approaches are most self-evidently useful 'if assertions are
made about the dominant determinants of or influences on policy they
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may be amenable to testing through a clearer understanding of key
actor's definitions of the situations, constructions of reality and
motivations'.17 Uius, subjectivist approaches can be used to comple¬
ment other approaches. However, the problem for the researcher of
gaining access to 'reality' is not resolved by the rejection of posi-
tivist scenarios and the adoption of subjectivist ones since both in
the end fail to account for the hermeneutic nature of all knowledge.
'Ultimately', says Edwards, 'subjectivist accounts provide only an
alternative truth not a better one'.18
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CHAPTER 5
The Departmental Carrmittee on Scottish Licensing Law:
Its Role in Policy Development.
I. Introduction
At this point the thesis will turn to consider our empirical case
studies in the light of the concepts and ideas outlined so far. The
next two chapters will deal with our first study on the reform of the
Scottish drink laws. This chapter is specifically addressed to the
Departmental Committee on Scottish Licensing Law (The Clayson Ccmnittee)
which had a broad remit to review the liquor licensing laws of Scotland
and to make recarmendations on what changes might be made in the public
interest. Chapter 6 then considers the legislative response to the
Clayson Report.
Cne of the main themes developed in Chapter 2 was that Scotland,
by virtue of its historical development - being assimilated into the
British state politically but. maintaining a distinctive 'civil society'
- had developed a distorted political culture which Nairn described as
'cultural sub-nationalism' . This manifested itself in many ways in
Scottish society - in popular literature, in sport, in the Church, and
in many other areas which had become associated with a particular
'Scottish way of life'. One of those areas which had become associated
with Scottish popular tradition was the Scottish attitude towards drink.
In the first part of this chapter we shall explore aspects of this
issue in an attempt to separate myth frcm reality.
The opening section (Section II) deals with the social and histor¬
ical context of drinking and its control in Scotland. Here we trace
seme of the historical differences in the evolution of the licensing
systems north and south of the border. We find that the licensing
law in Scotland had not always been as restrictive as it was in the
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20th century and that even this restriction was the prolongation of
a measure intended only as a temporary limitation during the First
World War.
The ambivalent attitude towards the consumption of alcohol in
Scotland is then discussed. On the one hand it is seen as a sign of
sociability, but on the other it is also perceived as a dangerous and
addictive drug if taken in excess over a long period. Thus temperance
movements, founded on a strong Calvinist anti-drink tradition, arose
in great numbers in Victorian Scotland to condemn the excessive use
of alcohol. In opposition to this the use of alcchol in Scotland
acquired a symbolic value 'of considerable importance to the self-
esteem of the individual and of the nation'.
The problems created by this ambivalent culture are then examined.
The legacy of this "cultural neurosis' is that contemporary Scotland
has a very much higher proportion of alcchol related problems and dis¬
abilities than England and Wales where there has been a more relaxed
approach to the consumption of alcohol. Sore statistical evidence is
then produced to demonstrate the extent of these problems in compari¬
son with south of the border. Against this social and historical
background the pressures for contemporary reform are identified and
the genesis of the Clayson Committee mapped out.
The remainder of the chapter examines the approach of the Clayson
Committee in dealing with drinking and its control in Scotland.
Section III considers the appointment of the Committee and Section IV
its 'approach1 to the problem. Section V outlines some comparative
developments in England before Section VI sets out the main issues
and the nature of the arguments. 'The Committee's assessment of the
evidence is dealt with in Section VII, its mode of decision-making in
Section VIII and the effectiveness of its participatory process in
Section IX.
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In discussing these issues some of the ideas outlined in Chapter
2 en approaches to policy analysis are drawn upon, the aim being to
identify the balance of forces which prevailed in the different phases
of policy formulation. Of particular relevance here are the concepts
of group theory and demand regulation. It was noted in the earlier
chapter hew the 'package' of interests associated with a particular
policy option can affect whether that option is adopted. Ihe status
of a group is another factor which can affect the way policy is deter¬
mined, those groups with a high standing in the community being gran¬
ted virtually automatic participation in the consultation process.
This chapter will consider in some detail hew such factors operated
in the case of the Clayson Committee and in what way they influenced
the recommendations of the Carmittee.
The part values played in the decision-making process will also
be considered. The Carmittee established very early on in its delib¬
erations a 'working philosophy* through which the issues under its
remit would be examined. In other words the way in which prcblems
were identified and defined will be explored along with the way in
which these definitions influenced decisions concerning policy recom¬
mendations .
Examples of how the law can impinge upon individual freedom will
also arise. For instance, what restrictions were justifiable in lim¬
iting a person's choice as to where, when and hew he drank? What
were the minimum requirements of supervision to ensure an equitable
balance between such individual choice and the maintenance of public
order in the wider community? This provides an opportunity to examine
empirically a concrete example of the philosophical debate concerning
self-regarding and other regarding action outlined in Chapter 3.
Much of the material in that chapter will be of relevance as
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particular issues, such as the role of veto polls and the right of
police entry to private clubs, come to be discussed.
In drawing this chapter to a close the 'effectiveness' of the
Committee as a vehicle for formulating public policy of this nature
will be assessed. The public impact of the recommendations and the
transition in the policy process from Report to legislation form the
basis of Chapter 6.
II. The Social and Historical Context of Drink Control in Scotland
The licensing system in Scotland came into operation at a much
later period than that in England, being based on Section 10 of the
Licensing Act, 1756. As far back as 1424 the Soots Parliament had
passed a number of Acts dealing with the selling and consumption of
alcoholic liquors, but the unsettled condition of these earlier years
was not conducive to consistent observance of these laws. Indeed,
dcwn to the middle of the 18th century the smallness of the popula¬
tion and its distribution over widely separated and mutually inacces¬
sible areas rendered Scottish legislation rather expressions of
Parliamentary opinion than measures for effective administration.1
When the two crcwns were united in 1603 there was no assimila¬
tion of Scottish and English legislation, but on the subject of
drunkenness more or less similar statutes were for a time enacted for
both countries. The Scots Parliament in 1617 dealt with 'the vile
and detestable vice of drunkenness daily increasing to the high dis¬
honour of God and great harm of the whole realm' and made drunkenness
and the 'haunting of taverns and alehouses after ten hours at night
or at any time, of the day except in time of travel or for ordinary
refreshments' punishable by fine or imprisonment.2
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Even after the Treaty of Union in 1707 there was still no pro¬
posal to assimilate the liquor legislation of the two countries.
Acts passed in 1710 and 1716 imposing stamp duties on the granting
of alehouse licences in England and Wales did not apply to Sootland.
Hcwever, in 1756, the foundation of the modern Scottish licensing
system was laid. Section 10 of the Act of that year provided that
'retailers of such liquors in both parts of this Kingdom should be
subject to the like pcwers and authorities' .
By an Act of 1808 the retail of liquor in Scotland required an
excise 'licence' or a justice's 'certificate' and was limited to
'common inns, alehouses, or victualling houses'. These provisions
were consolidated by the 1828 Hcme-Drummond Act which confirmed the
justices in the counties and the magistrates in the royal burghs as
the authorities for granting the 'certificates', without which excise
licences for inns, alehouses, and victualling houses could not be
issued. Thus, the necessary machinery for licensing was set up and
a form of certificate was set out with conditions attaching to the
grant. Amongst the first limitations was that public drinking was
not to be permitted ' during the hours of Divine Service on Sundays'.
In 1846 the increasing interest in the temperance movement in
Scotland led to the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of
Camions, under the chairmanship of Mr. Forbes-Mackenzie, to enquire
into the granting of certificates. As a result of the Committee's
Report, the Licensing (Scotland) Act of 1853, better kncwn as the
Forbes-Mackenzie Act, was passed. It separated retail liquor licen¬
ces into two main classes - 'on' and 'off' - and provided that publi¬
cans should not sell groceries and that grocers should not sell
liquor for on-consumption. Three forms of certificate were substitu¬
ted for the existing form, viz. for hotel-keepers, for publicans, and
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for grocers. Various restrictive regulations were imposed, the most
important being that a licensee 'do not open his house for the sale
of any liquors, or sell or give out the same on Sunday, except for
the accommodation of lodgers and bona fide travellers' . The Act also
made it illegal to sell or consume liquors between 11 p.m. and 8 a.m.
The law remained substantially the same until the end of the
century when the 1896-9 Royal Camtission on Liquor Licensing Laws
examined the Scottish position. As a result of this enquiry the
Licensing (Scotland) Act of 1903 was passed which gave effect to many
of the recommendations made. This 1903 Act was to form the basis of
the licensing code in 20th century Scotland. It repealed former
statutes, but re-enacted with variations their leading provisions, re¬
arranging the constitution and duties of the Licensing Courts and
strengthening the provisions against sale to children and young per¬
sons. Further, the Act for the first time in Scotland dealt with
the 'club problem' and provided for the compulsory registration of
clubs in which exciseable liquors were sold.
1913 saw, as a result of a long and vigorous political controv¬
ersy, the Temperance (Scotland) Act, which gave to the localities the
pcwer of local option in respect of the issue of certificates or
licences for the sale of liquor. Then, with the outbreak of war in
1914, further restrictions were introduced to regulate the hours of
sale and supply in an attempt to boost the war effort. Under Govern¬
ment war regulations, the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) was
empowered to restrict the sale, consumption and supply of intoxicat¬
ing liquor and to limit the hours of opening of licensed premises
and clubs. The purpose of this was to prevent the 'efficiency of
labour frcm being impaired by drunkenness, alcoholism, or excess'.
The historian A. J. P. Taylor has attributed the introduction of the
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afternoon break to the failure at the Battle of Neuve Chappelle, after
which Sir John French, to conceal his failure, complained that he had
run short of shells. The Government in turn blamed the munition wor¬
kers, who were alleged to draw high, wages and to pass their days drink¬
ing in public houses. Consequently opening hours were restricted, and,
in particular an afternoon break was imposed when drinkers had to be
turned out. This, he suggests, along with Summer Time, ranked as one
of the few lasting effects of the Great War on British life.3
The restrictive law originally meant to be only temporary, con¬
tinued to operate in Scotland right up to the seventies. Thus, licen¬
sing law for the greater part of this century has been founded on the
preposition that by restricting the opportunities to purchase and con¬
sume, the misuse of alcohol would be diminished. The law seemed to be
not entirely without success when, in the late twenties and early
thirties, consumption dropped and misuse was at its lewest. However,
this was due as much to the poverty of that period and the effects
of the great depression as to the effectiveness of the licensing laws.
As poverty in its most extreme form passed and was .replaced by a grow¬
ing affluence and a consumer orientated society the consumption of
alcohol once more increased with a corresponding increase .in the prob¬
lems of misuse. Since the sixties the public has spent an increasing
proportion of its disposable income on alcohol with the result that
consumption has risen and alcohol abuse has become one of the biggest
social problems facing contemporary Scotland.4
The modern law relating to liquor licensing in Scotland was
largely contained in two Acts - the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1959 and
the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1962. The 1959 Act, which contained the
basic code, was a consolidating measure which repealed and reproduced,
with amendments, all the enactments relating to Scotland including the
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1903 Act, the 1913 Temperance Act, the Acts of 1921 and 1949, the
Licensed Premises in New Towns Act 1952, the Licensing (Seamen's
Canteens) Act 1954, and various miscellaneous statutes. The
Licensing (Scotland) Act 1962 was an amending measure which, in the
main, implemented the recommendations of the First Report of the
Guest Committee on permitted hours on weekdays and sale and supply on
Sundays.5
The First Guest Report was published in November 1960 and recom¬
mended the continuation of the afternoon break with no substantial
alteration in the extent of the permitted hours. However, with
regard to the sale and supply on Sundays, it was recommended that the
special provision for supply of liquor to travellers be discontinued
and replaced by a system of permitted hours for hotels, public houses
and licensed restaurants. The 1962 Act though, excluded public
houses frcm its Sunday opening provisions.
A Second Guest Report appeared in 1963 relating to the constitu¬
tion of licensing courts and the arrangements for granting certifi¬
cates authorising the sale of liquor in areas of housing development
and redevelopment.6 This Report did not recommend any radical changes
and with one or two minor exceptions no legislative action was taken.
The Guest Committee was appointed not to review the subject of
liquor licensing as a whole, but to examine the law relating to cer¬
tain limited aspects of the licensing code. As a result the Ccrrmittee
thought it better to concentrate on the practical aspects of the prob¬
lems placed before them 'rather than to attempt to evolve any philos¬
ophy which might serve as a basis for a complete reshaping of the
licensing law, if that were thought to be necessary.7 This compares
interestingly with the approach of Clayson.
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Hie nature of the problem in Scotland would seem to arise from
the ambivalent attitudes which Scots hold towards alcchol. Studies
have shown that various ethnic groups exhibit different rates of
alcoholism and drinking pathologies ,8 The attempts to explain these
differences are many and varied,, but one of the main explanations put
forward is the cultural one. This perspective stresses the social
meaning and function of alcohol, drinking and drunkenness and des¬
cribes hew different patterns of alcohol use have emerged in differ¬
ent societies. In this respect Scotland is classified as an 'ambiva¬
lent culture', where attitudes to the use of alcohol are contradic¬
tory in that there are two directly opposed value systems in relation
to the use of alcohol operating in Scottish culture at the same time.9
On the one hand, drinking is perceived as a sign of sociability
and an aid to canrnunication at a wide variety of formal and informal
events. The ability to consume large quantities of alcohol is often
associated with notions of toughness and maturity. A lifestyle which
involves a drinking pattern of continuous heavy consumption, particu¬
larly of spirits is sometimes seen as an indication of sophistication
and urbane social mobility. Cn the other hand, drunkenness, though
condoned if infrequent and relatively good humoured, is perceived as
extremely threatening if the drunk person's unpredictable behaviour
turns ugly in any way, either through direct aggression or through
other forms of anti-social behaviour. Alcoholics, whether they are
considered to be sinful or ill, are in either case felt to be inade¬
quate. Thus alcohol is simultaneously approved and condemned.
The source of this confusion and the reason for the existence of
two simultaneous but contradictory attitudes is that alcohol has a
double identity. It is both a drug and a symbol and it is when the
drug effects of alcohol are at variance with its presumed symbolic
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function that problems relating to its use and abuse arise.
The myths which surround alcohol are many - myths of toughness,
of maturity, of sophistication, of sexuality. These are manifesta¬
tions of a set of deep-seated symbolic values which have grown and
developed in Scotland over hundreds of years. However, competing
against these myths has been a strong Calvinist anti-drink tradition
manifest in the history of the evangelical temperance movements.
These temperance leagues warned of the evils of drink and offerred
salvation through strict adherence to abstinence, Protestantism, the
Sabbath and the Scottish family way of life. One teetotal eyewitness
at Arthur's Seat in Victorian Edinburgh described how 'on May Morning
... the sun rises to shed its light on a scene of swearing and depra¬
vity ... Nothing prevails but disorder and dissipation and shouts of
laughter, caused by the floundering of scineone more drunken than his
fellows; and one would almost imagine the asseirtoled crowd were there
like a company of heathens, to worship the sun through drunkenness' .10
Another temperance advocate, and a doctor, was so appalled by the
extent of drunkenness at the end of the 19th century that she wrote,
'I scarcely know of any other physical condition, excepting insanity
and hydrophobia, at which the individual or the public need be so
truly and properly alarmed'.11
The output of Victorian temperance literature was prolific and
its range remarkable. An 1880 temperance history could list more than
200 periodicals from 'The Abstainers' Journal', published in Edinburgh,
to 'The York Temperance Visitor', as well as nearly 900 books and
pamphlets. Titles of the period included 'An, Earnest Appeal frcm the
Furnace by a Bottle Hand to his Felicw Workmen' (1856) , 'Temperance
in the Hay and Harvest Field' (1892) , 'Country Walks and Temperance
Talks' (1901) and the wonderful 'Tippling and Temperance' (1890).
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This delightful tract was 'a treatise in 1,289 words each, commencing
with the letter T'. 'Thoughtless thousands turn to the too tempting
tap', it began. 'Thriving tradesmen taste tipple timidly ... time-
wasters tipple tremendously ... thereby turpitude thrives, turmoil
triumphs'. Worst of all was 'the trivial, time-serving toss-pot' who
became a 'truculent tyrant throwing toast, tea-cake ... table-knives,
tea-cups ... trays, tongs, then tearing the table-cloth', all in
marked contrast to the behaviour of the 'tolerant temperance theorist'.12
The 'father of temperance societies in Great Britain' was said
to be Jchn Dunlop, a Greenock magistrate and .anti-usage campaigner.
Another prominent figure was William Collins, a printer and publisher,
who founded the Scottish Temperance League. Temperance tock root in
Scotland around 1830 and during the first year some 130 societies had
been formed, with a total membership of 25,000 including many clergy
who were active in helping the cause. Frcm Scotland it spread south
- an example of 19th century 'cultural emigration' . Harrison has
recorded:
'Scotsmen established the anti-spirits movement
in England. Scottish temperance zeal for many
years burned more brightly than English enthu¬
siasm, and the Scottish religious atmosphere
closely resembled that of New England, where
the American temperance movement was bom.
Rich countries easily attract intellect and
energy from nearby poor countries, and the
temperance movement assisted the process.
Scotsmen in fact helped to prepare the very
ground in which the early anti-spirits move¬
ment tock root, for evangelicalism itself cwed
much to the eighteenth century diaspora of devout
Scottish Presbyterians'.13
Here then is another aspect of Scotland's 'cultural neurosis'.
A history of ambivalent, attitudes towards the use of alcohol has led
to a disproportionately high incidence of alcohol-related problems
in modem Scotland. A number of reasons can be advanced to explain
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why drinking should play such a disproportionately important part in
the cultural life of Scotland. The Scottish Health Education Unit
suggest that alcohol consumption rates tend to be particularly high
where there is a) social pressure to imbibe; b) inconsistent or non¬
existent social sanctions against excessive drinking; c) drinking
outside a family or religious setting; and d) anfoivalence towards
moderate drinking. They comment:
'All these conditions are fulfilled in Scotland
today. When they are viewed in the context of
a rigorously enforced protestant ethic, a fierce
and sometimes embittered patriotism and a com¬
paratively inimical climate, it is easy to see
how the functional aspects of drinking behaviour
have become inextricably tangled with a host of
compensatory and guilt provoking feelings. These
have acquired separate symbolic associations and
have served to make drinking an activity quali¬
tatively of considerable importance to the self-
esteem of the individual and of the nation' .14
Drinking and problem drinking in Scotland has been the subject
of an enquiry by Martin Plant.15 Drawing upon his own research as
well as several related studies, Plant offers some interesting insights
into a complex area. This more recent evidence will be considered
here before discussing the evidence which was available to Clayson in
the early seventies.
Wilson's study of drinking habits in the United Kingdom compares
consumption in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and England and Wales.16
Table 5.1 shows average alcohol consumption in the UK by sex. The most
striking conclusion was that drinking habits in Scotland were almost
indistinguishable from those in England and Wales. Wilson's survey
revealed that 6% of men in England, Wales and Scotland and 3% of those
in Northern Ireland reported having drunk 51 units or more in the pre¬
vious week. This is the equivalent of 25% pints of beer or 51 single
glasses of spirits or wines. The heaviest drinkers were young adults
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TABIE 5.1 Average Alcohol Consumption in the United Kingdom
by sex.




aged 20 or over
Females
aged 20 or over
England and Wales 19.6 7.0
Scotland 19.5 6.2
Northern Ireland 14.5 6.5
*These are standard units, which are equivalent to h pint of beer,
1/6 gill of spirits (an English single), a glass of wine (4 fl. oz.)
or a small glass of fortified wine (2 fl. oz.) .
This table relates only to drinkers.
Source: Wilson (1980)
as cited in Plant (1982) p. 105.
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aged 20-27. Results shewed though, that in Scotland males aged 28-37
consumed almost as much as those aged 20-27 which lends support to
the view that in Scotland youthful levels of relatively heavy drinking
persist rather longer than they do south of the border. This, postu¬
lates Plant, might be one explanation for the particularly high levels
of alcohol problems in Scotland.
Another factor which might go some way to explain national varia¬
tions in the levels of alcohol problems is the pattern of drinking.
Males in Scotland reported that on average they had only 3.0 drinking
days in the previous week while those in England and Wales had 3.6.
Similarly, females in Scotland had an average of 2.1 drinking days,
while those in England and Wales had 2.7. Plant comments that these
variations could mean that in Scotland drunkenness is a more ccrnnon-
place consequence, since alcchol consumption is concentrated into
fewer days. This heavy drinking (defined by Wilson's survey as drink¬
ing four pints of beer or equivalent in one day) took place mainly at
the weekend (Friday to Sunday) when 38% of Scottish male drinkers had
drunk heavily on one day, compared with 25% of male drinkers in England
and Wales. Plant remarks:
'This important study suggests that the traditional
view that drinking in England and Wales is more
moderate than in ... Scotland is to some extent
justified... The survey ... lends support to the
view that the main reason why Scottish alcchol
problems are more commonplace than those in England
and Wales is the -pattern rather than the total gen¬
eral level of alcchol consumption'.17
(original emphasis).
It is commonly accepted that excessive alcohol consumption plays
a direct role in the development of liver damage and death from cirr¬
hosis of the liver. Table 5.2 shows the nurrber and rate of deaths
from liver cirrhosis per 100,000 in the United Kingdom between 1970
and 1979. The figures indicate that between these years deaths frcm
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TABLE 5.2 Number and Rate of Deaths frcm Cirrhosis of the Liver,
per 100,000 Population in the United Kingdom (1970-79).
„ T7 England „ ... , NorthernYear U.K. ,%7 , Scotland T 7 ,and Wales Ireland
N Rate N Rate N Rate N Rate
1970 1,671 3.0 1,392 2.8 239 4.6 39 2.5
1971 1,836 3.3 1,570 3.2 219 4.2 47 3.0
1972 1,976 3.5 1,662 3.4 258 5.0 56 3.6
1973 2.134 3.8 1,804 3.7 264 5.1 66 4.3
1974 2,149 3.8 1,754 3.6 328 6.3 67 4.3
1975 2,208 3.9 1,835 3.7 309 5.9 64 4.1
1976 2,289 4.1 1,890 3.8 319 6.1 80 5.2
1977 2,220 3.9 1,820 3.7 336 6.5 64 4.2
1978 2,364 4.2 1,926 3.9 382 7.4 56 3.6
1979 2,616 4.7 2,185 4.4 431 8.3 -
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics (1975; 1981)
as cited in Plant (1982) p. 117.
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liver cirrhosis in the UK increased by 56%. The table also reveals
that the rate of deaths from liver cirrhosis was consistently higher
in Scotland than in the rest of the UK.
Mortality data, however, indicate only the number of excessive
drinkers in a population who have died. In order to estimate the
nurrber of excessive drinkers who are living one must turn to other
data sources. One of these is hospital and psychiatric admissions
for alcchol related problems.
Notwithstanding the problems inherent in the collection of such
data (e.g. diagnostic categories can be insufficiently specific with
an element of approximation entering .into the classification of a
particular condition as alcchol-related), official statistics on
admissions to psychiatric hospitals for alcoholism and alcoholic
psychosis reveal some remarkable differences between Scotland and
England and Wales.
Table 5.3 shews total admissions to psychiatric hospitals for
alcoholism and alcoholic psychosis in Great Britain between 1970 and
1977. Since these figures are total admissions (i.e. first admissions
and readmissions) they record events and not people. What they indi¬
cate, however, is that admissions for alcoholism and alcoholic psy¬
chosis represent a much larger proportion of total, psychiatric admis¬
sions in Scotland (21% in 1977) than in England and Wales (6.8%).
Table 5.4 illustrates first admissions to psychiatric hospitals
for alcoholism and alccholic psychosis in Great Britain between 1970
and 1977. Since these figures represent people rather than events
they can be expressed as a rate per 100,000 population. It can be
seen that the rate of first admissions is considerably higher in
Scotland (40.8 per 100,000 population in 1977) than in England and
Wales (8.3 per 100,000), which further confirms that known alcohol
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TABLE 5.3 All Admissions to Psychiatric Hospitals for Alcoholism
and Alcoholic Psychosis, Great Britain (1970-77).
Great Britain England and Wales Scotland
Rate Rate Rate




Year NO. % No. % No. %
1970 10,570 5.1 7,279 4.0 3,291 15.0
1971 11,922 5.8 8 ,306 4.8 3,616 15.9
1972 13,568 6.5 9,287 5.0 4,281 17.2
1973 15,591 7.4 10,590 5.7 5,001 19.8
1974 16,915 8.2 11,498 6.3 5,417 21.4
1975 17,320 8.2 11,827 6.4 5,493 21.6
1976 18,087 8.4 12,700 6.7 5,387 20.6
1977 18,355 8.5 13,058 6.8 5,297 21.0
1977/70 +74% +79% +61%
Source: Health and Personal Social Service Statistics for England;
Health and Personal Social Service Statistics for Wales;
Scottish Health Statistics.
as cited in Plant (1982) p. 124.
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TABLE 5.4 First Admissions to Psychiatric Hospitals for
Alcoholism and Alcoholic Psychosis,
Great Britain (1970-77).
Great Britain England and Wales Scotland
Rate per Rate per Rate per
Nurrber 100,000 Nuirber 100,000 Nunber 100,000
Year population population population
1970 3,520 6.5 2,250 4.6 1,270 24.4
1971 3,999 7.4 2,550 5.2 1,449 27.8
1972 4,409 i—1•00 2,788 5.7 1,621 31.1
1973 5,293 9.7 3,345 6.8 1,948 37.4
1974 6,015 11.1 3,654 7.4 2,361 45.2
1975 5,844 10.7 3,721 7.6 2,123 40.8
1976 5,880 10.8 3,883 7.9 1,997 38.4
1977 6,203 11.4 4,085 8.3 2,118 40.8
1977/70 75% 80% 67%
Source: Health and Personal Social Statistics for England;
Health and Personal Social Statistics for Wales;
Scottish Health Statistics .
as cited in Plant (1982) p. 125
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problems are greater in Scotland than in the rest of Britain.
However, even before such evidence was readily available demands
for change in the licensing laws existed. In the late sixties there
was dissatisfaction with the way the law was operating. Restricting
the opportunities to purchase and consume had failed to have its de¬
sired effect. Hie Scottish Law Commission, for instance, drew the
attention of the Scottish Hare and Health Department to the large num¬
ber of proposals being put forward in connection with the licensing
laws and urged that a review of the Licensing Acts should not be too
long delayed. Also there was mounting ccmrercial pressure from the
licensing trade, consumer groups and tourist organisations for a more
relaxed approach to licensing hours. While the line was taken that a
more liberal approach would ease the social pressure to drink exces¬
sively in a short period, the possibility of increased trading oppor¬
tunities and hence increased profits was not lost on these commercial
concerns. Generally though, pressure for reform was diffuse being
spread across disparate sections of the community rather than concen¬
trated in any one campaign or pressure group.
It was the opinion of one senior executive of a major brewery that
a desire for a change in the licensing laws had been building steadily
throughout the post-war years.18 He said that although the Guest
Report had made some good recommendations, the 1962 Act had left too
many anomalies, especially with regard to hotel licences and veto polls.
He indicated that the Brewers had not been a leading pressure to get
Clayson established, but when Clayson was eventually set up they were
'of course, delighted'. Most of the early pressure he said had ccme
frcm the tourist authorities, and indeed this was acknowledged in the
introduction of the Clayson Report.19 The period following the 1969
Monopolies Commission Report20 on the supply of beer 'was marked by a
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significant increase in pressure for relaxation of licensing law,
particularly by tourist and oonsurrer organisations, and there was
evidence of more general dissatisfaction'.21
This 'general dissatisfaction', according to Mr. Alick Buchanan-
Smith, a Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Scottish Office at the
time of the Clayson Carmittee's appointment, was expressed by two
broad schools of thought. The first, which he labelled the 'temper¬
ance lobby', thought the answer to alcchol abuse lay in even more
restriction on its availability. The second, which he referred to as
'social reformers', believed the licensing laws to be far too strict
and favoured a relaxation in an attempt to encourage a more respon¬
sible attitude. He remarked:
'it was not so much a matter of individual pressure
groups lobbying for reform, more a case of a climate
of opinion desiring change. A lot of people, both
within the Scottish Office and in the Scottish com¬
munity generally, were extremely worried about ser¬
ious alcchol abuse in Scotland'.22
In response to mounting dissatisfaction with the licensing laws,
particularly in relation to tourism, it was announced on 8th December
1970 that committees of inquiry would be set up. In a written
Cannons answer, the Hate Secretary, Reginald Maudling, stated that
he had decided to appoint a committee of inquiry to review the law on
liquor licensing in England and Wales which 'was archaic and in need
of thorough overhaul to meet modern conditions 1.2 3 At exactly the
same tine, Gordon Campbell, the Secretary of State for Scotland,
announced that a Scottish committee of inquiry would be established
as he had 'decided that it would be appropriate to have a general
review of the licensing law of Scotland'.2 ^
While each committee was autonomous a 'close liaison' was main¬
tained between the committees through the Chairmen and Secretariat
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in an attempt to minimise the differences in any proposals for the
two countries. As the introduction to the Clayson Report stated:
'While the prime aim of each ccnmittee was to consider
the requirements of our respective countries and to
frame recommendations accordingly, we kept in mind
the desirability of narrowing these differences in
law as far as possible.... (0)n a matter such as this
it is perhaps too much to expect unanimity, but such
divergence as exists ... can be ascribed in the main
to genuine differences in circumstances and public
attitudes in the respective countries'.2 5
The Clayson Committee was of the 'matching' type. It duplicated
the work of an English comiittee north of the border. However, it
was independent in its appointment and operation and this autonomy
allowed the Committee to address itself to the issues as they appeared
in a specific Scottish context. In this respect the Clayson Committee
demonstrated the way in which the Scottish 'system' could function
independently when dealing with activities which acted solely on the
population of Scotland. Yet on the other hand, it also reflected a
desire not to diverge too far from the norms of the rest of the coun¬
try if the general desire for equality before the law was to be satis¬
fied.
III. Appointing the Committee
Che of the principal considerations in setting up a committee of
inquiry is achieving a balanced membership. Interests tend to be
balanced against each other in order to represent 'a good cross-
section of the community'. This can present semething of a dilemma
for the appointing department. The department will want to appoint
and be seen to be appointing, individuals of recognised ability and
experience, yet at the same time a minister and his officials will
try to ensure that the comittee personnel reflect, to some extent,
their own beliefs and expectations. Donnison has written that in
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the selection of personal talent 'Whitehall is politically sophisti¬
cated, but alarmingly ignorant about people'.26 The Scottish Office,
hcwever, does not seem to be as susceptible to this line of criticism
since knowledge of the range of suitable talent is more extensive
given the more compact. nature of Scottish society.27 Often a consid¬
erable number of potential candidates are kncwn personally at St.
Andrew's House because of their professional position and standing in
the community.
Of the Clayson Committee members spoken to all praised the sensi¬
tivity with which St. Andrew's House handled the selection, There had
been an effort on the part of the Scottish Office to avoid extremes.
Both the Brewers and the Church were excluded from the Camaittee on
the grounds that their positions were so diametrically opposed and
entrenched as to render debate sterile. Mr. Menzies Campbell, for
instance, commented that there had been 'a strenuous effort to find
a group of people with no special interest in licensing'.28 He said
the approach had been to appoint people who would be 'enthusiastic
and sensible' in their attitude to the problems at hand and who would
not slew down the work of the Committee by dogmatically arguing one
particular line. The Chairman, Dr. Christopher Clayson, also remarked
that 'it was deliberate policy not to have the Church represented on
the Scottish Cormittee, even although the Errol Committee had a
Bishop1,29 Similarly, Dr. Jchn Sutherland indicated that no Church
representative was included on the Committee because 'the Church of
Scotland tended to take too moralistic a view on the issue' . He added,
'the aim of the Scottish Office was to try to get together a cormittee
that would work. Senior civil servants were very careful in their
selection of members'.30
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This attitude of the Scottish Office was confirmed by a Minister
of that period, Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith, when he remarked that 'there
was a willingness to approach the problem in a practical way' . The
Clayson Cormittee had been 'a carmittee of real workers representing
a good cross section of the corrmunity, whereas one of the failings of
the Errol Carmittee was that it had been a bit too high powered' .31
It is interesting to note that the Committee was considered
'a good cross-section of the community' by Buchanan-Smith. A more
accurate description might be 'a good cross-section of the professional
carmunity' , sinae, as Table 5.5 shows, Carmittee members were drawn
from an elite group of well-placed Scottish citizens. This illustra¬
tes the point made by Chris Allen concerning the 'exclusiveness' of
Scottish Office activities discussed in Chapter 1. The members of
the Clayson Committee held positions as academics, doctors, lawyers,
local government officials and the like. This 'exclusiveness' also
tended to work against women who were under-represented, being redu¬
ced virtually to a residual category. Only Menzies Campbell was to
mention that he thought there was a good case for having more women
cn the Committee.
T. J. Cartwright, in his research on Royal Commissions and
Departmental Committees, has classified committees into three differ¬
ent types - impartial, expert or representative.32 The 'representa¬
tive' type, characterised by a pattern of membership which reflects
two or more counter-balanced interests, was deliberately avoided in
the case of the Clayson Committee. Nor can the Carmittee accurately
be described as 'expert' in that none of the members were selected
for their special knowledge of licensing matters. This leaves the
'impartial' type as the closest approximation of the Clayson Committee.
The expertise that members possessed encompassed a broad range of
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TABLE 5.5 Mexrbers of the Departmental Committee on
Scottish Licensing Law
Dr. C. W. Clayson (Chairman)
Mr. W. M. Campbell
Mr. James F. Falconer
Miss Morag C. Faulds
Mr. E. Frizzell
Mr. A. W. Hardie




Dr. J. D. Sutherland
Mrs. A. S. Than
Physician
Advocate
Town Clerk of Glasgow
Director of Social Work
Chief Constable (Stirlingshire)
Senior Administrative Officer










professional skills, but of greater importance was their ability to
take an informed yet coirmon sense view of the problem.33 Cartwright
has remarked on this:
'Impartial committees are ccrrposed of members who
cannot be said to have more than an average
interest in and knowledge of the subject matter
under study by the committee ... It is not
always easy, of course, to make these distinc¬
tions, to assess whether a particular person
does have special interests or expert knowledge
- to say nothing of whether he was appointed
because of it rather than for seme other reason'.3 4
These difficulties are not simply difficulties of academic analy¬
sis for they can .impinge upon the perceptions that individual members
hold with regard to their cwn role on the committee, and in so doing
can influence the whole tone and direction of a cormittee's activities.
The choice of chairman was particularly important since a good
chairman can more or less organise and orchestrate a committee.
Appointing departments therefore tend to lock for experience on pre¬
vious committees. Dr. Clayson had experience of several. He sugges¬
ted that "there were probably two main reasons for his appointment.
Firstly, since medical considerations were involved it was probably
felt that a doctor would be preferable to a lawyer; and secondly, as
he had just retired it would be known that he would have the spare
time to do the jcb. To these a third might be added, and that was Dr.
Clayson's recognised ability to resolve disputes and build a consensus.
The appointment of the Clayson Committee then, was fairly typical
corresponding to most of the internal rules set by bureaucrats for
such practices. There would seem to be little difference in the cri¬
teria adopted by the Scottish Office and other government departments
in their selection of personnel. However, Scottish Office appoint¬
ments to ccrrmittees of inquiry are drawn from a relatively small,
elite, and close-knit Scottish political community in which the
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participants are often personally known to each other, and this tends
to reinforce the 'exclusiveness' prevalent in the Scottish Office's
centralised "administrative style". Cn the other hand, such famil¬
iarity can facilitate same astute appointments.
IV. The Approach of the Ccnrmittee: It s 'Philosophy'
The Departmental Committee on Scottish Licensing Law was given
the follcwing terms of reference:
'To review the liquor licensing laws of Scotland
and to make recommendations cn what changes, if
any, might be made in the public interest; and
to report'.3 5
This mandate was sufficiently broad to allcw an investigation
into the whole field of liquor licensing law in Sootland, the first
comprehensive review for more than 40 years. To this end the
Committee sat in private for almost 2\ years, holding some 39 full
day meetings at which both written and oral evidence was considered.
In its method the Coirmittee adopted a standard approach, inviting a
number of specific organisations to submit written evidence, as well
as issuing a general invitation through the press to the public and
any interested parties to contribute. Some of the invited organisa¬
tions were asked only to comment to particular aspects of the remit,
while others were asked for their views on the basic issues involved
and the main practical questions arising from them. The response to
the invitations was considerable, with a total of about 250 written
submissions being received. In addition, the Committee heard oral
evidence from almost. 50 organisations.
Information was also obtained from a survey conducted by the
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys into public attitudes to
the licensing law in Sootland. (The equivalent OPCS survey for
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England and Wales was made available to the Errol Carmittee.) Both
Clayson and Errol, however, expressed reservations about the survey,
ccarmenting that the data had 'to be treated with seme care' .36
Ihe survey found that the vast majority of people in Scotland
(88%) drank alcoholic liquor at least occasionally. Among men the
proportion was 96% and among women 83%. 95% of the 18-34 age group
drank occasionally, while 87% of 35-64 year olds and 73% of the over
65s did so. As regards the places in which people drank, almost 60%
of the adult population in Scotland had a drink in a public house at
least occasionally, while a similar proportion did so in a hotel or
restaurant. 75% of those interviewed had an occasional drink at hare.
Regular drinking (for the purpose of the survey, once a month or more
often) in a public house was reported by 36%; in the heme by 35%; in
a club by 22%; in a hotel by 18%; and in a restaurant by 16%. The
survey confirmed that regular pub going was predominantly a male
activity, and a youthful one.
Information was also provided on the attitude of people in
Scotland tcwards pubs and the facilities they expected to find in
them. In response to a series of statements, 38% would not from
choice go into a pub; 33% of men would not wish to take their wife
(if they had one) into a pub; and 92% of women would not go into a
pub alone. On the other hand 50% felt that pubs were warm, friendly
places and almost a quarter felt at heme in a pub and thought it an
ideal place for a night, out. Virtually all favoured proper toilet
and washing facilities. There was also a substantial demand for
sandwiches, rolls and cold snacks, and to a lesser degree, for hot
snacks, while more than a half wanted tea and coffee to be available.
About a half of informants wanted a playroom or play-garden, sugges¬
ting some desire for keeping the family together while adults were
drinking.
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The survey also tried to establish the views of the public on
particular provisions in the licensing law. However, the Clayson
Report expressed a number of reservations about the findings, sugges¬
ting that public interest in licensing law itself was low; that the
survey demanded snap judgements on complicated issues ideally requir¬
ing considerable thought; that the answers tended to be inconsistent;
and that public attitudes on such matters were liable to alter.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the findings revealed some
interesting attitudes. 48% of those interviewed in Scotland felt
that in general the existing restrictions on the sale of alcohol were
'about right', while 23% felt that they were not restricted enough,
and 19% felt that they were too restricted. On the hours of opening
in pubs opinion was divided equally (about one-third in each case),
among those in favour of all-day opening and those who favoured exis¬
ting arrangements. Opinion was also fairly evenly divided on closing
time, 40% being satisfied with 10 p.m., and 42% in favour of a later
closing hour. As regards Sunday opening of pubs in Scotland, 48%
were in favour and 50% against. While there was relatively little
support for allowing children into the bars of public houses, there
was a good deal of support for the separate idea of a place where the
whole family could obtain refreshment. Nearly all (98%) informants
thought there should be a minimum age at which young people were
allowed to drink on their cwn in licensed premises, 81% considering
that the age should be at least 18.
Ihe data gathered by the OPCS survey was utilised by the Gorrmittee
with a measure of caution. By the time the Report came out the find¬
ings had dated by two and a half years. However, the Conmittee was
forced to accept that it was 'the best evidence available to us on
the attitudes and wishes of the consumer'.37
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Statistical information was obtained from government sources.
The only official figures available relating to the total consumption
of alcohol were those maintained by the Commissioners of Customs and
Excise for beer, wine and spirits (home-produced or Imported) which
were retained for home consumption. These statistics were maintained
cn a UK basis and therefore there was no breakdown for Scotland.
Since figures for Scottish consumption were not available from any
other source the Committee had to rely upon observations on the res¬
ponsiveness of consumption to changes in taxation and on more general
large-scale trends (e.g. Family Expenditure Survey statistics). Hew-
ever, statistics concerning the number of premises for which certifi¬
cates were granted for the sale of alcohol were more readily obtain¬
able, being published annually in the 'volumes of Civil Judicial
Statistics for Scotland. From these figures it was possible to build
up a picture of the changing pattern of retail outlets in Scotland
over the years.
Thus, in its modus operandi the Clayson Committee corresponded,
by and large, to a 'typical' departmental committee. Hcwever, while
there may have been nothing unusual in its procedure what was a dis¬
tinguishing feature of this committee was its enlightened, almost
philosophical, approach to its subject. It did not, to paraphrase
» Shonfield's expression, 'just plunge into its subject and collect
facts, but developed frcm a very early stage definite theoretical
assumptions not only about the issue under investigation, but also
about its own role in policy formulation'.38 It did not confine it¬
self to examining the technicalities of the licensing laws, but took
the opportunity systematically to scrutinise the principles and phil¬
osophy that lay behind those laws.
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Utilising the statistical information made available to it, the
Committee's initial task, according to sate of its members, was to
establish 'correct (objectives'. It was immediately apparent, remarked
Dr. John Sutherland, that 'a working philosophy was needed' . Simil¬
arly, Mr. Menzies Campbell indicated that 'it was plain frcm the first
meeting that changes were on the cards. The underlying theme of re¬
form was obvious frcm the outset, ihere was going to be no tinkering
- it was going to be a root and branch alteration' .39
The Committee's approach was developed from a tripartite analysis
of the controls available for the prevention of misuse. These were
categorised as:
i. Social controls, that is controls which derive frcm the
attitudes of a society, and its practices in relation to the
consumption of alcohol.
ii. Fiscal controls, that is taxation, whether for revenue-
raising or social purposes, and its effects en alcohol
consumption.
iii. Legislative controls, that is restrictions imposed by
law on the sale and consumption of alcohol.
These controls were not three separate forms of restriction;
rather they were interactive. Since fiscal controls were identical
in Scotland and in England and Wales, and the similarities in the
licensing laws were greater than the differences, the Committee looked
for an explanation of the greater misuse of alcohol .in Scotland in the
range of social controls.
Earlier it was noted that one of the main explanations that has
been advanced for the high incidence of alcohol-related problems in
Scotland is the cultural one. It was suggested that the strong pol¬
arity of views which prevails within Scotland blurs the distinctions
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between socially acceptable and socially unacceptable drinking beha¬
viour. While the Clayson Report was at pains to avoid an over¬
simplified analysis of the problem it was significant that the
Committee drew upon American research from the Co-operative Commission
on the Study of Alcoholism which emphasised that strong and conflict¬
ing attitudes towards alcohol within a society were an obstacle to
the reduction of alcohol misuse.40 Drawing from this research and
from the results of the OPCS survey, the Clayson Report was led to
comment:
'
.. . in present Scottish circumstances it is in the
area of social controls over drinking practice that
improvement is most required if the serious problem
of alcohol misuse is to be ameliorated'.41
Fiscal controls involving rates of alcohol taxation were also
thought to play a part in preventing alcohol misuse by setting the
cost of drink. Drawing upon Canadian studies at the Addiction
Research Foundation of Ontario the Committee quoted findings which
suggested that there was in general terms an inverse relationship
between the cost of alcohol to the consumer (i.e. cost per quantity
of pure alcohol) and the extent of harmful consequences of alcohol
misuse. The Committee was of the opinion, however, that this inverse
relationship did not in itself justify increased taxation. The rele¬
vance of the finding was limited to the Report noting that the extent
of the alcohol problem in Scotland, serious though it was, was in
fact restricted by the high rate of taxation, and that in deciding
future rates of alcohol taxation weight should be given to the sub¬
stantial part it played in alcohol control.
Subsequent research has lent same support to Clayson's thinking
on this issue. Professor Brendan Walsh has found that increasing the
cost of drink does not in itself dramatically reduce misuse.42 His
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study of Irish drinking suggested that prohibitive expense deterred
moderate drinkers, but not heavy drinkers who merely allocated an
increased proportion of their income, whether they could afford it
or not, towards obtaining drink.
Perhaps one of the most dramatic illustrations of the relation¬
ship between cost and consumption has been published by the Scottish
Health Education Unit in 1976.43 Table 5.6 plots the per capita con¬
sumption of whisky throughout the UK against the price of a standard
bottle, expressed as a percentage of disposable income, (personal
disposable income is what is left after deduction of taxes and statu¬
tory contributions) . As the cost decreases so consumption increases
Table 5.7 then shews the changes in consumption of whisky and its
relative cost in the UK frcm 1950-70 together with the rate of admis¬
sion to Scottish hospitals since 1956.
The SHE Unit comment:
'It is difficult to ignore the similarity of the curves
illustrating consumption and hospital admission, as
opposed to the converse curve illustrating cost.
Obviously, this is not a simple case of cause and
effect. Many other factors will influence the situa-
ticn. At the same time, however, it is clear that as
the individual pays less for his bottle of whisky, so
the total cost to society increases in terms of alco¬
holism and all the human suffering that accompanies it'.1+4
This report was brought out in 1976 and as the decade progressed
more evidence was gathered and published (for example by Plant) show¬
ing the links between price, consumption and alcohol problems. Much
of this evidence suggested that the price of alcohol be raised or at
least maintained in real terms. However, only some of this evidence
was available to the Clayscn. Committee in the early 1970s and its
task was to link existing data on price and consumption with data




Source: Scottish Health Education Unit, Understanding Alcohol
and Alcoholism in Scotland, HMSO, 1976.
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Thus, the third part of Clayson's analysis concerned legislative
controls. This for the most part involved licensing, but legislative
control of production and of advertising, were other forms of this
type of control. The basic premise of licensing was that it limited
the availability of alcohol through limiting the number of places it
could be purchased, the number of places it could be consumed, and
the number of hours it could be so obtained and consumed, and in so
doing levels of consumption and therefore rates of misuse could be
controlled. Hcwever, the Clayson Committee raised doubts concerning
the effectiveness of the licensing laws, questioning whether consump¬
tion was restricted by this means. Yet what effect a relaxation in
the licensing laws would have on consumption was not clear. Never¬
theless, after weighing up the possible advantages and disadvantages,
the Committee decided, on balance, that a relaxation was desirable
provided that any resulting increase in consumption as a result of
the relaxation was not of significant proportions. The Report argued:
'Licensing, a negative and restrictive process,
can play only a strictly limited part in the
control of alcohol misuse. The part should be
that of strengthening social control by help¬
ing in the formation of public attitudes to
alcohol and modifications of practices in its
consumption.'4 5
In reaching this decision the Clayson Committee did not receive
much assistance frcm the medical profession which .remained equivocal
as to the effect of thelicensing laws on the misuse of alcohol. The
Scottish Council of the British Medical Association could not substan¬
tiate an opinion 'in view of the unexpected lack of medical documenta¬
tion on the effect of .licensing laws' .tf6 The Institute of Psychiatry
was the same. They commented:
"The extent of any adverse health impact which might
result frcm an increase in sales outlets or an
alteration in type of outlet available is quite
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uncertain. Present evidence really doesn't allow
even an informed guess as to the likely consequence.
It may be noted in parenthesis that there is similar
uncertainty as to the probable effect of licensing
hours'.47
Similarly, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow
considered there to be insufficient evidence relating to the effect of
the law on the pattern of alcoholism and therefore could not predict
with accuracy what would happen if such laws were changed. This was
echoed by their counterparts, the Royal College of Physicians of
Edinburgh, which could not find reliable information either. They
remarked that it was 'not possible from existing knowledge to predict
with confidence the effect an health of alterations in the licensing
laws'.4 8
However, all the medical bodies were of the opinion that scire
external control of drinking should be continued. Ihey all concurred
that the available evidence suggested that problem drinking and alco¬
holism increased as alcohol became more available. By limiting sale,
the state was attempting to reconcile opposing responsibilities - to
allow citizens to drink, and at the same time to control the availa¬
bility of drink to those who misused it, and endangered themselves
and others. Therefore, in part at least, licensing controls were
intended to protect public health. And since external controls for
the protection of the public were accepted in other spheres of society,
for example speed limits, medical opinion thought them to be necessary
also with regard to alcohol use - although it felt unable to comment
on the nature and extent of those controls.
Ihe Clayson Committee's approach was based on a fundamental
scepticism that restriction of the availability of alcohol in itself
could control alcohol misuse. Careful consideration was taken of the
serious problem which existed in Scotland concerning the misuse of
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alcohol and weight was attached to this factor in the Committee' s
deliberations. However, as well as giving due regard to the part
licensing could play in controlling the problems of alcohol misuse,
the Committee also took into consideration the fact that a majority
of people in Scotland who consumed alcoholic drink did so in reason¬
able moderation and without harmful medical or social consequences.
The Committee thus developed an approach which sought to balance
recommendations that would be of benefit to the majority of consumers,
without however, exacerbating the existing problems of the minority.
The commitment was not only to take into consideration the circum¬
stances which prevailed at the time, but also "to anticipate the
likely development of work and leisure patterns and consumer needs
over the next 20 years' ,l+9
V. Comparative Developments in England: The Errol Committee
The Errol Committee was appointed by Heme Secretary Reginald
Maudling in April 1971 to review liquor licensing law in England and
Wales. It based this review, as Clayson did, on the proposition that
a licensing system was a necessary control since intoxicating liquor
could not be sold or supplied without some form of prior permission.
As noted earlier, English licensing law differed frcm that operating
north of the border. The licensing system in England and Wales was
based on local licensing justices who had complete discretion to grant
or refuse a licence of which five basic types existed - a full 'on'-
licenoe, an 'off'-licence, a restaurant licence, a residential licence,
and a combined residential and restaurant licence. The permitted hours
were 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. (11 p.m. in some
areas where justices permitted) . Sunday opening was from 12 noon to
2 p.m. and 7 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. Extensions could be granted and these
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were of three types - a supper hour which allowed an extra hour in
restaurants; an extended hours order until 1 a.m. for establishments
providing meals and music; and a special hours certificate until
2 a.m. for premises holding a public music and dancing licence.
Clubs were divided into two types - 'proprietary' and 'members'. A
proprietary club required a licence but a members club required only
a certificate of registration from the magistrates court as alcohol
was deemed to be 'supplied' rather than 'sold' in such premises.
Children had to be over 14 to gain access to licensed premises and,
generally speaking, over 18 to buy and consume drink in a bar.
Errol took the view that licensing law should concern itself
with physical standards and conduct of premises; character of licen¬
sees; ages for access, purchase and consumption, and hours of opening.
Hie main recommendations of the Report were in these areas. The
Report suggested that licensing justices should continue to be respon¬
sible for the grant of a liquor licence and for other functions aris¬
ing out of licensing legislation but recarrmended that licensing jus¬
tices ' absolute discretion be replaced by specified grounds on which
applications for grant and renewal of licence could be refused. Fur¬
ther, two types of licence were recommended - one personal to the
proprietor of the premises (a personal licence) and one held by the
owner (a premises licence). Existing licences were to be amalgamated
into one single form of premises licence - any differences in the types
of outlet regarding the nature of the premises or the nature of the
liquor allowed to be sold was to be specified in the conditions of
the licence. All clubs were to be licensed and police were to have a
general right of entry. Recommended permitted hours were to be from
10 a.m. until 12 midnight with, the proviso that licensing justices
have the power to close premises for a specified period of time if
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this was felt to be in the public interest. Off-licences were to be
open from 8,30 to 12 midnight and places of public entertainment were
to be exempted frcm permitted hours but other forms of control were to
apply such as a certificate to sell liquor as an ancillary to the main
purpose for which the premises were licensed. The Report also recom¬
mended that children under 14 be allowed access to certain parts of
suitable premises and that the age limit for purchase and consumption
be reduced frcm 18 to 17. The remaining Sections of this chapter will
consider in what ways and for what reasons the recommendations of the
Clayson Committee differed frcm these proposals.
VI. The Main Issues and the Nature of the Arguments
The remit of the Clayson Committee, as noted earlier, was such
that it was empowered to undertake a comprehensive review of the whole
sphere of licensing law. Thus, as well as dealing with those issues
which most attracted the public eye, viz. where and when the ordinary
consumer could and could not drink, the Cormittee also dealt with a
wide variety of other issues. A brief review of the issues and the
arguments about them will be of benefit before proceeding to analyse
the role of pressure groups in the policy process. The most systematic
approach to this is to adopt the categorisation utilised by Clayson.
a) The licensing authority. Here, the structure of the new licens¬
ing authority was important since it would be through this body that
the licensing laws would be implemented. Of concern was the form the
authority should take in light of two main considerations: i) impending
local government reform, and ii) the principles by which licensing
should operate. The questions were at what level in the new two tier
system of local government licensing should fit, and whether it should
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be an 'administrative' or a 'judicial' function.
b) The types of licences. The sale of alcohol is carefully control¬
led through a system of certificates giving suitable licensees the
authority to sell liquor in specified premises. At issue was the ade¬
quacy of the existing types of certificate and the discretion by which
they were granted. The reform of certain types of certificate, it was
felt, could have an effect on changing patterns of consumption.
c) Hours of sale and supply. This was the issue which attracted most
public attention. The main topic of controversy concerned, on the. one
hand, the relationship between licensing law, levels of consumption and
rates of alcohol misuse, and on the other, the need to promote a more
civilised approach to drinking by changing social habits. Also imping¬
ing upon this debate was the question of the freedom of the individual.
What legal restrictions were justifiable in limiting a person's choice
as to where, when and hew he drank? And what were the minimum require¬
ments that would ensure a balance between individual choice and respon¬
sible control in the interests of the wider community?
d) The conduct of licensed premises. The problem here lay in the
concept of 'vicarious responsibility' and the 'fairness' of such a
legal concept in Scots law. While it was of the utmost importance to
see to the good conduct of licensed premises and to hold a licensee-
accountable, it was also important to prevent an injustice through
that person being held accountable for breaches of the law genuinely
out of their control.
e) Temperance polls. These were veto polls which involved keeping
certain areas 'dry' or 'limited' by the placing of a prohibition or
restriction en the sale of alcohol within a given community. Anachro¬
nism or local democratic right?
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f) Registered clubs. Since clubs were registered with the sheriff
and not licensed in the normal way, certain problems arose in their
supervision by the police. The principle at stake was whether club
members had a right to 'privacy' within their cwn clubs or whether
the public had a right to ensure good order through police access and
supervision.
g) The law and young people. At what age and in what circumstances
should young people be allowed to i) enter licensed premises, and
ii) consume alcohol?
It was principally on these issues that the pressure groups and
the public were invited to submit evidence, and it is to this evidence
and the positions of the pressure groups that the next section will
turn.
VII. The Pressure Groups: their positions and influence
The Licensing Authority
The debate concerning the licensing authority focused on four
different types of proposal. The first favoured the status guo with
the retention of a licensing court at district, level composed of elec¬
ted representatives and justices of the peace. This was favoured by
the largest single group of organisations, mainly composed of the
local authority bodies including the Association of County Council,
Convention of Royal Burghs, the cities of Edinburgh and Dundee and
other bodies such, as the Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland) .
They felt the existing system to be in the main satisfactory and that
the inclusion of JPs was desirable on the grounds that they were poli¬
tically impartial, less subject to pressures than elected representa¬
tives and ensured continuation of policy. These submissions gave the
impression though that the local authority bodies favoured the status
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quo principally because they lacked ideas in any other direction.
However, it may not be that difficult to see why such an attitude
should have prevailed given that local government reform was imminent.
Whether it was a product of indifference engendered by an uncertain
future or whether it was more a reaction of entrenchment to retain
as many functions at district level as possible in the face of impend¬
ing change is difficult to judge accurately. Perhaps simply they were
aware that whatever changes took place would be "small beer" compared
with what was to follow.
The second proposal favoured was to use the new district author¬
ity, or some part of it, as the licensing authority. This was favour¬
ed by a small number of bodies including Glasgow and Aberdeen Corpor¬
ations . The argument was for the licensing authority to be composed
entirely of elected representatives on the grounds that they would be
both knowledgeable about local conditions and accountable to the elec¬
torate. This would emit JPs who, it was thought, were not accountable
and move licensing from a "judicial" function to an 'administrative'
one.
A third and opposing view was that the licensing system should
be a funcrtion of the sheriff on the grounds that the system would
thereby be beyond suspicion of corruption and, where there was a dis¬
pute there would be impartial examination of the evidence. This line
was most strongly argued by the Church of Scotland. They pointed out
that the emphasis on local knowledge could also mean increased oppor¬
tunities for corruption.
"For there to be intimate local kncwledge there is a
much greater chance, of there being local pressure
and undue influence no matter frem wham it comes...
The retention of the present system because of the
use of local kncwledge is a proposition of dubious
value'.5 0
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A fourth proposal was for a new type, of 'ad hoc* statutory body
along the lines of a tribunal consisting of laymen appointed by the
sheriff. Apart from the Law Society of Scotland this idea had little
support.
In its deliberations the Committee quickly established criteria
against which the issue was to be judged. The. premise frcm which they
began, originally contained in the Guest Report, was that licensing
was not an appropriate function for the Sheriff Court. Even though
decisions of a court had an authority and credibility because of the
manner in which they were reached, licensing was not, according to the
Committee, a judicial function per se. Rather, it was a system of
administrative control of a commercial activity through which a number
of competing considerations were balanced. Qioe this had been estab¬
lished, logic suggested that 'responsibility should be placed on an
established administrative body answerable to the electorate - namely
in view of the local nature of licensing decisions, the district
council'.51
The Committee' s decision had implications for local democracy
itself - for if the objections to the local authority as licensing
t
authority were upheld, they could amount to objections to the system
of local government itself. Licensing was only one of the many func¬
tions involving private commercial interests which the local authority
exercised on behalf of the community, so to single out licensing on
the grounds of possible corruption was inconsistent since it ignored
many other areas of local government where corruption was also, a dan¬
ger. Another point in favour of the local authority exercising admin-
inistrative controls of this nature was that it could exercise its
discretion in accordance with a stated policy on the location and con¬
duct of premises and their effect on surrounding amenities.
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The recommendation made was that licensing courts should be re¬
placed with licensing becoming a function of licensing authorities
('boards') appointed by the district council in the same manner as a
committee of the council. The decision to go for a new set up of
'licensing boards' seems to have had little to do with pressure group
influence since the majority proposal in favour of the status quo,
which had some powerful subscribers, was eventually rejected. The
proposal, for a local authority licensing board, on the other hand,
did not command, numerically at least, widespread support. In this
instance the decision would seem to stem primarily from the interpre¬
tation of the conclusions reached by the Guest Committee on the matter.
An element of doubt though, appears in the Report as to how acceptable
the proposal would be to public opinion. The Report commented:
'The possibility that public opinion may not at
present be prepared to contemplate it should
not prohibit discussion of its merits'.52
This decision was very much in keeping with the working philosophy
of the Committee since it was illustrative of two of its main features.
Firstly, through its deliberations a principle was established frcm
which a logical argument developed despite the outcome not being the
most popular of the options. And secondly, the Gommittee, aware of
this, demonstrated the capacity to take a forward view, by recommend¬
ing it on the basis of envisaged shifts in public opinion.
The Types of Licence
The basis of the law was that it was an offence to sell exciseable
liquor without holding a certificate granted by the licensing authority
or in contravention of the conditions of a particular certificate.
Five types of certificate were available in Scotland: hotel, public
house, off-sale, restaurant and restricted hotel.
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The views submitted to the Coimaittee fell broadly into three
categories - that five types of certificate were sufficient to meet
requirements; that five were too many and should be reduced and sim¬
plified; and that five were not enough, and additional certificates
should be added to meet changing circumstances.
Those who favoured the status quo included several of the churches
and temperance organisations, the local authority organisations, the
legal bodies and ACPO(S). Typical of the temperance lobby was the
National Temperance Federation who thought that the primary purpose
of licensing was to protect society rather than make it easier for
people to drink. They were particularly concerned at the development
of off-sales in supermarkets and felt stricter control should be exer¬
ted over their issue to protect women and young people under 18, who
it was considered were particularly vulnerable to this type of selling.
The Church of Scotland also wished to see restriction in off-sales,
both in terms of hours, which they thought should be co-extensive with
normal shopping hours, and in terms of premises, so that off-sales
certificates should not be granted to premises with an on-sales cer¬
tificate. They also strongly opposed the suggestion of licences for
cafes, a point similarly made by ACPO(S) who thought that 'extending
liquor sales to cafes is undesirable, principally because they, a)
seldom have the amenities required, and b) tend to draw on the young,
many under 16 years, for their habitues'.53
There were several suggestions for the reduction in the number
of types of certificate in order to simplify the system. These came
mainly frcm those involved in the licensing trade and usually centred
around difficulties they had encountered with the law. For instance,
the British Hotels and Restaurant Association (Scottish Division)
wanted to see certificates reduced to simply pub, hotel and off-sale,
191
while the Licensed Grocers and Wine Merchants' Association of Scotland
advocated replacing licensing of off-sales with a form of registration
of such premises with the licensing authority.
Lastly, there were those who favoured additional types of certi¬
ficates for particular premises. Organisations representing the
entertainments industry proposed a special certificate for cinemas,
theatres, dance halls, bingo clubs and the like so as to allcw for
the sale of drink, but confine it to bona fide patrons only. Bodies
such as the Cinematograph Exhibitors 1 Association (Scottish Branch) ,
the National Association of Bingo Clubs and the Scottish Ballroom
Association, all advocated an entertainments licence to be granted,
provided the applicant satisfied the basic criteria of health and
safety, to enable drink to be sold as an ancillary to the main enter-
tainnent activity. Self interest tended to dominate with perhaps the
most blatant (honest?) appeal ccming from the Company Secretary of
Mecca Ltd.:
1.. .we would like to see a much more liberal approach
and a drastic reform in the law relating to Licences
for places of entertainment and catering in Scotland
than has prevailed hitherto, for the simple reason
that this would enable this Company to fulfill its
wish to expand its interests in Scotland very consid¬
erably and with a much greater degree of confidence
as to return on its investments in Scotland, which
are not inconsiderable new...'.5 4
Support for the cafe-type pub mentioned earlier was also evident,
particularly among the pro-liberalisation school such as the Scottish
Tburist Board, the British Tourist Authority, the Licensing Law Reform
Society, and the Scottish Chamber of Coirmerce. However, the term
'cafe-pub' caused much confusion since the contributors to the debate
were often talking at cross purposes. Seme took it to mean a pub with
the facility to serve tea, coffee, soft drinks, snacks etc., while
others took it to mean a cafe licensed to sell hard liquor. Neither
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really captured the intention which was to be a new kind of establish¬
ment, generically different, something along the lines of the 'bistros'
of the continent. The most vociferous plea for this type of establish¬
ment came from the Licensing Law Reform Society who based their case
on an existing 'cafe-pub' in Brighton. The claims made for this esta¬
blishment - named 'The Vasso' - are quite remarkable and are worth
quoting at some length if only for the unwitting levity of the style.
Under the rather emotive heading of 'Set the People Free', the
Reform Society wrote:
'These new style establishments, with full 'on' licences,
will set the scene for an entirely new pattern of social
behaviour. The British public will be set free, as never
before, in the history of the Nation. The family with
children and particularly women will be united for the
first time outside the hare'.
Under the heading 'New Deal for Women', they continue:
'Women will be able to behave outside the hare in just
the same way as they do in the hare. At any time they
choose they will be able to meet their friends and
enjoy a free choice, in one place, ranging between tea
and coffee, cakes and pastries, or alcoholic drinks.
Their children can be present with them and they need
not be left at home or outside the premises. Waren
will be permitted to meet their menfolk on their awn
terms in surroundings in which they feel more at ease'.
Lastly, under the stirring heading, 'A Revolution', it is claimed:
'With the establishment in the country of what may be
termed the 'Cafe-pub' a new pattern of leisure activity
will emerge and a revoluticn in social behaviour begin'.55
The enthusiasm of the submission can perhaps be explained by the
fact that it was written by one Geoffrey Irwin, who not only happened
to be Chairman of the Licensing Law Reform Society, but was also the
founder and licensee of 'The Vasso'I Despite its unintentional humour
the memo did highlight the need for a change in attitude towards drink
and licensed premises, a matter of primary importance to Dr. Clayson
and his Conmittee.
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A need for such additional licenses was not lost on the Conmittee.
They concluded that a reduction in the number of certificates would,
far from simplifying matters, only lead to increased difficulties in
the administration and supervision of premises. Accordingly, the
retention of the original five certificates was favoured, along with
the introduction of additional new categories. The Committee thought
that an entertainments licence was a development which should be
'encouraged in so far as it might help to promote civilised drinking
and breakdown the attitude that regards the consumption of liquor as
an end in itself'.56 A refreshment house certificate for cafe-pubs
was desirable because it 'would keep the family together'.57 Also
recommended was a residential certificate which would allow guest
houses to sell alcohol to residents only.
In relation to this decision pressure groups appear to have played
a more significant part especially concerning the entertainment licence,
where the interests involved presented a reasonable case for being
allowed to provide alcohol as an ancillary to entertainment. Their
obvious commercial self interest should not, hcwever, be forgotten.
Nevertheless, the logic of Clayson's recommendation can be defended
on the grounds that many of these entertainment establishments were
already supplying alcohol under public house certificates. The new
type of certificate was more appropriate in that it confined sale and
supply to bona fide patrons.
The issue of the cafe-pub also seems to have been influenced by
public opinion as was shewn by the OPCS survey which indicated that
over three quarters of the sample were in favour of such premises.
The Committee's rationale, then, again illustrates the underlying
theme of liberalisation which came to be an integral part of the
Committee's 'working philosophy'.
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The Hours of Sale and Supply
The subject of the permitted hours of opening was by far the most
popular in terms of submissions received and by far the most contro¬
versial. Everyone, it seemed, had some opinion to offer, ranging
right across the spectrum from the liberal to the restrictive. The
first question to be tackled was whether a system of permitted hours
was necessary at all. The Brewers' Association of Scotland (BAS) was
not entirely convinced that it was:
'Given strong control over the granting of licenses,
there would be many attractions in having complete
freedom regarding licensing hours. Under such a
system, the individual licensee would be able to
decide when to open and close his establishment
according to public demand. Whilst this may con¬
jure up pictures of uncontrolled drinking 24 hours
a day, it is felt that in practice, public demand
would quickly dictate sensible times of operation'.58
Hcwever, this particular argument gave the impression that the
Brewers were angling to see how far they might push the Committee for
they quickly and realistically conceded that 'this would be a very
radical step which rtay not be acceptable to the Government',59 Their
submission then continued to outline a detailed fallback position
which identified the areas where they felt the law was in need of im¬
provement.
It was generally accepted by the other trade organisations, the
legal bodies, the local authorities, the youth organisations and the
police that there was a need for some form of control over the number
of permitted hours. Such a need being established the question then
was what those hours should be.
While therewere few representations to make the law even more
restrictive there were a number of organisations, mainly the churches
and temperance groups, who took the view that it should not be any
more liberal. The Church of Scotland argued that 'the law cannot
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countenance, greater permissiveness but must aim at checking the fur¬
ther spread of alccholism by effectively limiting the distribution
and availability of alcohol'„60 The Free Church, in much the same
vein, thought that 'restrictive laws were brought in to curb execes-
sive drinking and such laws are no less necessary today in view of
the increasing consumption of alcohol and the accompanying increase
in the prevalence of alcoholism'.61 The Congregational Union of
Scotland attacked the Brewers, who they said, wanted an extension of
hours for financial gain since 'they are motivated by profit as much
as, if not more, than by the convenience, of the public'.62 The
Scottish Band of Hope Union were the most militant in that they
'would welcome an immediate closure of all public houses', but reali¬
sed ' that this may not be possible'.6 3
However, not all of the religious and temperance groups were so
reactionary. The British Temperance Society, vhose submission was
originally mnade to Errol, felt that as prohibition was inoperable,
and restriction of hours had not worked, a more relaxed approach bo
opening hours might prove conducive to creating a more civilised
atmosphere for consumption. Similarly, the Roman Catholic Bishops in
Scotland thought that 'a more relaxed form of permitted hours would
be for the common good' „64 Longer hours, they proposed, would lead
to more social drinking and in effect minimise the number of people
involved in hard drinking.
Cn the other side of the coin, not all of the trade organisations
were in favour of relaxation and increased hours. The National
Association of Licensed House Managers (NALHM) was against any exten¬
sion of hours on the grounds that their members, and bar staff gener¬
ally, worked long enough hours without taking on any additional bur¬
dens. The Scottish Licensed Trade Association (SLTA) was also opposed
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to any discontinuation of the afternoon break, Ihey favoured its
retention so as to allow staff a break frcm service to the public
for food and rest, for family relationships and for cleaning and
restocking the bar. In theory they said, the answer would lie in a
shift system, but there were practical difficulties in obtaining
suitable staff and even if available, their extra cost would neces¬
sitate a rise in the price of the service.
It is interesting to note the different perspectives from which
this problem was viewed. The NAIHM and SLTA were protecting the
interests of their own members. The Brewers, hcwever, favouring
relaxation, thought that the SLTA took an over protective approach
to the question. A senior Brewers' executive was later to remark
that there had been "differences.between the BAS and the SLTA over
the issue'.6 5 The BAS position was that licensing hours should
'satisfy public demand and not suit the industry which was providing
the service to the public'. He conceded that staff hours had to be
taken into account since they had 'cost implications which had con¬
sumer implications' „ However, the argument 'was not only about remun¬
eration but also about responsibility' . According to another Brewers'
executive,66 NALHM tock the view that the increased hours would cor¬
respondingly mean an increased amount of personal responsibility for
their managers, whereas the Brewers saw the extension of hours as an
opportunity for managers to delegate responsibility.
This was an interesting confrontation since it illustrated the
divisions within the ' trade' itself, with the Brewers viewing the
problem from the side of 'management' and being concerned with increa¬
sed sales and increased profits, while the NALHM and SLTA viewed the
problem in terms of the interests of their members and their working
conditions.
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Amongst those organisations favouring relaxation - a considerable
majority - views differed markedly as to hew far and in what way per¬
mitted hours should be extended. Some such as the cities of Dundee
and Edinburgh, along with ACPO(S) favoured as early as a 9 a.m. start,
while the STB, STUC and BAS opted for 10 a.m. However, the majority,
including the Association of County Councils, the Convention of Royal
Burghs and the other trade organisations remained faithful to 11 a.m.
Proposals for an appropriate closing time were equally as varied with
the most radical again coring from Edinburgh Corporation who suggested
2 a.m. Other liberal suggestions came from the STB and ACPO(S) who
thought a terminal hour of midnight was justified to meet public de¬
mand. The most common recommendation though, was for an 11 p.m. clos¬
ing, givingan extra hour in the evening.
Majority opinion favoured 11 a.m. opening and 11 p.m. closing,
although within that period a number of options were proposed. Gen¬
eral feeling though, was that either the afternoon break should be
done away with altogether, or, if a break was to be retained, it
should be at the discretion of the licensee, thus allowing for a
degree of flexibility.
The question of Sunday opening of public houses proved to be
another issue of controversy. Once, again, the churches and temperance
bodies and same sections of the licensed trade (NALHM) opposed Sunday
opening. The churches and temperance groups based their arguments
largely on the principle of Sunday observance and the desirability of
preserving the tradition of the Scottish sabbath with its emphasis on
family life. The Church of Scotland argued that 'in positive concern
for man's wholeness as a spirit-body creature, the necessity of the
weekly holiday for Christian and non-Christian alike is not in doubt'.67
NALHM were concerned that Sunday was the only rest day for many of
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those employed in public houses, a point endorsed by the Church of
Scotland who criticised 'the putting of profit and self-interest
before concern for those who have to work'.6 8
The other sections of the trade, the BAS and SLTA, were in
favour of Sunday opening, although the SLTA emphasised that it must
be optional with discretion to open or not left to the licensee.
Others backing Sunday opening included ACPO(S) , the STUC and the RC
Bishops. The case was largely based on the fact that public demand
for liquor tended to be no different on a Sunday and that the closing
of public houses only resulted in the gross overcrcwding of hotel
bars. However, those supporting Sunday opening did concede to the
religious nature of the day in that general support seemed to be for
a later opening, around 12.30 p.m., to avoid the possibility of offen¬
ding morning church-goers. Organisations representing the off-sales
section of the trade appeared unconcerned over Sunday opening with
the Licensed Grocers and Wine Merchants content to remain closed.
These recommendations were duly considered by the Committee.
In their deliberations they attached 'considerable importance to the
desirability of removing any element which conduces to undesirable
drinking practices and of encouraging what we might call civilised
drinking',69 To this end the Committee were convinced of the need to
retain a system of permitted hours, but were impressed by the weight
of evidence in favour of an increase in the number and flexibility of
those hours. Accordingly, opening hours of 11 a.m. to 11 p.m. were
recamended which the Committee felt to be a 'reasonable extension in
all the circumstances'.70
However, it was noted that some reputable organisations such as
the STB and ACPO(S) had recoirmended a terminal hour of midnight.
While recognising the advantages in this, the Ccmmittee feeling at
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the time was cautious - 'we are not convinced that there is a substan¬
tial body of public opinion in Scotland which is ready at this stage
to support general extension of the permitted hours in public houses
until midnight'.71
Here there would seem to be good evidence of one of the Cctrmittee' s
'tactical' decisions. The Coirmittee were tempted by even more liberal
hours than those they recamended, but restrained themselves to what
they thought were realistic proposals in face of public opinion, and
more importantly, in face of what would be acceptable to Government.
Their ' forward looking view' therefore, had to be tempered with a con¬
siderable amount of pragmatism and political astuteness. The Chair¬
man, in particular, was very aware of this problem of reconciling
what was desirable with what was feasible. . Dr. Clayson was later to
carnent that it was of the utmost importance as 'this was where Errol
came to grief'. His cwn Conmittee he said, 'were constantly asking
themselves - "is it practical; could we get away with it?"' In this
instance of opening until midnight, the police favoured it and in
principle so did the Committee, but 'of course, we realised that
Parliament would be unlikely to swallow it'. Dr. Clayson concluded
'it was not wise to go the whole hog; if we had, the thing would have
been killed stone dead'.72
Cn the question of Sunday opening there were two issues at stake
- the principle and the actual hours of opening. As regards the prin¬
ciple, the Committee, while respecting the sincerely held beliefs of
those who wished to retain the traditions of Sunday observance, accep¬
ted that public opinion had moved on the issue and that a less restric¬
tive attitude now prevailed. Restrictions on a Sunday could no longer
be justified on Sabbatarian ground alone. Further, since there was
evidence to suggest that existing hotel facilities were not adequate
200
and since the Committee were sympathetic to the argument that the
closure of public houses on Sunday detracted from the social benefits
normally associated with a day of rest, they took the view that in
principle pubs should be permitted to open at the discretion of the
licensee,
That principle established,the problem remained of when to open.
It was felt appropriate that the earliest time at which licensed
premises should open on Sundays was 12.30 p.m. to avoid a clash with
the usual times of morning church services. Closing time was to be
11 p.m. since the Conmittee could see no justification for an earlier
time, and as on weekdays, hours of business would be at the discretion
of the licensee. Off-sales were also to be permitted since it was
considered illogical to allcw for on-consumption but not for off-
consumption .
This issue was the first to cause a note of dissent frcm the
general conclusion. Miss Morag Faulds dissented from the majority
opinion being opposed to the idea of Sunday opening of public houses.
The dissent was entered as a footnote in the Report. The manner in
which the dissent was expressed represented another important tactical
decision by Dr. Clayson. He was determined not to have a minority
report on the grounds that such a report would diffuse the impact of
the main report. He later indicated that he had had to exercise all
of his Chairman's authority on that point as Miss Faulds had 'wanted
to write a long script of dissent and so had to be told firmly, but
politely, "no"'.7 3
Given that virtually all the submitting organisations had some
opinion to offer on permitted hours, it is not possible to establish
any one particular influence of importance. Perhaps the most impor¬
tant feature was the need to relax the pressure to drink,
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the main question being to what extent. While a number of responsible
organisations argued for a radical reform, the Committee had to bal¬
ance these views with their assessment of what would be acceptable to
public opinion at large, and more importantly to those in Government
who would be responsible for drafting legislation on the basis of the
Caimittee's recommendations. Their pragmatic approach, sought to com¬
bine their theoretical carmitment to liberalisation with a practical
appraisal of the politically acceptable.
The Conduct of Licensed Premises
The decision to allcw the majority view to be expressed as the
Committee view, with instances of dissent being confined to footnotes
in the main report, was to affect the Chairman himself when he found
that he was in the minority over the issue of vicarious responsibility.
Che concept of vicarious responsibility is a technical and legal
matter which concerns the nature of the responsibility of those
engaged in the management of licensed premises for their good conduct.
The certificate holder has overall responsibility for the conduct of
the premises, including the conduct of his staff and their control
over the premises. It has been generally accepted that in the case
of a contravention of the criminal law, the licensee was vicariously
liable for the acts or emissions of his staff, that is, he could be
guilty of an offenoe. Hcwever, the sheriff's decision in the Noble
v. Heatly case in 1967 cast doubt on the certificate's holder vicar-
rious responsibility for acts or emissions of his staff.74 In that
case the Sheriff held that the certificate holder was not criminally
liable as he did not 'knewingly' permit the offence. This left the
law in seme confusion.
Understandably on a technical issue such as this the most infor¬
med representations came frem the legal bodies. The Law Society of
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Scotland for instance, recarmended that 'vicarious responsibility in
all circumstances be imposed on the licence holder for the conduct of
the premises and for breaches of certificate by his staff'.75
Similarly, the Faculty of Advocates supported vicarious responsibility
being absolute.
The Committee was of the view that a certificate holder must carry
a high degree of responsibility for the overall conduct of the premises.
Thus, it was accepted that a certificate-holder should have vicarious
criminal liability, but whether it should be absolute or stop short of
being absolute left the Committee divided. The majority view was that
in applying for a certificate a certificate holder entered into an
implicit undertaking that the law would be observed in his premises.
On the other hand some of the Committee considered that to place the
burden of absolute vicarious responsibility on a certificate holder
was unfair since it would ignore the practical conditions that pre¬
vailed in licensed premises and the possibility that an offence might
take place without, the certificate holder's knowledge.
It was Menzies Campbell who was responsible for persuading the
Chairman that vicarious responsibility should not be absolute on the
ground that it was contrary to the principles of Scots law for a
licence holder to be held responsible for the misdemeanours of his
staff. Yet despite the Chairman being won over the rest of the
Committee, with one exception (Mr. Kerr) , were not. In fact, the
Committee had received an explanatory memo frcm Mr. Ccwperthwaite, a
senior civil servant in the SHHD indicating that the issue had already
been canvassed in the Scottish Office and the consensus was that vic¬
arious responsibility should be absolute.
It is difficult to assess the significance of this action from
the Scottish Office. Its significance may lie in it being illustrative
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of the potential of the Scottish Office to influence outcomes on
matters that are technically and legally complex involving consider¬
ations of which the average committee member may not be fully aware,
or even interested.
Dr. Clayson then, had to abide by the rules he himself had set.
The Committee view was held to be that of the majority which favoured
absolute vicarious responsibility, with those subscribing to the
minority view having their names recorded accordingly.
Temperance Polls
The temperance or 'veto' poll originated from the Temperance
(Scotland) Act 1913. Its underlying idea was that if a sufficient
majority of the inhabitants of an area were opposed to the existence
of licensed premises in that area, then no certificates could be
granted, making the area 'dry'; or alternatively a limitation could
be Imposed on the number of certificates issued to control the number
of licensed premises in the area. At issue was whether this was a
fundamental democratic right of the local populace or merely a cumber¬
some anachronism.
Not surprisingly, the continuation of temperance poll legislation
was favoured by all of the Scottish temperance groups and by virtually
all of the churches. The Church of Scotland for instance, was unable
to accept any suggestion that the veto poll be abolished:
'We are adverse to any attempt to deprive the people
of their democratic right to express their views
and to have such views implemented if shared by a
sufficient number of people in the neighbourhood.
Indeed, it is our belief that the more people are
encouraged to take a responsible interest in their
local affairs the better it will be for the country
as a whole'.76
However, this view was not shared by the RC Bishops who argued:
'At present where they are successful the problems
and supervision of drinking are merely transferred
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to another area which already has its own problems
to deal with'.77
For this reason they recommended the abolition of veto polls, a
sentiment at variance with all the other churches. The local author¬
ity organisations also came down in favour of abolition mainly on the
grounds of the difficulties they created for planning.
As one might have expected though, the most vociferous represen¬
tations to have temperance poll legislation repealed cane from the
licensed trade and the Brewers. To protect itself against veto polls
the licensed trade had its own special fund - the Scottish Licensed
Trade Veto Defence Fund. The SLTVDF's submission was by far the most
detailed analysis of the temperance poll issue, covering such aspects
as the nature of veto polls; the trends, costs and anomalies created
by polls; the problems for local authorities in planning and control;
and the operation of clubs in "limitation1 and "dry" areas. In their
opinion the distribution of licensed premises should be planned to
meet, the needs of each community. Further, they argued that residents
did not have a democratic right to determine policy in regard to the
sale of liquor in their own area, only a democratic right to influence
the policy of their elected representatives, who had a social respon¬
sibility towards the residents.
This line was also the one on which the BAS chose to base their
case:
'The democratic right of individuals to object to the
granting of a licence, or to the standard and conduct
of existing premises, is surely safeguarded by their
normal rights to object to the granting or renewal of
a licence at the Licensing Court or, indeed to the
Planning Authority. In addition, the individual has
the normal rights of access on these matters to his
local councillor and ultimately to his Member of
Parliament. There would seem to be no logical reason
therefore, why the individual should be afforded
greater powers of protection in this particular field,
and it is therefore submitted that the democratic
arguments are not realistic'.78
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One of the most influential factors in the Committee's delibera¬
tions seems to have been the changing use to which veto poll legisla¬
tion was being put. Crie of the effects of post-war development and
reconstruction in the West of Scotland was the creation of large hous¬
ing estates situated on the periphery of Glasgow. Designed to rehouse
the populace frcm the derelict inner city areas, they suffered from a
peculiar Corporation resolution passed in 1890 preventing alcohol
frcm being supplied on Corporation property. The result was vast
estates without a single licensed premise. Inhabitants of adjacent
areas, apprehensive of the possibility that their locality would pro¬
vide sites for such licensed premises, with all the attendant problems
of nuisance and risk to public order, resorted to veto legislation to
enforce restrictions. The restrictive resolution thus moved from
being a sentiment of temperance to a defensive measure over amenity.
The use of veto polls in such a manner was not thought to be a
legitimate one by the Committee:
'What is clearly objectionable is that, in a situation
in which it is generally accepted that there should be
licensed premises providing facilities for the consump¬
tion of alcohol it should be possible for the inhabi¬
tants in the irmediate locality to prevent them being
provided on a site which is otherwise appropriate for
the purpose. One need only consider the extension of
this principle to seme other generally desirable but
locally unpopular facility, say a prison, to see that
it is untenable'.79
Therefore, in agreement with, the vast majority of witnesses, the
Committee reoonmended that temperance poll legislation be repealed.
A major factor in this decision was the general change in public
attitudes toward the social use of alcohol. The temperance movements
were no longer as widespread as they had been at the end of the 19th
century and public opinion had moved far from the austerity of
Victorian values. While advocates of temperance were acknowledged
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to hold sincere beliefs, the Coirmittee felt veto polls were no longer
compatible with modem social conditions. By applying only to the
retail sale of alcohol veto polls treated the activity of drinking as
something special and apart. The objective of the Goimiittee, on the
other hand, was to de-mystify such traditions and practices with a
view to promoting a more civilised approach to the consumption of alco¬
hol.
Registered Clubs
Members' clubs have a special place in the law since they are not
'licensed' but registered with, the sheriff. Two main issues arose in
this context - i) whether the existing system of registration should
be retained, and ii) the nature of police supervision.
The principle underlying the law relating to the supply of liquor
in registered clubs is that all property of the. club, including the
stock of liquor, belongs to the members collectively and that when a
member obtains liquor what takes place is a supply rather than a sale.
To qualify for registration a club must meet certain conditions regar¬
ding its constitution, membership and the like. The certificate of
registration is then granted by the sheriff, not by the licensing
court.
The line taken by the club organisations which commented was that
by and large the arrangements for registration were satisfactory in
that they preserved the private nature of clubs. The Working Men's
Club and Institute Union (WMCIU) for instance, stressed the essential
difference between a public house which is open for business to mem¬
bers of the public, and a members' club, which is set up by a group
of individuals for some common purpose, and in which the supply of
liquor is restricted to members and their guests. Cn the other hand
a number of organisations, .mainly the churches and licensed trade
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organisations, proposed that members1 clubs should be licensed in the
same way as licensed premises. Majority opinion though, favoured the
status quo, raising no objections in principle to the system of regis¬
tration with the sheriff. The Committee also favoured this line, jud¬
ging registered clubs to be different in kind frcm licensed premises
and recommending club registration by the sheriff be maintained.
More controversial was the question of police supervision of
clubs. Unlike licensed premises which are subject to police entry
and inspection at any time, registered clubs cannot be entered or
inspected unless the police have a warrant authorising them to do so.
The club organisations strongly opposed any suggestion that the police
should have unrestricted right of entry to registered clubs, The
WMCIU argued on the basis that the control of the club was the respon¬
sibility of the club committee who had it in their power to discipline
members. In addition, if there were abuses of the law in the club
premises the police already possessed adequate powers to deal with
them. Any suggestion of police entry to clubs would not be tolerated
either by the officials or members of clubs.
The Association of Conservative Clubs also took a strong line
against unrestricted police entry:
'This Association takes the view that a members1 private
Club is a mutual association of persons for particular
objects and is strictly of a private nature.... Apart
from those occasions already provided by legislation
for the entry of the police other than by warrant, any
open ended right would be a grave intrusion on the
privacy of individuals in association'.80
Essentially, the feeling was that a club was not 'a place of
public resort' and the usual protection felt to be needed by the
public was not required.
On the other hand there was considerable support for the opposite
view that registered clubs should be subject to the same police
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supervision as applied to licensed premises. ACPO(S) argued quite
simply that 'the law relating to clubs should be strengthened to make
them subject to the same police supervision as other types of licensed
premises '.81 The SLTA made a similar recommendation and support was
also forthcoming from the local authority organisations, the churches
and the legal bodies.
In its deliberations the Coirmittee agreed that a case for the
police right of entry to registered clubs existed. While accepting
that such a right of entry involved to some extent an invasion of the
privacy of private associations, the Catmittee attached greater impor¬
tance to the control of the conduct of the premises because of the
contribution this could make to improving drinking habits and attitu¬
des towards liquor. The public interest in ensuring the maintenance
of standards was thus placed ahead of any infringement of privacy.
Emphasising that any club which conducted itself properly within the
law should have no possible objection to police supervision, the
Coirmittee recommended accordingly that the police should have a right
of entry to registered clubs as to licensed premises.
The important influencing factor in this case would seem to be
the clear cut majority of organisations in favour of unrestricted
police entry, and also the 'weight' of that opinion which included
the police and the legal societies. Another contributing factor must
be the fact that the First Guest Ccrrmittee had reached a similar con¬
clusion on the matter some twenty years earlier. Lastly, not only
did opposition to unrestricted police entry come from the clubs them¬
selves, leaving them open to the criticismi of self-interest, but the
nature of their main argument, that entry as of right would constitute
an infringement of privacy, was based on an assertion, which was in
the words of the Report, 'a matter of judgement'.
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The Law and Young People
Che of the most controversial issues which arose in the course
of the Committee's enquiries concerned the law and young people.
There were two main considerations - at what age should young people
be allowed access to licensed premises and at what age should they
be allowed to buy and consume alcoholic liquor in those premises.
Virtually all of the submitting organisations had something to say
on this issue, particularly the various youth organisations.
The law as it. stood prevented children under 14 from being in
the 'bar' of licensed premises during permitted hours; a 'bar' being
carefully defined in the 1959 Act. However, there were no age restric¬
tions on the admission to licensed premises, except to a 'bar1 as so
defined. This meant that it was permissible for persons under 14 to
enter a licensed restaurant, hotel lounge or railway refreshment room.
At issue was whether such a provision should be extended to public
houses to allcw children under 14 access.
A small number of submissions took the view that the minimum age
for access should be raised. The Scottish Temperance Alliance favour¬
ed 16, while Aberdeen Corporation advocated 18, on the grounds that
it would reduce the high incidence of under-age drinking. The YWCA
of Scotland went as far as to suggest 21, but gave no reason other
than to assert that greater controls would assist in restricting
drunkenness.
A greater number of organisations simply supported the status
quo, among them the churches, some temperance organisations, the local
authority organisations, ACPO(S) and some of the youth organisations,
such as the Scouts, Boys Brigade, and Girl Guides,
The licensed trade itself tended to be divided between the reten¬
tion of the existing system and a modest relaxation for children's
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access. NALHM and the SLTA opposed the entry into public houses of
children belcw the age of 14. NAHM's argument reflected obvious
self-interest:
'It is our contention that the traditional British
pub is the centre where grcwn-ups can gather,
exchange gossip, discuss business or just spend
a pleasant time in good ccnpany. To introduce
children into these surroundings would have a
distinctly harmful effect on the atmosphere of
the present pub. It would drive away many of our
present clientele - and this assertion is based on
our cwn research among our own members' .82
Hie SLTA took tie line that the availability of children's rooms
in some establishments was sufficient to cover the need for such fac¬
ilities. Ihey were greatly concerned by the "unfortunate fact that
certain licensed premises still existed where children should not be
allowed to go' .8 3 Hie BAS were a bit more liberal suggesting that
children under 14 should be allowed into certain bars such as lounge
bars and cocktail bars where these were ancillary to a restaurant or
other catering facility,
There was also considerable support, frcm a wide variety of organ¬
isations that the law relating to children's access should be relaxed
more widely. In the view of the Scottish Standing Conference of
Voluntary Youth Organisations, 1 the crux of the whole matter is for
proper and adequate education of the young in regard to the risks and
dangers attendant on the abuse of drinking alcoholic beverages'.84
Similarly, the Working Party on Youth-at-Risk Garmented that alcohol
related problems could be better controlled 'in a society which edu¬
cated its young in the proper use of alcohol, instead of trying to
keep them away from it with laws which reflect, the views of religious
extremists of the nineteenth century'»85
The Educational Institute of Scotland went, even further and sug¬
gested that 'it should be lawful for parents or guardians to purchase
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liquor for consumption by their children or wards in a bar or other
licensed premises'.86 In so doing they created a storm of controversy
within the E.I.S. The proviso to the recommendation was that the
young persons were in the company of their parents or guardians at
the time of such consumption,, However, even with this proviso the
recommendation was widely disputed by a number of E.I.S. members.
The recommendation had been part of the original E.I.S. memoran¬
dum to the Clayson Committee which had been drafted by Mr. Raymond
Thomasson, the Assistant Secretary. This memo had gone forward to a
sub-ccmmittee of the Executive which approved it, before it proceeded
to the full Executive in January 1972. At this meeting of the Execu¬
tive an amendment had been moved which sought to delete the contro¬
versial, recommendation. This though, had been defeated by 13 votes
to 6 and the memorandum was passed with only a minor technical alter¬
ation.
Once passed, the memorandum was published in 'The Scottish
Educational Journal', the offical paper of the E.I.S. (of which Mr.
Thcmasson happened to be the editor) . At this juncture seme of the
grass roots membership, upon reading the published memo, took excep¬
tion to the recommendation and expressed their dissatisfaction with
it. So much so that Mr. Thomasson wrote a defence of the Institute's
evidence in a subsequent edition of 'The Scottish Educational Journal'
explaining the intention behind the recommendation.
The intention, the article said, was to enable parents to give
seme guidance and exanple to their children in the proper use of alco¬
hol. The law was inconsistent in that it allowed parents to supply,
and under 18 year olds to consume, alcoholic drink privately in the
heme, but when such activities were public it became an offence. It
was emphasised that the E.I.S. were not saying that parents ought to
212
introduce their children to strong drink, the point was that parents
should be 'free to follow their cwn judgement and conscience in the
way they bring up their children in this natter, untrammelled by the
present archaic licensing laws which surround the subject with an
aura of furtiveness'.8 7
However, seme of the membership remained unconvinced and this
was recorded in the E.I.S. oral evidence to the Clayson Committee in
April. Hie E.I.S. delegate commented:
"Ihe Institute's proposals have been widely mis¬
interpreted or misunderstood by some Institute
members amongst others. A number of our members
felt so strongly about what they thought we were
saying, in fact, that they wrote asking to be
disassociated from the sentiments expressed. I
think it is right to put this disavowal of the
Institute's proposals by some of its members on
record'.88
Even for a Committee dedicated to liberalisation, the E.I.S. pro¬
posal was too radical and, in any case, would have intolved too many
potentially anomalous consequences. However, this was not to rule
out the possibility of admission of young persons to licensed premises.
Hie Committee's view was that although there were many premises into
which it would be unsuitable to take children under 14, in other care¬
fully controlled circumstances with, proper safeguards, no harm need
result from their admission. Hie Ccrmiittee wrote:
'We have difficulty in accepting the argument that
exposure of children to an environment in which
people are drinking is bad in itself regardless
of the conditions and circumstances in which the
drinking is taking place. Where the conditions
are right we see no reason why a child should not
be present in a bar in a hotel, a restaurant or
even a public house in the company of his family' .89
Hie Committee proposed that it should be left to local judgement
as to which premises were thought suitable for the admission of chil¬
dren under 14, and, to cover this recommended the introduction of a
'children's certificate'.
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This recommendation again fitted into the Ccnmittee's working
philosophy of educating people, especially young people, in the proper
use of alcohol. The idea that the family should be able to stay
together and the children introduced to a drink in a civilised environ¬
ment, thus dispelling many of the mysteries which surrounded drinking
establishments, was very much to the fore. Their view was that chil¬
dren should come to see drinking, in the right conditions, 'as simply
an incidental part of normal social activity'.
A strong influence in this decision must have been sane of the
more important youth organisations who recognised the need to educate
young people in the social activity of drinking. Without their back¬
ing it would seem unlikely that Clayson could have proceeded with such
an innovative recormendation. The reason that the majority of opinion
was in favour of the status quo would seem to lie in widespread appre¬
hension that the necessary safeguards would be maintained over the
suitability of premises. What must be borne in mind is that at that
time a great proportion of public houses prcbably were unsuitable.
The vast improvement in premises and the proliferation of well appoin¬
ted lounge bars is only a phenomenon of the last decade, so it is per¬
haps understandable that opinion should have been on the cautious side
in the early seventies.
The second main issue of controversy concerned the age at which
young people should be allowed to purchase and consume alcoholic liquor.
The law as it stood then prevented anyone under 18 frcm buying liquor
in licensed premises, with certain exceptions relating to those over
16 purchasing beer, porter, cider or perry for consumption with a meal
not served in a bar. Persons under 18 could not consume liquor in a
bar, but they could elsewhere in licensed premises such as restaurants.
214
Only a limited number of organisations submitted that the age of
18 for the purchase or consumption of liquor in a bar should be redu¬
ced. The STUC, the Convention of Royal Burghs, the Scottish Liberal
Party and the Scottish Council of the BMA all suggested 17. The
Scottish Young Conservatives and Scottish Chamber of Ccrrmerce favoured
16. The main arguments rested on the notions that young people were
maturing earlier both physically and mentally; that lowering the age
would lessen the temptation to challenge authority; and that the limit
of 18 was unenforceable in any case leading to young people acquiring
early drinking experience in illicit circumstances.
Against this, the overwhelming majority of opinion opposed any
lowering of the age. Right across the board there seemed to be agree¬
ment on the desirability of retaining the status quo with the churches
and temperance organisations, the licensed trade associations, the
BAS, the local authority groups, ACPO(S) , the legal, bodies, the bulk
of the youth organisations and the majority of medical opinion all
supporting this line. The churches and temperance groups tended to
emphasise the possibility of increased teenage drunkenness and violence
and the dangers of earlier exposure to the harmful effects of alcohol.
Another salient point made by a number of organisations was that the
challenge to authority by seme 17 and 16 year olds by evading the law
would simply be transferred to a lower age group, and while the law
as it stood may have been unenforceable, it still had an influence on
social attitudes and behaviour. The licensed trade, in particular,
pointed out the difficulties of assessing the age of young people and
how such difficulties would be aggravated by a reduction in the legal
age of consumption.
The Ccrrmittee considered in. great detail the arguments presented
both for and against lowering the age for consumption before coming
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down in favour of retaining the age of 18. There were a nuirber of
specific reasons for this. Firstly, it was agreed that a reduction
in the limit might lead to an increase in teenage drunkenness and in
drink related crimes. Secondly, reduction to 17 would result in
longer exposure of the young drinker bo the harmful effects of alco¬
hol, since medical evidence had shewn that young people, for any
given intake of liquor, retain higher blood/alcohol levels for longer,
making them 'unable to hold their liquor'. Thirdly, lowering the age
to 17 would increase pressure on even younger people to cbtain drink
and the problem of identifying legal frcm non-legal drinkers would
merely be shifted cnto a younger age group. Lastly, the age limit of
18, despite the extent to which it may be ignored, must have an influ¬
ence on social attitudes and behaviour.
Mr. Menzies Campbell later indicated that the issue was one of
the most controversial which came before the Coirmittee. He said that
several of the Carmittee had firmly believed that the age should be
reduced frcm 18 to 17. He himself had favoured such a reduction, but
'eventually came down, against it, being persuaded by the volume of
evidence'.90 The most powerful and influential argument was that a
reduction to .17 would make identifying under-age drinkers even more
difficult and existing problems would only be transferred onto younger
people. With the exception of Mr. John Kerr who dissented, the rest
of the Conmittee reached the same conclusion and felt supported 'not
enly by the overwhelming weight of evidence, but also by the quality
of the evidence submitted'.91
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VIII. Decision-making within the Committee
During the course of its early deliberations the Corcnittee devel¬
oped a definite working philosophy against which to assess the sub¬
stantive issues that were to oome before it. But what kind of values
were involved in this working philosophy? Hew did the Committee, indi¬
vidually and collectively, judge the evidence? What factors were im¬
portant in influencing their interpretation of material? How did they
arrive at their recommendations?
The values which underpinned the early commitment to relaxation
can perhaps best be described as those associated with classical lib¬
eral reformism. The Committee viewed its task as being to drag
Scottish licensing law frcm its dark ages into the last quarter of
the 20th century, by promoting an environment which would be conducive
bo 'more civilised drinking'. It was realised that a change in
Scottish drinking practice would not come about overnight, but would
only be achieved through decades of re-educating public attitudes in
Scotland towards the social use of alcohol. While the individual was
to be given greater freedom it would increasingly be the collective
social sanctions and disapprobation of the community that would guide
drinking behaviour rather than prohibitive legal restrictions. For
the proposed reforms to be successful the underlying assumption was
that the new individual freedom would have to be accompanied by greater
individual responsibility.
On this basis it is hardly surprising that the Committee was wary
of any extreme recommendations made to it. The two extreme proposals
at opposite ends of the spectrum - complete freedom to drink without
restriction at one end and complete abolition of the brewing and dis¬
tilling industries at the other - were regarded as self-cancelling.
Seme of the letters frcm individual members of the public tended to
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fall into these categories, arguing one extreme or the other. Cne
such example came from C. F. H. McFadyen, M.B., Ch.B., who recorrmen-
ded in the strongest terms that 'brewing and distilling be done away
with in the public interest since there can be no apologistic for
the use of alcchol save as a surface antisceptic1.92 Dr. Clayson
comented, 'those submissions which obviously overstated the case
more or less ruled themselves out. While such testimonies received
proper attention the Committee was not in any way misled by them'.93
Attention was, then, focused on the middle ground, upon the more
moderate proposals which were received. The assessment of this evi¬
dence was approached in a rigorous and systematic fashion. The sub¬
missions were first circulated in advance of meetings with notes,
including a summary and commentary from the Secretary to the Committee
attached. These notes could be influential for they often pointed
out strengths or weaknesses in the arguments presented. It was also
within the pcwer of the Secretary to draw the attention of members to
other considerations such as the standing of the submitting organisa¬
tion and the advisability of being seen to be giving due consideration
to their opinions.
A number of examples illustrate this quite neatly. For instance,
in dealing with a 'heavyweight' like the Church of Scotland, the
Secretary advised that 'the Committee will no doubt wish to invite
the Moral Welfare Committee to give oral evidence'.94 While the deci¬
sion rested with the Committee the astute use of language - 'will no
doubt wish' - left the Committee in no doubt about the appropriate
path. Similarly, with the Church of Scotland's counterparts the RC
Bishops it was noted that the 'submission raises no fresh point of
substance but the Committee may consider it politic to invite the
Bishops to give oral evidence'.9 5 Again, concerning whether the STL'C
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should be invited, it was suggested that 'it would seem desirable in
view of the general standing of the STUC to do so'.96 Finally, of
the Scottish Standing Conference of Voluntary Youth Organisations the
Secretary wrote, 'the Ccrmittee may agree that the Standing Conference,
representing as it does 26 national voluntary youth organisations,
should be invited to speak on this topic, if only to demonstrate that
the voice of those involved with young people had been heard'.9 7
The 'status1 of the pressure group submitting evidence seems to
have influenced members in different ways. Not only that but also
their interpretation of how it affected the proceedings of the Committee
generally. Mr. Menzies Campbell and Mr. John Kerr were emphatic that
the status of an organisation had not affected the way in which the
evidence was viewed and assessed, all the evidence being considered on
its own :merits. Mr. Campbell said that the Committee was sceptical of
special status groups and were alert to particular biases.
'Although the Committee were open minded
they "weren't mugs" and were alive to
arguments which concealed ulterior motives.
It wasn't too difficult to see propositions
that were being put forward to justify other
interests'.9 8
Mr. Kerr remarked quite simply that 'the ground was covered very fully'.
Dr. John Sutherland though, felt that it was difficult to assess
what was more influential - the status of a pressure group or the con¬
tent of their submission. He thought in the majority of cases the
quality of the submission was probably most important, but on same
occasions status played its part. He gave the example of the Church
of Scotland, who, he commented caustically, submitted 'twentyfoolscap
pages - mostly on sin' . However, because of their importance it was
necessary for the Committee 'to make the Church of Scotland feel that
they had been listened to. It was important that the Committee should
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not offend those who had submitted evidence'.9 9
Dr. Clayson himself, put yet another point view since he believed
that status did have an important influence in the Conmittee's analy¬
sis of evidence. He said, 'it was inevitable that major organisations
would carry more weight. The weight of evidence was an important con¬
sideration and there was little doubt that certain bodies carried more
weight than others'.10 0 This was, however, not to deny the importance
of the quality of the evidence. He continued, 'the presentation of
the memo was extremely important and obviously one which presented
clear arguments concisely using proper syntax and correct spelling
made a greater impression than one which was lacking in these quali¬
ties'. He did not agree with the line espoused by Campbell and Kerr,
emphasising that as far as oral evidence was concerned 'certain bodies
had to be seen no matter what',
Here we can see an example of how consultation is not always
equitable since groups do not have uniform status, principal 'inside'
groups being granted almost automatic consultative status. Dr. Clayson
.revealed, 'the Ccmuittee had to see the established Church. Likewise
the Police, the Law Society and some youth organisations virtually
chose themselves'. However, he confided that to a certain extent it
had been an exercise in public relations since it was of the utmost
importance that 'the consultation had to be seen to be done'.
The reconciliation of differences within the Committee had also
evolved as part of the working philosophy. Only three issues proved
controversial enough to warrant notes of dissent in the Report -
Sunday opening; the minimum age for purchase and consumption; and the
vicarious responsibility of the licensee. Whatever the differences of
opinion on the other issues they proved to be bridgeable so that the
vast majority of the recommendations made were unanimous. Despite the
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unanimity, Dr. Clayson was quick to indicate that there had been no
shortage of lively debate in his Committee. How had this unanimity
been achieved?
Frcm the evidence of the Committee members it would appear that
decisions were reached in a very informal manner. Mr. Menzies
Campbell, for example, found it difficult to convey the exact pro¬
cedure by which the Committee came to a decision, indicating that
'it was just resolved to proceed in a particular way' . Similarly,
Dr. Sutherland said decisions were reached 'by agreement - rather
like approving minutes. There was an informal vote of a sort when
the Chairman would ask if everyone was agreed upon an issue'. He
emphasised however, that although procedure was informal, the Ccrmiittee
were well aware that they had a precise task to perform, so 'decisions
were decisions and they were clearly formulated". John Kerr's comments
were in the same vein. He indicated that there were 'no major dis¬
agreements or stand up fights' so the Committee were able to reach a
consensus on most issues. He was full of praise for Dr. Clayson,
stating that 'he was a very good Chairman in that he was able to
focus the discussion and resolve differences'.101
Much the same story was given by Dr. Clayson himself. He confir¬
med that issues tended to be resolved by 'interpretation of the mood
of the Committee'. After a full debate of the matter in hand Dr.
Clayson would sum up and indicate what majority opinion appeared to
be. It was then put to the members that this was the view of the
Committee and if there were no objections it was so recorded by the
Secretary. There was no shorthand recording of the deliberations, as
it was decided frcm the outset to adopt a non-attributive type of
minute, only notes of dissent being recorded individually. As far as
Dr. Clayson could remember, 'the Committee never took a vote - all the
decisions were reached amicably'.
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In assessing the evidence, in debating the strengths and weaknes¬
ses of arguments, and in reaching decisions, the liberal reforming
values of the Committee as a whole and as individuals were certainly
brought to bear as policy was developed. Yet does this not open up
the Committee to the accusation that they might have pre-judged soma
of the issues? Not in as much as the recommendations of the Committee
were rooted in the existing research evidence, from Canada, USA and
Europe, and in the various statistics, on consumption, prevalence of
alcoholism, death rates from cirrhosis of the liver, expenditure pat¬
terns and the like, that was made available to the Committee in the
early stages of its deliberations. Dr. Clayson indicated that 'the
Committee's policy of relaxation stemmed as much from the statistical
material available as from the evidence which was presented'.
Thus, the fact that the liberal values of the Committee were
consolidated early en into a 'working philosophy" gave them a frame¬
work, incorporating a number of theoretical ideas and concepts,
against which to judge the substantive issues that were to appear
before them.
IX. Public Participation and the Effectiveness of the Committee
Cartwright has written;
'By systematically taking evidence on a specific problem
from almost anyone who wants to give it, these committees
provide a unique opportunity for the views of the various
interests in society to be injected efficiently into the
decision-making process... In short ... departmental
committees offer an illuminating case study of the mechan¬
ics of public participation in government".102
How successful did the Committee feel themselves to be in this
respect? How did the pressure groups react? How effective, in fact,
was the Committee?
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The Committee merrbers, perhaps not surprisingly, took a very
favourable and optimistic view of the process. Dr. Sutherland, for
example, thought that it was a 'sensible method' in that it gave
various bodies ample notice to prepare, formulate and present their
evidence. ' Can * t see what else there could be', he opined. In a
very similar vein, Menzies Campbell responded that he 'can't think of
anything better' . He granted that the method adopted was certainly
laborious but all possible interests had an opportunity to make sub¬
missions. Yet to a certain extent the method might, have disadvantaged
some people who perhaps found it difficult to put things 'down in
black and white'. Cn the other hand public meetings were not really
suited to tackling such a complex issue. They were more effective
when the issue could be reduced to a single subject, which licensing
could not. Cn the whole he thought that 'there was a good balance
between, efficiency and participation'.
John Kerr took a more cautious line, arguing that the participa¬
tion in decision-making was 'marginal'. In the same manner as in
politics, the pressure group personnel met by the Conmittee tended to
be the activists. In effect what one got was 'their view of what
their organisation thought public opinion to be' . For instance, he
indicated that they did not get a lot of young people's views on the
issues; instead what they got were adult views on what young people
thought. In this way the Ccnmittee got 'a filtered view of public
opinion'. However, he asked rhetorically, 'is there a better way?'.
Dr. Clayson tended to concur' with this line. He commented that
the procedure 'certainly gives the opportunity for participation, but
whether that opportunity is taken is a different matter'. He illustra¬
ted this by saying that at the outset the Committee had advertised in
a total of 24 Scottish newspapers asking for evidence from individuals
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and groups but that it had met with little response. "The majority
don't bother - its left to a vocal minority' , he remarked.
That said, it would appear that, the bulk of the pressure groups
who contributed had few difficulties in cartmunieating their opinions
to the Ccrrmittee. The principal reascn for this would seem to lie in
the fact, that specific invitations were issued to most of the organ¬
isations deemed to be relevant, while a general invitation to the
public covered those other groups and individuals who felt inclined
to ooiment. Being a Conrnittee of the Scottish Office, and more speci¬
fically the SHHD, ccrrmunication was directly with St. Andrew's House,
Edinburgh. Since the vast majority of organisations submitting evi¬
dence were either wholly Scottish based or had Scottish branches, the
problems concerning geographical distance did not arise, at least at
this stage in the policy process.
With the exception of those submissions from 'national' organisa¬
tions which were intended primarily for the Errol Conmittee all the
representations were framed to take account of the Scottish legal
idicm. Organisations were given a general framework within which to
work but were free to make additional comments on specific issues as
they wished. Internal decision-making within groups cbviously varied
between each organisation depending on its nature, size and structure,
but there were many similarities among the more important contributors.
The major trend in the well established organisations was to have the
formulation of their evidence dealt with by a sub-ooimdttee of the
main executive ccmmittee. Bodies such as ACPO(S) , the E.I.S., the
STB, the Scottish Council of the BMA, the Church of Scotland, the Free
Church and the Brewers approached the issue in this manner. In some
instances such as the E.I.S., the Scottish Council of the BMA. and the
Brewers, the 'sub-committee' consisted of a single individual responsible
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for drafting the submission, while in others, like the STB and ACPO(S)
a working party of several members tackled the problem. In the case
of a body as well organised as the Church of Scotland a complete com¬
mittee could be assigned to the subject, in this instance the Moral
Welfare Committee.
Hcwever, in all cases the draft of the evidence written by the
sub-corrmittee had to be formally approved by the executive committee
or equivalent governing body before the decisions reached by the sub¬
committee became official policy of that organisation. While the
executive or equivalent retained the right of veto, it appeared in
most cases to be largely theoretical since only rarely was the verdict
of the sub-corrmittee seriously challenged, due primarily to the more
detailed knowledge of the subject acquired by the sub-ooirmittee in
the course of its deliberations.
When dealing with social issues of this type which impinge upon
the freedom of the individual, a Committee of enquiry can be a parti¬
cularly useful vehicle for gauging public opinion. While not every¬
one chose to participate, for those who did, a formal channel of
communication was available through which their views could be expres¬
sed.
However, one must bear .in mind the point made by John Kerr, that
the principal contributions came from a relatively small and elite set
of politically active interest groups. Submissions were by no means
accorded equal weight. In this respect the Committee was not always
interested in obtaining new ideas, but with obtaining a sufficiently
convincing range of opinion in order to legitimate particular recom¬
mendations .
The conclusion that one arrives at about the Clayson Committee
is that as a ccmrritbee it was procedurally orthodox but theoretically
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innovative. Hie distinguishing feature of the Committee was its
philosophical approach to its subject and its commitment to examine
issues against a stated theoretical framework. Evidence was viewed
from a position which was not value free, but which was an explicit
and integral part of the approach. It did not fall into the pitfalls
of Shonfield's 'pragmatic fallacy' since it utilised not only the
evidence submitted to it, but also other research findings, and asses¬
sed the information available against a cogent set of concepts.
Being appointed by the Scottish Office it was autonomous in its
operation and could therefore address the problems as they manifested
themselves in Scotland. The 'Soottishness' of the Committee, that is
the Scottish perspective, lay not so much in any procedural differences
frcm English counterparts, although being based in Scotland eased com¬
munication between the Committee and Scottish pressure groups, but in
its ability to appreciate social and cultural mores which were parti¬
cular, and perhaps unique, to the country and environment in which it
was operating.
Hie Goirmittee was also very conscious of its own role in policy
formulation and this was reflected on a number of occasions in the
tactical decisions which appear throughout the Report. While never
compromising on its basic principles the Committee was aware of the
need to make its recommendations practical and, more importantly,
politically acceptable, so as to facilitate the inclusion of those
recommendations in workable legislation. 'This transition from Report
to legislation will form the basis of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
The Formulation of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976
I. Introduction
The Clayson Report, which formed the basis of the last chapter,
was published in August 1973. 'Ihe Licensing (Scotland) Act was passed
in November 1976= The transition from the Report's policy recommenda¬
tions to a concrete legislative enactment constitutes the concern of
this chapter =
Section II considers the initial reaction to the Report - both
frcm the public and frcm the Government, After a period of formal con¬
sultations between the Government and interested parties on the content
of a Report, it is ultimately the Government which decides the fate of
a Report - whether it is to be shelved, discussed or acted upon. Thus,
in the sane way as the Cormittee acted as a regulator of demands in
producing the Report, the Report itself became the object of demand
regulation as it competed for attention and a place on the political
agenda.
Section III examines the pre-legislative activity surrounding
the Clayson Report in 1974 and 1975, At the heart of the matter dur¬
ing this period was the accusation that consideration of the Report
was subject to an unnecessary delay. Different protagonists to the
debate adopted different perspectives as to what constituted 'delay',
This section tries to disentangle some of the arguments and values
involved in an attempt to shed some light on the actors' ' assumptive
worlds1.
Section IV briefly outlines the Government's cormitnent to legis¬
late and notes the differences between the Government's legislative
proposals and the recommendations of the Clayson Report, At this
stage, with, the issue on the legislative agenda, pressure group
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activity became more cbservable and further examples of the virtual
automatic consultation of established groups by Government are high¬
lighted.
Section V examines in some detail the Licensing Bill as it pro¬
gressed through Parliament. It focuses upon hew some of the more
irtportant decisions were arrived at and looks at the way in which
pressure group activity and the values of MPs influenced those deci¬
sions.
Before making some concluding remarks, Section VI considers
briefly the implementation of the 1976 Act', and observes the novel
interpretation of Section 64 concerning regular extensions of hours
through which the 'all day pub8 has came about in Scotland. It then
records some early assessments of the operation of the new Act which
cautiously suggest that the more relaxed law can be deemed a reason¬
able success.
II. The Initial Reaction to the Clayson Report
Hie Report of the Departmental Committee on Scottish Licensing
Law was published in August 1973 and reaction to it was as varied as
the submissions themselves had been. Generally,, those organisations
that had advocated liberal reforms welcomed it while those who had
sought the maintenance of restrictive controls were disappointed by
its reccrrmendations. Bodies that one would expect, such as the
Brewers, the Scottish Licensed Trade Association, The Scottish Tourist
Board, the Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland), the
Scottish Health Education Unit and the Law Society of Scotland, all
favoured the Report. The Brewers thought that Dr. Clayson, to his
credit, had taken a "responsible attitude' and commented that 'the
Report was a heaven sent opportunity for reform". They were 'amazed
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and delighted by Claysan'.1 ACPO(S) felt that the Clayson Report was
an enlightened and important document'.2 The Scottish Health Education
Unit also welcomed the recommendation for more liberal and relaxed
licensing hours and stated that 'it. was one of the few things the Group
and the Brewers actually saw eye to eye on'.3 The Law Society for
their part were 'quite happy with the Report, and saw no reason to oom-
rrent'.4
In a similarly predictable way the principal opposition to the
Report's proposals came from the Churches and temperance organisations.
Leading the attack was the Church of Scotland whose Moral Welfare
Committee criticised the Report for underestimating the importance of
licensing as a regulatory factor in liquor control.5 Not surprisingly
the Church disagreed 'vehemently' with the proposed discretionary
opening of public houses on Sundays.
Hie United Free Church also made its criticisms kncwn at the
time. While commending Dr. Clayson 'on a thorough review of Scottish
Licensing Law' they nevertheless expressed 'strong disapproval of
many of the conclusions and recommendations'.6 Likewise, the
Association of Christian Teachers thought that 'an increase in licen¬
sing hours only adds strength to the supposition that the consumption
of alcohol is the socially accepted norm'.7
Thus, in much the same way as there had been extremes of opinion
in the evidence itself, there were corresponding extremes of opinion
about the Report which, ranged across a broad spectrum frcm 'delight'
to 'vehement opposition' . The 'Glasgcw Herald' of 12th October 1973
reported the controversy over the reform of Scotland's licensing
laws in a leader entitled "IWo views on licensing'.8 This controversy
was symbolised by the conflicting views expressed by the Church of
Scotland's Moral Welfare. Conmittee and the Lord Provost's Committee
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of Edinburgh Corporation. The 'Herald' ccnxnented:
'Licensing reform is long overdue, and the Lord Provost's
committee rightly intend to urge the Secretary of State
for Scotland to implement the recommendations of the
Clayson Committee. While the Kirk have good reason to
be concerned about chronic misuse of alcohol in
Scotland, they are wrong to assert that Clayson does
not sufficiently reflect the gravity of this problem'.9
The procedure for submitting views on the Report was again form¬
alised. Hie Secretary of State invited views to be submitted on the
Committee's recommendations in general and on any specific recommen¬
dations which affected particular interests. The submissions were
to be made to the Scottish Office by the 30th November 1973 which
allowed approximately four months to receive all relevant comments.
From the evidence available it would appear that the general
tendency was for organisations to argue much the sane line as before,
simply highlighting points with which they agreed or disagreed. In
this respect there seemed to be a greater onus on organisations dis¬
agreeing with the Report to express their views of discontent than
for organisations agreeing with the recommendations to express appro¬
val. Those who favoured liberalisation and relaxation of the laws
were, naturally, sympathetic to the Report's recommendations and
seemed content to note that their opinions had been acknowledged and
recorded, and indeed in many instances confirmed. Thus, many of the
organisations whose opinions the Report had endorsed no longer felt
the need to make any further statement or take any further part in
the process.
By the end of 1973 formal consultations between the Scottish
Office and pressure groups had came to a close. It was over two and
a half years since the Committee had been appointed. The Report had
been published and the initial reaction assessed. At this juncture
the fate of any committee report lies in the balance. Will it be
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shelved after all the time and public money that has been spent to
arrive at a conclusion? Or will some of its recommendations be imple¬
mented through a statutory enactment? If some recommendations are to
be implemented how long will they take to become legislation and in
what form will they appear? The answers to these questions are poli¬
tical decisions which are outwith the control of the committee itself.
As Cartwright has noted:
"Hie difficulty is that the effects of a committee's
recommendations do not lie wholly or even largely
in its own hands. There are some tactics and devices
which a ccmmittee may use to help "sell" their recom¬
mendations, but their effectiveness still depends on
a great many factors beyond its control and even beyond
its power of influence. Royal commissions and depart¬
mental committees are above all advisory committees.
Ihey have no powers of execution. The fate of their
recommendations lie in hands other than their own' .10
Whatever a committee may recommend it is still Government which
governs. In Chapter 2 it was noted that Government has 'officiality',
' legitimacy' , and ' authority' which enables it to regulate demands on
the political agenda. Thus, a government has discretion in its treat¬
ment of ccmmittee reports and recommendations. A committee report,
therefore, must compete for that scarcest of political resources -
time. In this respect its fate is dependent on which demands are
given priority and how the political agenda is set. This in turn can
be dependent upon the predispositions of those who are in a position
to set that agenda. Their values can affect whether a report is taken
up or even discussed at all. This chapter, then, will try to explore
empirically some of the themes outlined in Chapter 2, especially the
underlying one that policy making is both an intellectual activity
and an institutional process.
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III. Pre-legislative Activity 1974-75
The Clayson Report was published in August 1973, but it was not
until April 1975 that Parliament, in the form of the Scottish Grand
Committee, debated its findings. Given the time allowed for formal
consultations after publication, this left a period of some 18 months
before the Report was considered. Did this period constitute an un¬
necessary delay or was it an appropriate response under the circum¬
stances?
Cue of those who felt most strongly that there had been a delay
in acting upon the Report was J. P„ Mackintosh. (Lab. Berwick and E.
Lothian) who argued in the Scottish Grand Committee that too long a
delay would render any legislation outdated by the time it was imple¬
mented because of rapidly changing social customs. He commented,
'I hope no one will suggest that this is a question of parliamentary
time, because I feel that being told continually that we have no
time for divorce reform, for law reform, for licensing reform in the
present legislative framework constitutes a powerful argument that
the legislative framework for Scottish Affairs is not adequate',11
The Government Front Bench, however, strongly rejected any crit¬
icism of delay. Harry Ewing (Under Secretary of State at the Scottish
Office) responded?
®I reject at the outset ... the charge ... that the
Government have been too slew to act on the Clayson
Report. Those who make the charge fail to appre¬
ciate the difficulties that this Government have
been faced with since the Report, was published in
August 1973. All politicians in Scotland spent the
major part of 1974 fighting elections, and I am sure
that the Clayson Committee Report was furthest from
their minds during practically the whole of 1974'.12
•»
All things taken into account this seems a plausible enough expla¬
nation. The remaining months of 1973 were taken up with formal consul¬
tation and virtually the whole of 1974 comprised only urgent legislative
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activity. As noted in Chapter 1, the Conservative Government fell in
early 1974 to be replaced by Harold Wilson's Labour Government in the
February. This administration had little time to do anything except
to deal with the most pressing economic matters until the second elec¬
tion was called later in the year. That the Claysan Report came up
for debate in the Scottish Grand Gammittee in April 1975, within the
first six months of the first legislative session of the October admin¬
istration does not seem unreasonable under the circumstances.
The general feeling of the debate in the Scottish Grand Committee
in the spring of 1975 was that the Clayson Report should be welcomed
as an .important document. Secretary of State for Scotland, Willie
Ross, gave the Report a lukewarm endorsement in so far as he agreed
that licensing, in itself, could only play a limited part in control¬
ling alcohol abuse, but he expressed reservations over a number of
specific recommendations such as the Sunday opening of pubs and the
abolition of the afternoon break. The opposition spokesman, Alick
Buchanan-Smith (Cons. N. Angus and Mearns) viewed Clayson more favour¬
ably and urged speedy reform, but warned that the fact that the issue
was being debated in the Scottish Grand Committee had raised expecta¬
tions among the people of Scotland. He warned:
'If these expectations are dashed, if action or
legislation does not follow this debate, it will
simply encourage a growing feeling of cynicism
among many people in Scotland about the functions
of this Committee and what we are doing in rela¬
tion to a matter which, has caused wide public
concern1.13
In the same vein David Steel (Lib. Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles)
urged prcmpt action. He noted that the Committee had sat for two years
and its Report had been published some 18 months. Despite being a con¬
troversial subject, legislation ought to be introduced 'at an early
date'. His concern was that the Government should not shuffle it off
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until such a time as there was a Scottish Assembly.
The Press too urged prompt legislative action. 'The Scotsman'
for instance, commented after this debate that it would be a 'tragedy'
to shelve the Clayson Report,14 while the Daily Record informed its
readership that 'Willie keeps brakes on Clayson1„15
The SGC debate, then, was an opportunity to give the Report a
formal public airing for the first time since its publication. During
this 18 month period between publication and the SGC debate there
appears to have been little pressure group activity. This was perhaps
not surprising given the circumstances of the electoral upheaval of
1974. What activity there was seems to have been divided along the
established battlelines of an anti-relaxation lobby and a pro-relaxation
lobby. The Church of Scotland, as noted earlier, made representations
to the SHHD immediately after Clayson published, but thereafter appears
to have adopted a rather passive role. For the pro-relaxation lobby
the SLTA seems to have been much more active, their Secretary revealing
that 'there was a constant dialogue with the SHHD'.16 Mr. Ridehalgh,
the SLTA Secretary, was particularly concerned that the Report should
not be shelved so there was some lobbying by the Association 'to try
to get things moving'. He commented that 'one only has to look at
Errol on which no action was taken to see how Reports can be shelved'.17
A spokesman for the Brewers suggested that the SLTA and also the
Scottish Tourist. Board had been .important in lobbying, but indicated
that the Brewers themselves had not been that active. He remarked,
off the cuff, 'In any case, Labour Government don't tend to listen to
Brewers'.18 This perhaps reveals something about the brewing indus¬
try 's sensitivity towards its own image.
Dr. Clayson himself adopted quite an active role during this per¬
iod. John Kerr revealed that 'Clayson did an immense amount of
239
campaigning to keep the Report alive'.19 This campaigning was conduc¬
ted largely through the media. Although there were no formal cartacts
with Ministers, Dr. Clayson did have some contact with MPs. They
would usually be seeking clarification on particular points and he
would deal with these queries through private correspondence. He also
accepted invitations from broadcasting authorities to ccmrent. Later
he was to express his regret at having participated in these 'rather
unsatisfactory affairs'. The problem lay in the time he was allocated
to put over his case. Instead of having sufficient time to develop an
argument he felt he was forced into ' the two-minute syndrome'. Being
restrained by this format Dr. Clayson was uncertain whether these
broadcasts helped or not. He also utilised the press by writing seme
articles for the 'Glasgow Herald' and the 'Sunday Mail1. The theme
of these articles was the same. His article for the Herald appeared
under the headline 'Outlook grim unless Scottish drinking laws are
reformed',20 while his feature in the 'Sunday Mail' appeared as "My
nightmare for the 1980s; Clayson hands out a warning'.21 He was later
to reflect on press coverage and corment, 'The Sunday Mail kept the
pot boiling, but whether this accelerated progress in any way is un¬
certain' .22
Che person who confirmed the media was of importance was Harry
Ewing, the Scottish Office Minister in charge of the licensing issue.
He said that 1 the media had a tremendous influence' and spoke of the
'Sunday Mail' in particular. Typical of the "Sunday Mail's' line was
its comment in December 1974 that since its publication in August
1973 the Clayson Report 'has been gathering dust in a Government office.
It has been ignored by politicians, shuffled by civil servants and
almost forgotten by the public'„2 3
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Morag Faulds, Director of Social Work for Inverness-shire and
Menber of the Clayson Committee, held a similar view in April 1975.
Speaking at a conference on alcoholism a few days before the scheduled
Scottish Grand Committee debate, she was reported in "The Scotsman' as
saying, 'it is time our legislators recognised the urgency of the pro¬
blem. Are they (the Clayson reconmendations) doomed to eternal rele¬
gation in the vaults of St. Andrew's House'.24 Cnly John Kerr was to
support her in this view. He felt that there had been a 'resistance
among civil servants in the Scottish Office, especially in the higher
echelons'„2 5
However, others on the Committee were not so critical. Menzies
Campbell thought that no one on the Committee could have objected to
the subsequent handling of the Report. In fact, he did not know of
any comparable report which had been dealt with as quickly. Dr.
Clayson also felt in retrospect that 'the government acted with cred¬
itable speed'. He said that 'there was a lot of apprehension at the
time on account of the two general elections'. Parliament could not
therefore be blamed for the timetable. He could, however, blame them
'for what they did to the Report, but not for the timetable' .26
MPs also thought that the Report was dealt with promptly. Bruce
Millan, Minister of State and subsequently Secretary of State at the
Scottish Office, indicated that 'a lot of work had to be done before
the Bill appeared' . It was then a question of finding parliamentary
time. He did not accept that there was any delay and pointed out that
'lots of reports never see the light of day'.27 Much the same story
was told by Robin Cock. (Lab. Edinburgh Central) who thought that the
time before legislation appeared was reasonable. 'It was a very long
Bill as Scots' Bills go and it was in a highly technical legal area.
Drafting it would require twelve months at least - let alone any
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political judgement' ,28 He said that the question one must put to
those who said there was a delay was what piece of legislation they
would have left out in 1975 to allow a licensing Bill to go through.
Given that 1975-76 was only the second parliamentary session of the
Labour Government, he thought they had done extremely well to have
dealt with it as quickly as they did. He indicated that there was
some doubt as to whether the Bill would actually be ready in time to
present to Parliament in the Easter of 1976. "Ihat it was ready was
thanks to Harry Ewing who worked very hard to get the Bill finalised' ,29
Harry Ewing himself, suggested that the Report was acted upon
more quickly than any other major report he could think of. 'It was
a remarkable achievement that the Government enacted most of the
Report's main recommendations within three years. The Report was pub¬
lished in late "73 and by late '76 the Act was on the statute book.
The Government had certainly not adopted any delaying tactics' .30
He felt the achievement to be all the more remarkable when it was
remembered, that Willie Ross was Secretary of State at the time. Willie
Ross had very strong and definite views on drink and. on some of the
more controversial recommendations he 'had to fight tooth and nail with
Willie to get them through'.31
All the indications are then, that the licensing issue proceeded
at a reasonable pace given the circumstances that prevailed at the
time. Omitting 1974 as a year confined to urgent legislative activity
because of the two general elections, the issue cane up for debate in
the spring of 1975, followed by a commitment, to legislate in the new
Parliamentary session later in the year. It seems unlikely that the
Conservative administration of the early 70s could have introduced
legislation any quicker had their term of office run its full course,
since it most probably would have been locking to go to the country
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in late 1974 or early .1975 in any case, leaving little time for a
Scottish Bill of such detail. Information obtained fran the Law
Society of Scotland suggests that the Conservative administration
had little intention of moving quickly on the. issue anyway. The Law
Society were informed by the Government in late 1973 that 'nothing
would be happening on the issue in the near future'.32 This leads to
the conclusion that even if the Conservatives had been able to retain
office it is unlikely that legislation would have appeared any sooner
because it seems as though they intended leaving the issue until they
had secured a second term of office.
IV. The Commitment to legislate
The statement to the House that the Government was preparing
legislation en licensing law was made by Willie Ross on 28th October
1975. The proposals that he outlined differed in some important
respects from the recommendations made by Dr. Clayson. Although there
was an endorsement of the extension of hours bo 11 p.m., the introduc¬
tion of the new experimental 'refreshment' and 'entertainment' licen¬
ces, the abolition of temperance polls and the creation of new licen¬
sing authorities, there was considerable divergence on a number of
issues with no opening of public houses an a Sunday, retention of the
statutory afternoon break and the closing of off-sales at 8 p.m.
The following day press reaction was unfavourable. The 'Daily
Record' ran a front page banner headline saying 'Short Measure,
Willie''.3 3 The paper reported that the Scottish Secretary had
' clanged the bell firmly against Sunday opening of pubs'. It queried
"Why these unique Scottish restrictions on Sunday pub-drinking? Why
should our laws be so different frem those in England? '. The 'Record' s'
verdict was simple - "Short measure, we say'. The 'Scottish Daily
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News' also reported ' Sunday pub drinking out', but carmented only that
'as expected, Mr. Ross has ruled out Sunday pub opening in Scotland -
although this was recoirmended by the Clayson Report'.34 Indeed, only
a few weeks earlier a System Ihree Saotland poll oorrmissioned by the
'Glasgow Herald' had shewn that a majority wanted pubs to be open on
a Sunday - 54% were in favour, 44% against and 3% did not know.35
Hcwever, the issue was new en the legislative agenda and pressure
group activity was to become more observable. At this period in late
1975 there were consultations between the Scottish Home and Health
Department, with its responsibility for licensing, and established
organisations. A memorandum prepared by the SHHD relating to the
Government's proposals for the reform of the licensing laws was cir¬
culated to a nunfoer of bodies such as the Law Society of Scotland,
ACPO(S) , ODSLA, the Church of Scotland and the SLTA. The responses
of these organisations were, not surprisingly, very much in keeping
with their previously stated positions. Ihe Church of Scotland, for
instance, was concerned about the idea of a refreshment house licence
on the grounds that 'present Scottish attitudes cannot cope with this
development'.36 Qi the other hand, Dundee District Council expressed
disappointment 'that all the recommendations of the Clayson Committee
would not be implemented' and through ODSLA urged that strong repre¬
sentations be made 'for the implementation of the remaining recommen¬
dations '.3 7
The lines of conmunication between interested groups and the
SHHD appear to have operated with reasonable efficiency, at least for
those organisations which were already an established part of the con¬
sultation process. Officials of the Law Society of Scotland met with
Scottish Office Ministers and officials on several occasions to dis¬
cuss details of the legislative drafting. Similarly, representatives
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of such bodies as the Church and the SLTA also had meetings. Only
ACPO(S) had the reservation that government communication was some¬
times lax. The problem, according to one senior police officer, was
that 'the SHHD would occasionally send proposals for comment and
expect a reply yesterday!'.38 He described this process as the
'pressure of preference' by which he meant that ACPO(S) were often
sent a brief of possible legislative options and were simply asked
to state their preference as quickly as possible in order to facili¬
tate the progress of legislation. ACPO(S), he indicated, were aware
of the reasons for this which concerned parliamentary timetabling.
He emphasised though, that the Association had always responded to
any requests made of it concerning legislative proposals and where
any hold-ups or breakdown in communication had occurred it had always
been at the SHHD end!
Here then, we see examples of established organisations which
are virtually automatically consulted by government on issues consid¬
ered relevant to them. These groups expected to be consulted. Their
position and. status in Scottish society was such that they were more
or less guaranteed the ear of the Scottish Office. Organisations with
such power do not therefore conform to the image of the struggling
pressure group battling against the government to have its opinions
heard and acted upon. Rather they are part of the legislative machin¬
ery itself and come to expect 'an active involvement in the content
of Scottish legislation'.39 One of the ironies of this situation is
that, on occasions, instead of applying pressure on the government
for action, they themselves can be pressurised by government for quick
responses to particular legislative options.
Within the Scottish Office in late 1975 there seems to have been
a rather novel method of dealing with the licensing issue. According
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to Harry Ewing, the Minister in charge, what happened was that all the
main recamriendations of the Clayson Report were listed in a memorandum
which was then circulated amongst all the Scottish Office Ministers
who were asked for their opinions. This was not the usual procedure
since normally matters are dealt with only by the Minister concerned.
Hcwever, on this occasion because the issue was felt to be so wide
ranging everyone was asked for their thoughts. Where they all agreed
on a recommendation that recommendation was certain to go into the
legislative draft. Where there was a difference of opinion there were
further consultations which would usually result in sane modification
of the recommendation.
Certainly, the influence of the then Secretary of State, Willie
Ross, was prominent in the overall shaping of the legislation. "Oie
shape of the Bill was very much influenced by Willie Ross' , said Rabin
Cook. 'What one had to remember was that Willie had very strong views
on drink so that Sunday opening would be an anathema to him' .40 Even
although, Bruce Millan was to replace him as Secretary of State in the
Cabinet reshuffle following Wilson's retirement in March 1976, the
main principles of the Bill were already there and 'the die was cast'.
Another Labour MP, Neil Carmichael (Glasgow, Kelvinside) remarked that
'as far as Sunday opening was concerned, Willie thought things were
alright as they were, whereas Bruce, perhaps intellectually felt
Clayson to be right, but thought the climate in Scotland was not ready
for such a change'.41
Dr. Clayson also felt the Scottish Office were over cautious in
their approach to the reform. He pointed out that 'the recommenda¬
tions were in a sequence and onoe that sequence was broken things
became a little chaotic'.42 He related the story of the time he had
been involved in a radio broadcast, debate with the Minister concerned,
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Harry Ewing. In it he had put to Harry Ewing this argument that it
was important that the package of recarmendations be implemented
otherwise the sequence would be broken and the underlying philosophy
of the Report lost. However, he was informed by Harry Ewing that
never in parliamentary history had a Departmental Report been enacted
in its entirety and 'Dr. Clayson need not suppose that his will be
the first to be so honoured'.43 Dr. Clayson said that he thought that
remark to have been very revealing about the government's attitude to
the issue.
He was particularly disappointed that his recommendation on chil¬
dren's certificates was emitted and not even debated. It was Willie
Ross who condemned it as not being in accordance with Scottish drink¬
ing conditions. Ross missed the point completely, said Dr. Clayson,
since the idea of the children's certificates was to change those
traditions. 'Such was his weight that he effectively killed that
provision dead', he reflected.44
Another area where Willie Ross was influential in modifying a
reccnmendation concerned the provisions for off-sales. The original
recommendation was for off-sales to be open frcm 8 a.m. to 11 p.m.
However, Willie Ross cut this back to 8 p.m. In a letter to the
Church of Scotland, a Scottish Office civil servant wrote that 'the
Secretary cf State believes that his proposal that off-sales premises
should close at 8 p.m. might help to reduce one of the Scottish drink¬
ing practices that he would like to see altered - that is the buying
of alcohol at a late hour for consumption in their own hemes by people
who have already been drinking heavily',45
The influence of Willie loss in the licensing issue needs to be
differentiated into two separate spheres - one concerning the parlia¬
mentary timing of the legislation and the other concerning the content
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of that legislation. Although critics have condemned Ross for 'delay¬
ing' legislative action on the reccnmendations of the Clayson Report,
there seems little hard evidence to support the accusation. If the
period of time between the publication of the Report and the issue
appearing on the legislative agenda can be said to constitute a 'delay',
then there are other more plausible reasons to account for it. So it
is perhaps misleading to portray Willie Ross as the puritan ogre hos¬
tile to reform. In fact a nunber of his statenents in the House sug¬
gest that he saw considerable merit in a great deal of the Clayson
Report. Hcwever, where his Calvinist ethics were without doubt influ¬
ential was in shaping the content of the legislation. There were a
nunber of recarmendations which he believed went much too far in lib¬
eralising the law and to which he objected as being against the inter¬
ests of the Scottish people. Hie inclusion of these in any Scottish
Licensing Bill he opposed vehemently. His concern then, was focused
on the type of reform that was desirable rather than on the principle
of reform itself. And it was in this capacity that his strong Calvin¬
ist conviction manifested itself most profoundly.
V. The Bill in Parliament
The Licensing (Scotland) Bill was finally presented and read a
First time by Willie Ross on 23rd March 1976 and was referred to the
Scottish Grand Ccmmittee for Consideration of Principle the following
day. It came before the SGC, which met for one sitting, on 6th April.
Harry Ewing introduced the debate, explaining the reasons for
the rejection of sate of Clayson's main recanrendations. Although
the Government accepted the argument that inadequate social controls,
that is a lack of sensible attitudes to alcohol consumption, made
drink an especially serious problem in Scotland, they were not
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convinced that legislative controls in the form of licensing played
as limited a part in the regulation of alcohol abuse as was suggested
by the Clayson Report. Accordingly, the government avoided any pro¬
posals which would be likely to result in a substantial increase in
total consumption. In their view some of the Clayson proposals risked
that result, particularly the reccnrnendation for the opening of pubs
on Sundays. However, they were also aware of the need to modernise
the law to meet changing social circumstances.
The reason given for not implementing a number of the more radi¬
cal reccrrmendations, Sunday opening in particular, was that they could
lead to a substantial increase in consumption„ The Clayson Report,
though, had already conceded that any relaxation which led to an un¬
acceptable increase in consumption and a corresponding increase in
misuse would constitute an argument against relaxation. However, the
Report pointed out that 'if, as there is reason to believe, the attri¬
butable increase in consumption is likely to be slight, the argument
must be weighed in the balance against those which suggest that relax¬
ation is desirable' .1+6 The basis of the Clayson philosophy was that
any increase in consumption which might result from relaxation, pro¬
vided it was reasonable, would be overshadowed by the benefits achie¬
ved in reducing the pace of drinking by creating more civilised social
attitudes and drinking habits. Hcwever, the rejection of the proposal
for Sunday opening would appear to be more attributable to the reli¬
gious scruples of Willie Ross and his concern for the traditional qual¬
ities of the Scottish Sabbath, than to any logical argument about in¬
creased misuse because of the Sunday opening of public houses.
The Opposition spokesman, Alick Buchanan-Smith was quick to point
out that the Government was taking too short term a view since the
idea of Clayson was that the Report had to be looked at as a whole
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rather than a series of individual recommendations. He urged that
they 'should try to anticipate, and not simply react to shorter term
pressures'.4 7 It was thought that these pressures emanated from the
religious conmunity. Yet the irony was that while the views of the
Church of Scotland were influential they did not undertake a great
deal of active representation over the issue. Since Willie Ross was
sympathetic to the Church's line, and Sunday opening was emitted frcm
the original Bill, the Church simply did not see a need to make any
representation at that time. In fact Mick Buchanan-Smith carmented,
"it is the Calvinism of the right hen. Merrfoer for Kilmarnock that is
behind this rather than any reasoned body of opinion'.48
The limited vision of the Scottish Office was further criticised
by Dennis Canavan (Lab. West Stirlingshire) who argued that since it
was seme two and a half years since Clayson reported, the question
arose as to whether the public's attitude in Scotland with regard to
licensing and public custcms had changed to a degree where perhaps
even the Clayson reccmmendations, which were more radical than those
contained in the legislation, were not slightly out of date. He em¬
phasised the need to have a greater degree of self discipline on the
part of the individual rather than an external discipline imposed by
legislation.
Ch that note the Consideration of Principle was duly reported to
the House the follcwing day and from there was camiitted to the First
Scottish Standing Carmittee. The Standing Committee was to have its
first meeting on 18th May and was to sit throughout May and June, hav¬
ing a total of fourteen sittings.49 The clause by clause debate was
extremely detailed with hundreds of amendments coming before the
Committee. There was much repetition of arguments which have previously
arisen elsewhere and a large part of the debate revolved around the irore
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technical provisions within the Bill and around the linguistic intri¬
cacies of parliamentary drafting. In order to avoid this minutiae,
the analysis of decisions within the Standing Canmittee will be con¬
fined, as far as possible, to the main issues as they were enunciated
in the previous chapter.
For most of the early sittings the debate was confined to techni¬
cal provisions concerning the operation of the licensing boards. Of
interest in the early debate was Clause 2, although not for its sub¬
ject - "The Disqualification of Interested Persons' - but for the way
it illustrated the Scottish Office consultation procedure and its
effect on legislation. Harry Ewing asked if a particular matter could
be returned to !onoe our discussions and considerations have been com¬
pleted'.50 'Ihis request ruffled the feathers of Mr. Michael Clark
Hutchison (Cons. Edinburgh South) . Mr. Hutchison tock a dim view of
the fact that a Bill had been presented to Corrmittee which was not in
its final form - 'We are told something may happen on Report as a re¬
sult of discussions with outside bodies. This is not the way to do
business. There has been a breakdown somewhere in the Scottish Office
an the arrangements. The Bill should not have come to the Conmittee
until it was in its final form, with no ifs and buts and possible al¬
terations by the Government later'.51 Harry Ewing, informed him that
the representations in question 'were not made to us before the legis¬
lation was published, but afterwards, and we are considering them'.52
He explained further that a number of Government amendrents 'openly
and honestly have their origin against the background of the discus¬
sions we have had with various organisations *.5 3
This brief exchange is illustrative of the mariner in which
Government continues to have consultations with, and be influenced by,
outside organisations. Dialogue between Government and various
251
interest groups does not end when legislation appears. In fact, in
many cases that is when the real lobbying begins. It is, in essence,
the very stuff of which pressure group politics are made. In this
light it is difficult to see why Clark Hutchison should become so dis¬
turbed by a situation which is an accepted and almost ritualised part
of parliamentary activity and of the policy process.
The area which attracted most public interest, and which also
provided one of the most novel illustrations of pressure group lobby¬
ing, was the issue of permitted hours generally, and the Sunday open¬
ing of public houses specifically. The controversy focused on the
principle of whether public houses should have the legal right to open on
a Sunday. It will be remembered that the original Bill emitted any
provision for the Sunday opening of pubs for reasons outlined earlier.
'Ihe Bill then, as it came before Parliament, allowed for pubs to open
en weekdays frcm 11 a.m. to 2.30 p.m. and 5 p.m. to 11 p.m. with no
opening on Sundays, while hotels and clubs could open 11 a.m. to
2.30 p.m. and 5 p.m. to 11 p.m. on weekdays and frcm 12.30 p.m. to
2.30 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. to 11 p.m. on Sundays, These times incorpor¬
ated Clayson's recoiimendation for an additional hour opening in the
evening, but rejected the all day and Sunday recommendations. Ihe
debate in Committee was to centre around the plethora of amendments
which sought to have these provisions included in the legislation.
Ihe case for Sunday opening was put principally by Malcolm
Rifkind (Cons. Edinburgh Bentlands) . There were three main themes to
his argument. The first was that while a substantial number of people
considered Sunday to be a day of rest and recreation, it was not nec¬
essarily incompatible with those objectives that pubs should be avail¬
able as one means of :recreation for those who wished to use them.
Secondly, it was illogical to perpetuate a system whereby anyone who
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wished to do so could obtain alcoholic liquor in a hotel, but not in
a public house. Amongst other things such a situation tended to
result in problems of overcrowding and damage to amenity in those
areas where hotels were concentrated. Thirdly, the existence of per¬
mitted hours on a Sunday in other parts of the UK had not led to any
serious problems of the type that was being suggested would occur in
Scotland if a Sunday opening amendment was accepted. Sunday opening,
he suggested, 'would create a more rational, sensible and responsible
approach to licensing'.54
The chief opponent to any proposed relaxation was Tteddy Taylor
(Cons. Glasgow Cathcart) . He was saddened by the fact that the crea¬
tion of one legal anomaly after another had put Scotland on the 'slip¬
pery slope' to unrestricted access to drink, and he oould not see how
an extension of hours would do anything to reduce Scotland's 'special
problems of alcoholism and heavy drinking'. The argument that he
espoused most vociferously though, concerned the protection of tradi¬
tional qualities of the Scottish Sabbath:
'I take the view that it would undoubtedly change
the character of our way of life, and cause a
great deal of offence to a large number of people,
if drinking on Sundays and public houses open on a
Sunday became part of our way of life, unless we
were to change the pubs themselves „.. The moment
provision is made for public houses to be open on
Sundays, the whole character of the ooimrunity will
inevitably change alcng with the whole character
of Sunday in that community'.5 5
A cast of supporting actors also made contributions to the debate,
the most worthy of consideration probably being Robin Cook's. He recog¬
nised that there was a serious and legitimate argument based on the
individual's liberty to be able to choose when, where and hew he
drinks. However, the risk of increased consumption, because of the
more relaxed hours, leading to the possibility of an increase in the
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incidence of drink related problems was too great, given the inade¬
quate facilities which existed in Scotland for treating alcoholism.
The Government response came from Harry Ewing who attempted to
persuade the Ccrrmittee that Sunday opening was not such a good idea.
His case rested on four points. Firstly, using material extracted
from 'The Sunday Mail Pub Spy Column', he suggested that given the
unsatisfactory state of some of Scotland's hostelries they did not
warrant being open on a Sunday. Secondly, letters frcm the public
were limited - 'no more than about 60' - and inconclusive, the views
expressed being split evenly. Thirdly, admissions for alcoholism and
alcchol psychosis had increased dramatically between the late 50s and
early 70s. Fourthly, the opening of pubs on Sundays would involve
additional nuisance and loss of amenity for those living in close
proximity to premises. For these reasons he .reconrnended the Committee
to reject the amendment. However, much to the chagrin of the Govern¬
ment, Harry Ewing's exhortations went unheeded because the Coirmittee
divided 10 votes to 6 in favour of the amendment (Table 6.1).
TABLE 6.1 House of Commons Parliamentary Debate, First Scottish
Standing Committee, 18th May - 1st July 1976, col.488.
Ayes Noes
Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Cons.) Buchanan, Richard (Lab.)
Craigen, J. M. (Lab.) Campbell, Ian (Lab.)
Douglas-Hamiltcn, Lord James (Cons)Cook, Robin, F. (Lab.)
Gilmour, Sir John (Cons.) Ewing, Harry (Lab.)
Hutchison, Michael, Clark (Cons.) Hamilton, James (Lab.)





This Division shows that Conservative Members were more favourably
disposed towards reform than were Labour Members. 6 Conservatives
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compared to only 3 Labour voted in favour of the Sunday opening of
pubs, while only 1 Conservative and 5 Labour voted against. The cor¬
responding Division on the Sunday opening of pubs at the Report Stage
will also reveal that Conservatives were generally less reserved in
their attitudes towards liberalisation.
This important decision to incorporate Sunday opening in the
legislation was taken on 17th June, and within days there was activity
to have it reversed. The Church of Scotland, previously conspicuous
by its absence, irrnediately swung into action. Ctl 21st June, the
General Secretary, Rev. L. 3eattie Garden, wrote on behalf of the
Department of Social Responsibility of the Church of Scotland, to the
Secretary of State seeking an 'urgent meeting'. He wrote:
'we are deeply concerned about the proposed opening of
public houses on Sundays in Scotland in view of the
serious problem of alcoholism and alcohol abuse in
Scotland today'.55
A similar letter was also sent to MPs representative of each of the
political parties - Richard Buchanan (Lab. Glasgow Springburn) , Lord
James Douglas-Hamilton (Cons. Edinburgh West), Hamish Watt (SNP,
Banffshire) and Russell Johnston (Lib. Inverness). Arrangements were
then made for a joint delegation frcm the Church of Scotland and the
Free Church to meet the MPs at the House of Cannons on June 30th.
In his reply to L. Beattie Garden, Richard Buchanan offered the fol¬
lowing piece of advice - 'tactically I would advise putting local pres¬
sure on the MPs who are in favour of Sunday opening of licensed prem¬
ises '.5 7
By the 25th June the Church of Scotland Alcchol Working Party
had prepared a series of papers for the meetings scheduled for the
30th. As well as the above mentioned MPs, Harry Ewing, Donald Stewart
(SNP, Western Isles) and Teddy Taylor were also seen. In a letter to
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Teddy Taylor after the scheduled meeting, dated 2nd July, thanks were
expressed to him for his advice and his 'suggestion as to how we might
approach the various groups of MPs' . The Church stated - 'on our part,
we can assure you that we are seeking to encourage those in the Church
who feel as we do to write to their respective MP about the matter of
Sunday opening' „58 This the Church duly did in a circular to all min¬
isters in early July. It set out the principal reasons for the
Church's opposition to Sunday opening and reported on the meetings
that had taken place between the Church's delegation, Government Mini¬
sters and other MPs at the House of Commons on the 30th. The circular
statedj
'In our representations, we strongly emphasised the
authority which the Church has to speak on this
subject, based partly on the size of the Church's
membership and also on the experience gained by
the Church as the main voluntary group in Scotland
caring for alcoholics and for those with serious
drink problems. We were courteously and sympath¬
etically received by the Secretary of State for
Scotland and had opportunity for frank discussion
with Scottish Members of Parliament. Although the
Secretary of State has not reached a final decision
on what the Government will new put forward at the
Report Stage of the Bill on the question of Sunday
opening we were left in no doubt that the
Government's original decision not to allcw public
houses in Scotland to open on Sundays was their
preference. We believe that the recommendation of
the Standing Committee to allow Sunday opening
could yet be reversed, but this will only happen
if Scottish Members of Parliament are made aware
of the strength of public feeling on this question.
This point was stressed to us by many Members of
Parliament whom we met, including the Secretary of
State. Urgency in this matter is of paramount
importance.'59
Accordingly, the Church requested their ministers to write to
their MP if they felt strongly about the issue and encourage members
of their congregation to do likewise, emphasising that this should be
done quickly as the Bill would shortly be before Parliament on the
Report Stage.
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Ihe Church's late activity was reported by the Press with some
astonishment. 'Kirk steps up fight, against Sunday pubs' stated the
'Glasgow Herald'. But it pointed out that 'the strongest argument
against any move to delete the Sunday opening provision from the Bill
at Report Stage is that it would have to be done by the votes of
English MPs, who already have Sunday opening'.60 And the 'Daily
Record' made a similar point under the headline, "Ihe Kirk fights on
... but why?' It commented, 'A democratic decision has new been taken
by a Parliamentary committee. From all the evidence, it accurately
reflects the view of the majority of the citizens of Scotland. All
it seeks to do is to bring us into line with what the rest of the UK
has enjoyed for years. Even the Kirk's usual wail that it will inter¬
fere with their traditional Sabbath is just so much eyewash' .61
Why then, did the Church of Scotland leave it so late to enter
the fray? One reason already enunciated was that it accepted Willie
Ross's statement on no Sunday opening at face value and was caught
completely unaware when the Sunday opening amendment was carried. It
did not bother to undertake any lobbying activity before the Committee
vote, either to apply pressure, or even to ascertain how Members
might vote. The only contact seems to have been an informal meeting
with James White MP in late May during which the Rev. Keith Steven
had discussions with him about the Church's views on both alcohol and
abortion. Other than that the Church would appear to have taken it
for granted that the Bill would complete its legislative passage with¬
out any alteration to the original Sunday opening laws.
Another reason relates to organisational and personnel changes
within the Church itself. During this year 1975-76 both the Convener
of the Moral Welfare Committee and the General Secretary and Director
of Social Work stepped down and were replaced. The. Convener of the
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Moral Welfare Committee until 1975 had been Rev. L. D. Levison who had
been responsible for drafting the Church's submission to Clayson and
also for introducing the report to the General Assembly for approval.
However, when his term of office had expired he had been replaced by
Rev. P. Bisset. At the same time the General Secretary and Director
of Social Work, Rev. L. Beattie Garden was succeeded by the former
Associate General Secretary, Rev. Frank S. Gibson. In addition the
Moral Welfare Committee was restructured to beccne the Carmittee of
Social Responsibility. Therefore at a time when a piece of important
Scottish social legislation relevant to the work of the Church was
passing through Parliament, the Church's personnel and organisational
structure was in a state of transition. To complicate the matter
even further Frank Gibson, who was described by one source in the
Church as ' the real driving political force', was on sabbatical leave
for a period of time during which the Bill was before Parliament and
as a result was not always on hand to deal wi h developments.
There would appear, then, to be two reasons for the Church's late
intervention. Firstly there was acceptance of the emission of Sunday
opening frcm the original draft Bill. The Church seemed reassured in
the knowledge that Willie Ross was sympathetic to their viewpoint.
Secondly, there was the upheaval in the Church's organisation and per¬
sonnel which appears to have had an effect on its day-to-day function¬
ing.
The result of these oversights ' ave been chronicled by Rcbin Cook:
'... the churches failed to launch a parliamentary
campaign until the decision had actually been
taken, by which time they were reduced to the
paradoxical position of inviting the whole House,
including its preponderant English membership, to
overturn the decision of a Scottish Carmittee.
Predictably intervention at this late stage proved
ineffective since most MPs had already been forced
by press enquiries to take a public stance from
which they could not easily retreat and rather res¬
ented being pressured to do so',62
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Perhaps the strangest representation made on the issue of Sunday
opening came frcm the Strathclyde Licensed Trade Association. Harry
Ewing, speaking in Ccrcmittee, let it be kncwn that several representa¬
tions had been made to him since the Conmittee's decision in favour of
Sunday opening. Amongst them he had 'received a letter frcm the
Strathclyde Licensed Trade Association expressing bitter opposition to
the decision taken'.63 However, a startled Alick Buchanan-Smith rose
to his feet to state that he also had 'received a letter from that
Association dated 21st June 1976 in which, nothing is said about being
bitterly opposed to the decision'.6tt He proceeded to inform the
Committee that the Strathclyde Licensed Trade Association had asked
that all existing public house licences should automatically become
seven day licences without any special conditions attached. An irate
Harry Ewing retorted that he took 'the strongest possible exception
to any association ... sending letters on the same subject worded very
differently to different parties in the House of Commons'.65 Even
Tteddy Taylor was bemused, uttering 'in 12 years in Standing Conmittees
I have never known a pressure group interested in a Bill give conflic¬
ting advice to the Government and the Opposition'.66
What the Strathclyde Licensed Trade Association hoped to achieve
by this action is not at all clear. Whether it was some sort of
sophisticated ploy that backfired, administrative incompetence or
simply crass stupidity, is impossible to tell. Whatever their idea
all they succeeded in doing was to anger and alienate the very politi¬
cians they were trying to influence and lose credibility in their eyes
as a serious and trustworthy organisation.
Following on the question of Sunday opening was the question of
all day opening. Cnoe more opposition amendments sought to do away
with the afternoon break, from 2.30 p.m. to 5 p.m. and so have permitred
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hours frcm 11 a.m. to 11 p.m. as recommended by Clayson. The argument
for all day licensing was put principally by Alick Buchanan-Smith and
centred around the need for greater flexibility to cater for different
canmunity needs such as shift-workers, travellers, tourists, mid-
afternoon shoppers and the like. The point was that the break was
out of date and no longer suited modern working and leisure patterns
in Scotland. He argued 'by having a more flexible and open system,
one hopes to adopt a more civilised and modem attitude towards drink-
The case against was put by Teddy Taylor who took the view that
abolition of the afternoon break would lead to greater absenteeism,
involve longer hours for bar staff and lead to a deterioration in
conditions of hygiene in pubs. Cn this occasion the amendment was
defeated convincingly by 13 votes to 5 (Table 6.2) .
TABLE 6.2 House of Commons Parliamentary Debate,
ing'.67











Craigen, J. M. (Lab.)
Douglas-Hamilton, lord James (Cons.)
Ewing, Harry, (Lab.)
Gilmour, Sir John (Cons.)
Hamilton, James (Lab.)





In this Division it can be seen that a number of Members who
supported the Sunday opening of pubs crossed over to oppose all day
opening. lord James Douglas-Hamilton, Sir John Gilmour, Michael Clark
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Hutchison, J. M. Craigen, James White and Hamish Watt all voted for
Sunday opening but against all day opening. Again the majority of
those voting in favour were Conservative while the majority voting
against were Labour,
A major factor in the rejection of all day opening had been the
'trade' itself. Hie SLTA had requested that mandatory afternoon clos¬
ing be retained for two reasons. Firstly, at this time a majority of
its members still felt the afternoon break to be beneficial for staff.
Secondly, there was a concern that in the event of all day opening,
pubs which would prefer to close for the aftemocn would be forced to
stay open in order to remain competitive. So for reasons of uniform¬
ity the SLTA advocated that afternoon closing be mandatory.
Hie law as it affected young people was another area of pressure
group interest. Apparently there was nothing in the law as it stood,
nor in the legislation before Parliament, which, prevented a young
person under 18 being in possession of, or consuming, drink in a pub¬
lic place. As a consequence Teddy Taylor moved an amendment which
would make it an offence for a person under 18 to be in possession of,
or consume, alcoholic liquor in a public place. Here he had in mind
the habit, especially in the urban areas, of groups of youths gather¬
ing on a street corner or in a public park to consume drink which
they had managed to procure from an off-licence. In support of his
case he quoted a recommendation frcm an information pamphlet of the
Police Federation advocating that a police officer should have the
pcwer to apprehend an under 18 year old in possession of drink. Ihis
power would be similar to the power to apprehend an under 16 year old
in possession of tobacco.
Harry Ewing, however, indicated that the Government had been in
consultation with ACPO(S) about the implications of creating a new
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offence and their feeling was that such, a clause would not be enforce¬
able and would be better left out of the legislation. Teddy Taylor,
though, felt that the Scottish Office were not taking sufficient
regard of the Scottish Police Federation (SPF) view. He commented:
'I think there is undue emphasis within the Scottish
Office at present ... of consulting the Chief Police
Officers without consulting the Police Federation.
I knew there is a lot of consultation with the
Federation, but I often feel that there is a distinc¬
tion drawn between matters on which it is considered
appropriate to consult the Federation1.6 8
In certain respects there does seem to be an element of truth in
Teddy Taylor's remarks. Perhaps it is only to be expected though,
that the Scottish Office will go to the apex of an organisation for
an opinion rather than its middle or lower ranks. In Chapter 1 we
noted the comment made by Chris Allen concerning the 'exclusiveness1
of the Scottish Office administration. Here then, we can perhaps see
an example of this 'restriction of influence over decision-making'.
It is interesting to examine the different perspectives from
which the problem was viewed. ACPO(S) looked at the problem in the
abstract. There was no doubting the matter constituted a serious
social prcblem, but they thought it would serve no useful purpose to
make the problem a criminal offence, a criminal offence moreover,
which, in practice was virtually impossible to enforce. The Scottish
Police Federation (SPF) on the other hand, saw the problem in much
more practical terms. It was SPF members, that is ordinary PCs on
the beat, who had to deal with the situation on a day to day basis,
and feeling pcwerless to do anything, urged that a new offence be
created. On this occasion at least the police view was divergent.
That the ACPO(S) view prevailed was probably as much to do with the
weight of their argument as anything else, but being the senior organ¬
isation and being directly consulted by the Scottish Office was cer¬
tainly no disadvantage.
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A further issue of controversy which was to affect the police
directly was the question of police entry to clubs. The Government
had adopted in the legislation the Clayson recommendation that the
police should have the same right of entry to clubs that they had to
other licensed premises. Clayson's reasoning, it will be recalled,
was that while this would, to a certain extent, infringe upon the
members' privacy, it could, through better control of the conduct of
premises, contribute towards improving social attitudes to drinking.
However, a number of amendments appeared in Committee which, attempted
to restrict the entry of the police and make it conditional upon them
being in possession of a signed warrant. Michael Clark Hutchison
brought out the old chestnut that 'a club is a very different institu¬
tion frcm a pub'.69 What was at stake was a fundamental principle of
individual liberty. Here we see a practical manifestation of the
philosophical controversy discussed in Chapter 3. To what extent could
conduct within the club be considered self-regarding in the sense of
being limited to bona fide members? In what ways, if any, did the
activities of members impinge upon the freedoms and rights of others
outwith the club?
The Government, while accepting to a limited extent, the 'club
as an extension of the member's heme' argument, placed greater emphasis
on the need for proper supervision and control given the growth in the
number of clubs whose main purpose was the supply of drink. The cen¬
tral point was the need for common standards in supervision which
applied to all licensed premises. The Government, for the time being,
managed to defeat the amendment quite convincingly by 11 votes to 4,
but it was clear that there was still uneasiness amongst certain mem¬
bers about the provision, an uneasiness which was to became evident
again on Report.
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An occurrence, which was to provide an interesting insight into
the ethics of lobbying involved the closing time, of off-sales. The
Bill as drafted required that off-sales close at 8 p.m., the idea
being to make their hours of trading more akin to normal shopping
hours. An amendment was moved by Malcolm Rifkind in Conmittee to
restore the closing hour to 10 p.m. and this was accepted without
much ado by the Government en two grounds. Firstly, 10 p.m. still
maintained a distinction between off-sales premises and on-sales prem¬
ises and secondly, certain sections of the trade had requested a
return to the later hour. On this latter point Harry Ewing related
a revealing anecdote. Mr. Ewing apparently had a meeting with Mr.
Agnew of 'Agnew Stores', a chain of off-licences, on this question
of closing time. At the meeting Mr. Agnew, who Mr. Ewing described
as 'an obnoxious young man' argued forcefully that any reduction in
hours of business would inevitably lead to redundancies, which would,
he emphasised, not lock at all good for a Labour Government. More¬
over, as there were a number of 'Agnew Stores' in Mr. Ewing's con¬
stituency, there would be redundancies on his cwn doorstep. Further
still, Mr. Agnew it seems, would make it his business to see, through
the local press, that the local electorate knew exactly who was to
blame. Harry Ewing, though, was experienced and astute enough to
recognise a blackmail threat. However, unknown to Mr. Agnew, the
Scottish Office had already decided to restore the old closing hour.
Yet Harry Ewing was not to be denied his sport. Realising that the
issue of redundancies was a red herring, he proceeded to inform Agnew
that not only were the Government going to reinstate the old terminal
hour, they were in fact considering extending it to give more opening
hours. In which case, asked Harry Ewing of Agnew, 'hew many extra
people will you be able to employ?' 'Ah, but it doesn't work, that way'
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replied Agnew. 'ExactlyI' retorted a smug Harry Ewing.70
Whether one would consider the approach unethical is a matter of
judgement. However, there is no denying that it was a crude and abra¬
sive attempt to apply pressure, lacking in any subtlety or refinement,
and as a consequence fell someway short of having its desired effect.
All it succeeded in doing was to alienate the Minister in charge of
policy. The incident seems to offer a good example of how not to
approach a politician.
As the Ccrrmittee proceedings drew to a close after a lengthy
fourteen sittings, Teddy Taylor was still to be found fighting a vali¬
ant rearguard action for the cause of temperance. Gamely he tried to
have veto polls retained but the amendment was defeated convincingly.
His most novel contribution though, came on Clause 124 - Alcoholic
Liquor in Confectionery. Mr. Taylor expressed considerable concern
at the level of alcohol in liqueur chocolates. 'Ihe alcoholic content
of such chocolates, he informed the Comnittee, had just been increased
by a Carmen Market directive and he was somewhat perturbed about the
potentially deleterious effect this might have on the chocolate eating
British public. After a lengthy diatribe against bureaucratic decision¬
making in the EEC, Mr. Taylor was forced to the despairing conclusion
that this was just one more example of the loss of sovereignty of the
British Parliament!
The party was still not over though. Even more entertainment was
provided when an amendment came up in the name of Hamish Watt. Unfor¬
tunately for the hon. Member for Banff, he was not present to move it!
This provoked Harry Ewing to launch into a scathing invective:
'There is a serious point about the absence of the hon.
Merrber for Banff and the way he has treated the
Committee. In the last three years we have been
plagued in the House with constant allegations from
the SNP and their supporters that Westminster never
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gives enough time for this or for that aspect of
Scottish legislation. Indeed, they run campaigns
on this. Yet new that Westminster is giving a
great deal of time, they insult the people of
Scotland by deciding to absent themselves frcm
the Canmittee. Ihey rub salt into the wound by
having the temerity or impertinence to put down
amendments, and then their Member is not present
to move them'.71
Mr. Watt's absence should perhaps be put into a wider perspective.
Of the 14 occasions on which the Committee met, Watt is on record as
having attended all but two, the 7th and the 14th. He is also shewn
to have voted in 16 out of the 31 Committee Divisions. Watt, it would
seem, was rather unlucky to be on the receiving end of such a vilifica¬
tion J
The Bill came to the floor of the House for its Report Stage on
27th July and, as was expected, the main point of contention concerned
the Government's attempt to reverse the Committee decision on Sunday
opening. The Government sought to introduce a new clause which would
have put the Bill back into the state in which it was before the suc¬
cessful amendment moved in Committee. Taking no chances the Government
also had at the ready a second group of amendments which represented
their 'fall back position' should the new clause be defeated. These
had the effect of placing certain restrictions on Sunday opening.
A great deal of familiar ground was covered during the course of
the debate. Bruce Millan again reiterated the need to strike a bal¬
ance between the convenience of the majority and the possible dangers
of increasing the prcblems of the minority. Sunday opening, he felt,
would 'push us over that edge, cause damage and increase all the prcb¬
lems'.72 Malcolm Rifkind on the other hand, argued that it was illog¬
ical to advocate extended permitted hours on weekdays but not on
Sundays. Further, it was even more unconvincing when alcohol could
be readily obtained in clubs and hotels in any case. In keeping with
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his predilection for stirring up controversy, "teddy Taylor was once
again not to disappoint. Concerning the need to raise the standards
of licensed premises, he stated contentiously:
'The situation may be anomalous new but it is
improving. Vfe are getting more hotels and clubs.
With time and pure capitalism demand and supply
will cane together and drinking conditions will
improve in Scotland'.73
Needless to say, an irate Robert Hughes (Lab. Aberdeen North) was not
so convinced about the merits of unfettered capitalism, accusing the
hon. Member for Glasgow Cathcart of having 'a nerve to say that bene-
ficient capitalists will in time improve the drinking situation in
Scotland'.711 As far as the substantive issues of Sunday opening were
concerned, the debate tended to reproduce points and arguments which
had been aired on previous occasions. What proved to be the interest¬
ing feature of this debate was the controversy over voting procedure.
The scene was set with Bruce Millan's early statement to the
House:
'I would say a word about English Members in relation
to the Division when it is called. I very much hope
that this will basically be a decision of Scottish
Members. It is not, of course, possible for me - it
would be completely improper - to suggest that English
Meirfoers are not entitled to vote on this issue. Ihey
are entitled to vote just as on other issues, Scottish
Members within the last few days have voted on what
have been exclusively English matters. I see nothing
wrong in principle about that and, therefore, there
has been no intention en my part to say that English
Members should not vote. Nevertheless, I hope at the
end of the day the vote will represent Scottish
opinion on the matter'.7 5
It does not take much reading between the lines to see that Bruoe
Millan was warning off potentially disruptive English votes, albeit in
a most proper and constituticjnal manner. So, do English Members pres¬
ent a problem when there is voting on a purely Scottish issue? 'Not
really1 thought Malcolm Rifkind. "Of course, English Members are per¬
fectly entitled to vote. However, they do tend to take into account
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the predominant feeling among Scottish Members so that on most occa¬
sions a Scots majority prevails. It is extremely rare for English
Members ever to force a measure through against the prevailing tide
of Scottish Members' opinion' .76 Nor did Bruce Millan himself, des¬
pite his statement, think it was much of a problem since normally vot¬
ing was along party lines. However, he said 'on free votes it would
be very unfortunate if English Members did vote the other way frcm the
Scots majority. Cti these types of issues people vote according to
their own conviction - and of course, you can't stop them frcm voting'.
David Steel, though, was somewhat puzzled by Bruoe Millan's statement
to the House and suggested a possible solution. He oomnented:
'It was the first time I ever heard a Minister say
in a debate on a Scottish Bill that he hoped that
the English and Welsh Members had left so that we
Soots could decide the matter by themselves. That
is a very strange concept because the logic of it
is - and I would support it - that we should long
ago have devised same method of taking Report stages
through the Scottish Grand Ccmmittee with only a
final reserve power left to the House'.7 8
Cn this occasion a Scots majority did prevail within the overall
majority but unfortunately for Bruoe Millan the majority voted against
the Government's new clause prohibiting Sunday opening. This forced
the Government into their fall back position of a series of restric¬
tions on Sunday opening of premises, which, they later had to introduce
into the Bill. The 'Glasgow Herald5 reported the event with the front
page banner headline 'Yes to Sunday pubs - Majority of 21 in Commons
vote' ,79
In this Division on the Government's New Clause 1 it should be
remembered that an "Aye" vote in favour of the new clause was a vote
against Sunday opening. A "No" vote represented a vote in favour of
Sunday opening.
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The turnout for this vote was particularly high with 66 Scottish
Meirbers going through the Division Lobbies. This represented 93% of
Scots MPs. Of these 66 MPs, 36 voted in favour of Sunday opening and
30 voted against. Thus an overall Scottish majority of 50.7% prevailed
in favour of pubs opening cn the Sabbath in contrast to the 42.2% who
believed they should remain closed.
Party composition in this 1974-79 Parliament gave Labour 41
Scottish seats, Conservative 16, Liberal 3 and the SNP 11. From Table
6.3 it can be seen that the Labour Party was remarkably divided on the
issue, 19 Labour MPs (46.3%) voting "No" (i.e. in favour of opening)
and 18 (43.9% voting "Aye" (i.e. against opening). This ambivalence
reflected the two lines of thought which seemed to exist amongst
Labour Meirbers. On the one hand the likes of Dennis Canavan (West
Stirlingshire) , Neil Carmichael (Glasgow Kelvingrove) and John Mackintosh
(Berwick and East Lothian) were typical of those who felt same of the
hypocrisy that surrounded Sunday should be blcwn away. Cn the other
hand the Government Front Bench of Willie Foss, Harry Ewing and Bruce
Millan urged that MPs vote against Sunday opening, ostensibly on the
grounds that such an extension would engender more drink related prob¬
lems, but also because of religious concern with Sunday cbservance.
The Conservative Party were less reserved though. All their 16
MPs voted and of these 10 (62,5%) voted in favour of Sunday pubs while
6 (37.5%) opposed the idea. Similarly the SNP came out strongly in
favour of opening on Sundays. 10 of their 11 MPs voted and 7 of this
10 registered a "No" vote (i.e. in favour of opening) . Thus 63.6% of
Scottish National Members voted for Sunday drinking in public houses,
while 27.2% voted against by registering an "Aye" vote on New Clause 1.
New Clause 1 was also supported by the Liberal Party '/hose 3 Scottish
Meirbers all voted for the clause and hence against Sunday opening of
public houses.
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House of Cannons Parliamentary Debate, Vol. 916, col. 613 (Report
Stage 27.7.76).
Division on Sunday opening of pubs.
The Division is on Government New Clause 1 which sought
to put the Bill back into the state in which it was before
the successful amendment moved in Carmittee to allcw the
Sunday opening of public houses.
Therefore an "Aye" vote in favour of the new clause is
a vote against Sunday opening. A "No" vote against the
clause represents a vote in favour of Sunday opening.
Figures in Tables include Tellers.




























































Table 6.4 shows Scottish voting by Age Groups. Cnly the over 65
age group was hostile to the Sunday opening provision, all the other
age categories favouring the relaxation.
The analysis of Scottish voting by Religion (Table 6.5) has been
by far the most difficult to undertake since there is no comprehensive
list of religious beliefs held by MPs. While it is possible to obtain
information on a Member's party, constituency, age, education and other
particulars frcm 'Dod's Parliamentary Companion! and 'Who's Who', in¬
formation on religious allegiances is not divulged. The only publica¬
tion which reveals religious denomination is the 'Catholic Directory'.
Unfortunately, no equivalent information is readily available on
Protestants, Jews or atheists. Therefore the simple categorisation
of 'Catholics' and 'Others' has had to be adopted. This is not as
informative as one would have liked but it is all that circumstances
permit. Table 6.5 thus shews the Catholic vote to have split narrowly
against the Sunday opening of pubs, while the residual category is
shewn to have voted in favour.
The breakdewn of voting by Schooling (Table 6.6) shews that MPs
educated at a Scottish Secondary came out in favour of Sunday opening
by a majority of 23 votes to 16. They were not, hewever, supported
by their counterparts who had attended a Scottish Independent, this
group of MPs coming out against pubs opening on a Sunday by 6 votes
to 4. Interestingly though MPs with an English public school back¬
ground did vote in favour of opening by 6 votes to 1.
Table 6.7 (Higher Education) shews that both Oxbridge graduates
and Scottish university graduates voted in convincing numbers in fav¬
our of Sunday pubs, a combined figure of 23 votes to 15. Those with
no further education voted marginally against the proposed liberalisa¬
tion by 8 to 7.
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TABLE 6.5 Scottish voting by Religion
Total vote Scottish vote Catholic Others
Aye 36 30 3 27
No 57 36 2 34
TABLE 6.6 Scottish Voting by Schooling
Total Scot. T, . Scottish Scottish English English
vote vote Element. Mp. GrLoar Public
Aye 36 30 3 2 16 6 2 1
No 57 36 2 0 23 4 1 6












Aye 36 30 5 1 10 4 8 2
No 57 36 8 1 15 3 7 2
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The most striking feature of Scottish voting by Region (Table
6.8) was the unequivocal vote against the Sunday opening of pubs by
representatives of the Highlands. This can perhaps be attributed to
the fact that the Highlands have the highest rates of alcohol related
disabilities in the U.K. It is therefore not surprising that the
region's MPs should have erred on the side of caution when confronted
by a proposal which would make alcohol more readily available. The
Highlands were in fact the only region to go against Sunday opening.
While the Borders and Central divided evenly, the South-West, Glasgow,
Edinburgh and the North-East all came out in favour of the extension
of pub opening to Sundays.
Table 6.9 (voting by Occupation) shews that the only category to
have supported the clause to keep pubs closed on a Sunday was
'Miscellaneous White Collar'. The Professions, Business, Forces and
Workers all favoured pubs being allowed to open on the Sabbath day.
As was expected the issue of police entry to clubs once again
appeared in the debate. Dennis Canavan tabled an amendment to restrict
the right of police entry to clubs, a move designed to preserve the
status quo. He informed the House in proposing the amendment that he
had received a number of representations from clubs in his constituency
contesting Clause 114, on the grounds that it was an invasion of the
privacy of clubs. His contention was that there was a difference
between a pub and a club, since a pub was a public place whereas a
club, in theory at least, was often considered as an extension of the
hare. The Bill, as it stood, allowed for a right of entry for police¬
men at any time and for any reason. This, it was pointed out, could
lead to the embarrassing situation where a constable could take the
names and addresses of any person on the premises if he had grounds
for believing an offence was being committed. The amendment, therefore,
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Aye 36 30 1 3 11 3 5 1 6
No 57 36 1 5 13 6 5 6 0
TABLE 6.9 Scottish Voting by Occupation
Total Scot Misc.2
, " Professions1 White Business3 Forces Workers Unknown
vote vote „ ,.Collar
Aye 36 30 5 18 3 1 1 2
No 57 36 9 12 5 2 4 4
includes medics,, advocates, solicitors, university academics
2Includes teachers, civil servants, local government administrators,
trade union officials, journalists
3Includes directors and self-employed farmers.
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sought to restrict entry to those occasions when either the police had
a warrant or had been given the permission of the club secretary.
Malcolm Rifkind also emphasised the differences between a pub and
a club. He proposed his own amendment to allow uniformed police to
enter a club without a warrant only if there was reason to believe that
the time that would elapse before such a warrant oould be detained
would prevent the enforcement of the law. Similarly, David Steel sup¬
ported the principle of the amendments, pointing out that a club had
control over its membership in a way that, a pub did not have over its
customers. It was wrong, he felt, to penalise long established bona
fide clubs when the real problem lay in controlling the miushroaming of
clubs which were not genuine.
With the weight of parliamentary opinion firmly against him,
Harry Ewing was forced to concede the Government's position, Garment¬
ing that 'it is a wise Minister who knows when he is on a loser' ,80
It was suggested that if all the amendments were withdrawn, the
Government would undertake to reinstate the original clause requiring
a police officer to obtain a warrant before entry.
Tarn DalyelL (Lab. West Lothian) , however, questioned the cause of
the Government's change of mind of the issue:
'I was a bit disconcerted by what was apparently a
fairly sudden decision by the Government to change
their mind on the issue of police supervision of
clubs. Why was that change made?' .8 -
A],though Harry Ewing never spelt out the reasons to the House it would
appear that it was a direct result of pressure from the club lebby.
Dennis Canavan later revealed that both he and Harry Ewing had attended
a meeting at cue of the Miners 1 Welfare Clubs in his constituency to
discuss same of the issues in the legislation affecting clubs. The
club had made out a strong case to which Canavan was sympathetic, that
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a club was essentially private, whereas a pub was public. Hcwever,
it was not only the Scottish clubs that were concerned about police
entry provisions, but also the English clubs as well. He indicated
that around this time the clubs in the North of England were lobby¬
ing their MPs extremely hard on the issue of police entry without
warrant. Mr. Canavan claimed that it was the three-way pressure frcm
himself, Northern English MPs and the clubs which was responsible for
the Government's reversal on the clause.
Harry Ewing confirmed later that this had been the case. The
reversal of the Government's position had not unduly perturbed him
though, since he was not sure that licensing legislation was the most
appropriate place for such a clause to be, feeling that it might be
better placed elsewhere. As far as his ccnment that 'it is a wise
Minister who kncws when he is on a loser' was concerned, he simply
felt it would have been futile to have laboured the point any fur¬
ther, as to have done so, in the face of inevitable defeat, would
only have led to a loss of Ministerial credibility.
What was the police reaction to this? What did they think of
the argument, as presented in Parliament, that police entry as of
right would have been an intrusion of privacy? The ACPO(S) spokesman,
Supt. Bowman was nothing if not forthright. 'A lot of balls I', he
responded unequivocally. He said that vhen a considerable proportion
of licensed premises in Scotland were registered clubs it was illogi¬
cal that the police should be denied entry as of right in order to
carry out their function of supervision. 'The police are required
by law to supervi.se so why should we not get into clubs?' he opined.82
His contention was that the measure concerning police entry was taken
out due largely to MPs whose 'idea and vision of a club was one of
plush leather armchairs, velveteen wallpaper and a haze of cigar
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smoke. They simply failed to grasp the reality of the nature of
scare clubs in Scotland'.83 Despite the clause being defeated, Supt.
Bowman remained philosophical. Hie police were allowed their full
say on the matter, but their reccrrnendation had been rejected. There
was no resentment about this because it was fully understood that was
hew the parliamentary process operated. 'In any case' , he mused,
' the police survive without the clause1.811
In answer to Tarn Dalyell's question then, the Government changed
their mind on the issue principally because of the weight of the club
lcbby and their effectiveness in mobilising widespread support for
their cause among MPs. The clubs, through their representations, were
successful in getting across their point concerning the fundamental
difference between a club and a pub. Further, with the strength of
the North-East England MPs thrown in with the prevailing Scots major¬
ity, the Government's chances of carrying the clause on a free vote
were non-existent. In addition, while the police would have welcomed
right of entry, it was not a provision of sufficient importance for
them to make any strong stand. They simply acknowledged that they
had been listened to, accepted the deliberations of Parliament and
resolved to operate within the confines of the old law, a law with
which they were already familiar.
The Bill proceeded to an immediate and formal Third Beading which
gave the opportunity for a number of brief summary statements before
the Bill was passed to the Lords. Harry Ewing in his winding up speech
remarked - 'I used to describe myself as the "Three D's Minister" -
divorce, devolution and drink. The divorce Bill is on the statute
bock, the drink Bill is on its way to another place and I should be
grateful if hen. Members could give me. the hat-trick'.85 As fate would
have it though, he was never to score his third goal.
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The Bill was brought from the Camions to the Lords and given a
First Beading on the 28th July. However, it was not until two months
later, on the 29th September, that the Bill was read a Second Time
and coimitted to a Public Bill Ccnmittee. The Lords concerned them¬
selves with technical drafting amendments and only two issues stand
out as being worthy of note.
The first concerned the schedule added by the Commons which
placed restrictions upon the granting of Sunday licences which Lord
Guest described as 'unduly restrictive, unnecessary, and really an
insult to Scotland'.86 Lord Kirkhill (Minister of State, Scottish
Office) pointed out, however, that 'there is a question of judgement
and a matter of opinion as to hew far a reforming Bill should be tot¬
ally radical' „87 The safeguards in Schedule 4 ■were designed to pro¬
tect against undue disturbance or public nuisance in a locality, for
instance the opening of a public house on the ground floor of a tene¬
ment property. Lord Guest, hewever, took the view that it was unfair
that an applicant who was considered suitable to have his premises
open on weekdays should have to surmount a further obstacle to open
his premises on a Sunday. By a narrow margin of 8 votes to 6 Lord
Guest's amendment was agreed to, which had the effect of removing
Schedule 4 from the Bill. Although an attempt was made by Lord
Kirkhill to reintroduce it on Report, their Lordships again over-ruled
it.
The second concerned the right of police entry to clubs. In
accordance with the undertaking given by the Government, a new clause
similar in terms to those of Section 159 of the 1959 Act was introdu¬
ced on Report. It was evident though that a number of their lordships
were not happy with this state of affairs. Emphasis was placed on the
strength of feeling that there should be equality of treatment in the
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question of inspections and the rights of police entry in any licensed
premises. The Lords were on the verge of rejecting the clause when it
was pointed out to them that if they did so the Camions would not have
the opportunity to discuss the amendment since procedurally it could
not be reintroduced. This would have created a number of difficulties
since the Government had already given the undertaking to restore the
provision to its original form of police entry by warrant. So through
'a generous gesture of the Lords',88 as Baroness Eliot put it, the new
clause was allowed to stand.
The Bill was given a formal Third Reading on 2nd November and was
returned to the Camions where the Lord's amendments were considered
the following day. As was to be expected the debate centred upon the
Lord's removal of the safeguards of Schedule 4. Bruce Millan pointed
out that there was a general acceptance, both by those who were in
favour of Sunday opening and those who were against, that if Sunday
opening was to be permitted it would be necessary to write certain
safeguards into the Bill. These safeguards, he stressed, were related
solely to inconvenience and were not related specifically to the stan¬
dards of the licensed premises themselves. Malcolm Rifkind also accep¬
ted the principle that different circumstances can and should be applied
to Sundays as compared with other times of the week. However, J. P.
Mackintosh found the arguments presented 'singularly 'unconvincing and
even muddled'. He remarked, 'I find it a particularly odious bit of
old fashioned sanctimonious Presbyterianism for people to suggest that
we want two standards - one for Sundays and one for the rest of the
week'.89 Robin Cock reminded him though, that the interests of a
great many people who live in tenements incorporating a public house
have to be protected. He was less than amused that the safeguards for
such persons had been removed by the Lords:
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'It is not open to us in this debate to question the
constitutional arrangements ... but pertinent questions
about a two-chamber system are raised by a situation in
which this House, after prolonged debate, arrives at a
balanced compromise only to see it destroyed by another
place, which clearly was not listening to our debate' .9 0
Further, he suggested that the Lords who participated in the Licensing
debates ' lacked comprehension of the way in which working people live
in an urban environment in Scotland' .
It is interesting hcwever, to contrast, the viewpoint of Robin
Cock on the Lords with that of the man who was responsible for bring¬
ing the licensing issue to the fore, Dr. Clayson. The good Doctor
was moved to comment;
'you will find that as far as regards grammar, syntax,
logical form, impartial analysis, not to mention
discoverable meaning, the speeches of their noble
Lordships in the upper House (of whatever political
party) are far in advance, of the verbiage frcm the
Commons. And what is more their ncfole Lordships
have time to do their homework I.'91
Two very divergent views indeed. Whatever the merits of their
ncble Lordships the relevant section of the schedule was restored to
the Bill and the Sunday safeguards retained. With that the passage
of the Scottish licensing legislation through Parliament drew to a
close. All that remained was the formality of the Royal Assent.
VI. The Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976: Implementation and
Interpretation.
The Licensing Bill received the Royal Assent on 15th November
1976 and its main provisions came into effect through a Cammenoement
Order on 13th December 1976, with the exception of Sunday opening
which had to be delayed until July 1977 for administrative reasons.
The reaction to the new law was as expected. On the one hand, the
trade in general was pleased about the new freedoms and relaxations
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they had gained. Ch the other, the churches predictably expressed
reservations about the effect of Sunday opening on family life, and
about the possibility of increased alcchol abuse as a result of longer
opening hours. In a press release issued in September 1977, the
Church of Scotland was concerned at the large number of applications
from public house cwners for Sunday licences and extended hours. The
statement urged congregations to lodge objections with the Licensing
Boards wherever there were suitable grounds to oppose the granting of
extended drinking time. The Rev. Harry Gibson, convener of the Social
Responsibility Committee's Working Party on Alcoholism commented:
'It is our belief that in many areas of Scotland,
extention of the licensing hours will undoubtedly
cause undue disruption or public nuisance'.92
The Church was taking the only rearguard action left open to it, given
that Sunday opening was a fait accompli' - to actively encourage objec¬
tions to Sunday licences and to provide would-be objectors with infor¬
mation on hew to object.
Reservations of a very different kind came frcm another source -
Dr. Clayson. Writing in an article he stated:
"The role of licensing has changed. Its role new
is to mitigate the evils we all see by reducing
the pressure to drink; by improving the quality
of leisure; by discouraging drinking as an end
in itself; and by encouraging moderate drinking
as a part of seme other social activity. The
new Scottish legislation will, from an adminis¬
trative point of view, discard much that was
obsolete and promote much that is wise in the
practice of licensing; but in view of its limita¬
tions, will not have the full social impact on
drinking habits for which we had heped',93
As opposed to the Church's reservations which were based on the
belief that the Act was much too liberal; Dr. Clayson's were based on
the belief that the Act was not liberal enough. However, at this
stage in 1977 nobody quite realised the way in which the legislation
was lestined to develop. Through the novel interpretation of Section
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64 concerning the regular extension of hours, a situation was to
arise where all day opening of pubs became possible. By applying for
a regular extension of afternoon hours frcm 2.30 p.m. to 5 p.m. it
was possible for a licensee to keep his premises open from 11 a.m. to
11 p.m. Thus, the 'all day pub' arrived, as it were, by the back door
and in an ironical way one of Dr. Clayson's most important recamienda-
tions was fulfilled.
Just how widely appreciated was the possible interpretation of
that clause? It would seem frcm the evidence gathered that knowledge
of the possible use to which the Section could be put was not that
widespread. Ihe Secretary of State at the time, Bruce Millan, indica¬
ted that it was never envisaged that such an interpretation would be
placed upon the Clause. He remarked 'the original idea was for it to
be confined to tourist areas and the like - it was not intended to be
applied in as wide a manner as it has been'.9 4 The Opposition spokes¬
man of the period Alick Buchanan-Smith also suggested that 'ncbody
could be sure of the way in which licensing boards would interpret
that clause' ,95 Likewise, Malcolm Rifkind said that it was certainly
not intended to have regular extensions in the manner that new pre¬
vails. While there was no doubt that the clause was being misinter¬
preted, it was not causing undue Ministerial concern in the Scottish
Office since it had not created any significant problems. This was
also confirmed by the police who indicated that the provision had not
caused them any problems, although the issue was being kept under re¬
view. Supt. Bowman commented that as the regular extensions were
granted on a yearly basis, this temporary grant was in many ways
advantageous as it assisted licensing boards and the police in the
supervision and control of premises.
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Although the implications of the Section were not widely under¬
stood, there were certain organisations and individuals who did see
hew the provision could be utilised. Harry Ewing, for instance, in
his dealings with the SLTA over the question of afternoon opening,
warned them at the time 'that smart lawyers would be able to see hew
Clause 64 could be interpreted'.96 A spokesman for the Law Society
also indicated that 'they were aware that certain "abuses" would be
possible in relation to the clause'.97 Mast significantly though,
the Brewers seem to have been aware of the possibilities. A Scottish
and Newcastle Breweries director, Mr. Alistair Mcwat, said that the
company undertook 'a leading role post-76'. "The liberalisation
process', he remarked, 'gathered steam frcm late 1976 throughout 1977
to early 1978'.98 Initially there was the extra hour extension in
late 1976, then came Sunday opening in late 1977, followed in early
1978 by the first issue of regular afternoon extensions. S and N, he
indicated, were at. the forefront of these developments, being the
first company to go for extended hours, 'S and N set the precedent,
having pursued the law with vigour'.9 9
How successful then, has the new legislation been? In terms of
all day opening the picture is somewhat uneven .in that the different
interpretations of the law by the various Local licensing boards has
produced a 'patchwork quilt' effect throughout Scotland. Essentially
it has been the main conurbations which, have, taken advantage of the
all day opening provision, while licensing boards in the rural areas
have been more conservative and cautious in their granting of exten¬
sions.100 This lack, of uniformity has prompted the SL1A, rather
ironically, to make representations to have all day opening introduced
across the board.
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On the question of the evening extension of licensing hours
involving the additional hour opening until 11 p.m., early evidence
from the Scottish Office is both favourable and encouraging.101
The SHHD undertook a research survey with the co-operation of Scottish
and Newcastle Braveries and Tenent Caledonian Breweries, to monitor
the change in consumption patterns before and after the introduction
of the new Act. The survey involved monitoring the till readings in
a sample of licensed premises to measure differences in drinking pat¬
terns which could be attributable to the changes in the law. The
licensed premises in the sample were asked to record their till read¬
ings at specified times for each day of the week over three week per¬
iods before (November 1976) and after (March 77) the change in the
licensing laws. The conclusion reached ran as follows:
'From this survey of cash takings in licensed premises
there appears to be evidence that the extension of
permitted hours has produced a more relaxed pattern
of drinking. In bars remaining open until 11.00 p.m.
there has been a significant reduction in the habitual
increase in consumption just before closing time.
These results are repeated for each day of the week
and for bars in different neighbourhood locations,
that is town centre, country or housing estate. The
findings of the survey must, however, be treated with
sate caution since it has not been possible to verify
that the sample is representative of all bars in
Scotland'.10*
Clearly with only limited evidence available it is inadvisable to
make any profound pronouncements on the implications and effects of
the 1976 Act. It is still very early days, since an issue such as
this involving changing social attitudies and mores can take years,
decades or even generations to take full effect. Yet as far as can be
judged at present the Act can be deemed a reasonable success. Here
David Peck has observed that 'predictions of large increases in alcohol
consumption after the relaxation of Scottish drinking laws have so far
proved unfounded'.103 And Martin Plant has also noted cautiously that
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the extra drinking time leads 'not to an increase in alcohol consump¬
tion, but to a slower, more relaxed, rate of drinking'.104
As one member of the Clayson Ccmmittee responded with tongue
ever so slightly in cheek, when asked his feelings on his role in
helping to create a more relaxed environment, 'one would like to
think one is fostering the progress of civilisation'„10 5
VII. Conclusion
At the end of each case study certain conclusions will be drawn
which pertain to the case. Here, and at the end of the divorce study
(Chapter 8) and the hcmosexuality study (Chapter 9) , a short section
will pull together sane of the main themes which have arisen. So
that these conclusions may be compared in Chapter 10, they will, as
far as circumstances permit, follow a common format. It has to be
borne in mind though, that as each case brings to the fore different
types of issues and considerations, the emphasis in each conclusion
may vary. Nevertheless, in order to make these comparisons in the
final chapter, each conclusion will address itself to the following
standardised questions. These questions are by no means exhaustive,
but are offered merely as a means to initiate, discussion.
1. What was the context of the reform?
2. What were the pressures for and against change? What was the
role of pressure groups, especially the Church, Law and Medicine?
3. What was the role of governments, both Labour and Conservative?
How did they react to pressures? What were their responses over
time?
4. How did party politics affect the issue?
5. What was the role of individual MPs? How did they assess the
issue? How did they speak and vote? Who was influential and why?
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6. Did parliamentary procedure help or hinder change in any way?
How was the Scottish Grand Carmittee used?
7. What was public opinion on the issue? How did it change over
time? Along what lines did it divide? Which categories of
opinion were predariinant?
8. How did the values of those making the decisions affect the
outcare? What part did the "assumptive world' of the policy¬
maker play? What kinds of cultural factors influenced those
values?
9. What comparisons can be made with England? What were the
similarities or differences in policy content and similarities
or differences in enactment?
10o What was the 'Scottish dimension'?
In the last chapter the social and historical context of drink
control in Scotland was discussed at some length and it is against
this background that the licensing reform ultimately has to be under¬
stood. It was argued that Scotland not only had a history of
separate licensing legislation from England and Wales, but that as
a nation it also had its own distinctive attitude towards the place
of alcchol in society. This attitude was based on an ambivalence
which on the one hand saw alcchol as a dangerous and addictive drug
and on the other as a requisite for sociability and hospitality. It
was at one and the same tine both condemned and approved. Further,
it was suggested that this ambivalent attitude was one of the mani¬
festations of Scotland's 'cultural neurosis', a feature of its
'cultural sub-nationalism' which had developed historically. Hie
legacy of this 'neurosis' was to leave contemporary Scotland with a
very much higher proportion of people with alcchol related problems
than England and Wales.
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A factor which contributed to this high level of alcohol problems
was restrictive licensing. The Guest Report suggested scne pieceneal
alterations to the law in the early 1960s, but by the end of the decade
more widespread reforms were being demanded. The licensing trade and
the tourist organisations advocated a relaxation in the laws to ease
the pressures to drink. Their concern though stemmed as much from an
interest in commercial gain as it did from any social conscience.
The Clayson Committee, set up in 1971 to review Scottish licensing
law, received more than 150 written submissions. The major bodies -
the churches, the law and imedicine were split in their recommendations.
The Church of Scotland firmly opposed any relaxation in licensing
hours, especially on a Sunday, whereas the Raman Catholic Church in
Scotland thought a more relaxed approach to consumption would be for
the common good. The legal, profession tended to avoid making any
dramatic statements either way on the issue. The Law Society of
Scotland confined its comments to technical issues such as vicarious
responsibility, although the Faculty of Advocates, while still couch¬
ing its arguments in legalistic terminology, did come out rather more
strongly in favour of liberalisation. The medical profession remained
equivocal. The Scottish Council of the British Medical Association,
the Institute of Psychiatry, and the Royal Colleges of Physicians and
Surgeons in Edinburgh and Glasgow could not substantiate an opinion
on the effect of licensing laws on the misuse of alcchol because of a
lack of reliable evidence. They did, however, warn that problem drink¬
ing and alcoholism increased as alcchol became more available and for
this reason some form of external control over the availability of
drink should remain.
The range of other organisations urging liberal reform was varied.
The Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland), the Association
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of County Councils in Scotland, the four city Corporations and the
Scottish Trades Union Council, as well as the more obvious bodies
within the licensing trade itself, and in tourism and commerce, all
generally favoured a more liberal approach to licensing hours.
Opposition to any relaxation came mainly from the various Scottish
Free Churches, the temperance movements and other assorted Christian
groupings.
At this point in the evolution of policy recommendations, consul¬
tation between organisations and the Clayson Committee (based in the
Scottish Office) were along formalised lines and communications were
for the most, part good. This was especially true for those groups
with a high. ' status! in the community who were granted virtually
automatic participation both when the Committee was sitting and in its
immediate aftermath.
While no formal group alliances were formed there seems little
doubt that the broad support of diverse groups for certain proposals,
for example the extension of evening closing time to a later hour,
greatly influenced (and strengthened) the Committee's ultimate recom¬
mendations .
With the exception of the Educational Institute of Scotland which
had a squabble over the wider implications of its submission, indivi¬
dual organisations submitting views to the Committee appear to have
been able to resolve their internal disputes to the satisfaction of
any dissenters so as to allcw clear and precise .recommendations to
stand as the view of that particular organisation. However, there
is sorme evidence to suggest disputes between different organisations
with a common background or similar cause. Take for example the dis¬
pute within the licensing trade over extra hours; the Brewers'
Association of Scotland were wholeheartedly in favour, but the
288
National Association of Licensed House Managers and the Scottish
Licensed Trade Association, whose members would have to implement
those house, were rather more reticent and looked for assurances in
working conditions and pay. This was more or less a 'management-
union confrontation' within the trade itself. Consider also the
dispute between ACPO(S) and the Police Federation over the wisdom of
introducing an offence to cover the possession and consumption of
alcohol in a public place by a young person under age. Once again,
this time fran within the police, there, were two different perspectives
on the problem.
After the Clayson Report was published there was a short period
of a few months to allow formal comment on the Report to be submitted
to the Scottish Office. The views of the various organisations which
made further representations remained by and large consistent with
their previous positions. As one might expect those who opposed the
Report's recarmendations were rather more vociferous than those who
found the Report acceptable.
In the period 1974-75 pressure group activity was minimal, being
confined to those most closely involved in the subject like the SLTA,
since licensing at this time was not yet an issue on the political
agenda. It is interesting to note that Dr. Clayson felt obliged to
.involve himself in keeping the issue alive by courting the support of
the media. He therefore remained active in his role as Chairman of
the Committee.
Cnce the commitment to legislate was given by the Secretary of
State for Scotland in October 1975, pressure group activity picked up.
Perhaps the strangest example of lobbying came frcm the Strathclyde
Licensed Trade Association, who for seme bizarre, reason saw fit to
lobby both the Government and the Opposition with contrary proposals.
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Also there was the example of 'crude' lobbying by the Agnew organisa¬
tion which amounted to little more than an attempt at political black¬
mail. Further the Church of Scotland provided an example of the inef¬
fectiveness of late lobbying when it only made its representations on
Sunday opening of pubs after the decision had been taken. Cbviously
though, the effect different pressure groups had on individual decisions
varied. However, once again a particularly important factor in deter¬
mining a group's influence appeared to be its social standing and
political weight within the ccnrnunity since such status facilitated
participation in the consultation process.
The Conservative Ministers .in the Scottish Office in 1970 appeared
to react favourably to the pressures of the late 60s. According to
Alick Buchanan-Smith, an Under Secretary at the time, there was consid¬
erable concern inside, as well as outside the Scottish Office about
Scotland's drink problems. However, it should be noted that it was
not only Scottish pressure which led to the appointment of Clayson.
It had as much to do with the appointment of the Errol Committee in
England and Wales as anything else. And Errol itself was a product
of the findings of the Monopolies Commission Report in the late sixties
on the sale and supply of beer.
It was, of course, a Labour Administration which inherited the
Clayson Report in 1974. That they incorporated it into their legisla¬
tive programme in 1975 is indicative of the cross-party nature of the
subject. There is perhaps a little irony in this in so far as the
Labour ministerial team at the Scottish Office seemed to be more con¬
servative in their approach to liberalisation than their Conservative
predecessors might have been.
While party politics per se did not enter into the formal debates
because MPs were allowed to vote freely on the issue, there was,
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nonetheless, evidence of voting along party lines on certain issues,
especially in scare of the Standing Committee divisions. Fbr the most
part, though cross-party voting was evident and it oould be seen in
the division on the Sunday opening of pubs how the votes split:
Labour were divided and favoured opening by only one vote, while the
Conservatives were much more ooirmitted to the relaxation. With one
or two notable exceptions the Conservative Members generally seemed
to be much more receptive to a liberal licensing code than many of
their Labour counterparts. Perhaps this may have had something to do
with the fact that it was the Conservative Party which set up the
original Clayson enquiry.
The licensing issue generated a number of novel cross-party
alliances between individual MPs. Imagine for instance, Teddy Taylor
(Conservative), Donald Stewart (SNP), David Steel (Liberal) and Willie
Ross (Labour) all voting on the same side against the Sunday opening
of pubs. Or George Younger and Alex Fletcher (both Conservative)
dividing with Dennis Canavan and Neil Carmichael (both Labour) in
favour of Sunday opening.
Parliament and individual MPs then, had a rather more important
role to play in deciding upon policy options than the 'rubber stamp'
role with which they are usually associated when party political
matters involving the Whips are concerned. Several MPs made influen¬
tial contributions which affected the outcome of particular decisions.
For example, Malcolm Rifkind's eloquent argument in favour of the
Sunday opening of pubs was of considerable importance in getting that
amendment carried. Also, Dennis Canavan and Michael Clark Hutchison
featured prominently in the campaign to reverse the decision to allcw
the police unrestricted entry to private clubs. And the influential
contributions from J. P. Mackintosh, while not specific to any
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particular decision, were of immense importance in setting the tone
and widening the parameters of the debate.
That these men, or rather their arguments, prevailed over the
rearguard actions of Willie Ross and Teddy Taylor can probably be
attributed to the fact that they reflected the popular mood of
Scotland. Soots were tired of being what they perceived to be
'second-class citizens'. They were, after all, asking for no more
than England already possessed. Scotland was in a vibrant, energetic
and expectant mood in the mid-1970s. The prospect of devolution and
an Assembly lay ahead. That the Scots were no longer prepared to
tolerate the Calvinist orthodoxy towards drink was just one more mani¬
festation of a growing (albeit short-lived) self-assurance.
While the Licensing (Scotland) Bill was a government provision
it was also allowed a free vote. In parliamentary terms this is a
rather unusual combination. Since it was a government measure and
since the government controls (for the most part) business in the
House, licensing benefited from parliamentary time and a place on
the legislative agenda. Therefore, unlike the majority of other
issues involving free votes, it did not have to oDirpete in the lottery
for Private Members' time. The guarantee of time for adequate debate
gave the measure a distinct advantage in completing its legislative
passage (although a number of MPs were heard to carp about the ungodly
hour at which some of those debates took place!).
Once on the political agenda, the Licensing Bill seems to have
progressed smoothly along the well established path for Scottish legis¬
lation, although it was not without its points of controversy. Get¬
ting the issue on to the political agenda was a more contentious mat¬
ter. Both sides of the argument have already been reviewed and the
conclusion drawn that given the circumstances of the two 1974 Elections,
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the issue came up for consideration in a reasonable space of time.
Here the Scottish Grand Cormittee provided a useful forum for debat¬
ing the general principles and implications of the Clayson Report.
This debate in April 1975 helped to keep the issue to the fore and
also acted as a sounding board for Scottish parliamentary opinion.
That the Scottish Grand Committee was again used to take the Second
Reading of the Licensing Bill the following year further facilitated
its passage by removing it from the crowded timetable on the Floor
of the House. It will be interesting to consider in the final chap¬
ter what possibilities might exist for the Scottish Grand Committee
at the Report Stage of legislation progressing through Parliament.
Licensing was an issue which attracted much public interest.
This interest was widespread and varied as was demonstrated by the
range of submissions made to the Clayson Committee. The positions
and arguments of the various organisations submitting evidence have
already been well catalogued. Suffice to repeat here that the
' liberal' school of thought comprising the 1 trade1, tourist interests,
the police and various local authorities prevailed over the Church of
Scotland and the temperance lobby.
Public opinion, however, was not expressed only in formal submis¬
sions. Licensing was an issue which evoked popular appeal and there¬
fore was the subject of media exposure. The Scottish press in the
early and mid-seventies reported the divisions between the licensing
reformers and the Kirk and generally came down in favour of a more
relaxed approach to drinking. The 'Sunday Mail1 and 'Daily Record'
were especially Important in campaigning for legislative action, and
they were supported by 'The Scotsman' and the 'Glasgow Herald'.
Cpinion poll surveys on Scottish attitudes toward reform appear to
be rather scant in number, but one which did feature in the 'Glasgow
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Herald' of 6th and 7th October 1975 indicated that Scotland was in
favour of Sunday opening of pubs and extended hours in the evening
while being opposed to afternoon opening and the idea of 'family'
pubs. The Clayson Connaittee of course, had already expressed reser¬
vations about the reliability of poll material in its 1973 Report.
The way in which individual MPs assimilated information about
public opinion obviously varied according to their personal predilec¬
tions and values. So their 'assumptive worlds' played an important
part in the stances that were adopted and the decisions that were
reached. Clearly, Willie Ross was of central Importance in shaping
the initial legislation and there seems little doubt that his Church
of Scotland values were responsible for placing constraints upon many
of Clayson' s recommendations and especially for the emission of Sunday
pub opening frcm the original Bill. But since licensing was an issue
involving a free vote a number of Ross's restrictions came to be over¬
ruled by MPs whose values were more libertarian. These MPs, typified
by J. P. Mackintosh, viewed the licensing issue in a different pers¬
pective from their traditionalist counterparts. Reasons why the lib¬
eral view prevailed have already been postulated. However, it is
worth emphasising again that in these free votes the contribution of
individual MPs can be of great importance in determining policy out¬
come. And to explain why particular policies emerge as they do re¬
quires at least some understanding of the values and perceptions
policy-makers (in this case Scottish MPs) have of the problem and the
wider environment.
According to Young (Chapter 2) values are sustained by cultural
transmission. They can be influenced by class, ethnic, religious,
regional or familial diversities„ In the case of Scotland though,
it is not only important to identify such diversities as may prevail
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amongst Scots themselves, but also to identify whatever diversities
as may exist between Scotland and its neighbours south of the border,
England and Wales.
A comparison has revealed a number of things. Licensing law
has had a different history either side of the border, differing in
many of its procedures and legal technicalities as well as in some
of its principles. But not only have the laws been different, more
Importantly, rates of alcohol misuse and alcohol related problems
have varied dramatically with Scotland suffering a very much higher
proportion of such problems than England and Wales.
Both Clayson and Errol reviewed the state of the licensing laws
either side of the border in the early seventies. That a large mea¬
sure of the Clayson Report, was enacted while the Errol Report gathered
dust was probably due to the fact that the problem in Scotland was
seen to be much more urgent. Something had to be done to ease the
pressure to drink which many thought the restrictive laws had helped
to create. Further, there was a sense of grievance in Scotland that
the Scots were being treated unfairly by being denied advantages and
liberties which the English had enjoyed for many years. The dispari¬
ties were perceived as being yet another manifestation of the Scots
'second class citizenship".
'The conclusion then, comes full circle. The 'Scottish dimension*
in licensing policy, if it can be so described, lies in all of the
aspects discussed above. It lies in the independent Clayson enquiry,
in the interaction between Scottish pressure groups and the Scottish
Office, in the role of individual Scottish MPs, in the parliamentary
procedure for Scottish business, in Scottish public opinion, in the
values of those with the pcwer to influence policy, and above all,
in the social, and historical context of drink control in Scotland.
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Scotland's airbivalent attitude towards alcohol was a feature of the
historical development of 'cultural sub-nationalism'. And Scotland's
reform of its licensing law in the 1970s was a concomitant of its
increased self-awareness and its belief and expectation that its
'sub-nationalist' days were soon to be over.
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CHAPTER 7
Changing Attitudes to Divorce: The Fifties and Sixties
I. Introduction
The next two chapters will consider the issue of divorce reform,
examining comparative developments on either side of the border over
the last few decades. Divorce is an 'issue of conscience1 and this
will allcw us to look at the changing moral climate since the mid-
1950s. The purpose of this investigation is to ascertain how policy-
development on the divorce issue differed as regards Scotland and
England.
In Chapter 1 it was noted that Scotland, after the Union of 1707,
maintained its own legal system which, necessitated certain legislation
being framed in the idicm of Scots Law. It was also noted that since
that date Scotland has maintained its own 'civil society' even
although, the Scottish State was assimilated into the United Kingdom.
So while there had been an absorbtion in politics, there was still a
separation in social mores (although, as will be seen, even this dis¬
tinction was being eroded to some extent by the transmission of cul¬
tural values from the metropolitan south). Scotland, then, manifested
a strange political ambivalence whereby it could be both dependent and
independent within the wider British political system. It is this
unique ambivalence that we shall explore through this particular case
study.
Further, Chapter 2 outlined approaches to policy-making which,
it was suggested, would be relevant and applicable to our case studies.
For instance, it will be seen hew, since it is dependent on a changing
moral climate, policy development in ' issues of conscience1 can often
be incremental in style. Moreover, this chapter will try to highlight
the theme that policy-making is both an intellectual activity and an
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institutional process and that this is particularly true of 'issues
of conscience'. In these moral areas not only must thinking (espec¬
ially amongst a small nunfoer of influential policy-makers) be for
the most part harmonious, but also institutionally there must be an
opportunity which is conducive to initiating debate and enacting a
legislative reform.
Control of the political agenda is thus an important factor in
the success or failure of a particular measure. In this study on
divorce it can be seen how the Government, because of its 'official¬
ity', 'authority' and 'legitimacy', and in spite of its stated 'neu¬
trality' when 'issues of conscience' are at stake, could, through its
control over the parliamentary timetable, affect the outcome of
English divorce reform. Ihe study also allows us to examine what
values were involved in policy formulation and how these evolved over
time.
Section II of this chapter briefly sets out the philosophical
perspective on divorce before Section III traces the history of div¬
orce law reform frcm pre-Reformation times to the mid-20th century
in both England and Scotland. Section IV takes up the discussion in
the 1950s as divorce law reform began to emerge as a moral, social
and political issue. Here it is suggested the demise of Eirene
White's reform Bill in the 1950-51 Parliamentary Session displays
seme of the characteristics of a 'ncn-decision'. The Morton Commis¬
sion on divorce reform which applied to both England and Scotland is
outlined and its ineffectual reccnimendations criticised.
Section V then comprises the main comparative developments in
divorce law reform on either side of the border. In Part (a) the
Archbishop's Group and its publication "Putting Asunder1 is discussed
along with the Law Ccarimission's commentary on it, 'The Field of Choice'.
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These papers were the basis upon which English law was subsequently
reformed. The 'polities' of the English Divorce Reform is discussed
under the sub-heading 'Parliamentary Activity' and this charts the
progress of the unsuccessful Wilson Reform Bill in 1968 and the suc¬
cessful passage of the Jones Bill in the following Session 1968-69.
The iirportance of gaining tacit Government assistance in the form of
additional parliamentary tine becomes apparent at this point. Also
highlighted here is the importance of the unremitting efforts of Leo
Abse in steering the Bill through Parliament.
In Part (b) Scottish developments are examined and similarities
and contrasts drawn against the English experience. What emerges
from this examination is that Scotland appears for the most part to
have followed in the wake of the English debate, as far as the prin¬
ciples of divorce were concerned. The Report of the Scottish Law
Commission, 'Divorce: The Grounds Considered', is outlined here.
The Scottish Law Commission which 'shadowed' its English counterpart
more or less adopted its main recommendations, revising them only to
meet the technical, requirements of Scots Law. The role of the Church
of Scotland is then considered. Stimulated by the activity in England,
the Church of Scotland, after a Working Group had studied the issue
carefully, came out with what was to be the most radical proposal of
all -separation for a continuous period of two years, consequent upon
a decision of at least one of the partners not to live with the other,
should act as the so'ie evidence of marriage breakdown. In the space
of a decade the Church had shifted its thinking on divorce on to rad¬
ically different ground.
At this juncture In the late sixties English proposals went on
to become law while Scottish proposals never got off the ground. In
drawing this section to a close the attitude of the Scottish Office
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is examined and compared with the Heme Office. Some of the prophetic
statements that appeared in Parliament about the fate of Scottish
divorce reform are then noted and, together with the concluding
remarks, they serve as a prelude to the next chapter on the Scottish
divorce issue in the 1970s.
II. Philosophical Perspective
Divorce is one of those issues which, as well as embodying social
and political considerations, raises fundamental religious and moral
questions. Lord Gorrell, chairman of the 1912 Royal Commission on
Divorce, put it succinctly:
"the questions raised on the inquiry touch not merely
upon human laws and institutions, but upon matters
which are affected by religious beliefs and opinions,
and are regarded by very many as concerned with man's
spiritual welfare as well as with, his social conditions'.1
One problem lies in the varied ecclesiastical doctrines on the
subject of marriage and its dissolution. Views differ not only
between denominations but in some instances also within churches.
Gorrell's contention was that such divergence was illogical:
'all (Christian) churches have identically the same
sources from which to draw their conclusions; and
although there is a whole world of literature upon
the subject, the original materials on which the
question depends are extremely limited. If these
materials in the Old and New Testaments are exam¬
ined without partiality or preconceived inclination
to arrive at one result rather than another, and
with adequate regard as to the origin of these
materials, there ought to be no reason for such
wide diversity of opinion'.2
The result of such diversity in religious opinion was to dirminish
its sphere of influence:
'questions relating to marriage and divorce affect
all the inhabitants of this country, whether they
are believing Christians, nominal Christians, or
do not belong to any Christian church, and the
Legislature cannot allow its consideration of these
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questions, even in a country in which the larger
proportion of the inhabitants are Christians, or
nominally such, to be limited by the views expres¬
sed by representatives of Christian churches,
especially where so much difference exists between
them'.3
From these various religious interpretations of the Scriptures
three basic, but different principles have emerged:
1. that marriage is indissoluble;
2. that marriage is dissoluble on the ground of adultery;
3. that marriage is dissoluble for such grave causes as render
joint married life actually or practically impossible.
It is against the background of these moral principles concerning
relations between the sexes, and the progressively changing conceptions
of their utility, that secular divorce law has evolved historically.
III. Historical Developnent
While serious breach of the obligations involved in matrimony
has always been regarded as constituting a legal as well as a moral
wrong, the historical development of divorce law differs quite mark¬
edly between Scotland and England.
In Pre-Reformation England all matters relating to marriage and
its dissolution lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Ecclesiastical Courts, with an appeal from their decisions to Rome.
The Church at that time held that a valid marriage between Christians
was indissoluble and so the only 'divorce' possible was divorce 'a
mensa et thoro' (from board and bed) which in effect was only the
equivalent of a judicial separation. Hcwever, there was a system of
effecting complete separation by means of decrees of nullity, the
grounds for which were numerous. These, in effect, declared a union
not to have been a valid marriage because of seme basic impediment
which existed at the time the supposed marriage took place.
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Immediately prior to the Reformation, the first Acts dealing
with particular marriages were those related to Henry VIII and during
his reign relations between Church and State were placed on a fresh
basis, the Crown being treated as the supreme authority in both
Church and State.
After the Reformation there seems to have been seme irregularity
in the operation of the divorce laws. The ecclesiastical law as to
divorce remained unchanged by statute with only decrees 'a mensa et
thoro' which recognised separation but did not permit remarriage.
However, it appears in the years immediately after the Reformation
people, not infrequently, regarded themselves as entitled bo re-marry
after, and sometimes even without, a divorce 'a mensa et thoro'.
Subsequently though, it came to be recognised that without a private
Act a valid marriage could not be dissolved. The pattern was set in
1697 when Parliament agreed to pass a Private Bill which gave the
Earl of Macclesfield an absolute divorce from the Countess and from
the end of the 17th Century Acts of Parliament dissolving marriage
became increasingly frequent, although it must be added only among
the monied classes. The process was both slow and expensive and over
the period 1715 to 1852 the total number of dissolutions amounted to
only 244.
The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, based on the Report of the
Royal Commission of .1850-53, abolished the jurisdiction of the
Ecclesiastical Courts and set up a new state Court for Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes. The most important provision of the Act was the
introduction of the petition for the dissolution of marriage. Absolute
divorce - divorce ' a vinculo matrimonii' - was to be granted on the
same, basis as had applied in private divorce legislation, i.e. adult¬
ery by a wife and aggravated adultery by a husband. This legislation
.306
had the effect of giving lesser rights to wives than to husbands.
A further review of the divorce law was carried out by the Royal
Ccmmission of 1909-12 which effectively set out and analysed the
cpposing points of view on the issue. Hie Report was not unanimous,
but the majority reccrrmended that sexual inequality should be elimin¬
ated as regards the grounds cn which a divorce might be obtained and
that the grounds for divorce should be expanded to include desertion
for more than three years; cruelty; incurable insanity; habitual
drunkenness found incurable after three years from first order of
separation; and imprisonment under commuted death sentence.
The War intervened to prevent early action on the Report. How¬
ever, in the post-war years with the enfranchisement of women, an Act
in 1923 gave them equal rights in the sphere of matrimonial law allow¬
ing them to claim divorce on the same grounds as men, i.e. adultery.
A quarter of a century was to elapse before any of the main re¬
commendations of the Gorrell Commission were given legislative effect.
In 1937 a Private Member's Bill, sponsored by A. P. Herbert, introdu¬
ced desertion for three years and upwards, cruelty and incurable in¬
sanity as additional grounds for divorce.
In sum then, up until 1857 divorce, in common law as well as
ecclesiastical law, and in practice, remained essentially unrecognised
except through private Acts of Parliament which were the preserve of
the wealthy. In the years 1858 to 1937 adultery remained the princi¬
pal ground of divorce in England and Wales.
Ihe development of the divorce law in Scotland presents a marked
contrast. Admittedly before the Reformation in Scotland, as in
England, jurisdiction in matrimonial, matters rested with the Eccles¬
iastical Courts. Decrees of divorce granted by those courts did not,
in any sense sever the marriage bond, being in effect decrees of
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judicial separation. Hcwever, after the Reformation, both adultery
and desertion became recognised as grounds for dissolution of marri¬
age. With the introduction of divorce .in 1560 no distinction was
made between the sexes in respect of the grounds on which divorce
could be obtained. From that tine until 1938 the grounds for divorce
remained unchanged. Scottish practice was therefore much more lib¬
eral than that which prevailed south of the Border.
The dissolution of marriage on the grounds of adultery was not
formally introduced into Scotland by statute, but irmediately after
the Reformation the courts held it to be the law of the country.
The courts appear to have adopted a similar attitude as regards des¬
ertion, only in this case wilful desertion as a ground for the dis¬
solution of marriage was confirmed by statute .in 1573, four years
being fixed as the minimum period during 'which the desertion must
subsist.
The Westminster Confession of Faith was adopted by the Church of
Scotland in 1647 and ratified by Act of Parliament of Scotland in
1690. Chapter 24 was headed "Of Marriage and Divorce' and Articles
5 and 6 ran;
'In the case of adultery after marriage, it is
lawful for the innocent party to seek out a
divorce and, after the divorce, to marry another,
as if the offending party were dead.... (N)othing
but adultery, or such wilful desertion as can no¬
way be remedied by the Church or Civil Magistrate,
is cause sufficient of dissolving the bond of
marriage, wherein a publick and orderly course of
proceeding is to be observed...'
After the Reformation divorce jurisdiction passed into the hands
of the Coimiissary Court of Edinburgh with appeal to the Court of
Session, and on abolition of this jurisdiction, by the Court of
Session Act 1830, exclusive jurisdiction in divorce became vested in
the Court of Session, where it has since remained.
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For almost four centuries then, the law of Scotland was more lib¬
eral and in advance of the law as it stood in England. It was not
until the Acts of 1937 and 1938 that the law on both sides of the
border came more closely into line. The 1937 Matrimonial Causes Act,
applicable in England and Wales, and the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1938,
applicable north of the border, while maintaining the traditional dif¬
ferences in legal practice, set out roughly comparable grounds upon
which divorce might be granted - adultery; desertion for at least 3
years; cruelty; incurable insanity; and sodcmy or bestiality.
IV. The Emergence of the Divorce. Issue in the 1950s
Richards has pinpointed the forerunner of the contemporary debate
on divorce law reform as the Bill promoted by Mrs. Eirene White (Lab.
East Flint) in the 1950-51 parliamentary session. The measure sought
to allow divorce in cases where a couple had lived apart for seven
years, even where one party to the marriage objected. This introdu¬
ced a whole new set of principles into divorce. No longer would the
concept of matrimonial offence be the sole ground for divorce. In¬
stead, the concept of the breakdown of marriage was introduced.
Where it was clear that a marriage was dead, society was asked to
accept the fact without seeking to classify the spouses into guilty
and innocent parties. Introducing her Bill, Mrs. White stated:
"The social purpose of this Bill is to meet the
situation in which many thousands of men and
women are living apart: in a state which is not.
marriage, in any full sense of that word, but
in which they are unable legally to form another
union or to establish a normal heme life'.5
The fate of this Bill though, was to illustrate the way in which
an issue can be removed from the political agenda and in a number of
ways it manifested, the characteristics of non-decision-making discussed
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in Chapter 3. As Richards has noted, 'the Labour Government at this
stage had but a negligible majority in the Cormions and decided to
avoid the issue by the traditional delaying device of a Royal Conmis-
sion'.6
The Attorney-General of the period, Sir Hartley Shawcross propo¬
sed:
'that the best way of dealing with the present
proposals in the long run, the way which would
arouse least bitterness of religious or parti¬
san conflict, would be to recommend the appoint¬
ment of a Royal Ccttmission to study the whole
field of our marriage laws, rather than to
attempt, at this stage, perhaps insufficiently
considered legislation dealing piecemeal with
one aspect or another of what, is, in. fact, a
very wide problem' . 7
Although emphasising the Government's neutrality, he pointed out
that to take a vote on the Bill 'would inevitably tend gravely to
prejudice any subsequent inquiry'.8 Despite the Second Reading being
carried by a clear majority of 131 to 60 votes, it was apparent from
the Government's attitude that there was little hope of the Bill be¬
coming law, so Mrs. White was to withdraw her Bill in return for the
promise of the Royal Commission.
The ensuing Commission, whose remit included both England and
Scotland, sat for four years and was headed by Lord Morton. The
Report, published in 1956, was however, in the words of Professor
Richards, 'an undistinguished document'. He oonmented:
'Not merely did the Corrmissioners fail to agree but
they took no steps to initiate research into their
problem. For them the collection of evidence meant
the collection of opinions. Their method of proceed¬
ing was wholly that of the nineteenth century.
Either the Commission knew nothing of social science
or they believed it had nothing to offer them' .9
An even more scathing attack on the Report came from 0. R.
McGregor who described it in 1957 as a 'souffld of whipped conjectures'.10
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He criticised the composition of the Committee which lacked any recog¬
nised professional social scientist. This, he suggested, went far in
explaining the character of the Report. The Commission's terms of
reference required it to consider the desirability of changes in the
law and its administration according to the criterion of the need to
promote and maintain healthy and happy married life and to safeguard
the interests and well being of children. McGregor argued:
'This criterion imposed the inescapable obligation to
consider the causes and social consequences of divorce,
and to assess the implications of changing attitudes
to marriage. No Corrmissioner possessed expert know¬
ledge of the considerable body of modem sociological
research on such topics, or was equipped with an under¬
standing of the techniques and potentialities of social
investigation developed during the last twenty years.
Lacking such essential assistance, the Morton Ccmmission
joined the Jumblies and went to sea in a sieve'.11
Further, he continued:
"Ihe prerequisite of fruitful social investigation is
the ability and willingness to formulate relevant
questions. Such capacity was not to be expected of
a Corrmission dominated by lawyers who, whilst paying
lip service to the need for judging proposals by the
test of the social good, are conditioned to define
both social problems and the social good in legal
terms. The Commission's Report is substantial evi¬
dence of its members' ignorance of the social sciences'.12
Here we can perhaps draw seme comparisons between the approach
of the Morton Ccmmission and the approach of the Clayson Carmittee
on Scottish Licensing Law which was discussed earlier in Chapter 5.
While the Morton Commission was criticised for not having the ability
or willingness to formulate relevant questions, a distinguishing fea¬
ture of the Clayson Committee was its enlightened, almost philosophi¬
cal, approach to its subject. Although composed of non-specialists,
the Clayson Committee membership nevertheless possessed a broad range
of professional skills which could be applied to the licensing issue.
In addition, the Committee utilised much relevant technical and stat¬
istical information in its efforts to work out the assumptions,
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principles and objectives by which it would operate. Thus, there are
marked contrasts .in the style of each Committee. Whereas Clayson
examined the issue of licensing in the context of other types of con¬
trol available to prevent the misuse of alcohol, Morton made no com¬
parable attempt to broaden the scope of the enquiry into the divorce
issue, failing, in McGregor's words, 'to assess the implications of
changing attitudes to marriage'.
The basis of the Morton Ccnmissicn' s analysis lay in its belief
that a great number of marriages were breaking up which in the past
would have held together. This was attributed to an increasing ten¬
dency to regard divorce, not as the last resort, but as the obvious
way out when things started to go wrong.
This analysis net with harsh criticism frcm McGregor as accepting
as self-evident truths the unverified conjectures of many 'institu-
tionalist' witnesses. He remarked that 'there is no doubt that the
Commission regards the break up of the middle class, mid-Victorian
family code as leading to the disintegration of the family' .13
The central issue then, which confronted the Commission was the
retention or abolition of the matrimonial offence as the basis of
divorce law. With one exception, lord Walker, the Ccmmission agreed
that the law based on the doctrine of matrimonial offence should be
retained. However, rather surprisingly in view of this declaration,
the Ccrrmission proceeded to divide into two main groups according to
their attitudes to proposals for extending the grounds for divorce.
The first group of nine resisted any extension of the law which would
admit the principle of the breakdown of marriage. They thought the
consequences of providing an "easy way out1 would be disastrous to
the stability of marriage.
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'If the principle that a marriage should be ended if it
has irretrievably broken down is followed to its logi¬
cal conclusion, then it must be accepted that a spouse
who had committed no recognised matrimonial offence
could be divorced against his will. In our opinion,
this would be so plainly unjust as to be in itself
conclusive against the introduction of any ground of
divorce which had this result.... The introduction
into marriage of this sense of insecurity and uncer¬
tainty would have a most disturbing effect on family
life, which would ultimately react on all members of
the canrnunity'.14
A second group of nine members, however, considered that the time
had come to introduce the doctrine of breakdown of marriage to a limi¬
ted extent. Ihey recommended that where husband and wife had lived
separate and apart for seven years, it should be possible for either
spouse to obtain a dissolution of the marriage, if the other spouse
did not cbject. They thought it important 'to recognise that matri¬
monial offences are: in many cases merely symptomatic of the breakdown
of marriage, and that there should be provision for divorce in cases
where, quite apart from the carmission of such offences, the marriage
has broken down completely'.15
Four of these nine went further and recommended widening the
scope of the new ground to allow a husband or wife to obtain a disso¬
lution of the marriage, notwithstanding the other spouse's objection,
provided the court was satisfied the separation was in part due to
the unreasonable conduct of the objecting spouse. Ihey saw 'no bene¬
fit to society to the individual or to the State in maintaining marri¬
ages in name which are no longer, and on all foreseeable estimates
will never be, marriages in fact'.16 However, these Contmissioners
never explained how they reconciled their proposals to allow divorce
after long separation with their desire to retain the doctrine of the
matrimonial offence. In effect it was a curious blend of the break¬
down of marriage principle with a modified version of matrimonial
offence. By seeking to combine the two opposing principles McGregor
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accused them of turning ' divorce law frcm anomaly into absurdity' .17
So in contradistinction to the Clayson Ccmmittee on Scottish
Licensing Law where recommendations were grounded upon a recognised
understanding of the direction in which it was desirable for Scottish
Licensing Law to move, the Morton Commission lacked any such clear
'philosophy' as to the direction divorce law should take.
The Commission was thus irreconcilably divided on the main issues.
As a consequence the Report had no influence and was in fact less
progressive than the House of Ccrrmons had been some five years earlier
in 1951. Lacking essential social science data on marriage and divorce
the Commissioners' justifications of their views amounted to no more
than an identification of the social good with their personal presup¬
positions. Nevertheless, at least one noble. Lord seemed suitably
impressed with the document. Speaking in the House of Lords on the
debate on the Morton Report, Lord Silkin announced:
'I cannot remember reading a Report of a Royal
Commission which is so clearly expressed and
which puts the case in such an interesting way.
If any of your Lordships is ever in need of a
little light reading I would recommend this
Report as worthy of consideration1.18
Could this possibly be the same. Report as the one to which
McGregor referred when he wrote;
"The Report ... contributes nothing to our knowledge
and fails even to clarify and define opposing view¬
points or to facilitate public discussion. Instead
of the traditional division into majority and mino¬
rity Reports, the Commission presented its readers
with a luxuriant confusion of footnotes indicating
agreement or disagreement of different Commissioners
with this or that proposition or paragraph. It is a
matter of opinion whether the Morton Commission is
intellectually the worst Royal Carmission of the
twentieth century, but there can be no dispute that
its Report is the most unreadable and confused ...
The Morton Commission has proved a device for
obfuscating a socially urgent but politically
inconvenient issue1.1 ••
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V. Comparative Developments in England and Scotland
(a) England
Having faded from the political agenda for the remainder of the
fifties, the divorce issue did not reappear for eight years. Leo
Abse (Lab. Pontypool) winning a place in the Private Member's Ballot,
introduced a Bill in the early months of 1963 which contained two
main provisions, one which sought to facilitate reconciliation between
estranged couples, and another, the intention of which was to extend
:he grounds of divorce by permitting the dissolution of marriage after
seven years' separation. Abse introduced his Bill on the Second Read¬
ing debate with his usual caustic style and wit. He remarked:
'I realise that the House may consider it a little
impertinent to introduce a Bill in respect of
Royal Commission recommendations upon which dust
has settled for a mere eight years. In matters
affecting human relationships this House always
moves with considerable caution. But I would pray
in aid that ... the only clause that the most con¬
servatively minded Member of this House ... could
regard as having some novelty is one that I am
told was first recommended by a Commission presided
over by the first Archbishop of Canterbury of the
Protestant Church of 1552. I hope, therefore, that
the House will consider that, whatever else may be
said, it cannot be suggested that I and the other
sponsors of the Bill are bringing forward a hasty
and ill-considered measure'.2°
However, despite Abse's exhortations serious objections to any
extension of the grounds for divorce were to arise both within and
without Parliament. While the provisions facilitating reconciliation
between estranged couples caused little controversy, the proposed new
separation clause met with strong religious opposition with harsh crit¬
icism coming frcm the Church of England. Ronald Bell (Cons. Bucking¬
hamshire South) was a typical opponent of the Bill. He was at pains
to emphasise that he was not objecting to the clause 'on any narrow
grounds of resisting progress or of prejudice' but because he genuinely
315
believed that 'such proposals would be wholly inimical to the institu¬
tion of marriage and the happiness of the people of this country' .
'This is a Christian country', he informed the House, 'and those of
us who hold the Christian religion are entitled to say that the gene¬
ral atmosphere of our laws should be based upon the basic tenets of
that religion'.21
Such a line, of course, has serious implications for the founda¬
tions of public policy in a democracy and runs contrary to the posi¬
tion adopted by Lord Gorrell in 1912 when he argued that the Legisla¬
ture could not allcw its consideration of such questions to be limited
by the views of the Christian churches.
Bell's comments adhere closely to the arguments of Lord Devlin
outlined in Chapter 4 and provide a good example of a defence of the
"disintegration thesis'. The essence of this argument is that the
State has a duty to uphold moral standards because these are essen¬
tial to the maintenance of society. Society has a right to preserve
its cwn existence and therefore the right to insist on some kind of
moral conformity - in this case the moral orthodoxy of the Church of
England.
'In April of 1963, with a Conservative government ... in power,
the churches mobilized the whole Establishment bo obliterate my Bill',22
Abse was later to write. 'The actions of the Church of England hier¬
archy, both covert and overt, placed him in a position where he was
obliged to withdraw the separation clause in order to secure the pas¬
sage of the uncontroversial reconciliation provisions, although not
before he had launched several scathing broadsides against them for
defending the bourgeois ethic. He commented;
'I knew that after the Churches had acted I oould not
under a Tory government, put my Bill through Parliament;
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the Church of England was still the Conservative Party
at prayer. It was to the country not to Parliament I
was speaking; and although I knew it would take seme
years before the walls finally fell, this assault had
to be fierce if the foundations were to be irrevocably
weakened',23
There can be no doubt that the Abse measure, and indeed the man
himself, was the catalyst that reactivated discussion of the divorce
issue, in the sixties and brought it back onto the political agenda.
In the June of 1963, the Archbishop of Canterbury announced in the
House of Lords with seme anfoivalence and reluctance, the formation
of a working group to review the divorce law. This group was formally
appointed as a Church of England Committee in January 1964 under the
Chairmanship of Dr. Mortimer, Bishop of Exeter, to review the law of
England concerning divorce. Its terms of reference explicitly recog¬
nised the differences in attitude between church and state and con¬
fined the scope of the enquiry to what the church ought to say and
do with regard to the secular- laws of marriage and divorce. The
Report of the Archbishop's Conrnittee, 'Putting Asunder', was published
in July 1966.
The Report was an extremely important document in that it heral¬
ded the turning point in the Church's attitude to divorce. It effec¬
tively condemned the divorce doctrine of absolute matrimonial offence
and suggested an entirely new framework. The principle of the break-
dewn of marriage was to replace the doctrine of matrimonial offence
and there was to be no accusatory procedure and thus no guilty or
innocent party. A divorce would be granted if a court was satisfied
that a marriage was truly at an end, that no reconciliation was pos¬
sible, that adequate financial provision had been made for the depen¬
dent spouse and the children, and that there was nothing in the con¬
duct of the petitioner that would make it contrary to the public
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interest to grant a divorce. However, the method by which, these facts
were to be established was to take the form of a prolonged inquisition
into the circumstances of the candidates for divorce. Thus, a court
hearing into a divorce application would come to resemble an inquest.
The Church's new found realism was set out in the early paragraphs
of the Report:
' (I)t is right that Parliament should make provision
for divorce and remarriage. Indeed it conforms with
natural justice by so doing, since natural justice
requires that, human law should not be the tyrannical
imposition upon the cortmunity of an alien code, but
an expression of the ccmrrunity's own mind... Any
advice that the Church tenders to the state must rest
not upon doctrines that only Christians accept, but
upon premises that enjoy wide acknowledgement in the
nation as a whole. No one should think, therefore,
that advice frcm the Church in this matter is bound
to represent an ecclesiastical attempt to obtain
legal enforcement of specifically Christian tenets'.2^
The Archbishop's Group discovered in the course of their inquir¬
ies that in practice the courts had already gone a considerable way
towards transforming judgements theoretically founded on the matri¬
monial offence into what were virtually judgements on the state of the
marriages in question. Accordingly, they cane to the conclusion that,
whatever the legal theory might be, legal practice was moving, in line
with society as a whole, towards the concept of the breakdown of mar¬
riage. Since they had no reason to suppose that, the doctrine of break¬
down of marriage would favour- 'divorce by consent' (in the strictest
sense) nor that it would be incompatible with a covenant of lifelong
intention, they arrived at their fundamental reoonmendation: 'that the
doctrine of the breakdown of marriage should be comprehensively sub¬
stituted for the doctrine of the matrimonial offence as the basis of
all divorce'.25 In making this reconmendation the Group were well
aware of the possibility of injustice against the. non-offending
spouse, but. felt the public interest required as a general rule that
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'empty' legal ties be dissolved.
So, within the spaoe of sane three years the Church, of England
had completely reviewed its position on divorce law and had cone to
embrace the doctrine of the breakdown of marriage as the basis for
divorce, albeit accompanied by alterations to the administration of
the law. Ihese alterations were cumbersome to say the least, and in
reality inoperable. However, the important breakthrough was that the
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principal of breakdown had been accepted. As a consequence the Report
was well received. A leader in 'The Times' expressed sympathy with
its ideas;
'It is doubtful whether there has been published in
recent times a more persuasive, thoughtful or con¬
structive plea on behalf of the breakdown of
marriage doctrine or a more effective condemnation
of the present method of divorce'.26
Not surprisingly, the principles of "Putting Asunder' were also
welcomed by the Divorce Law Reform Union, as well as by Leo Abse.
Nevertheless, Mr. Abse was not unaware of the publication's short¬
comings as he was later to explains
'I did not mock this report. The candour with which
the matrimonial offence was condemned meant that the
theological apologia which for centuries had buttres¬
sed the doctrine was ended. The alternative solution
proffered was so ramshackle that it would collapse
under its own weight. It was demanding a revolution
in the whole modus operandi of judges and lawyers,
and the legal establishment is not. given to such
flightiness....'.2 7
Indeed, the legal establishment was not given to such flightiness.
'Putting Asunder' , immediately after its publication in July, was ref¬
erred by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, to the newly established
Law Commission for their advice. Within four months, by the November
of 1966, the Law Commission had completed its deliberations and produ¬
ced a wide-ranging commentary, 'The Field of Choice'.28
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Right at the outset, the Law Conmission outlined the objectives
it thought a good divorce law should seek to achieve. Firstly, it
should buttress, rather than undermine, the stability of marriage ;
and secondly, when in the regrettable circumstances that a marriage
did irretrievably break down, it should enable the empty legal shell
to be destroyed with the maximum fairness and the minimum bitterness,
distress and humiliation. Thus, it was against these objectives that
the existing law and possible reform options were to be judged.
The Law Commission had little sympathy with the divorce law as
it then stood on the grounds that it failed to achieve adequately the
objectives of good divorce law as they had set them out. It did not
do all it might to aid the stability of marriage, tending to discour¬
age attenpts at reconciliation. Nor did it enable all dead marriages
to be buried, and those that it did bury were not always interred with
the minimum of distress and humiliation. Further, the insistence on
guilt and innocence tended to embitter relationships, with particularly
damaging results to the children. In sum, its principles were widely
regarded as hypocritical.
In light of this, the report proceeded to outline four main pro¬
posals for consideration - 1. Breakdown with Inquest; II. Breakdown
without Inquest; III. Divorce by Consent; IV. The Separation Ground.
As regards proposal I it was felt public opinion would be unlikely
to consider it an improvement if in every case the whole matrimonial
history were ventilated in public. The Commission was forced to con¬
clude that the proposal could not be made to work because of purely
practical difficulties.
The Commission though, considered the concept, of breakdown of
marriage sof such importance and value' that it proposed the scheme
of Breakdown without Inquest to overcome some of the difficulties of
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the Archbishop's Group's recoirmendations.
Under the alternative proposal, the court, on proof of a period
of separation, would assume that the marriage had broken down and, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that there was no reasonable
prospect of a reconciliation, and there was no reason of public policy,
including inparticular justice to the parties and the children, why
the marriage should not be dissolved, Hie court would then be left
to judge the appropriate consequential arrangements to be made regard¬
ing the parties and the children. However, the Law Commission con¬
ceded that the fixing of a suitable period of separation as a pre¬
condition of the right to file a petition presented the greatest
difficulty in the way of the scheme. It was felt that if prompt
relief was to continue to be given in cases of outrageous conduct, no
period of much more than six months prior to the filing of the peti¬
tion oould be regarded as a feasible timespan were breakdown to
becore the sole ground for divorce. Hie Cormissioners emphasised
that if as short a period as this was regarded as unacceptable, then
the proposal would cease to be a practical one.
Hie third option considered was that of Divorce by Consent.
Here the report pointed out that even staunch supporters of Divorce
by Consent conceded that the case for it was very much weaker when
children were involved, this proposal was to be confined to those
instances where no dependent children were involved and where there
were dependent children no divorce was to be granted. The Law Cortmis-
sion however, felt that such an extreme differentiation between mar¬
riages with children and those without would be both unacceptable and
undesirable.
Hie last of the options to be considered in 'Hie Field of Choice'
was the Separation Ground. Hiis additional ground of divorce was
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based on a nurrber of years separation. The intention behind it was
to give recognition to the principle that where a marriage had
irretrievably brcken dcwn it should be dissolved irrespective of
guilt or innocence. This would be achieved not by making breakdown
cne comprehensive ground for divorce but by retaining the grounds
based on the matrimonial offence and adding the separation ground
to them. Cue of the main difficulties in this proposal was to fix
a period which was not so short that it might undermine the stability
of marriage, but not so long that parties who had grounds for peti¬
tioning on the basis of a matrimonial offence would not be prepared
to wait. The Law Commission reached the conclusion that if the
Separation Ground was to be introduced there should be two different
periods of separation. The longer one, of perhaps five years, should
operate when the respondent objected to a divorce. The shorter, per¬
haps two years should operate, where the other spouse did not object
or consented to the divorce. The Commissioners, however, drew atten¬
tion to the fact that the Archbishop's Group expressed very strong
objections to the introduction of the breakdown principle as an
addition to, instead of a substitute for, the principle of matrimonial
offence, for reasons of mutual incompatibility of the two principles.
The view of the Law Commission though, was that it was perhaps not
necessary to make an exclusive choice between the two as the legal
system frequently chose different principles to dispose of distinguish¬
able situations.
All of these ideas, then, were considered and discussed in a
debate in the House of Lords in November 1966. Initiating the debate
the lord Bishop of Exeter pointed out that the courts were, in prac¬
tice, acting not so much on the ground of matrimonial offence, but
were increasingly passing judgements based on the ground that the
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marriage had irretrievably broken down. What was needed was a radical
reform to remove the most unsatisfactory features of the system and
this, he believed, was supported by public opinion which, on the whole
now agreed that the divorce laws should be made more realistic and
more humane. The public did not want easier divorce, but it did want
more sensible divorce, he opined.
The Archbishop of Canterbury, supporting the principle of the
breakdown of marriage as the basis for divorce, pointed the way forward
to a possible solution when he urged that 'the authors of "Putting
Asunder" and the Law Commission might together try to bridge the gap
between what is called, on the one hand, breakdown with inquest, and,
on the other hand, breakdown without inquest'.29 Support was forth¬
coming from Lord Soper, speaking on behalf of the Free Churches, as
it was from the Earl of Iddesleigh, a Reman Catholic, who recognised
and appreciated the need for divorce in society, although, of course,
not for him or those of his persuasion. However, not all of their
noble Lordships spoke in favour of reform, the most vociferous oppo¬
nent being Baroness Summerskill who spoke with deep concern about the
plight of the discarded wife and her problems of inequality and eco¬
nomic insecurity. Speaking 'more, in sorrow than in anger', she criti¬
cised the Archbishop's Group for having produced 'a curious and dis¬
appointing document called "Putting Asunder", in which they have failed
to recognise that the stability of the family should have governed all
their thinking'.30
In a different vein, the concern of Lord Silkin was with the
legislative enactment of any reform. While he was not in favour of
the Government itself introducing legislation, on the grounds that
to do so would inevitably split the Government and perhaps even cause
its downfall, his ccmrients highlight the ambivalent nature of
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Government 'neutrality' already alluded to in Chapter 3.
"This is essentially a matter for a Private Member's
Bill, with free speech, plenty of tine given for a
discussion and a free vote. It is no good letting
a private Member introduce a measure one Friday
afternoon, if he is successful in the ballot, and
leave it at that - I think most of us have agreed
that the law is in need of some kind of revision,
and I would suggest that if the Government would
encourage some private Member to introduce a Bill,
and would give ample time for discussion, it would
be the best way of revising it'.31
lb resolve their differences a series of meetings occurred between
the Archbishop's Group and the Law Commission in the summer of 1967.
The outcome was an ingenious compromise. The breakdown of marriage
was to be the grounds on which a divorce was granted; however, the
old standard matrimonial offences were to remain, although not as
offences, but as evidence of the breakdown. Divorce after separation
of two years was to beccme available by mutual consent, and after
five years' separation, subject to financial safeguards, divorce
would be possible even against the wishes of one of the parties.
Thus, the basic principles agreed, the way seemed clear for new divorce
legislation.
Parliamentary Activity: The English Reform
Leo Abse, still the parliamentary driving force behind divorce
law reform, was later to write of this period in late 1967:
'With the established Church and secular reformers thus
agreed, with the Law Commissioners engaged on the
sophisticated task of drafting the Bill, with the
Labour Cabinet via the Lord Chancellor at least silen¬
ced if not tacitly in support; with my friend John
Silkin Chief Whip in the Commons and imy old ally
Lord Shackleton now leader of the lords, the work
of turning the consensus into legislation seemed a
simple political task'.32
However, as it transpired it was to be far from a simple political
task, despite the good fortune of finding a sympathetic formal sponsor
in William Wilson (Lab. Coventry South) . He had won fourth place in
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the ballot which entitled him to an early Friday - the day allocated
for Private Member's Bills - in the parliamentary session. Wilson
did not claim as early a Friday as he might have done for two legiti¬
mate reasons. Firstly, preparations on the Bill were still being
carried out with the Law Commission working to finalise the draft,
and secondly, Wilson had committed himself to a parliamentary trip
to India. So in his absence the Bill was launched by Leo Abse at a
press conference in January 1968 to a sympathetic though reserved,
reception. 'The Times', the next day, wrote:
'There is a great deal to be said for changing the
law so that the sole ground for divorce should be
that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
That is what the divorce Reform Bill purports to
do. But there has been such an obvious attempt
to accommodate differing shades of opinion, to
express a new consensus, that the result is an
uneasy conpromise'. 3 3
In the days immediately following the launch of the Bill there
occurred a heated exchange between Abse and the Archbishop of
Canterbury. The Archbishop issued a statement regretting the Bill's
proposals to retain and enlarge the existing grounds of divorce.
Abse publicly accused him of a breach of faith, criticising him for
reneging on his commitment to divorce after two years separation.
However, it transpired that the Archbishop had expressly declined to
approve or disapprove the separation ground when it was presented to
him in order to keep his options open. Abse was later to describe
the Archbishop as ' the wily prelate ... following the principles of
Machiavelli',31+ The storm though, was to blow over quickly as the
Bishop of Exeter brought Church opposition under control.
The Bill obtained a Second Reading in February by a comfortable
majority and proceeded to a Standing Committee '/here its supporters
had a corresponding majority. 'The Times' wrote perceptively that
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the Second Reading majority reflected 'MPs' approval of its principle,
rather than their liking for all its provisions or their confidence
about its practical results'.3 5
So it proved to be. The Bill, due to its complex nature and the
wide range of opinion that existed in Committee, required thirteen
sittings. Professor Richards has conmented that 'the shades of opin¬
ion on the Standing Committee had a glorious but confusing variety'.36
Opponents of the Bill oould not agree with each other, nor could its
supporters find common ground amongst, themselves. So while the
Committee adopted the breakdown of marriage principle without a divi¬
sion, the detailed application of the principle was attacked by those
who wished it to be both more and less restrictive.
The principal opposition to a number of the proposals in the
Bill came from the women's organisations. "Ihe Tines' reported in
April 'the opposition of almost all the main women's organisations
representing nearly two million women, and an Impressive array of
public figures, including Lady Summerskill and the Archbishop of
Canterbury'.37 They were applying pressure through petitions, memor¬
anda and direct lobbying. Leo Abse was to record that 'with all the
misgivings of the middle class women's lobby being ventilated, the
whole proceedings took longer than ... anticipated'.3 8
It was not then, until late in. May that the Bill emerged out of
canmittee to be reported to a House that had run out of private
members' time and which was overflowing with a flood of governmental
legislation. With no further parliamentary time available the Bill
was effectively lost. Even if the Commons could have found time to
deal with the Bill before the summer reoess it would have been diffi¬
cult to have arranged for adequate consideration by the lords. All
Abse could do was to plan for the following session.
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In the parliamentary time available to him, Abse publicised his
failure and organised an effective campaign of protest to highlight
the fate of the Bill. He argued that it was intolerable that a mea¬
sure which had been extensively debated and enjoyed almost overwhelm¬
ing support should be delayed by the technicalities of the parliamen¬
tary timetable. The campaign was given favourable media coverage and
in the July of 1968 it had its effect when the Government gave him an
assurance that if the Bill was reintroduced in the next session time
would be found for its completion.
Of course, the reintxoduction of the Bill was onoe more dependent
on, the private members' ballot. On this occasion, none of the first
eight named MPs were amenable to sponsoring Abse's measure and it is
only the first eight that are guaranteed full Second Reading debates
for their Bills. Fortuitously though, the ninth named Member was
Alec Jones (Lab. Rhondda West) who was agreeable to adopting the Bill.
However, being ninth in the ballot meant that there was no certainty
of securing adequate time to obtain a Second Reading. Therefore, it
became essential to select carefully one of the days to be used by a
Member having priority whose Bill was relatively unoontroversial, so
that the time remaining on that day could be used to start a Second
Reading debate on the Divorce Bill. Once started it was Abse's inten¬
tion to pressurise the Government into allocating the time it had
already premised. This ploy worked admirably. After the Bill was
introduced on December 6th, Abse managed to persuade Ministers to
allcw the debate to continue. In accordance with Standing Orders, a
motion was moved and carried to permit a morning sitting, and on
December 17th the debate, was resumed and a Second Reading obtained
by 18 3 to 106 votes.
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Opponents of the measure, however, protested against the Govern¬
ment provision of additional time. So much, so that when the Bill was
going through its Report Stage in June 1969 a full scale procedural
debate was initiated by Sir Lionel Heald (Cons. Chertsey) on the ques¬
tion of the Government's handling of the issue. He moved a procedural
motion just before the Bill was to complete its passage through the
Commons at an all night sitting. His motion was that the Divorce Bill
was being given preference and priority over all other Private Members'
Bills despite the Government's professed neutrality towards the con¬
tents of the Bill and despite their refusal to accept it as Government
business or to accept any responsibility for it. The motion, declared:
'that such action by the Government is in contravention
of Standing Order No. 15, is unconstitutional, and
constitutes a grave abuse of Parliamentary procedure
by the Executive'.39
Heald presented his case around Standing Order 15 which provided
for two kinds of business in the House, Government business and
Private Members' business. His argument revolved around the question
of the status of a Private Members' Bill on which the Government pro¬
fessed neutrality, but which appeared on the Order Paper marked with
an asterisk, the customary .indication that it was Government business.
Ch the grounds that there can be no third kind of business his asser¬
tion was that either the Government must adopt it as Government busi¬
ness and therefore accept responsibility for it, or leave it as
Private. Members 1 Business, in which case they had no grounds for ele¬
vating the Bill above any of the other Private Members' Bills down for
consideration.
The motion, however, was viewed by Michael Foot. (Lab. Ebbw Vale)
as a wrecking resolution designed to prevent the progress of the Bill.
He highlighted at least one precedent in A. P. Herbert's Matrimonial
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Causes Bill of 1937 which received time from the Conservative Govern¬
ment of the period to complete its stages. This, he felt, was a per¬
fectly reasonable conclusion for both previous Governments and the
present Government to have come to. He contended:
'The Government are not abandoning their neutrality.
All that they are saying, and it is a very cannon
sense thing, is that the House has a right to make
up its mind on the subject'.110
Ch the other hand, Enoch Powell (Cons. Wolverhampton S.W.) took
the view that the Government was exercising power without responsibil¬
ity- He accused the Government of promoting a legislative result
without submitting themselves to the normal channels of accountability
through which they can be held responsible for their actions. As such
he thought the procedure an abuse of the principle and philosophy of
Standing Order No. 15.
Michael English (Lab. Nottingham West) though, posed a pertinent
question by asking what procedure was available other than the one
adopted by the Government?
'... if hon. Members object to the system whereby
time has been given to this Bill, it is not their
duty merely to suggest that the Government are
wrong in giving time on behalf of the country and
of the House, but to suggest that the House should
have a better system for determining how Bills of
this controversial nature should come before it'.41
The Government's position was explained by Fred Peart, the
leader of the House of Commons. He suggested that the most comparable
and recent precedent was the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1964 which was
heard after 10 p.m. at the end of a day's business through an anounce-
ment of the Leader of the House at business question time. He took
the view that the Government, was .right, and indeed had a duty, to
enable the House to make up its mind on important matters which affec¬
ted the community, which were not of a party kind, but. were moral in
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nature, and on which opinion in the country at large expressed con¬
cern. He felt that it was not incompatible for the Government to
exercise neutrality while at the same time providing time for
Parliament to reach a decision on the issue.
When the Question was put, the motion was defeated by 166 votes
to 62, and the debate cai the substance of the Bill was resumed. How¬
ever this motion and the placing of the Bill on a Thursday night by
Bob Mellish, the new Chief Whip, left Leo Abse a bitter and angry man.
He later wrote of his feeling thus;
'I expressed my resentment against Mellish both
privately and publicly when, during the debate
on Heald's motion, I poured withering soorn on
him in a manner to which Chief Whips are unaccus¬
tomed1 o42
The style of this 'withering soorn' took the form of Abse's customary
caustic wit. He regaled the Goirmons:
'I would not say that when the right hon. and
learned Member for Chertsey (Sir Lionel Heald)
tabled the motion, he intended it to be a wreck¬
ing proposal. I suspect that the right hon.
and learned Gentleman's innocence is equalled
only by the .innocence of the Government Chief
Whip who, with great magnanimity, saw to it that
this Motion would come up for discussion at this
late hour, and before the Bill. I am certain
that the right, hon. and learned Gentleman, who
is deeply interested in constitutional questions,
is genuinely ccmmitted to a search for the aetio¬
logy of the asterisk, a matter about which he
spoke with great skill. I am equally certain that
the Chief Whip wanted to be sure that equity would
be shown in every respect of those who take an
opposing view to the sponsors of the Bill'.1+3
The problem for Abse lay in maintaining a core of supporters
throughout the night and into the following afternoon to act as lobby
fodder. The vital need was not simply to outnumber his opponents but
to keep a mi.n±mum of one hundred supporters on hand so that, when
necessary, authority could be obtained to hold a division. Although
several of the amendments seeking to restrict the scope for divorce
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were put to the vote, they were successfully defeated by Abse's
stoical, supporters and by the mid-afternoon of the 13th June, after
some sixteen hours of debate, the Bill had been Reported, received
its Third Reading and was ready to be passed to the Lords. It was
a remarkable achievement of stamina for the sponsors of the Bill
against the filibustering arguments of the opposition. Abse was
later to reflect philosophically:
'Politics is not the art of the possible: that
is its most menial function. Politics is the
art of the impossible, and real achievement
cores to those who do not submit to the obvious'.^
Meanwhile a new factor had appeared on the scene in the form of
the Matrimonial Property Bill sponsored by Edward Bishop (Lab. Newark) .
Bishop had won third place in the ballot and had decided to introduce
a Bill which would make fundamental changes in the law of property.
Basically this Bill proposed that when a marriage ended in death,
divorce or separation, the husband and wife would each retain anything
they brought into the marriage and anything they were individually
given or inherited during it, but all other resources and property
accumulated during the marriage would be split equally. Moreover,
although property which a spouse acquired during the marriage by gift
or inheritance would belong solely to that spouse, any increase in
the value of such separate property during marriage was to be treated
as belonging to the spouses equally.
The Bill, however, was a confusing affair and it was criticised
by the Law Commission as being completely unmanageable. Not only were
there technical defects but some of the provisions could conceivably
contribute to increasing rather than diminishing marital stress. The
Law Officers, who were in the process of reviewing the whole field of
family property, argued forcefully that the legislation should be
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postponed until the Ccnrnission had completed its study. Sharing this
view the Government predictably, but mistakenly, placed a whip on to
ensure its defeat. However, such was the support of women's organisa¬
tions throughout the country and among backbench Labour MPs, that the
whips had to be. taken off and the Bill obtained a Second Reading on a
free vote.
The effect of all this was that the Matrimonial Property Bill now
straddled the Divorce Bill's path to the statute book and the two
issues became bound up together. It was not that the divorce reformers
were not sympathetic to the intentions of the Bill, for there was wide¬
spread agreement on the need to provide additional financial safeguards
for divorcees. It was more that they were dismayed by the practical
implications of the Bill and were concerned by the prospect of it de¬
laying the implementation of the Divorce Bill.
Bishop subsequently agreed to withdraw his Bill in return for a
premise of legislation in the following session, but the apprehension
of the divorce reformers proved justified. Opinion was building that
no Divorce Bill should be passed until a Property Bill had been con¬
sidered and enacted by Parliament. In the event, to gain the lord's
approval the sponsors of the Bill had no choice but to agree that the
Divorce Bill, should not core into effect, for a year to enable a
Matrimonial Property Bill to be. enacted by the Lord Chancellor which
would come into operation at the same time, 1st January 1971.
Professor Richards has posed the question why was the parliamen¬
tary campaign on the Divorce Bill so protracted when all the general
pressures of opinion and organisation tended to favour the Bill? He
has shewn that public opinion polls revealed a firm majority in sup¬
port of reform. A Gallup Survey in January 1968 illustrated that 70%
approved of divorce after two years separation where both spouses
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consented, with only 17% disapproving, while 13% were 'don't knows'.
Unilateral divorce after 5 years' separation was approved by 56%,
with 26% disapproving and 18% non-canmital. For Professor Richards
then:
the delay had two main causes. The technicalities
and the flukes of the parliamentary timetable helped
to destroy the Wilson Bill. The other and fundamental
difficulty was the intricacy of the subject ... Apart
from religious and moral controversy, questions were
raised involving legal procedure, child welfare,
social security and property law. The limited ration
of time allowed for private members' Bills can scarcely
be expected to accommodate a measure that arouses such
a galaxy of argument1.^5
Although Richards takes into consideration the opposition of the
large number of women1 s organisations, he plays dawn their collective
impact: because of a lack of unity in their views. Individual organi¬
sations opposed the Bill on different grounds and for different rea¬
sons 'so female dissatisfaction was divided'.116 Abse, on the other
hand, while concurring with Richards' overall diagnosis, places a
much greater emphasis on the role of women in opposing the Bill. He
reveals:
'the avalanche of protest, anxiety and vituperation,
mainly carting frcm middle aged, middle class deserted
wives, that I endured with each post taught me that
all the compromises, additions and alterations we
could make in the Bill oould not give to these sad
women the emotional security they sought'.4 7
Charting the progress of the reform from the early to the late
sixties, he commented:
'Attempting social legislation in a society in transition
is a more complex and bewildering task than altering the
laws of a more stable ccrrmunity: the politician today is
legislating on a moving staircase, and society had moved
a long distance since 1963. The theological objections
and anxieties had been overcame: but new anxieties were
abroad. The relative status of male and female with the
family has lost its old definitions: husband and wife no
longer had their confident, roles, and women, having cut
adrift from their old intolerable moorings, had a quest
but no certain destination. All the floating suspended
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anxiety of women suffering a crisis of identity was,
for two arduous parliamentary sessions, to rest,
suffocatingly upon the Divorce Bill'.1*®
In Abse's estimation then, the real wonder of it was that the Bill
ever reached the statute book at all.
(b) Scotland
It has been noted earlier that the historical development of the
divorce laws in England and Scotland has been markedly different.
However, the respective divorce reforms of 1937 and 1938 brought the
laws of the two countries roughly into line with regard to the grounds
upon which divorce could be granted, although still maintaining a dis¬
tinction as set by legal tradition and procedure. In a similar fashion
the Morton Corrmission of 1955 applied not only to England and Wales,
but also to Scotland, and its main recommendations, on the principles
of divorce at least, applied to both sides of the Border. And as we
shall see presently, in the mid-60s the Scottish Law Commission 'sha¬
dowed' its counterpart in England, and both reports reached much the
same conclusions. The modern trend could thus be described as being
one of maintaining distinctiveness in legal practice, but minimising
differences in principle so as to make the law broadly comparable
north and south of the border.
Qie .Important indicator of changing attitudes to divorce in
Scotland .in the 1950s and 1960s was the shift in thinking of the
Church of Scotland. In 1957 the General Asseirfoly resolved to send to
the Presbyteries for discussion and comment the Report; of the Special
Committee on the Re-marriage of Divorced Persons. The Presbyteries
were requested to give, their considered opinion cn the doctrine of
marriage set forth, in the Report, the definition of the Church's
attitude to divorce, and the duties of ministers to divorced persons
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seeking re-marriage in Church. A year later, in May 1958, the
Gonmittee reported back, the range of replies and recarmendations
received. In general the Presbyteries found the proposals made by
the Committee acceptable. The Christian doctrine of marriage, that
it was not only a legal bond and a natural tie, but an act of God,
was accepted unanimously. Also re-affirmed unanimously was the recom¬
mendation that 'the grounds set forth in the Act of 1938 be approved,
on the principle that these grounds, and the matrimonial offences
detailed in the Act, are such as may be. so grievous and may so damage
and make a mockery of the union of husband and wife as to cause one
party, relying on the mercy of God, to seek the termination of the
marriage' „49 Lastly, on the question of re-marriage, it was recommen-
ded by a substantial majority, that while no minister should be re¬
quired to solemnise a marriage against his conscience, the re-marriage
of innocent parties to a divorce by a minister of the Church should be
permitted, but not the re-marriage of guilty parties.
Church of Scotland thinking on the issue in the fifties then, was
still firmly entrenched in the concept of the matrimonial offence.
While the Church recognised the need for, and permitted, the secular
dissolution of marriage, it still insisted on the labels of 'guilt'
and 'innocence1 being attributed to spouses in a divorce action. So
much so that in cases where divorced persons wished to remarry, the
minister had to obtain adequate information concerning 'the life and
character of the parties to be remarried' and the circumstances of the
divorce case, and further he should 'consider whether there is a dan¬
ger of scandal arising if he solemnise the re-marriage'.50 This type
of thinking within the Church, was to prevail for the next ten years.
In the interim period in the early sixties, there was little
activity on the divorce issue with the exception of the Divorce
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(Scotland) Act 1964. This was an enactment to amend the divorce laws
of Scotland to facilitate reconciliation and to confer new powers on
the courts to award interim aliment. The provisions were modest, and
came as a response to the Abse legislation, of 1963. However, the
reform proved to be controversial for the manner in which it was pas¬
sed through Parliament.
Hie Bill had been introduced in the Lords or 16th January 1964
by Viscount Colville of Culross and had passed through that House
with little discussion by the Spring. On its arrival, in the Coimons
it was sponsored by Forbes Hendry, the Member for Aberdeenshire West,
but it became caught up in the backlog of all the other private mem¬
bers 1 business. So with the parliamentary session drawing to a close,
the Government decided to take the rather dramatic step of assisting
its passage. This had the effect of causing a procedural uproar.
After an unopposed Second Reading it went to the Scottish Stand¬
ing Committee where, on 30th June, Lady 'IWeedsmuir, the Under Secretary
of State, explained the Government's intentions towards the Parliamen¬
tary timetable:
'It will not have escaped the notice of hon. Members
that last Friday was what is commonly called in
Parliamentary terms Black Friday, when Private
Members' Bills normally fall if they have not com¬
pleted their stages. Therefore, the Government
felt that, as there was time in the Scottish
Standing Committee, it should be given an opportunity
to consider this Bill which has been waiting in the
wings since March. It has already been considered in
another place, and has also had an unopposed Second
Reading on the Floor of the House of Commons. Should
it be reported, the Government will consider whether
facilities can be available for its remaining stages1.51
At issue was a Sittings Motion to enable the Committee, to meet
for four sittings within the week, so as to allow enough, time for con¬
sideration of the Bill. Such an idea, however, was bitterly opposed
by the Labour Members on the Committee. Willie Hamilton (Lab. Fife
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Central) protested that this was 'an outrageous way to treat Scottish
meirbers 1 and indicated that he would not. be co-operating, not because
he did not favour soma of the provisions, 'but because of the squalid
approach by the Government in attempting to bulldoze the Bill through
the Canmittee' .52 Similarly, Willie Ross (Lab. Kilmarnock:) launched
into an attack - 'The Royal Cormission took four years on this, but
the Scottish Committee is given four sittings. 'Ihis is a contenptible
attitude towards Parliament and to the Royal Cormission - and indeed
to the subject'.53
A number of Members were of the opinion that there was no demand
for the Bill by the people of Scotland and suspected that ulterior
motives lay behind its introduction. George Lawson (Lab. Motherwell) ,
for instance, was convinced that it was the intention of a Tory
Government in low morale to embarrass the Scottish Labour Party with
the Bill. He asserted:
'Seme members of the Government, I do not knew at
what level, hope that the religious differences
in Scotland as affected by this matter, will reflect
adversely on us. They are exploiting religious con¬
flicts and ideas in order to embarrass us'.5
On the question of adequate discussion of the Bill, Dr. J. Dickson
Mabon (Lab. Greenock and Port Glasgow) contended that it had not been
given a fair hearing among the people of Scotland. It was unackncw-
ledged by the Raman and Protestant Churches in Scotland and, as far
as he was aware, the many secular organisations concerned with social
law had not been consulted. What demand there was for the reform
appeared to emanate frem a handful of lawyers.
Willie Hamilton, once again sought: to enlighten the Committee
about Scottish attitudes towards the subject. Relaying the factual
information that since the. Royal Commission Report of 1956 some .15
Bills had been presented in both the Commons and the lords, he
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proceeded to make the point that 'not. one was introduced by a
Scottish Member of the House of Cannons or a Scottish peer' .55
This, he implied, was indicative of Scottish feeling on the subject.
Nevertheless, despite the protests the Sittings Motion was
accepted by 11 votes to 7 and the Bill did pass through its ccnmittee
stage in four sittings, although the last one was an open ended after¬
noon sitting which lasted sane ten hours.
What is interesting about these exchanges is the manner in which
an essentially non-party political issue became the vehicle for poli¬
tical comment and criticism. It is difficult to establish exactly
what the Conservative motivation might have been but it would seem
to have involved three possible factors. Either there was genuine
feeling that this was a worthwhile measure to get through in the time
available, or it was simply a political expedient to follow the
English measure with a similar Scottish provision in order to keep
the law on either side of the border roughly compatible, or it was
a cleverly contrived exercise to place Scottish Labour MPs in an
awkward position before a pending election. These factors are not
mutually exclusive and so it could have been any one, or any carbina-
tion, of the three. Given the modest provisions of the Bill perhaps
the most plausible account is that it was merely a way of extending
to Scotland those provisions for reconciliation which, had already
cote into effect in English law in 1963. Any political inconvenience
it might have caused the Labour Party in Scotland would naturally be
viewed by the Tory administration as a beneficial side-effect.
Perhaps though it was not so much what the Conservative Govern¬
ment intended as what Labour MPs in Scotland believed they intended.
They ascribed to the Government all sorts of Machiavellian doings on
the issue. It was thought that the Tories were trying to create the
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impression that they were a modernising party and in so doing put
the Opposition in the position of obstructing what could be regarded
as a progressive measure. It was quite clear that there was opposi¬
tion to the Bill among certain Labour MPs ranging from outright hos¬
tility to mild reservation, but, for fear of appearing unnecessarily
obstructionist, they had to couch their opposition in terms of pro¬
cedural outcries and sittings motions concerning the curtailment of
debate. Pursuing such a course of action tended, on occasion, to
get them tied in knots. For instance, it was claimed in one breath
that the Bill was a Tory ploy to divert Scotland's attention frcm
more important matters such as the economic troubles of Scottish in¬
dustry, while in the next breath it was argued that there was no
interest in Scotland in such a Bill. As for the question of exploit¬
ing religious conflicts, whether it was real or not was not so impor¬
tant as the fact that seme Labour MPs perceived it as being real.
Consequently, it tended to reveal more about the personal insecuri¬
ties and anxieties of those MPs than it did about anything else.
In keeping with their commitment the Government duly found the
parliamentary time to assist the Bill in its later stages by alloca¬
ting a slot at the end of the day's business on 21st June. Within
an hour and a half the Bill was reported and given a Third Reading.
The effect of the measure, as noted earlier, was to extend to Scotland
the provisions for reconciliation already extant in English law.
While it was at this tine in England that the level of debate
on the divorce issue began to warm up, there was no corresponding
upsurge of interest in the Scottish context. England to a great
extent took the lead on the issue and this may be best explained by
the fact that as discussion was concentrated on the principle of
divorce it was applicable to both, sides of the border. Viewed in
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this perspective the Scottish Law Commission's Report of 1967 can be
seen as an attempt to adapt the broad principles thrashed out in the
English debate into the Scottish context.
In late December 1966, the Scottish Law Ccmnission was invited
by the Secretary of State to review, in relation to Scotland, the
ground covered by "The Field of Choice1 and 'Putting Asunder'. Their
report, 'Divorce: The Grounds Considered' , was published some five
months later in May .1967, and examined all the possible options in
the Scottish context. Although at the outset they emphasised the
difference in Scottish legal background and tradition, they accepted
that much of the debate concerning the principles of divorce were
relevant to, and with some modification, could be applied to,
Scottish practice. They wrote that 'Putting Asunder', 'puts in issue
seme of the fundamental assumptions of the law of divorce in England
and Wales, and these are fundamental assumptions of the existing law
of Scotland also'.56 With one of these fundamental assumptions they
agreed - that divorce should not be regarded as a punitive measure,
but rather as a recognition that a marriage was dead and ought to be
buried with the minimum of embarrassment, humiliation and bitterness.
Hcwever, they pointed out that there was nothing inconsistent about
adding to the existing grounds another ground, viz. irretrievable
breakdown. The law of Scotland set out a series of peremptory grounds
of divorce not all of which could be classified as matrimonial offen¬
ces, such as incurable insanity and injurious conduct committed under
the influence of mental disease. So Scotland (like England) did not
have an exclusively punitive approach to the problem. The addition
of irretrievable breakdown would not mean then, as 'Putting Asunder'
suggested, that the new ground would be incompatible in the respect
that it was being added to a class of other grounds all of which
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exhibited the characteristic of an offence. lhe result would simply
be that the grounds of divorce, taken as a whole, would have the one
thing in common, that upon proof of any of them, the court would dis¬
solve the marriage.
On the breakdown of marriage the Report commented:
'Every action of divorce is new brought because a
marriage has irretrievably broken down, though not
on the ground of the breakdown. Marriage being,
as a minimum, a partnership, it is enough that one
partner maintains irretrievable breakdown for the
breakdown to be a fact, however strenuously and
sincerely it may be denied by the other partner' .57
However, it was pointed out that irretrievable breakdown, being an
essential of every application for divorce, could not usefully be
made a ground of divorce in the sense of being the subject matter on
which the court, in deciding whether the marriage is to be dissolved
or not, should acme to a conclusion. Accordingly, it was recommended
that the existing grounds of divorce be retained, their legal signifi¬
cance being, that if a party could prove one of these grounds, then
there would arise an irrebuttable presumption that the marriage had
irretrievably broken dewn, and should be dissolved. The 'separation
ground' could then be added to cover cases where the fact of the par¬
ties having lived separate lives for a stated period of time was evi¬
dence that the marriage had brcken down, ihe Report stated:
'It imay be assumed that generally, when spouses have
for a nunber of years voluntarily lived separately
because they cannot live happily together, their
marriage has irretrievably broken down, and that
that is true whether or not the separation was a
consensual one'.5 8
The question though, arose as to what constituted an appropriate
length of separation where, firstly, both spouses consented or did not
oppose the dissolution of the marriage and, secondly, where one of the
spouses was opposed to the dissolution. In the first instance where
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both parties consented or acquiesced, the Scottish Law Commission
adopted the view of its English counterpart: and recommended a period
of two years. In the case where there was opposition from one spouse,
the Report again concurred that the situation required that the
length of separation be longer than the two year period. It did not,
however, state a specific period of time because of 'the fact that
the length of period is not a question of logic or legal policy but
of social and political expediency, and therefore ultimately to be
decided by Parliament itself.59
In sum then, the conclusions readied by the Scottish Law Commis¬
sion were in the main very similar to those hammered out south of the
border by the joint delegation frcm the Law Commission and the
Archbishop's Group. While there were, of course, differences in
detail as a consequence of the different legal traditions and prac¬
tice, there was a broad concurrance on the fundamental principles
upon which divorce law should be based. Divorce was to be granted
upon proof of one of the several grounds for divorce. Included in
those grounds would be the new ground of separation, where divorce
would be available after a period of two years' separation when both
spouses consented or acquiesced, or after a period of (say) five
years when one spouse objected, subject, of course, to certain safe¬
guards.
Ihus, by mid-1967, on both sides of the border, the basic prin¬
ciples for the reform of the divorce, laws had been spelled out.
Also at around this time in 1967, as a consequence of the English
initiative, attitudes within the Church of Scotland were beginning to
shift and fresh thinking on the issue was becoming apparent.
In the April of that year a Working Group was set up to enquire
into the existing grounds for divorce and to determine whether there
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was any need for a reform in the law. The enquiry was established as
a response to four pressing factors - I. the rise of the divorce rate
in the United Kingdom in the sixties; II. the concern of the legal
profession about the abuses of the existing system; III the persis¬
tant attempts by sections of society to bring about radical change;
IV. the toll of human misery, either leading to, or as a consequence
of, divorce in its existing form. It was stated:
'Christian compassion demands a study of the situation
with a view to discovering scare degree of remedy for
and alleviation of such suffering'.6 0
The Report of this Working Group on divorce law reform was pre¬
sented to the General Assembly for consideration in May 1968. At the
outset it was recognised as being only honest to acknowledge that
when a marriage had collapsed to the point of being an empty shell it
ought to be decently buried. As a means of doing that the Report
argued that the existing grounds for ending a marriage were inadequate
and unsatisfactory. Three main reasons were enunciated as being res¬
ponsible for this state of affairs. Firstly, the matrimonial offen¬
ces listed as 'grounds' were more the results than the causes of
marriage breakdown. As such it was unfair to use such offences as
hard and fast proof that one partner was guilty and the other inno¬
cent in so far as legal guilt might not adequately reflect the moral
realities of the situation. Secondly, the application of this accu¬
satorial principle lent itself to manipulation, insincerity and dis¬
honesty. It tended to incite one party to distort or exaggerate the
conduct of the other resulting in a deepening of the bitterness
between them and minimising the possibilities of reconciliation.
Thirdly, it required an. action at law to be taken by the legally
innocent party, but if that party refused to sue for divorce the
empty shell of a marriage was perpetuated, leading to all sorts of
frustrations and hardships.
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After reviewing and carmenting on the various proposals put for¬
ward by the other bodies in the debate - the Church of England, the
Law Conrission and the Scottish Law Carmission - the Church of
Scotland Report reached its own quite independent conclusions. The
Report agreed that divorce should be granted on the ground of break¬
down of marriage as against the need to prove certain matrimonial
offences, the view being taken that such matrimonial offences were
often the outcome rather than the cause of a deteriorating marriage.
It was recommended that separation for a continuous period of at
least two years, consequent upon a decision of at least one of the
parties not to 11.ve with the other, should act as the sole evidence
of marriage breakdown„ This time period was considered long enough
to be reasonably certain that breakdown had really occurred, but it
would also afford time for the opportunity of reconciliation.
Attempted reconciliation of at least three months was to be permitted
without it having an effect on the period of two years continuous
separation. Divorce on this ground would be available to both or
either party. Safeguards, of course, would prevail and the Court
should be satisfied as regards the financial provisions relating to
the spouses and children, and the provisions for the welfare of the
children.
These proposals were amongst the most radical, to have emerged
during the entire course of debate on the issue and they marked a
pronounced swing in the Kirk's thinking, a fact which did not go
unrecognised in the Report. The Report observed;
'We are very conscious that these proposals constitute
a quite radical departure frcm the standpoint of the
"Commission on Re-marriage of Divorced Persons"
accepted by the General Assembly in 1958, when matri¬
monial offence was approved as the main ground for
divorce, and when the General Assembly last pronounced
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on the subject. However, we are convinced that our
study within the present remit, indicates that in
the changes we propose we are still being true to
the spirit of the Christian ethic'.61
The General Assembly of 1968 received this Report, but reserved
judgement on its conclusions and recommendations, preferring instead
to send it down to the Presbyteries for study and comment, ihe fol¬
lowing year the replies from the Presbyteries were reported back.
Out of the 60 Heme. Presbyteries 58 made returns and the breakdown
ran as follows: 36 accepted the principle of breakdown as the sole
ground for divorce as proposed by the committee; 8 wanted the addi¬
tion of separation to the existing grounds; 8 favoured no change in
the law as it stood; and 6 were negative and non-committal.
Of the 8 Presbyteries which, suggested adding a separation clause
to the existing grounds, the ccmmittee argued that this would only
make matters worse since the abuses attendant on the accusatorial
principle would remain, and in addition the compulsory period of a
two year separation would be compromised because there would be no
one principle applied upon which divorce could be established. Some
of the objecting Presbyteries considered the separation period of
two years as being too short. The committee held though, that two
years of separation was long enough to provide sufficient proof of
breakdown, but in any case, whatever period of separation was selec¬
ted, a further delay would be involved because of procedure before a
divorce was actually granted. Other Presbyteries expressed concern
about those cases where an intolerable situation of continual humili¬
ation and hardship prevailed which warranted some kind of protection
and relief being given without the long delay of two years. The
committee's response to this was that while divorce would certainly
be precluded on these grounds within the two year- period, temporary
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protection would still be available in the form of judicial separa¬
tion.
While appreciating the concern expressed by some Presbyteries
that any new proposals should not cause hardship or weaken the insti¬
tution of marriage, the canmittee reaffirmed the proposals contained
in its Report of 1968 along with one or two additions consequent upon
the comrents received. Ihe General Assembly of 1969 then, received
the committee's Report on Divorce Law Reform, accepted the revised
proposals put forward and commended these 'to the consideration of
Her Majesty's Government with a view to reform of the Divorce Law of
Scotland'.62 Within the space of a decade the thinking of the Church
of Scotland on the issue of divorce had undergone an almost revolu¬
tionary transformation.
Ihe response of Her Majesty's Government to the request for
Scottish divorce reform was ncn-existent. The Scottish Office adop¬
ted the traditional line that the matter was best dealt with through
a Private Member's Bill. At this time, of course, there was a
flurry of activity on the English reform Bills, but no one seems to
have considered the position of Scotland .in relation to any proposed
reform. Only Donald Dewar (Lab. Aberdeen South) appeared to have
been aware of the possibilities. As early as the December of 1967
he pressed the Secretary of State at Scottish Question Time for a
statement on his policy on divorce reform in Scotland. Willie Ross
answered with the stock .response that the issue had never been thought
a suitable subject for Government legislation, but if any Member
wished to introduce a Bill on the basis of the Scottish Law Commission' s
Report, the Government would be willing to assist with the drafting.
Donald Dewary however, pointed out, rather prophetically, seme of
the problems that such a course of action might entail. He remarked;
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'Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is very
unsatisfactory, if the Private Member's Bill
which has already been brought forward is enacted
for England, that we in Scotland shall have to
wait until an hon. Member favourably disposed to
such legislation is fortunate enough to be success¬
ful in the Private Members' Ballot? That will
result in a long time lag, and once again Scotland
will lock as though it is taking second place in
the legislative train'.6 3
David Steel (Lib. Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles) also pushed the
Secretary of State as to whether he would give, in addition to draft¬
ing assistance, Government time, in the Scottish Grand Committee for
such a Bill. However, Willie Ross remained nan-carmital indicating
that it was a natter of the luck of the draw.
The issue was again raised by Donald Dewar in December 1968 when
he book the opportunity of speaking on the Divorce Reform Bill.
The tenor of his comments was much the same:
'I feel very strongly that it would be wrong and
unfair if divorce law north and south of the
Border rested upon a completely different social
basis. If this Bill gets the kind of Second
Reading that I hope it will, and it gets through
to the Statute Book, I hope that the Government
will give careful consideration to the best,
quickest, and most efficient way of getting a
suitably amended Scottish Act on the Statute
Book'
Twice again in 1969 Donald Dewar sought to keep the pot boiling,
once in February and once in December. On both occasions he quizzed
Willie Ross as to what plans he had to implement the proposals for
divorce law reform contained in the Scottish Law Carmission Report.
Qnoe more he pressed for action. At a Question Time just before the
Christmas recess he asked:
'Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is not a
matter of drafting as much as a matter of time
that is at issue., and that when so many represen¬
tations have been made, from the Scottish Law
Ccffrrtu'-ssion, the Church of Scotland and the Law
Society of Scotland, it would be very unsatisfac¬
tory if Soots Members were not given a chance to
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came to a decision on this important matter in the
same way as English Members last session?'55
Yet again though, Willie Ross played defensively. Thus, in con¬
trast to the position taken in the higher echelons of the Home Office,
that providing additional parliamentary time was not incompatible
with maintaining Government, 'neutrality' , the Scottish Office adhered
strictly to the traditionalist view that the matter had to be dealt
with through a Private Member's Bill, and that before such a Bill
could proceed the will of the House in respect of the principle would
have to be obtained on Second Reading.
With the end of the decade only a few days away, divorce .reform
as far as Scotland was concerned, was destined to becore an issue of
the seventies.
VI. Conclusion
The removal of the Eirene White Bill from the political agenda
in the early 50s provides a good example of a 'non-decision' . The
Labour administration was not politically secure and chose to avoid
the electoral consequences of the issue by assigning it to a Royal
Commission. This Commission in turn, which took over four years to
deliberate and eschewed any of the research techniques of social
science, effectively buried the issue for the remainder of the decade
and beyond, with a staid and divided Report which broke no new ground,
insisting instead on the retention of the principle of matrimonial
offence.
The early sixties, however, saw changing attitudes. The issue
was brought back to the public's attention by the dynamic personality
of Leo Abse who succeeded in rekindling the debate through the intro¬
duction of Private Members' legislation. After initial hesitancy,
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the Church of England responded to the changing mood and produced a
radical report in 1 Putting Asunder1, which was quickly follcwed by a
Law Commission critique that put the Church of England proposals
into a more practical perspective. However, resistance both within
and without Parliament was not yet overcome. That it eventually was
overcome can be attributed largely to the astuteness and dogged per¬
sistence of Leo Abse. A comment made by A. Lawrence Lowell in the
early years of this century fits him well:
'Cne man who holds his belief tenaciously counts for
as much as several men who hold theirs weakly,
because he is more aggressive and thereby compels
and overawes others into apparent agreement with him,
or at least into silence and inaction. This is,
perhaps, especially true of moral questions'.66
The importance of Abse' s role in divorce reform cannot be stressed
enough. His political astuteness, his intellect and his close personal
contact with those in positions of pcwer were vital factors in achiev¬
ing reform.
That the English reform suffered a 'delay' cannot be denied. It
was due to a lack of foresight on the part, of the sponsors of the
Jones Bill, and to residual pockets of resistance frcm some political
churchmen and a number of women's organisations. It succeeded eventu¬
ally due. principally to the Government's allocation of parliamentary
time, which itself was heavily dependent on Abse's harassment of those
in control of the business agenda. The ensuing procedural motion
sorely tested the Government's position of 'neutrality' but it high¬
lighted the need for tacit Government approval for a Private Members'
measure of this nature to succeed.
Events in Scotland were subdued. Although the reform in England
was confined to that country, the debate concerning the principle of
divorce law was equally applicable to Scotland. The Scottish Law
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Commission reviewed the proposals emerging from England, and adapted
them, while maintaining the principle, to the Scottish context. Thus,
the tendency was to maintain differences in legal tradition and prac¬
tice, but to minimise differences in principle. The Scottish reform
of 1964 was noteworthy only in so far as it provided a precedent for
the allocation of parliamentary time and for the manner in which the
debate became 'politicised' in a party political sense, illustrating
sore of the underlying assumptions and sensitivities of sore Soots
Labour MPs.
The main feature of note .in the Scottish sphere was the dramatic
swing in the thinking of the Church of Scotland on the issue, moving
from a traditionalist line in the late 50s to a radically different
approach ten years later. Their initiative though, was slew to be
accepted by opinion at large and consequently it fell by the wayside.
The most prophetic remark of this period however, came from
Donald Dewar who with uncanny foresight predicted that unless the
Government took some responsibility for providing time for a Scottish
debate on the issue, there would undoubtedly be a 'long time lag'
before a decision could be reached. This 'long time lag' forms the
basis of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
The Scottish Divorce Reform Attempts of the Seventies
I. Introduction
The Scottish Office adopted the traditional line that divorce was
an issue which was best dealt with through Private Members' legisla¬
tion. This chapter examines the sequence of Private Members' reform
attempts which eventually culminated in the successful Divorce
(Scotland) Act 1976.
Section II charts the various Private Members' Bills that were
introduced in the Camions in the first half of the seventies and out¬
lines the methods by which they were introduced, their sponsors and
their ultimate fate. One of the main features of these debates revol¬
ved around what constituted Scottish public opinion on the divorce
question. This theme is developed in Sections III, IV and V where
different perspectives on public opinion are discussed. Section III
locks at public opinion as represented by pressure groups, Section IV
inquires into how MPs appraised public feeling and Section V reviews
public sentiment as it was expressed in the media and opinion polls.
Section VI then proceeds to examine the 'politics' of the 1976
divorce reform. The crux of the matter here hinged on whether
Scotland should adopt distinctive policies designed to suit its cwn
particular requirements or whether reform should be directed towards
making the law north and south of the border roughly comparable so as
to allow for uniform practice throughout Great Britain.
In Section VII there is an assessment of the obstacles to reform
and the swing in opinion. What were these 'obstacles'? How was the
apparent 'delay' to be explained? Was there a 'swing' in public
opinion? If so, how can it be accounted for? These questions are
considered and some explanations offered. Section VIII then outlines
some concluding remarks.
However, before progressing to a discussion of the Private
Members' Bills in Section II, it may be apposite at this point to
describe briefly seme of the technicalities of Private Members 1 pro¬
cedure. There are three separate procedures for initiating back¬
bench legislation - the Ballot, the Ten-Minute Rule, and Standing
Order No. 37. These shall be dealt with in reverse order.
Under Standing Order No. 37 any Member can present an 'unballoted'
Bill to the House on any sitting day by giving at least one day's
notice. On presentation of the Bill a day for Second Reading is named
and the Bill takes its place on that day's Order Paper. However,
these Bills have no practical chance of being debated, since the
Ballot Bills will have pre-emptied the time. These Bills can make
progress only 'on the nod', that is to say by being unopposed at all
their stages, or in very rare and exceptional occasions by being allo¬
cated Government time.
The Ten-Minute Rule, or Standing Order No. 13, affords an oppor¬
tunity for two Members each week to make a short ten-minute speech
to introduce a Bill. A similar short speech can also be made in oppo¬
sition. These speeches are made after Question Time on Tuesdays and
Wednesdays. A vote may or may not take place. Unless defeated, the
Bill then follows the same path as an unballoted Bill. The attraction
to Members of this procedure is the publicity it affords. The oppor¬
tunity is used to air a particular problem since it is rare for Ten-
Minute Rule Bills to make further legislative progress.
The main method for introducing Private Members' Bills is the
Ballot. On the second Thursday of each Session, 20 names are drawn
from those Members who have entered the Ballot. These Members then
introduce a Bill of their choice on the fifth Wednesday of the Session.
The size of the Ballot and the number of Fridays available for their
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consideration has varied. In the 1966-70 Parliament there were 27
Bills and 16 Fridays, but throughout the duration of the seventies
there were only 20 and 10 respectively. With such severe pressure
on time the number of Bills which have a realistic chance of success
is obviously limited. Generally speaking the first 6 are guaranteed
a Second Beading debate and the remainder have to jockey for position.
Therefore a high position in the Ballot is essential if the Bill is
to have a fighting chance. The later Fridays are then used to debate
the remaining stages of Bills, priority being given to those Bills
which have progressed furthest along the legislative road. Thus,
time can be as big a hurdle to a Bill as any concerted opposition.
The two are not unrelated, of course, for unless a Bill's sponsor
can secure a Closure Motion which requires a minimum of 10O votes in
favour, opponents can talk it out through a 'filibuster'. Lastly,
Bills not reached during debating period are called over formally
but can make no progress if any Member indicates opposition. This
is usually done by saying 'Object'. Bills which have been objected
to in this way, or talked out, can be put down for a later Friday,
but needless to say, as time passes more and more Bills accumulate on
the agenda.
In the following section it will be seen how some of these pro¬
cedures operated in relation to the Scottish Divorce Bills.
II. The Scottish Bills
The first attempt to reform Scottish divorce law came on 27th
January 1970 when Donald Dewar (Lab. Aberdeen South) introduced a Bill
under the Ten-Minute Rule procedure, though conceding that the Bill
was 'no more than a gesture'.1 He admitted that its success would
depend on the Government's willingness to give it parliamentary time,
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but he was quick to point out that the English measure, which had not
been in the first eight places in the Private Members' Ballot, had
been helped from its Second Reading onwards by Government allocated
time. Further, he argued that the legislative procedure for Scottish
business could facilitate the passage of the Bill:
"This is a matter of Scottish concern only and it
could pass through almost all its stages upstairs
in Coimiittee. The demands that it would make on
this Chamber would be modest' ,2
The important thing was, he suggested, that Scottish Members should
have an opportunity to take a decision.
Opinion in the House was divided. Yet, no matter what the shade
of opinion expressed, the speaker would invariably claim that he was
reflecting public opinion in Scotland. It was to become one of the
recurring features of all the debates throughout the six years before
an enactment was achieved, that each contributor to the debate,
whether he was in favour of reform or against it, would claim Scottish
opinion to be cm his side. In fact, Sir Myer Galpem (Lab. Glasgow
Shettleston), who opposed the proposal, went as far as to say that
there was widespread opposition to the reform in Scotland, even
although his personal mail, which he described as being 'unusually
heavy', indicated a majority in favour of change. His explanation
for this conundrum ran thus:
'I confess that the majority were in favour of divorce
law reform, but I am sure that every hon. Member kncws
that people living in adultery are much more vocal
than others who are living in a harmonious state of
matrimony'.3
It would seem that 'public opinion', like statistics, can be open to
a variety of interpretations, and indeed distortions, in order that
personal predilections may be justified.
Opinion in Scotland also appeared to be divided. Support for the
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Bill's provisions came frcm legal opinion such as the Law Society of
Scotland. Hcwever, reservations, which will be discussed mare fully
later, were expressed by the Church of Scotland's Women's Committee
on Social and Moral Welfare:
'This is not a Bill that our Church is seeking to take
up or support in any way. The Church's proposals are
very different frcm those Mr. Dewar is seeking to pro¬
pose. He wishes to add the ground of separation to
the existing grounds. We would rather hold on to what
is the present position than move into this kind of
mixture. Mr. Dewar's proposal means that no matter
what the position, a person could get a divorce - if
they failed on the grounds of adultery they could then
fall back on two years' separation. This is to cheapen
marriage still further'.4
Before the division was called another old chestnut of an argument
was produced as to why the reform should be opposed. It was Sir Myer
Galpern again, and he failed to see why the House should be asked to
agree to a proposal which would 'lead Scotland to hang on to the coat
tails of England in this matter'.5 This was to be another central
theme running through the debates - should Scotland seek parity with
England on social issues of this kind thus making the law as near
uniform as possible throughout Great Britain or should it seek to
formulate social policy which was reflective of and particular to the
Scottish context?
Dewar won his division by 115 votes to 84 and the Bill was read
a First Time. A Second Reading was not achieved hcwever, as it was
deferred by objecting Members on four different Fridays between late
March and early May.
Although the division was won by 115 votes to 84, a Scottish
majority of 25 votes to 19 opposed the reform. In percentage terms
this meant that 35.2% of the Scottish vote was opposed to reform and
26.7% was in favour, the remaining 38.1% comprising the 27 Scottish
Members who did not vote. Fran Table 8.1 it can be seen that just
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over half this opposition, came from 13 Conservative rotes which
represented 61.9% of the 21 Scottish Conservative MPs sitting in
the 1966-70 Parliament. 31.1%, or 14 Labour Party members voted in
favour of the reform in ccntrast to the 22.2% or 10 Labour MPs who
voted against. The Liberal Party were evenly split 2 for and 2
against and the solitary SNP 'ember, Mrs. Winnie Ewing, who had
entered Parliament at the 1967 Hamilton By-Election, voted against
this Scottish reform.
Table 8.2 shews voting by Age Groups and it can be clearly seen
that the bulk of the opposition to reform came from the over 45s.
88% of those who voted 'No' fell into this category. On the other
hand it can be seen that of the 10 Members who voted and were under
45, 70% or 7 MPs voted in favour. Hie picture which emerges from
this table, then, suggests a fairly straightforward split between
the younger Scottish MPs who tended to favour reform and the older
Scottish Member who was more inclined to oppose it.
The difficulties of analysing the voting by religion have already
been commented upon in Chapter 6. The breakdown of voting in Table
8.3 shews Scottish Catholic MPs to have voted against divorce reform
by 3 to 1. In this 1970 vote a majority of the residual category of
Protestants, Jews and atheists also came out in opposition to Donald
Dewar's reform Bill.
Table 8.4 illustrating Scottish voting by Schooling shows the
interesting pattern that English educated MPs voted more than 2 to 1
against the reform. Of the 13 MPs in this category, 9 voted against
and of those 9, 7 were educated at an English public school. In con¬
trast, those in receipt of a Scottish based secondary education,
either at a local authority Academy or at an Independent, were gener¬
ally disposed to rote in favour of reform (13 votes to 9) . However,
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r//hen those who had received only an Elementary education are included,
the Scottish based vote becomes much more equitably split, 14 votes
to 12 in favour. It will be noted that these Elementary educated MPs
voted 3 to 1 against the reform. These MPs are inevitably older
Labour Menbers in their 60s and this conforms with the pattern estab¬
lished in Table 8.2 which suggested older MPs were anti-reform.
The breakdown of voting by Higher Education (Table 8.5) shows a
remarkably even split for and against in each category, the odd vote
or two in each case going against reform.
Table 8.6, illustrating voting by Region, indicates that Glasgow
and 'the west' were just marginally against reform by 9 votes to 7,
a pattern repeated in Edinburgh and ' the east', where 5 votes to 2
were cast against the measure. If one combines the Borders and South¬
west categories it can be seen that the vote in 'the South' as a
whole was evenly split. This leaves only the North-East as the only
region in favour of reform by 3 votes to 1.
Voting by Occupation (Table 8.7) shows the category of Miscellan¬
eous White Collar to be the only one in favour. This category includes
teachers, civil servants, local government administrators, trade union
officials, journalists and others. Both the Professions, which inclu¬
ded medics, lawyers and university academics, and Business, which in¬
cluded directors and self-employed farmers, came out against the pro¬
posed reform.
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House of Cannons Parliamentary Debate, Vol. 794, col. 1211.
Division on Divorce Law Reform, 1970.
Hie Division is on Donald Dewar's Divorce (Scotland) Bill, introduced
under the Ten-Minute Rule procedure 27.1.70.
Figures in Tables include Tellers.
*Party canposition at time of vote: Lab 45; Cons 21; Lib 4; SNP 1.
TABLE 8.1 Scottish voting by Party*
Total Scottish _ , ^ TLab Cons Lib SNP
vote vote
Aye 115 19 14 3 2 0
(26.7%) (31.1%) (14.2%) (50%) (-)
No 84 25 10 13 2 1
(35.2%) (22.2%) (61.9%) (50%) (100%)
TABLE 8.2 Scottish voting by Age Groups
Total Scottish Under oc; .. c. cc ,c , TT , „
-,r 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Unknownvote vote 35
Aye 115 19 3 4 5 4 1 2
No 84 25 1 2 9 10 3 0
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TABLE 8.3 Scotting voting by Religion
Total vote Scottish vote Catholic Others
Aye 115 19 1 18
No 84 25 3 22
TABLE 8.4 Scottish voting by Schooling
Total Scot. . , Scottish Scottish Scottish English English
vote vote CMn Elem. Second. Indp. Grantrar Public
(Academy)
Aye 115 19 1 1 9 4 13
No 84 25 4 3 7 2 2 7
TABLE 8.5 Scottish voting by Higher Education
Total Scot. „ , . , Other Scottish Other „ rT .Oxbridge „ , . , „ . TT None Unknownvote vote ^ English Univ. H.E.
Aye 115 19 5 1 5 2 4 2
No 84 25 7 1 6 3 5 3
TABLE 8.6 Scottish voting by Region
Total Soot. ^ s_w_ Glasgow Edinburgh High-
vote vote + west' + 'east' lands
Aye 115 19 2 2 7 2 2 3 1
No 84 25 0 4 9 5 4 1 2
TABLE 8.7 Scottish voting by Occupation
Total Scot.
professj_ons Business Forces Workers Unknown
vote vote White
Collar
Aye 115 19 3 11 2 1 11
No 84 25 5 8 4 2 2 4
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The second attempt at reform came early in 1971. Robert Hughes
(Lab. Aberdeen South) had won third place in the Private Members1
Ballot of the 1970-71 Session which guaranteed him a Second Reading
debate at a Friday afternoon sitting. For the Bill to progress the
debate had to be brought to a close with a closure notion, which
required a minimum of 100 Members to vote for the motion, irrespective
of the majority involved.6 Arithmetically, this Standing Order can
have the effect of placing the Scottish Private Member introducing an
exclusively Scottish Bill, at something of a disadvantage since
Scottish representation in the House stands at only 71 Members.
Hie Bill was presented and read a First Time on 25th November
1970 and came up for its Second Reading debate on 22nd January 1971.
Once again the speakers tried to establish what Scottish opinion was
on the divorce issue - with claim and counter-claim being hurled around
the debating chamber. Robert Hughes, the sponsor of the Bill, got the
shew under way by stating that 'there is no doubt that Scottish legal
opinion is in favour of change',7 a sentiment backed up by Bruce Millan
(Lab. Glasgcw Craigton) vho pointed to the support of the Scottish Law
Commission.
However, while Scottish legal opinion may well have been in fav¬
our of reform, Sir Myer Galpern could not accept that there had been
any demand for a change from the people of Scotland. He urged the
House 'to reject outright this attempt to interfere with the existing
Scottish divorce law because, first of all, there has been no demand
for such an alteration, and secondly, there has been satisfaction
expressed with the existing law'.8 Hamish Gray (Cons. Boss and
Cromarty) also argued that the law had not been unduly criticised by
the public in Scotland:
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'This is obvious from the attendance in the Chanber today.
The number of Scots Members of Parliament who have waited
to participate today in this debate is surely evidence
that there is no great demand in Scotland for this change.
If Members of Parliament had received pressing demands
from their constituents, that would be the most sure way
of getting them into the Chanber for such a debate. The
fact that so many Scots Members have not seen fit to wait
and take part in this debate indicates that they have not
been pressed by their constituents for a change in the
law'.
In sharp contrast, however, John Smith (Lab. Lanarkshire North)
could not accept the validity of such a statement, responding that the
average person never came into contact with divorce proceedings and
was, therefore, unlikely to give it that much consideration. Support¬
ing the proposed reform he argued that it was 'ridiculous for the law
not to reflect social reality'.10 In similar vein, Ian MacArthur
(Cons. Perth and E. Perthshire) suggested that divorce was not a sub¬
ject on which people made spontaneous representations to MPs. Never¬
theless , he sensed a change of opinion in Scotland:
'My assessment, for what it is worth - and it is certainly
not based on any statistical system of measurement but is
a matter of feeling rather than of logical judgement - is
that there is new a large body of opinion in favour of
reform, whereas there was not some years ago.11
What this debate serves to illustrate is that while it is rela¬
tively easy to discover the individual opinions of MPs, it is rather
more difficult to unearth the evidence cn which they base their asser¬
tions concerning Scottish public opinion. It becomes not only a ques¬
tion of what Scottish public opinion might be, but also who actually
represents that opinion. On examination of the statements made in
the debate it can be seen that each MP is basing his assertion of
what the Scottish feeling is, on who is taken, or alternatively not
taken, to represent public opinion in Scotland.
For instance, those supporting reform claimed the weight of
legal and religious opinion to be en their side. Bruce Millan felt
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the Scottish Law Ccurmission' s Report to be of particular importance
for two main reasons:
'First of all, the confidence with which, the arguments
are marshalled ... and secondly, the fact that the
people responsible for preparing it have considerable
experience of hew divorce law in Scotland works at
present'.
Further, he held the views of the Church of Scotland in the same res¬
pect for similar reasons:
'not just because it can bring to bear a particular
moral viewpoint, though that is obviously the most
important consideration, but also because the
ordinary parish minister in his parochial work has
considerable experience of the consequences of
broken or unhappy marriages'.12
One might say then, that this school of thought on Scottish pub¬
lic opinion tended to take well informed and articulate organisations
as being representative of attitudes towards divorce lav/ reform.
Qi the other side of the coin though, Sir Myer Galpern asserted
that 'Hie Law Society which is anxious to have this change, because
of the differences between the law in Scotland and the law in England,
does not represent the Scottish people' .1 3 So who represented
Scottish opinion for this school? For Hamish Gray it would seem to
be, as noted earlier, that if MPs had 'received pressing demands from
their constituents', then this would give a good indication of a
desire for change. Here it would appear to be a form of ad hoc indi¬
vidual lobbying which gives an MP a true reflection of public opinion.
Admirable as this may appear to advocates of participatory democracy,
it does tend to undermine Sir Myer Galpem's position, that although
the majority of his correspondents were in favour of reform, they
were not to be regarded as a true reflection of public feeling, since
by their nature they were bound to be more vociferous. The solution
for Sir Myer was that the matter 'should be debated in the Scottish
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Grand Canmittee, where only Scottish Members vote. In that way we
oould get a true reflection of Scottish opinion'.114
This suggestion raises a third point of view concerning public
opinion. The statement 'in that way we oould get a true reflection
of Scottish opinion' tends to imply that MPs themselves are public
opinion, or at the very least arbiters of public opinion. The impli¬
cation is that public opinion is the individual MP's interpretation
of a number of factors, such as constituency feeling, pressure group
activity and media response, through which he is able to obtain a
'sense' of popular feeling.
Thus, it is possible to identify three different types of inter¬
pretation of public opinion:- i. public opinion as represented by
organised group activity; ii. public opinion as represented by ad hoc
individual lobbying; and iii. public opinion as MPs judge it. During
the course of the debate on the Hughes Bill, John Smith commented
that it was 'ridiculous for the law not to reflect social reality'.15
However, the question remained as to what that social reality was and
hew it was reflected. To this it will be necessary to return.
Maanwhile, when the vote was taken on the Second Reading of the
Hughes Bill, the majority was 71 to 15 in favour and yet 'the question
was not decided in the affirmative', because it fell short of the re¬
quired 100 votes and as a consequence the Second Reading was deferred.
For the following three Fridays the notion continued to be deferred
and it was not until the 19th February that the Bill managed to be
Read a Second Time unopposed, due to the fact that no objectors to
the Bill were present. Rather strangely, although technically in
order, the Bill was committed to an ordinary UK Standing Conmittee by
the Speaker on the grounds that it was not legislation relating exclu¬
sively to Scotland. Apparently some of the financial provisions had
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UK wide implications. The Carmittee managed to meet on three occa¬
sions , but with parliamentary time running out the Bill was lost as
the session drew to a close.
Within this 71 to 15 majority in favour of reform, a Scottish
majority of 23 votes to 13 also prevailed in favour. The new 1970-
74 Parliament saw the Conservative Party assume power, but in Scotland
party composition was only slightly changed with Labour having 44
seats, Conservatives 23, Liberals 3 and the SNP 1. Hcwever, only
just over half those 71 MPs (50.7%) bothered to vote in the Divorce
Division, the other 35 MPs (49.3%) being absent or abstaining. This
meant that 32.4% of the Scottish vote was in favour of reform and
18.3% was opposed. From Table 8.8 it can be seen that 17 members of
the Labour Party supported reform and this represented 38.6% of their
parliamentary strength in Scotland. When compared with the 1970
Divorce vote this shewed just under a 6% increase in support amongst
Labour Members. Cnly 11 out of 23 Conservatives (47.8%) voted and
because of this, Conservative opposition to the reform (6 MPs) stood
at 26.1% of its Scottish Members, whereas a year previously in 1970
61.9% of Scots Tories had turned out to vote against. So even although
the Scots majority was 23 to 13 in favour of reform, perhaps Hamish
Gray had a telling point when he commented that the attendance in the
Chamber was evidence that there was no great demand in Scotland for
change.
Table 8.9 shews that the younger MPs under 45 continued to vote
in favour of reform. Of the 14 votes cast in this category 10 (71.4%)
were in favour. Interestingly the hard core opposition amongst the
older (over 45) MPs that had been evident in the 1970 vote, was no
longer as firmly entrenched. One reason for this might be that a num¬
ber of 'traditional' Labour MPs in their 60s, with only Elementary
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education, who had voted against in 1970, had retired to be replaced
in the General Election by a new breed of younger, better educated
Labour MPs. Mother reason might be the low Conservative vote.
The pattern of voting revealed by Table 8.10 again shows Scottish
Catholic MPs to have been opposed to divorce reform. On this vote,
however, the residual category has swung round in favour of reform.
The breakdown of voting by Schooling (Table 8.11) shews the oppo¬
sition from English educated MPs to have dropped dramatically, espec¬
ially amongst those who attended an English public school. Again
this fits with the pattern that one might expect frcrn a low Conserva¬
tive turnout, Labour MPs educated at English public school being few
and far between. In the year since the previous vote, heme educated
Scots MPs appear to be more favourably disposed towards reform, on
this occasion voting 16 to 8 for a change.
Ihe most striking feature of Table 8.12, illustrating voting by
Higher Education is the clear majority in favour amongst those educa¬
ted at a Scottish university. 10 out of the 13 votes (or 77%) cast
in this category wanted reform. The other categories remained as
equivocal as the previous year.
Voting by Region (Table 8.13) shows that the Glasgow and 'west'
vote remained numerically static at 9 votes to 7 against. However,
there was a dramatic shift in the Edinburgh and 'east' vote from
1970 when it had voted 5 to 2 against. In 1971 this vote was 6 to
nil in favour. This swing can be partly explained by the fact that
two Conservatives, Anthony Stodart (Edinburgh West) and N. R. Wyle
(Edinburgh Pentlands) , who had voted "No" in 1970 walked through
"Aye" lebby in the 1971 Division. Also George Willis (Lab. Edinburgh
East), who voted against in 1970, was replaced by Gavin Strang
(Lab. Edinburgh East) in the 1971 Election and the new incumbent
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House of Commons Parliamentary Debate, Vol. 809, ool. 1550
Division on Divorce Law Reform 1971.
The Division is on Robert Hughes' Divorce (Scotland) Bill introduced
under the Ballot, 22.1.71.
Figures in Tables include Tellers.
*Party composition at time of vote: Lab 44; Cons; 23; Lib 3; SNP 1.
TABLE 8.8 Scottish voting by Party*
Total Scottish ^ ^ SNP
vote vote
Aye 73 23 17 5 1 0
(32.4%) (38.6%) (21.7%) (33%) (-)
No 17 13 7 6 0 0
(18.3%) (15.9%) (26.1%) (-) (-)







35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Aye 73
" 23 3 7 11 1 0
No 17 13 1 3 6 2 1
1
o
TABLE 8.10 Scottish voting by Religion
Total vote Scottish vote Catholic Others
Aye 73 23 0 23
No 17 13 2 11
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TABLE 8.11 Scottish voting by Schooling
Total Scot. , Scot. Scot. Scot. English English
vote vote cwn Elem. Second. Indp. Granmar Public
Aye 73 23 3 1 11 4 1 3
No 17 13 3 1 6 1 0 2
TABLE 8.12 Scottish voting by Higher Education
Total Scot. „ , . , Other Scottish Other T1 , _
, , Oxbridge _ .. . . „ „ None Unknownvote vote y English umv. H.E.
Aye 73 23 4 1 10 1 5 2
No 17 13 3 0 3 1 5 1
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TABLE 8,13 Scotting voting by Region
**?■ Sof- Borders S.W. Edinburgh High-vote vote +'west' + 'east' lands
Aye 73 23
No 17 13
TABLE 8.14 Scottish voting by Occupation
"1 y*\+" p^ri'fpc h MlSC.
, * . White Business Forces Workers Unknown
vote vote sions collar
Aye 73 23 4 13 2 0
No 17 *13 0 6 3 2
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cast his vote in favour. Moreover, MPs who had previously opposed
such as Michael Clark Hutchison (Cons. Edinburgh South) and Tom
Oswald (Lab. Edinburgh Central) were absent, while supporters such
as Ronald King Murray (Lab. Edinburgh Leith) were present.
Table 8.14 (voting by Occupation) shews the majority in favour
amongs the category of Miscellaneous White Collar to have increased
from 11 votes to 8 in 1970 to 13 to 6 in 1971. The clear majority of
4 to nil in favour (as opposed to 5 to 3 against in 1970) which pre¬
vailed amongst the Professions can again be explained by the absence
of Conservative Members, several of whom fall within this category.
The third and fourth attempts at reform were instigated under
the Ten-Minute Rule procedure by Willie Hamilton (Lab. Fife Central.)
on the 23rd January, 1973, and the 14th May 1974, respectively.
Again the case was pleaded that the basic principles of The Bill were
approved by the legal organisation, the Church and other 'nan politi¬
cal bodies as well as countless individuals',16 and once more pleas
were made to the Government to allocate sufficient parliamentary time
to allcw the legislation to proceed. Cn both occasions the Bill was
introduced after a First Reading, only to have Second Reading defer¬
red several times by the objections of Hon. Members, the principal
antagonist being T. G. D. Galbraith.
The fifth attempt was made by Robin Cook (Lab. Edinburgh Central)
again under the Ten-Minute Rule Procedure, on the 21st January 1975.
It is interesting to note the regularity with which the reform Bills
appeared, virtually onoe a year. Such consistency in itself would
tend to suggest sane sort of desire for change. Once more the claim
was presented that 'nearly everybody of informed opinion in Scotland
accepts the case for reform'. Cook harangued, 'Why then, do we still
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fail to reform the Scottish law on divorce five years after the reform
of the English law and ten years after the report of the Scottish Law
Carmission urging reform in very strong terms? Heaven kncws, it is
not for the want of trying1.17
Yet without the assistance of Government tine, which never looked
like being made available, the Bill was destined to flounder. Cn no
fewer than ten occasions between mid-February and mid-May the Bill
failed to clear the hurdle of Second Reading, being objected to each
time by Tam Galbraith (Cons. Glasgow Hillhead) . Cock described these
Friday sittings as an 'elegant little ritual', and was later to remark:
'Although the veto procedure is sound in principle since
it prevents a contentious Bill making progress without
a debate on its merits, in this case there was widespread
reaction to its use by a member who had been divorced in
an English court under the reformed law which he was new
seeking to deny Scotland. In retrospect it is clear that
Tam Galbraith did more than anyone else to marshal 1 public
opinion in favour of divorce law reform'.18
III. Public Opinion: Pressure Groups
Die position of the Church of Scotland on the divorce issue in
the first half of the seventies requires some clarification. It will
be recalled that the Church issued a statement early in 1970 disasso¬
ciating itself from Donald Dewar's Bill on the grounds that the
Church's proposals were fundamentally different from the provisions
of that Bill which sought to add the grounds of separation to the
existing grounds. That remained in essence the Church's position
throughout the protracted struggle for reform despite the fact that
numerous supporters of reform repeatedly, and somewhat mistakenly,
claimed the wholehearted support of the Church for their cause. It
was not that the Church was opposed to reform - far from it. The
Kirk, in fact, did not consider the proposed reform radical enough
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in that it did not rid itself completely of the old accusatorial
clauses. While agreed on the principle that the breakdown of marriage
should be the sole ground for divorce the Church of Scotland was far
from impressed with the compromise solution reached by lawyers whereby
the old matrimonial offences were retained as one means of proving
that breakdown had occurred.
In a Moral Welfare Carmittee memorandum of 1972, the Church argued
'that the need for reform of the divorce law in Scotland is now even
more urgent than it was in 1969'.19 Two main reasons were submitted
for this. Firstly, in theory at least, there was a wide divergence
between the law of England and the law of Scotland as regards divorce
which was undesirable both on grounds of public policy and in terms
of human suffering. Secondly, Scottish courts often had to witness
matrimonial disputes which involved deceit, bitterness and gross
exaggeration. Yet, despite this desire for reform, the memo commented
crt the Hughes Bill that 'this did not in fact seek to reform the law
in the way envisaged by the Carmittee', and it continued in a rather
relieved tone 'in any event the Bill was not granted sufficient par¬
liamentary time and therefore never completed its passage through
parliament'.2 0
Late in 1973 a meeting was arranged between representatives of
the Moral Welfare Corrmittee and representatives of the Scottish Law
Commission in an attempt to iron out some of the differences between
the two sides. While the meeting was conducted in a very cordial
atmosphere and there was broad agreement on the main objectives,
there was, nevertheless, disagreement on the details of the reform,
as the Church 'was still not sure about accusatorial factors'.21
In early 1974, advice was tendered by Lord Dunpark as to hew the
Church should proceed. Lord Dunpark, formerly Alister Johnston QC,
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was a member of the Moral Welfare Gonmittee's Working Party on divorce
law reform in the sixties and worked on the Scottish Law Commission in
the early seventies, being responsible for the drafts of the Dewar and
Hughes Bills. His personal views, favouring the substitution of the
principle of breakdown, based on a period of continuous separation,
for the doctrine of matrimonial offence, were expressed as early as
1968 in the Law Society Journal.22 While his sympathies lay with the
Church's point of view, experience had made him familiar with both
sides of the argument. He wrote to the Convener of the Moral Welfare
Committee in February 1974 indicating that there were two reasons why
the Church's views had failed to find acceptance in Scottish legal
circles. Firstly, there was the desire of Scottish reformers to har¬
monise as far as possible the divorce laws of England and Scotland.
Secondly, there was the impossibility of persuading Parliament that
the public would be prepared to accept divorce laws which abolished
divorce for 'bad conduct'.
In his letter he stated:
'Let us be clear that there is now no hope at all of
persuading Parliament to legislate on the lines
desired by the Church of Scotland in 1969, in the
immediate future. No Government nor Member of
Parliament would, I am sure, be willing to sponsor
a Bill which would lose them or him the votes of
those who agree with the view ... that it is an
unnecessary hardship to cause a spouse who cannot
forgive an act of this nature (i.e. adultery, sodomy
or bestiality) to wait for two years before raising
an action.
'If your Committee's priority is to obtain divorce
law reform in the immediate future, then it must
accept the Sub-Committee Report and the form of the
latest Bill, because that is the form recanrended
by the S.L.C. which the Government will accept.
'My personal opinion is that, if the Church of Scotland
were now to abandon its enlightened 1969 attitude on
the grounds of practical expediency it would lay itself
open to criticism. My advice to the Church would be to
leave well alone and remain silent'.23 (original emphasis) .
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Dunpark, then, advocated silence 'rather than execute a complete
volte face', which is by and large the attitude the Church adopted.
In March 1974 the Scottish Law Commission issued a memorandum
outlining the areas of agreement and disagreement between the Church's
proposals and those of the Commission. In the opinion of the S.L.C.
it was of the 'utmost importance that those who support divorce reform
should, in the public interest, attempt to reach an agreement or, at
any rate, a measure of agreement' ,24 Common ground between the two
sets of proposals lay in the acceptance of irretrievable breakdown of
marriage. Divergence lay in the fact that the Church wished to see
all vestiges of the matrimonial offence removed whereas the Commission
favoured the retention of the former offences as proof that the marri¬
age had irretrievably broken down. The Church's proposals were sub¬
jected to a number of critical comments by the S.L.C. Firstly, it
was pointed out that since the main opposition to reform centred on
the reluctance of MPs and the public to allow divorce of a blameless
spouse after two years separation, there would be even more violent
opposition if divorce was to be granted after two years separation
without consent. The Commission were of the opinion that there was
a real difference between the case where neither party objects to
the divorce and the case where one party does cbject. Further, the
Commission considered it an exaggeration to say that adultery and
cruelty afforded instant grounds of divorce. It had to be remembered
that divorce was a relatively slew process even where the action was
undefended, but more importantly divorce was a step which few spouses
took lightly. In this vein the Church's thinking on judicial separa¬
tion would have unforseen consequences. The Church's idea was that
alongside the new structure for divorce a sub-structure for separation
should continue. However, since judicial separation was available only
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on proof of a matrimonial offence or of conduct justifying non-
adherence, the practical effect would not be what the Church intended
in that in many cases of adultery or cruelty there would be two sets
of proceedings where previously there had been only one.
Cn the basis of these criticisms the Scottish Law Caiiriission
concluded:
'This Camiission believes that its proposals taken as a
whole are fair, just and compassionate and therefore
in principle worthy of support by the Church. The
Commission also sincerely believes that its solutions
are likely to win a larger measure of support from
public opinion and Members of Parliament and are
therefore more realistic politically than the solutions
adopted by the Church. The Carmission therefore would
ask for the Church's support for its proposals as going
at least seme of the way towards the common objectives
of divorce reform, while appreciating that the Church
must lead, and not merely reflect, public opinion and
might therefore reserve its position as to the ultimate
shape which the law of divorce in Scotland should take' ,25
Signs that the Church's attitudes were beginning to soften appeared
in 1975 when the General Assembly reported:
'Divorce Law Reform continues to be a matter of
Parliamentary concern and is being reassessed by
the Committee. It believes that there are lessons
to be learned from the English experience of their
reformed divorce laws. ... The Gomrdttee remains
convinced that reform is necessary, but is not
fully in accord with such proposals as have so far
been brought forward.'26
By the end of that year however, the Church accepted the inevit¬
ability of the S.L.C. proposals. With the MacCormick Bill before
Parliament the Church relented and acknowledged that there were
grounds for the retention of the modified traditional grounds, espec¬
ially in cases of unreasonable behaviour where a remedy at the earliest
opportunity was necessary for the protection of one or other spouse.
The Church stated:
'We fully appreciate that this recommendation is
contrary to the views of the General Assembly of
1969. Nonetheless, we consider that the criticisms
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made of the Asseirbly 's views by the Law Commission
in its Memorandum of March 1974 are valid and that
there are positive advantages from the proposed
retention of the modified traditional grounds as
exemplifying circumstances of irretrievable break¬
down ',2 7
The Church of Scotland's position can be summarised thus: while
it was pro-reform in its outlook it did not undertake any lobbying
activity, because although agreed on the principle of divorce law
reform, the details of the Bills were at variance with its cwn recom¬
mendations. It was not until very late in 1975 that the Church came
round to accepting that the retention of the traditional grounds in
modified form was justified. Therefore, throughout the struggle for
reform the stance of the Church is best described as passive in so
far as it failed to mount any active campaign to promote reform, or
to exert any parliamentary pressure to have the series of Bills enac¬
ted.
As far as the Scottish Law Commission is concerned, it was much
more active, being responsible for the legislative drafts of the
divorce reform Bills. However, being part of the government machine
it cannot really be described as a pressure group in the traditional
sense. Nevertheless, its importance should be acknowledged in that
it was responsible for assisting the sponsors of the Bills, and also
for bringing about the change in Church thinking. Its contribution
is best viewed as an example of hew pressures for change can come
from within the machinery of government itself, a point alreaay noted
by Hall et al.28
The Reman Catholic Church in Scotland was, of course, strongly
against any reform in the divorce laws since in their teaching marri¬
age is both a civil act and a sacrament. Hence, divorce is viewed by
the Catholic Church as a threat to the stability and sanctity of
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marriage, and thus as a social evil. It was on these grounds then,
that it opposed the Scottish reform attempts in the first half of the
seventies.
Speaking in opposition to Willie Hamilton's 1973 reform Bill, a
Catholic spokesman ccarmented:
'This Bill would go even further towards making marriage
a casual institution in this country. The Catholic
Church upholds the sanctity of the marriage vows,
and believes any further attack on them can only weaken
an institution which is vital to the happiness of our
society'.2 9
Two years later in March 1975, when Robin Cock's Bill was trying
to make progress, the Catholic Press Office again made their position
clear:
'The question of divorce is not even under review in the
Catholic Church - there is no big movement to have the
teaching changed. Everyone accepts that the sacrament
of marriage between two Catholics is inviolable, and if
two Catholics break up, neither can re-marry. No one
says it isn't tough',39
The -underlying theme of the Reman Catholic Church's opposition,
then, was their belief that divorce undermined the sanctity of marri¬
age. Any reform which set about to relax the divorce laws was con¬
sequently perceived as reducing marriage to a casual institution.
Accordingly the Catholic Church in Scotland urged its members to lobby
their MPs to oppose any change.
Cne of the main difficulties with an issue like divorce is that
it is a topic on which few people are likely to be vocal. However,
there is a line of thought which suggests that actual vocal represen¬
tation need not always be the foremost consideration when contempla¬
ting reform. In 1972 Willie Hamilton remarked that 'the fact that
there is no vocal evidence that the bulk of people in Scotland want
this Bill is no reason why this House should not legislate. Very often
we legislate because we think it is right to do so, and in that respect
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we have to lead public opinion rather than be a reflection of it.'31
For such an approach to be successful though, implies that public
opinion, while not vocal, would need to be sufficiently sympathetic
(or indifferent) to the reform.
This absence of organised lobbying has been noted by Robin Cook:
'...reforms of English personal law were greatly
facilitated by the intensive lobbying of Parliament
by organisations such as the Divorce Law Reform
Union, or the Sexual Law Reform Society, but the
Scottish debates of the past couple of years have
been marked by the absence of any such group or any
form of organised lobbying'. 32
In sum, then, while certain influential sectors of Scottish opin¬
ion were in favour of divorce law reform, there was little, if any,
active organised support for the successive reform Bills.
IV. Public Opinion: MPs' Appraisal
Before proceeding to the issue of what MPs thought public opinion
in Scotland to be on the matter, it is important to understand just
hew MPs assess public opinion. When interviewed the most oonmon in¬
dicator which MPs ackncwledged to be influential was the correspond¬
ence they received. Ihey pointed out though, that while mailbags
could be useful, they only reflected the opinion of those who could
be bothered to write. So the opinion of the limited number of people
who wrote had to be balanced with wider feeling within the rest of
the constituency.
Neil Carmichael (Lab. Glasgow Kelvingrove) for instance, indica¬
ted that anything over 50 letters on an issue was a lot of correspon¬
dence. Most MPs he said, took into account the 'quality' of a letter
as manifested in its presentation and argument, although not to the
exclusion of everything else. MPs were painfully aware that the ill-
educated constituent was just as capable as the educated one of
380
withholding his vote at the next election. In his experience there
were two basic types of argument - argument which arose from emotion
and feeling, and argument which arose from an intellectual appraisal
of the situation. Each in its own way oould have an effect on him.
He pointed out that each MP's constituency varied in terms of social
and economic structure, and this too could have a bearing on the type
of issue constituents would lobby on. He described the composition
of his own, Glasgow Kelvingrove, as being 'rather elitist' with the
result that his constituents were 'very good at articulating demands
en all sorts of issues from the environment to the Third World'.33
Therefore, it was important not only that he knew his position on
issues of this sort, but that he could explain why he had adopted it.
This brought an element of personal conviction into the assessment.
It was of the utmost importance that an MP made a decision on grounds
that could be sustained. He remarked, 'The MP's own view of the sit¬
uation is important and whatever decision or point of view taken, the
important factor is to be able to defend and sustain that position'.31
This sentiment was repeated by Iain Sproat (Cons. Aberdeen South) .
He explained that personal conviction played a part in some way in
most decisions an MP had to take, but it was especially important on
moral issues when free votes were in operation. He carmented:
'As an MP the public assesses your character. Same
people in politics are felt to be trustworthy and
to speak with ccnviction while others are not.
People might not necessarily agree with the senti¬
ment being expressed but they would knew it was
based on conviction'.34
In this manner the character of an MP could be an important factor in
the outcome of decisions. He held up Lord Boothby and Willie Ross as
examples who were in this mould.
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Public meetings and surgeries could also play a part in shaping
an MP's opinions, although varying degrees of importance were attached
to them. Dennis Canavan (Lab. West Stirlingshire) for example, found
public meetings a useful means of assessing public opinion as he was
able to cbtain some measure of feeling through the questions and res¬
ponses. In a similar fashion, Iain Sproat thought that on 'neutral
occasions', such as coffee mornings, he could mix freely with people
and hear their opinions on different issues. However, this factor
was not so important for Neil Carmichael. He indicated that he ten¬
ded to mix with 'political people' most of the time so it was diffi¬
cult to see and appraise what 'ordinary people' were thinking. It
was a situation he regretted, but moving within political circles
rarely gave him the chance 'to meet the people in the pubs and clubs'.
He also had his reservations about the usefulness of surgeries as
indicators of popular feeling, since very often those attending were
seeking advice and assistance with their problems, rather than offer¬
ing opinions.
Pressure groups were also an influence. Robert Hughes thought
that organised and informed opinion could be influential especially
in situations where the MP was undecided. Iain Sproat, however, was
cautious about the role of pressure groups. He responded:
'Pressure groups can be important. It depends on an
MP's experience and character of how important he
lets them be. Pressure groups can have particular
interests and vested interests, of whatever kind,
can be dangerous to democracy'.35
There was a need to balance particular points of view because an MP
could do an injustice to society as a whole by focusing on a particu¬
lar interest to the exclusion of all others, he thought.
A rather delicate and sensitive source of influence was that of
religion. This was an influence which MPs agreed was extremely
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difficult to assess. Robert Hughes for instance, revealed that 'the
Catholic Church can have a considerable effect on sane MPs'.36
No doubt a similar statement could be made about the Church of Scotland.
The difficulty of assessing the depth of religious conviction was cap¬
tured by Neil Carmichael when he remarked, 'religion is important in
shaping opinion but it is impossible to quantify since it is not even
dependent on being religiously active'.37
Another indicator affecting an MP's judgement which was thought
difficult to quantify was the media. However, it is an Important gen¬
eral factor in an MP's appraisal of public opinion. The media oould
have quite a dramatic effect at particular moments. Iain Sproat said
that he could be 'sparked off by certain ideas, but it depended on the
time, place, mood etc. '. He added, "The press can make things seem
more important. It can focus attention on specific matters to the
detriment of others'.3 8 Neil Carmichael concurred that the media could
be influential and he personally found "The Sunday Mail' a useful in¬
dicator of popular feeling. The media, he thought, oould threw up
the occasional surprise in that sometimes there would be a big response
to an issue which previously had not been considered that important.
Likewise, issues which might be expected to cause a stir could some¬
times go largely ignored.
All of these factors, and no doubt some others, play an important
part in an MP's appraisal of public opinion. Sometimes pulling in
different directions, sometimes working in conjunction, these factors
tend to prey upon an MP's consciousness (and conscience) so that
assessment becomes a kind of filtering operation'.39 The assessment
is, then, a matter of individual judgement and as MPs are by their
very nature political animals, an element of 'selectivity' inevitably
creeps in. As Barker and Rush have pointed out, an MP needs information
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only partly for its own intrinsic sake and, beyond that, judges it
in the practical, political terms of what good it does him and his
political position to take the trouble to absorb it. They have
argued that:
'Politicians are advocates of public issues and use
"information" of various kinds to support their
opinions. This means that they are selective in
their information up to and beyond the point where
they will ignore or suppress information which may
undermine the force of their case or the informa¬
tion on which they feel it is based' ,40
In other words, MPs, like the rest of us, will tend to play up
factors which reinforce their personal biases, while playing down
those which are not in accord with their way of thinking.
What then, did MPs feel public opinion to be on the issue?
Personal judgement of public opinion tended to vary from MP to MP,
but there were certain broad areas of agreement. A number of MPs,
for instance, felt quite simply that there was no demand for reform
in the earlier part of the seventies. Harry Ewing (Lab. Stirling,
Falkirk and Grangemouth) , said that as far as he was aware 'there
was no public opinion clarrmering for reform'.41 He felt that the
continued failure of Private Members' legislation throughout the early
seventies was an indication that opinion was against them. By the
mid-seventies though, he thought that 'a constructive desire for
change had emerged'.42 The feeling of seme MPs was that Scottish
opinion tended to be more conservative with a small 'c', on such
social issues. Malcolm Rifkind (Cons. Edinburgh Pentlands) consid¬
ered Scottish public opinion to be more 'traditional' and this was
reflected on MPs' early opposition to divorce reform. There were a
number of reasons for this, he indicated, the two principal ones
being the greater proportion of working class opinion in Scotland
which manifested this 'traditional' quality and the underlying
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influence of religion in opinion formation.
Donald Dewar endorsed this view that different cultural tradi¬
tions existed north of the border. He pointed to the higher percen¬
tage of church membership in Scotland and emphasised the heavy Roman
Catholic view concentrated in the West. Since a great deal of sip-
port for the Labour Party caire from Catholics, Labour MPs in the
early 70s were not inclined to persuade people that reform was neces¬
sary. Leo Abse (Lab. Pontypool) also attached importance to the
'primness in the Scottish attitude' which he attributed to the
Calvinist ethos underpinning Scottish morality.1'3 He indicated that
when he had sounded out the opinion of Scottish MPs during the pass¬
age of the English Bill in the sixties, they had been reluctant to
support reform, lb have included Scotland in that provision would
have jeopardised the whole Bill since the Scots MPs would have most
certainly obstructed its passage.
Iain Sproat suspected that there may have been ambivalence in
Scotland on the issue in as much as the Soots may have liked the
idea of greater freedom, but deep within themselves felt opposed to
the break-up of the family. He suggested that opinion in Scotland
may have lagged a little behind in the sense that 'Scotland does not
have London which generates a metropolitan ethos'.^^ Consequently,
pressure for reform was slcwer to build up.
Robin Cook's analysis was that while an element of personal con¬
viction was bound to be involved in an MP's appraisal, MPs did feel
that they were reflecting public opinion. He revealed, 'A number of
MPs felt inhibited to support reform because of what they felt public
opinion to be. MPs felt they were in harmony with public opinion
since they considered public opinion to be hostile to reform' .45
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Underlying this issue is the theoretical relationship between an
MP and his constituents. The classical statement on this relation¬
ship, widely quoted, came from the 18th century statesman Edmund
Burke:
'Their wishes ought to have great weight with him;
their opinion, high respect; their business,
unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice
his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to
theirs; above all, ever, and in all cases to prefer
their interest to his cwn. But his unbiased opinion,
his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he
ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any
set of men living ... Your representative ewes you
not his industry only, but his judgement; and he
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices
it to your opinion' .45
In this scenario then, an MP's judgement ultimately prevails,
but not before he has given constituency opinion 'high respect'.
This too, has been noted by Pater Richards, who has found:
'... when the Whips allcw a free vote the spirit of
Burke is resurrected and Members beccme jealous of
their independence. As free votes are limited to
questions on which party alignments are inapplicable,
no cne can be accused of lack of party loyalty.
Even so, Members do not care to offend what they
know to be a majority view in their constituencies...'.47
In the early seventies then, it would appear that Scots Members
did not support reform in sufficient numbers because they believed
public opinion was not entirely sympathetic to change.
V. Public Cpinion: The Media
Press coverage of the Scottish divorce issue in the early seven¬
ties tended to highlight the differences which prevailed in the law
north and south of the border. On the day Willie Hamilton was set to
introduce his Ten-Minute Rule Bill, 23rd January 1973, the 'Daily
Fecord' reported that 'Scotland's divorce laws were once way ahead
of England and Wales ... but our laws have been lagging behind now
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for two years1.4 8 The report went on to draw attention to the anom¬
alies which had arisen and to the need for parliamentary time to be
given to debate the issue.
A few days earlier, the 'Glasgow Herald' ran an in-depth feature
under the headline 'More Scottish divorce but no reform of the law'.49
It recorded that since the English system had been reformed it was
widely felt in Scottish legal circles that it would only be a matter
of time before a similar reformation took place in Scotland. The
'Herald' ccmmented on this state of affairs, 'The delay is a matter
of concern The subject at least demands full discussion by our
parliamentary representatives'.50 It proceeded to explain to its
readers that the Bill would be introduced by Willie Hamilton under
the Ten-Minute Rule procedure, but since the Government of the day
under Mr. Heath had refused to give it special treatment in the way
of extra time, it would have little chance of success. The feature
then suggested that the Bill -would have stood a much better chance if
it had been selected by Willie Hamilton when he won his place in the
1972-73 Ballot. The 'Herald' explained:
'Instead, Mr. Hamilton opted for women's rights.
Other Scottish MPs who were also high up the list
by-passed the divorce reform because the Scottish
anti-reform lobby in Parliament is still strong
enough to make the progress of any reform Bill
extremely difficult'.5^
In response to this pieoe Professor I. D. Willock of the Faculty
of Law, University of Dundee, wrote to the 'Glasgow Herald' suggesting
that the resistance to divorce reform in Scotland stemmed frcm reluc¬
tance to allcw separation for five years as a ground without the con¬
sent of the spouse defending.52 He advocated that there was no reason
why off er desirable reforms should be held up until public agreement
was obtained on this issue.
387
A 'Glasgow Herald' leader echoed this sentiment in March 1973.
It commented that 'apart from the untidiness of being out of step
with England on this question, it is certainly time that in Scotland
the matrimonial offence was finally buried and that the irretrievable
breakdown of marriage was substituted as the sole ground for divorce'.53
A year later in May 1974, when Willie Hamilton was introducing
his second reform Bill, Professor Willock commented in another letter
that Scotland could very easily have a simpler divorce law based on
the desire of one or both spouses for divorce and conditional upon
their living apart for a certain period. He pleaded:
'Could our two major religious denominations not agree
that in an increasingly secular society, such a
settlement though perhaps short of their ideals, is
worth campaigning for?',5 4
When Robin Cook introduced his reform attempt in January 1975,
the 'Daily Express' ran the headline 'MPs cheer as new Bill is given
go ahead' and added in the first paragraph that 'there will be fury
among MPs if it fails'.55 Emphasizing the number of attempts, the
'Glasgow Herald' announced 'Fifth Bill for divorce reform' but warned
that because the Bill had been introduced under the Ten-Minute Rule
procedure its future was 'problematical' .56 Ttoo months l iter the
'Herald' informed its readership that discussions were taking place
between the Bill's sponsor, Mr. Rcbin Cook, and Government Ministers
over the question of parliamentary time, but that Mr. Harry Ewing,
Under Secretary of State at the Scottish Office, remained non-committal.
It was at this time that T. G. D. Galbraith repeatedly objected to
Robin Cook's Bill receiving a formal Second Reading and he sought to
explain himself in the letters page of the 'Glasgcw Herald'. He wrote
that 'there is nothing unusual in the treatment of Mr. Cock's Bill
(though that seems to be the impression) ; and that most Bills of
substance, whose sponsors have not secured a high enough place to
ensure debate, get "blocked" each Friday'.57 As the sequence of
objections continued the 'Aberdeen Press and Journal' noted that the
'Scottish Divorce Bill fails again'.58 In April the 'Daily Mail'
reported that 'MP ends fight for divorce reform',59 while in May "Ihe
Scotsman' announced that Robin Cook had formally withdrawn the Bill
'after it became clear that the Government would not intervene to
provide time for the measure'.^ 0
Ihe summer months of 1975 witnessed increased pressure for divorce
reform. There were talks between the Law Society and the Scottish
Office and aggrieved MPs began to speak out even more vociferously,
ridiculing the Government' s priorities which had found time for a
debate on hare coursing but not for Scottish divorce. In June the
Earl of Selkirk introduced a Divorce Reform Bill in the House of
Lords and won an unopposed Second Reading. "Ihe Sunday Times' repor¬
ted of a 'New attempt to reform divorce, Scottish style' and indica¬
ted that there were 'signs of a breakthrough for the reformers'.61
But when the Bill reached the Commons in July, the 'Scottish Daily
News' reported Edward Short, Leader of the House, as saying, 'I
regret that this very important and very necessary Bill has very
little chance of reaching the statute book this session' .62
In the new 1975-76 Parliamentary Session the divorce issue once
more came onto the agenda. In late December "Ihe Scotsmen' disclosed
that there were 'Duplicate divorce Bills "for safety"'. The Earl of
Selkirk was again proposing to take his divorce reform Bill through
all its stages in the Lords 'as a precaution against procedural
blockage of the identical Commons Bill sponsored by Mr. Iain McCormick' .
But by February 1976 the 'Daily Express' was able to report confiden¬
tly, albeit with split infinitive, that 'Iain McCormick is expected
j«y
to finally succeed in reforming Scottish divorce laws'.64 Then in
March a relieved 'Record' announced that the 'Divorce Bill clears
hurdle'. Its opening paragraph informed its readership that Tory
MP Tam Galbraith 'whose own divorce went through under English law
last year failed in the Cannons ... to hamstring the new Scottish
Divorce Bill'.65 Finally, with the passing of the provision, the
'Evening Times' was moved to corment that the new Divorce (Scotland)
Act would oome as a 'God-send to people who have been caught for
years in the agony of unhappy wedlock' .6 6
A good cross section of the Scottish press would appear to have
been favourably disposed towards divorce reform. As the seventies
progressed the Scottish press became increasingly irritated that
divorce law north of the border remained unchanged. The press was
thus influential in helping to create a climate of opinion which was
conducive to reform.
VI. The 1976 Divorce Reform.
The Divorce (Scotland) No. 2 Bill was presented and read a First
Time on 17th December 1975. It was the 'No. 2 Bill' because the Earl
of Selkirk had introduced the same Bill in the Lords on the 25th
November. The Bill was being sponsored by Iain MacCormick (SNP,
Argyll) who had won 4th place in the Private Members Ballot. In cne
very important respect it was a remarkably courageous decision for
him to introduce the Bill for he was a Reman Catholic with definite
religious beliefs about this issue. He conmented in his introductory
speech:
'...it quickly became apparent to me, especially since I
was the only Scottish Member to be lucky in the Ballot
that I did not have much alternative. I had to seek to
introduce a measure that was genuinely necessary and
important and that would affect the whole of Scottish
society',6 7
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He pointed out that the law had been reformed in many European and
Commonwealth countries as well as in England and Wales, so it was of
the utmost importance that Scotland caught up.
The aim of the Bill was to make provision for those whose marri¬
age had broken dcv/n and were no longer married in any meaningful sense.
The provisions of the Bill bore a striking similarity to those of the
English measure. The main change, and point of contention, lay in
subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 1. Subsection (1) provided that the
sole ground on which divorce could be granted in future would be that
the marriage had broken down irretrievably. Subsection (2) set out
the five conditions from which irretrievable breakdown was to be in¬
ferred. Three corresponded to the old matrimonial offences of adul¬
tery, cruelty and desertion and there were two new conditions which
provided that breakdown was to be inferred by a period of two years 1
separation if both spouses consented to the divorce, and a period of
five years' separation if one spouse unilaterally sought divorce.
The Bill also contained provisions relating to reconciliation and to
aliment which were similar to their English counterparts.
MacCormick emphasised on Second Reading, however, that the Bill
was not to be viewed as simply a carbon copy of the English enactment,
to make Scots law the same as English law on the issue. Sensitive to
the criticisms which had been levelled against him on this score, he
stressed:
'Whatever the opponents of this measure may think, it
does not represent a retreat from an unyielding and
fundamentalist Scottish attitude on the subject. Qi
the contrary it allows Scots law to recover what it
has recently lost - namely, leadership in a sensible
civilised approach to divorce'.6 8
This though, was not good enough for Tarn Galbraith who launched
into a scathing attack on both MacGormick and the Bill. MacCormick
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was criticised for having 'wasted a great opportunity' , while the Bill
was no more than a 'sham' . His fears were that the Bill would 'remove
the structure of contract as the support of marriage', that divorce
would be made easier and that a 'spiritual vacuum' would be created.
Further, he vigourously defended his previous stance on the divorce
issue and slated Rcbin Cock for the 'attempted character assassination'
and 'arm-twisting' after his vetoes on earlier reform attempts. He
carmented:
'We axe present in this House not to question each
other's motives or to seek to denigrate perfectly
respectable arguments on purely personal grounds.
If we are to do our jcb properly, we must examine
carefully and critically, as well as sympatheti¬
cally, in accordance with our cwn view of what
public interest requires, whatever proposals are
put before us'.6 9
The reference to the 'attempted character assassination' was to
the disclosure that Galbraith himself had been divorced under the
English reform while at the same tirre blocking progress on the
Scottish measure. For the present, of most interest in this statement
was the reference to 'our cwn view of what public interest requires'
which illustrates the manner in which MPs can place primary importance
upon their own judgement of public good,
Galbraith's solution to the shortcomings of the Bill was a rather
complicated system which revolved around a concept described as a
' family centre'. A provisional outline of this system suggested that
the ' family centre' would operate as a kind of clinic for broken
marriages and associated family problems. Upon initial deterioration
of the marriage, spouses would come along to the centre and register
their desire for divorce, whereupon the staff would move into action
in an attempt to affect a reconciliation. The idea was that even if
the marriage was not saved, the social services would at least assist
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each spouse to care to terms with divorce. Both in the principle upon
which divorce should be granted, and the emphasis placed upon the need
to attempt and facilitate reconciliation, the idea was not that far
removed fran Church of Scotland thinking on the issue. However, the
scheme was fraught with practical difficulties which effectively buried
it in Ccrrmittee.
Underlying Galbraith's thinking was the concern that Scotland was
imitating an 'imperfect Act of the English'. He argued:
'If there is to be any justification for a separate
legal system we should lock at each prcblem with
fresh eyes and not simply follow what is done in
England'.70
Galbraith's case then, was based on the principle that policy should
be formulated to meet particular Scottish requirements.
The opposing view, that is the case for uniformity in policy
areas of this nature, was put by both Rcbin Cook and Malcolm Rifkind.
Rcbin Cook felt that there was now strong public feeling in favour of
reform and one of the prime reasons for that feeling was 'the general
sentiment that the law as it affects individuals within a united
country, should be broadly comparable and similar'.71 In a similar
vein Malcolm Rifkind pointed to the irony of an SNP member introduc¬
ing a Bill of this kind, 'because it emphasises that in the sphere of
personal laws, as in so many others, it is undesirable and unnecessary
that we should have in this small island separate legal states for
different members of our community'.72
The crux of the matter then, is whether Scotland should on these
occasions formulate social policies which are distinctive and designed
to meet its cwn particular requirements or whether legislative reform
should be directed towards making the law north and south of the bor¬
der roughly ccmparable so as to allow for uniform practice throughout
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Great Britain. One preliminary answer at this stage might be that
Scots Law need not be different to English law simply for the sake
of being different, but it is important that political and adminis¬
trative mechanisms exist whereby a decision can be taken to formulate
different legislation when particular requirements appear to warrant
it. In other words, individual instances of uniformity or divergence
may not in themselves be as important as the capacity of Scottish
Members to reach independent decisions on the appropriateness of
uniformity or divergence in any given case.
Despite taking an opposing line to Galbraith, Rifkind rather
surprisingly attempted to justify Galbraith's stance on previous
Bills. He stated:
'He vindicated completely any suggestion that his
opposition to previous measures was the result
of any blind reaction and made it clear that it
was because of his own very special belief that
a more humane and sensible alternative could be
put forward'.73
Ihe role and motives of Tarn Galbraith will be discussed at a later
stage.
The Government's position was given by Harry Ewing who indicated
that the Government believed the existing law, with its emphasis on
the concept of guilty and non-guilty parties, might not new reflect
the views of the majority of people in Scotland. The Government was
particularly pleased that the Bill provided an opportunity for the
whole question to be debated fully.
The Bill proceeded to its Carnriittee stage in March and was dealt
with in four sittings. Right at the outset Tarn Galbraith moved his
complex series of amendments to alter fundamentally the structure of
Clause 1. The amendments, hewever, were unceremoniously torn apart
on the grounds of practicality. Harry Ewing, for the Government,
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indicated that there would be a number of administrative difficulties
in setting up the structure for conciliation. Malcolm Rifkind simply
remarked that it would put the lav of Scotland back some 500 years
since its effect would be to remove the conditions of adultery,
cruelty and desertion frcm Scots law. All in all the weight of the
Ccnmittee was so overwhelming against the amendments that they were
defeated in division by 12 votes to 1.
Another issue which provided a good illustration of the 'unifor¬
mity' versus 'divergence' argument concerned the period of five years'
separation. Ttoo amendments were tabled, one by Nicholas Fairbairn
(Ccns. Kinross and West Perthshire) who wished to see the period for
unilateral divorce reduced from 5 years to 3, while the other, by
Robin Cook, suggested a 4 year period. They both argued that there
was no particular logic in the figure of 5 and that it was only in¬
cluded because it was the figure used in the English measure.
Further, they were of the opinion that the difference between divorce
where both spouses consented and divorce where consent was withheld
should only be a minor one, since after 3 or 4 years of separation
there was not much doubt that the marriage had broken down. In such
situations there was no good reason to ' prolong the agony'. Cook put
his case thus:
'We may find that there are further reforms of the
English law en divorce within the not too distant
future, and if we constantly bring ourselves into
line with what the English have always done we are
liable to find ourselves lagging behind and having
to catch up with what they have just done' .74
On the other hand it was argued by Malcolm Rifkind that the five
year period would give the law a degree of uniformity throughout
Britain. Although he was aware that public opinion in Scotland on
the issue had changed he thought that the amendments were based 'on
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a fundamental miscalculation of the public mood'. Further, he believed
that there was 'grave concern amongst many people about the appropri¬
ate and desirable reforms which should be made in the lav/ of divorce'.75
In opposition to the amendments he argued:
'I believe that at a time when public attitudes are
changing only slcwly - perhaps merely evolving, if
one welcomes the changes that are taking place -
it is desirable in itself that the legislation that
we support should not be too radical as to offend
many who feel that their spouses have maltreated
them'.76
Lastly, it was his contention that,
'Much of the desire in Scotland for the reform of
the divorce law stems frcm a widespread feeling
amongst the public in Scotland that the criteria
for divorce and other circumstances should be
broadly similar throughout the United Kingdom'.77
The arguments presented by both sides were nothing if not sincere
and there was clearly great difficulty in trying to provide a rigid
statutory period to accommodate such a large number of completely
different cases and situations. What was of interest once again was
the way in which the opposing schools of thought assessed public
opinion. Cook's case was that opinion would accept a Scottish inno¬
vation to reduce the period of separation from five years to four,
whereas Rifkind considered such a provision too radical for an evolv¬
ing public consciousness. The underlying fear was that the amendment
would undermine the regard in which the institution of marriage was
held by the vast majority of Scottish people. The amendment was thus
rejected and the period of separation retained at five years. That
the 'uniformity' school of thought won through is perhaps indicative
of a Scots penchant for caution. Nevertheless, the issue highlighted
hew different calculations of the public mood can prevail amongst MPs,
affecting hew innovative they are inclined to be.
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Another example of an innovation thought to be 'moving too far
too quickly' arose when George Reid (SNP, East Stirlingshire and
Clackmannan) tabled an amendment to give jurisdiction in actions of
divorce to designated sheriff courts concurrently with the Court of
Session. He argued that such a provision would relieve the congestion
in the Court of Session; contribute towards savings in expenses; reduce
the inconvenience to partners in a divorce action who had to travel
significant distances; and allow a fuller hearing of actions involving
children and finance. However, the legal establishment was well rep¬
resented on the Committee with Lord Jarres Douglas-Hamilton (Cons.
Edinburgh West) , Nicholas Fairbairn and Malcolm Rifkind. All advocates,
they opposed the amendment. It was argued by them that congestion
would not in fact be relieved since many sheriff courts in Scotland
were already overloaded, particularly in Glasgow where soma three-
quarters of Scottish divorces occurred; that expenses would not be
reduced since extra administrative costs would be incurred; that it
would have far reaching repercussions for the legal system and the
legal profession; and that in any case, it would be best dealt with
by a different Bill.
One must be careful in attributing to the legal profession
ulterior motives in arguing for the retention of divorce actions in
the Court of Session, but certainly self-interest is a consideration
which cannot be lightly ignored. There would appear to have been a
fundamental split in legal circles over the issue. On trie one hand,
the Law Society favoured the hearing of divorce cases in the Sheriff
Court if that was the wish of the parties concerned, with option to
go to the Court of Session left available. The Faculty of Advocates,
on the other hand, rejected any such proposal and maintained that
divorce ought to be heard only in the Gourt of Session.
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When interviewed, one advocate offered reasons.78 He rejected
at the outset the argument that retention of divorce in the Gourt of
Session was merely a ploy to keep young advocates in work and felt
that this type of criticism only served to detract from the main
issues involved. He considered it essential in matters such as
divorce that uniform standards be maintained and this could only be
done in the High Court. While it was not for him to cast aspersions
on any sheriff, there was evidence to support the contention that
there was a certain lack of uniformity in decisions throughout the
country. Further, he thought that hearing divorce cases in the Court
of Session in Edinburgh could not really be considered a gross incon¬
venience in a country the size of Scotland. In any case a shift of
divorce proceedings would necessitate a major review of the jurisdic¬
tion of all Scottish courts.
These arguments, however, were viewed with some scepticism by
the Law Society of Scotland. When questioned on the vociferous
parliamentary opposition of the advocate MPs to divorce in the
Sheriff Court, a spokesman for the Law Society would only say - 'One
is entitled to draw one's own conclusions'79; as oblique a comment as
one might expect frcm that august body.
However, in the Committee debate the argument that was of most
interest was the one presented by Douglas Henderson (SNP, Aberdeenshire
East). While conceding that a very strong argument had been made on
the grounds of cost and convenience in favour of the amendment, he
felt that the proposed reform 'moved too far too quickly'. Admitting
the reform to be desirable he advised the Committee 'to reflect care¬
fully as to whether this is the right Bill in which to insert: it, and
to remember our responsibility to our constituents and the vast bulk
of the Scottish people in attempting to bring about a reform in the
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law which has taken so many years and involved so many people' .80
It was perhaps something of an irony that it was a member of the SNP
who was pleading for restraint on a Scottish social reform. SNP col¬
league Margaret Bain (SNP Dunbartonshire East) also concurred:
'I think most of us here want to see the reform in terms
of the concurrent jurisdiction going through also, but
most of us are worried that we could lose the basic
premise of this Bill by trying to be too radical at
this time'.31
In a similar vein the Government position was given by Harry Ewing who
argued that,
'this is a desirable provision, but unfortunately,
certainly for the moment and for a few years ahead,
it is not a practical proposition, and it could
easily be overtaken by the report of the Royal
Carmission'.82
The amendment was in the end rejected by the smallest of margins
- by 7 votes to 6 (Table 8.15) . The most striking feature of this
division was the solidarity displayed by the advocates! Ronald King
Murray (Lord Advocate), Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, Nicholas Fairbairn
and Malcolm Rifkind all combined to vote against the amendment. How¬
ever, there seems little doubt that if it had been passed in Committee
it would have been rejected on Report, otherwise the Bill would have
been in serious jeopardy. Thus for the sake of a reform in the prin¬
ciple of the law, rather than in the procedure, the concurrent juris¬
diction amendment was sacrificed.
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The Bill was Reported, read a Third Time and passed to the Lords
in the month of June. By now there was little controversy left sur¬
rounding the issue and the remainder of the Bill's passage was more
or less a formality. However, one exchange in the Lords highlighted
the procedural difficulties which had plagued the reform. Lord Wilson
of Langside complained of the unacceptable delay in the reform of the
divorce law and found it 'deplorable that we should have had to wait
seven years for remedial action' . He queried:
'... in light of the much more effective handling of
an analagous situation seme 40 years ago, has the
Minister ,.. reviewed the matter with a view to
avoiding similar delays arising in other areas of
equal importance to the people of Scotland? I Imagine
that he would readily agree that to neglect such a
review, after the regrettable history of this situation,
would be the reverse of competent government. I venture
the view somewhat tentatively that if, over the last
decade or two, there had been more meticulous attention
to this kind of thing by Scottish Office Ministers there
might be less political restlessness in Scotland today'.83
Lord Kirkhill, the Government spokesman, refused to be drawn hew-
ever, dismissing the issue as being irrelevant to the Bill. He would
only comment that 'the pace of legislation of this kind should be re¬
lated to the rate of public and social acceptance of it on the
Scottish scene and in my view the pace and timing was about right.,8h
It is to this 'pace and timing' of the reform that we turn in the
next section.
VII. Obstacles to Reform and the Swing in Opinion.
English divorce law was reformed in 1969 yet a Scottish measure
did not appear in the statute book until 1976. How can this 'delay'
be explained? What were the ' obstacles' to reform? Was there a
'swing' in public opinion and hew can it be accounted for?
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Che principle reason, already outlined, for the da lay in the
Scottish reform was insufficient support for it amengst Scottish MPs
in the early part of the seventies. Voting on the Hughes Bill revealed
a Scottish majority against reform as most MPs around this time asses¬
sed Scottish opinion as unsympathetic to the measure. In addition,
while certain sectors of 'informed' opinion had oome out in favour of
divorce law reform there was virtually no active organised pressure
to premote change. These points have been discussed more fully in an
earlier section and need not be repeated here. In this section the
aim will be to focus on some of the less overt reasons for the delay
in divorce law reform in Scotland.
A contentious issue throughout the whole protracted struggle for
divorce reform was the question of parliamentary time. A number of
MPs felt that there was insufficient time devoted to the issue which
was indicative of Parliament's inability to handle Scottish business
effectively. Scottish Nationalist, George Reid, extrapolated a case
for a Scottish Assembly on these grounds. He argued:
'If there has ever been a well established case for
Scottish law being brought back to the Scottish
people through the agency of a Scottish Parliament,
it is the long and sorry story of six years delay
in introducing a measure such as this' . 8d
Reid also found support from a rather strange parliamentary bedfellcw
in the shape of Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, who contended:
'Although Scotland may have less than 10 per cent of
Britain's population, we need more parliamentary
time allocated to us. This Bill is a good case in
point. There is not sufficient time when Scottish
Bills become of importance and relevance to a large
number of Scotsmen'.86
What was particularly galling to a number of Soots at this time
of devolution fervour was that the English reform of the sixties had
been allocated parliamentary time in order to secure its passage
401
whereas the Scottish reform attempts of the seventies were consistently
denied any such assistance. Rcbert Hughes explained though, that this
was something of a red herring since there were different administra¬
tions in the sixties and early seventies. He disclosed that the
Labour Government of 1964-70 had been favourably disposed towards
allocating time for Private Members' Bills which it thought socially
beneficial. In this way the Abortion Bill, the Divorce Bill and the
Homosexuality Bill had all been given parliamentary time to enable
them to be enacted, without the Government ever adopting formal sponsor¬
ship. However, the Conservative Government of 1970-74 was opposed to
giving parliamentary tine to Private embers 1 legislation, adopting
the policy that each Bill must stand or fall on its own merits.
Donald Dewar concurred with this argument and added that it had to be
remembered that the Bills in question in the late sixties had proceeded
quite a long way on the legislative path and had engendered consider¬
able support over a period of time. This, he felt, was different frcm
giving parliamentary time from the start to an issue on which feeling
still had to be sounded.
On these grounds he could 'not accept a conspiracy theory against
Scottish business as a lot of time was devoted to Scots Law, more than
people realised',87 However, this was not to deny that some of the
delay might possibly be attributed to certain aspects of procedure.
The Private Members' system probably contributed to the delay on two
counts. Firstly, the system was quite literally a lottery and it
needed not only a Scots Member to win a place in the first eight, but
also one who was sympathetic. Secondly, there was the problem of
getting the measure through e :n if a ballot place was won, as only
a limited nurrrer of reforms ever stood a realistic chanoe of being
enacted. He commented though, that these problems, while arguably
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contributing to the delay of Sacttish divorce law, were difficulties
which faced all Private Members who wished to legislate, and were
not particular in any way to Scots Members.
One of the MPs most closely involved in the English reforms of
the sixties was Leo Abse, who revealed the background to those measures.
He indicated that it had been a great advantage to him to have 'allies
in the Government who were ready to battle for tine' .88 Those allies
were John Silkin, the Government Chief Whip, and Roy Jenkins, the Home
Secretary, who were prepared to assist major pieces of social legisla¬
tion with parliamentary time in those cases where the House had indi¬
cated its approval of the proposed reform. Thus, personal contact and
friendship between Abse and high ranking Ministers in the Labour
A±riinistration were of the utmost importance to the English social
reforms of the late sixties.
It was probably such personal contact that enabled him to write
later:
'I have been too long in the Commons in any event to
elevate importance to procedures and rules. Members
in recent times have squandered years of effort
devising changes in our procedure and rules in the
magical belief that this will improve our government.
Procedures, however, are man-made and can be man-
avoided. I have never found any rule or procedure
in the House which effectively obstructed me from
obtaining my objective: rules, however, must be
shyly dodged and of course, simultaneously,
elaborate overt, genuflections must be made to them'.89
Such a statement, however, may be more reflective of Mr. Abse's
confidence, dynamism, intelligence and personal influence as a back¬
bencher, than of the experience of less able backbench colleagues.
When it was put to h±m that his cwn experience might be somewhat less
than typical, he did qualify his original statement. He responded
that he did 'not mean to suggest that the machinery is of no inportanoe,
more that people tend to blame the machine instead of themselves'.90
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In this respect then, Abse's apparently limitless energy and drive
can be considered a factor of vital inportance in the reform of
English divorce law.
Strangely enough, although by an altogether different route,
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton has since come to the similar conclusion
that parliamentary rules are there to be used. Given his party's
current line on devolution, a rather embarrassed lord James has had
to backtrack on some of his statements of the mid-seventies. He has
tried to justify his rather exuberant outburst in favour of more time
for Scottish business, and even a Scottish Assembly, on the grounds
that he had had only ' a limited experience of the House'. He has
since commented:
'If opportunities within the rules of the parliamentary
system are properly used, such matters can be dealt
with. The fact that legislation did not go through
earlier may have been because Scots MPs did not feel
sufficiently strongly. If they had, it might well
have been possible to have got Private Members'
legislation through',91
Parliamentary time must be considered an important factor contri¬
buting to the seven year 'delay' in Scottish divorce reform, although
one must be careful as to the reasons why. The Private Members'
Ballot system, with its emphasis on pure chance, had an effect. Yet
as Donald Dewar pointed out, this system operated for all MPs and
its drawbacks and pitfalls apply to the entire House and not just to
Scottish Members. However, in the Scottish case, even although there
were repeated attempts to initiate reform, the Government of the early
seventies were unwilling to assist with parliamentary time, as the
previous administration had done in the sixties. Further, Scotland
did not have a character like Leo Abse pushing for reform. His drive
and enthusiasm, along with his personal influence, greatly assisted
English reform. Nor, it would appear, did Scotland have a particularly
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sympathetic ear in the Cabinet to appeals for reform, as was the case
in England. This was another important factor.
Scotland's man in the Cabinet is the Secretary of State for
Scotland and during the period in question there were three different
Scottish Secretaries, Gordon Campbell (1970-74), Willie Ross (1974-76)
and Bruce Millan (1976-79). Gordon Campbell, it seems, was not parti¬
cularly interested in the issue and had 'no great convictions about it
either way' according to his fellow Conservative Iain Sproat. That,
in combination with that Government's general policy on Private
Members' legislation, put paid to any hopes for assistance of parlia¬
mentary time. His successor, Willie Ross, was even less favourably
disposed to reform, indicated the same source. A number of other MPs
confirmed Willie Ross's reluctance to get involved in the issue.
Neil Carmichael, for instance, felt that Ross's Calvinist persona
prevented the reform from making any progress. Robin Cook had personal
experience of this. He indicated that on his own Bill in 1975 he had
asked Bob Mellish, the Government Chief Whip, for parliamentary time
by putting dcwn a motion to have the Second Reading in the Scottish
Grand Committee. Mellish accepted the motion and sent a letter to
that effect, but because of the Easter recess Cook did not receive it
for some weeks. However, in the interim period Willie Ross came to
learn of this concession and so had exerted pressure on Mellish to
withdraw the offer, which he subsequently did. Cock conceded that
there was every chance that the motion would have been voted down,
but the important thing was that it would have been on the Order Paper
and therefore would have had to receive sore discussion. He was later
to write:
'We shall not knew why the Government steadfastly
refused throughout 1975 to grant time for Scottish
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divorce law reform until those involved publish
their memoirs, and perhaps not even then. At
the time it appeared to be sheer obstinacy...' .92
It is impossible to knew for sure since public access to the
Legislative Conmittee of the Cabinet is not permitted, but the finger
of suspicion does point towards the higher echelons of the Scottish
Office.
This scenario fits well with the remarks made by one very prom¬
inent figure in the Scottish Office in the mid-seventies. He said
that Ross's main interest was Scottish economic issues and in this
respect 'he had a tremendous grasp of Scottish industrial problems' .
He sincerely thought that 'history would show Willie to be one of
the great Scottish Secretaries'. However, 'as far as social reforms
were concerned, Willie Ross was not an innovator'.93
The influence of the third Scottish Secretary of this period,
Bruce Millan, in the divorce issue was negligible in the sense that
the MacCormick Bill had already made good legislative progress by the
time he took office. However, his thoughts on the matter are worth
referring to. The issue, he said, traditionally rested with Private
Members' legislation, but this was not necessarily nor wholly right.
He felt that 'if it is an important enough issue there is no reason
why the government should not provide time',9k However, the reason
why governments were reluctant to do so was that the government usually
ended up getting itself into difficulties. In allocating parliamentary
time to one issue they were then subjected to demands to allcw time
for competing issues. Rather than be faced with the problems that
such a situation presented, governments preferred to adopt a stance
of neutrality and assume a lew profile in matters which were of con¬
cern to Private Members.
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Another individual figure to feature prominently in the divorce
debates was T. G. D. Galbraith, who was by far the most controversial
antagonist to reform. He opposed reform vehemently throughout the
early seventies and personally took it upon himself to be present on
every occasion that a Bill came before the House on a Friday afternoon
for Second Reading in order to object to its progress. Cook viewed
this occurrence, as noted earlier, as an 'elegant little ritual',
whereas Galbraith looked upon Cook's approach as 'arm-twisting1 and
accused him of 'character assassination'. Cock has since suggested
that Galbraith's dogged opposition did more than anything else to
marshall public opinion in favour of divorce law reform. Others, how¬
ever, have argued that Galbraith was the victim of gross misrepresen¬
tation. So hew then, is Galbraith's position to be viewed? What
were his motives for such fierce and persistent opposition?
Perhaps it is only fair to let the man himself speak first:
'I thought, where there was a different legal system,
Mr. Hughes' Bill was introduced too soon after the
English legislation to benefit from experience of it.
As for Mr. Cock, he was in such a hurry he wanted to
legislate without ever having a Second Reading debate
on the principles of what was trying to be done'.9 4
His main reason then, was that he was objecting to the Second
Reading debate 'going through on the nod'. He was backed up in this
by his colleague Malcolm Rifkind who said that;
'Tarn Galbraith emphasised all along that his opposition
was on the grounds of parliamentary principle. He was
fundamentally opposed to a Second Reading going through
on the nod. This obviously could be frustrating to
other MPs. However, he was opposed on principle to a
piece of legislation passing forward without an oppor¬
tunity for proper debate'.9 9
He had publicly defended Galbraith because he felt 'his opposition was
sincere and was based on an alternative, and was not just for the sake
of being obstinate'.96 Although he defended his right to have an
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alternative proposal he did not necessarily agree with the proposal
itself.
Similarly, Harry Ewing felt that Galbraith 'fully explained his
position on Second Reading where he introduced the idea of family
centres'.37 Ewing was of the opinion that Galbraith objected for
'valid democratic reasons' since he wanted a chance to explain his
position fully in a proper debate on the issue. He thought that
Gaibraith had made some very good contributions on Committee, but had
often been 'badly misrepresented'. This sentiment was shared by
Donald Dewar who suggested that 'he was perhaps not as dishonourable
as the press made out'.3 8
Another of his colleagues, Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, indicated
that 'the reason he stated in public was that he was opposed in prin¬
ciple to the Bill going through the Second leading on the nod'.33
Given such a carefully worded reply had there been any other reason?
'No' , responded Lord James, it had not been his intention to imply
that there had been any other reasons. 'Strictly speaking', he added,
'MPs should not say what their colleagues views are'.
One MP who did think that there might have been other reasons
was Neil Carmichael who felt that 'Tarn's divorce may have had its
effect'. AJLso he thought that Galbraith had never quite recovered
frcm being removed from Ministerial office in the early sixties. He
revealed, 'Tarn had all the makings of a future Secretary of State, but
he was shattered at being sacked by MacMillan over Vassal'.100
Jhe fact that Galbraith had been divorced under English law while
opposing Scottish reform was a matter of public knowledge. What was
not widely kncwn though was the circumstances and the effect of the
divorce upon him. One MP who did not wish his comnents to be attribu¬
ted, remarked that Galbraith was 'psychologically distraught over his
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own divorce'. It would appear that Galbraith's wife had left him for
his increasingly homosexual tendencies and that he could not come to
terms with being abandoned. 'His inner torment was transferred to
the public sphere where he single mindedly opposed divorce reform'.
Such an insight reveals something of the 'assumptive world' of
Galbraith and tends to fit into the 'psycho-political' analysis that
Leo Abse used to assess the motivations of his fellow MPs. Abse has
written that 'politicians can use public events as a screen upon which
to project private travail'.101 His argument is that:
'... there remains a stubborn refusal to face the fact
that no less fateful consequences flew frcm the psycho-
pathology of our leaders. Their actions are fundarren-
tally influenced by the quality of their reality test¬
ing. If their feelings, affects and emotions so
distort external events, then their relations to them
may, with lamentable consequences for us all, be
singularly inappropriate. We cannot therefore extend
to the public man the same rights of privacy to which
the private citizen is entitled'.102
Ihe analysis though, is not without its difficulties. The state¬
ment by the MP which ascribes to Galbraith's behaviour motives arising
from his psychological state cannot, in any formal sense, be verified.
The validity of the MP's inference is based upon his cwn assessment
of the situation, and this in turn may reveal something about the
observer's own assumptive world and psychological state. Hie infer¬
ence then, is acceptable only in so far as it remains an assertion.
It is valid in as much as it is ' one man' s opinion'.
The role of Tarn Galbraith in the divorce issue was then a rather
complex affair. On the one level the explanation for his recalcitrance
lay in his objection on principle to a reform Bill proceeding without
prcper debate. On another level it lay in his psychological disposi¬
tion towards the subject, a disposition attributed to him by a fellow
MP, and a disposition which implied a subliminal hostility towards
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divorce reform. Corroborative proof that it was the second of these
reasons, rather than the first, that propelled him to obstruct the
passage of the reform, is difficult, if not impossible to obtain.
Given the nature of his circumstances, one can only say that his
emotional state may have had seme bearing on his judgement concerning
divorce law reform. Whether it did or not, there can be no denying
that Tarn Galbraith, for whatever reasons, was one of the major
'obstacles' to reform. Moreover, his obstructionism seems to have
been at least one of the factors involved in arousing public aware¬
ness on the issue.
Another factor which played a part in bringing the divorce issue
to the attention of the public was the 'cross-border problem'. Under
the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 it was possible to
obtain a divorce in an English court if a period of residence in
England could be established by the parties involved. This lead to
a situation where people were shifting from Scotland to live in
England in order to obtain a divorce under English law. In the opin¬
ion of Harry Ewing the desire for Scottish reform stemmed largely
frcm the public reaction to this 'cross-border problem'. 'As this
problem became more acute it highlighted the need for reform', he
said.10 3 Dennis Canavan similarly remarked that ' the old laws were
certainly anomalous and there was no doubt that shady practices con¬
cerning the switching of domicile, arranged adultery, etc., were
evident'.104 The law Society of Scotland also agreed that during the
time the law in the two countries was out of line there had been a
great many instances where domicile had been changed so that the
divorce action could be made in England. The Society felt that this
was unsatisfactory. A member of the Faculty of Advocates, Mr. Menzies
Campbell, thought it important however, not to overemphasise this one
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factor. It was not really the number of cases that was of importance,
it was the 'sense of injustice' that was engendered by the law of the
two countries being different.
This 'sense of injustice', that Scotland was being denied advan¬
tages which English already possessed, was of considerable importance
in helping to swing widespread public feeling in favour of divorce
law reform. Donald Dewar ccrrmented, 'the fact that the English already
had it assisted' .105 Malcolm Rifkind felt that by 1976 there had been
a sufficient change of opinion to allow the MacCormick Bill to proceed
with relatively little opposition. One reason for this change was the
relative success of the English measure and the realisation of the need
for comparable legislation in Scotland. He said:
'By 1976 the need to modernise the law was not a
controversy. There was some dissent as to how
it should be modernised - some for instance
wanted to reduce the separation period or have
divorce in the sheriff court - but the majority
were certainly agreed on the need to have a
roughly comparable divorce law for Scotland'.106
Robert Hughes spoke in the House in 1976 of this transition in public
feeling:
'It is often said in discussions that Parliament
is insensitive to public opinion. I am not sure
that this is true. It may be that what happened
in 1971 reflected public opinion at that time;
public opinion may not have been ready for a
change. Inoeed, I had many letters at the time
to the effect that Scotland by that measure would
merely be hanging on England's ooat tails. My
correspondence has now changed. Its tone now is
to the effect that it is wrong that England should
have advantages denied to Scotland. It is a
curious anaraly flowing from separate legal systems'.10 7
Rcbin Cook has also identified this swing in opinion in his analy¬
sis. He has estimated that the tide of opinion turned at around the
time of his own reform attempt in 1975 due to the public's frustration
at its prolonged obstruction in Parliament. Consequently, it is his
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contention that the reform of Scottish divorce law was delayed, not
through lack of parliamentary time, but because a majority of Scottish
Members were opposed to change until the mid-seventies. He has argued:
'It is not surprising that scire MPs smart under
the injustice of a public opinion that blames
them new for not implementing ten years earlier
reforms which that same public opinion would
probably not have tolerated at the time'.108
While this chapter has acknowledged the role of MPs and their
appraisal of public opinion as being an important factor in the 'delay'
of Scottish divorce reform, this section has endeavoured to bring to
the fore other important reasons why Scottish reform tock seven years
longer to achieve than its English counterpart. It is here contended
that the factors outlined in this section, viz. parliamentary time
(albeit conditional upon the qualifications expressed earlier); the
influence of key political actors, i.e. the Secretary of State for
Scotland; and the motivation of the 'lone campaigner' against reform
in the shape of Tarn Galbraith, were also important considerations con¬
tributing to the 'pace and timing' of the legislative reform of the
divorce laws.
VIII. Conclusion
Hie divorce reform is another issue which has to be viewed in the
context of the political climate in Scotland in the 1970s and also in
the context of Scottish history. It has already been noted on several
occasions that after the Union of 1707, Scotland, although assimilated
politically, maintained its 'civil society' of which the Church, the
education system and the legal system were concomitant parts. It not
only retained distinctions in certain areas of law but also preserved
some of the differences in social mores. The divorce issue highlighted
these differences yet at the same time illustrated the duality in
412
Scottish politics, being both dependent and independent within the
wider British system.
Organised pressure for and against change was confined in England
to a relatively small number of bodies and in Scotland to an even
smaller number. As far as the major professions were concerned,
medicine had very little to say on the subject. This left the churches
and the legal profession as the main protagonists in the debate. In
England, the Divorce Lav Reform Union, a single-issue pressure group,
made an important contribution towards achieving reform, but in
Scotland no such equivalent group appeared on the scene to lobby as
forcefully for change.
The parameters of the divorce debate were very much set by the
events in England. The appearance of the Church of England's 'Putting
Asunder' in 1966 and the Law Commission's review 'The Field of Choice'
set out the main options for consideration. The follcwing year the
Scottish Law Commission's 'Divorce: The Grounds Considered' more or
less adopted the same recommendations, revising them only to meet the
requirements of Scots Lav. It was not until the 1968 General Assembly
that the Church of Scotland came out with independent proposals for
Scotland. They were bo prove the most radical proposals of all. New
while the Church of England and the Law Cormission were able to find
common ground and work out a set of compromise recommendations which
were eventually to form the basis of the reformed English law, the
Church of Scotland and the Scottish Law Commission found it much more
difficult to reach this cammon position. The result was that while
both the Church of Scotland and the Scottish Law Commission, and
indeed the Lav/ Society of Scotland and the Faculty of Advocates,
favoured reform, none of them could agree which type of reform would
be most appropriate. With no common ground there was a lack of unified
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(or uniform) pressure for change throughout the first half of the
seventies. On the other hand the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland,
because of its doctrinal teachings, was single minded in its opposi¬
tion to any proposed reform. This influence seems to have had an
effect on at least some MPs.
The role of different governments was of particular importance
to the success or failure of the various reform attempts and attitudes
within Labour and Conservative administrations varied markedly on the
issue. There is no doubt whatsoever that the allocation of parliamen¬
tary time to Alec Jones' Divorce Reform Bill in the 1968-69 Session
was crucial to the success of that provision. This, of course, was a
feature of the 1966-70 Labour administration which gave additional
time to other Private Members' Bills considered to merit fuller public
debate than Private Members' business allowed. The liberal attitudes
of the Hare Secretary of the period, Roy Jenkins, and the Government
Chief Whip, John Silkin, had much to do with this generousity. In
stark contrast the 1970-74 Conservative government made it known that
Private Members' legislation would have to stand or fall on its cwn
merits since no extra parliamentary tine would be forthcoming, irres¬
pective of the perceived importance of the issue. And this stance was
maintained by Labour's Willie Ross when he returned to the Scottish
Office in 1974.
Since divorce was an issue involving a free vote, party politics
did not feature in the debate in the same way as with whipped legisla¬
tion. But it was interesting to record the skirmish between the par¬
ties over the 1964 Divorce (Scotland) Act and to speculate on the
motives behind its introduction just before an Election. Labour, of
course, perceived the Bill to have been introduced to stir up internal
religious disputes and to tarnish the Party as being unnecessarily
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cbstructionist in its attitude. That incident and the different
approaches of successive Labour and Conservative governments apart,
the issue does appear to have engendered a fair amount of cross-party
voting.
Being a subject for Private Members, the role of individual MPs
was of paramount importance. Without any shadcw of a doubt the most
influential MP in the English divorce reform was Leo Abse. He was
the one who rekindled the debate in the early sixties and later per¬
suaded first William Wilson and then Alec Jones to pranote Private
Member's Bills. And it was Abse who cajoled the Labour Cabinet
(through Jenkins and Silkin) into granting additional parliamentary
time for debate.
In the protracted struggle for Scottish reform a number of Scots
MPs featured prominently. Donald Dewar, Robert Hughes, Willie Hamilton
and Robin Cock were all active in urging divorce reform in the early
and mid-seventies. It is interesting to note in the passing that they
were all Labour MPs although Conservative support was forthcoming from
Alick Buckanan-Smith, the Earl of Dalkeith and Malcolm Rifkind. Hew-
ever, the most influential figure in the Scottish divorce issue did
not reside in the ranks of the supporters of reform, but in the oppos¬
ing ranks. Tam Galbraith single-handedly opposed the progress of a
number of Divorce Bills on countless occasions. His motives have been
discussed at length earlier, but ironically his dogged opposition may
have had the reverse effect from that intended, by focusing public
cpinion on trie need for reform. Also, Willie Ross, as Secretary of
State in the mid-seventies, must be considered a figure of influence.
It was upon his unsympathetic ear that the reformers' pleas for parlia¬
mentary time fell, pleas which were greeted with the official response
that divorce was a matter for Private Members' legislation.
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Parliamentary procedure was of critical importance in both the
English and Scottish reforms. The biggest hurdle that a Private
Menbers' Bill has to overcome is lack of parliamentary time. Due to
the vagaries of Private Merrbers' Business, only a very limited number
of such Bills stand a realistic chance of success. However, the
English reform Bill of Alec Jones, which came only ninth in the
Ballot, was greatly assisted by the additional time allocated by the
Labour government. In stark contrast this facility of extra time was
never accorded to any of the Scottish reform attempts in the 1970s
and it was postulated above that this was due initially to the policy
of the Conservative administration and latterly to the persona of
Willie Ross.
A government's position on the allocation of additional parliamen¬
tary time can vary dramatically. However, in reply to a parliamentary
question in April 1967 about the government's principles when deciding
to provide time for Second Reading debates on Private Menbers' Bills,
Richard Crossman, then Leader of the House, spelled out some of the
criteria.109 The considerations included the state of the Government's
own programme; the prospects of the Bill in Private Members' cwn time,
and the effect on other Private limbers' legislation; the amount of
interest in and support for the measure; the progress the Bill had
made; and the government's attitude to the Bill.
Thus, public interest in a Bill can affect its chances. In the
case of Scottish divorce reform the influence of public opinion was
open to varying interpretations. On the one hand, some MPs felt that
the fact that a Bill had been introduced in virtually every Parliamen¬
tary Session of the first half of the 1970s was indicative of a public
desire for reform, whereas on the other hand, opposing feeling was
that the continued failure of Private Members' legislation was an
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indication that opinion was against it. Of course, those who adopted
the former position tended to support reform while those who favoured
the latter interpretation were more inclined to oppose it.
Defining public opinion is problematical. It was V. 0. Key who
suggested that to talk, with precision of the idea of public opinion
was a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost.110 There¬
fore, it is important to outline the different categories of public
opinion under discussion. Public opinion is rarely, if ever, homogen¬
eous and so cannot be reduced to a single type. It has been suggested
in this chapter though, that it may be possible to reduce it to a
limited number of types in which predominant or prepondering opinion
can be established. Tie categorisation adopted here has been based
on MPs' appraisal of feeling at large, organised opinion in pressure
groups and views expressed in and by the media. These categories are
to a certain extent arbitrary and others may view public opinion dif¬
ferently. However, the important point is that whatever the categor¬
isation adopted it must be made explicit.
This chapter has suggested that what MPS thought about public
cpinion on the divorce issue depended a great deal on their own values
and beliefs and on who they took to represent public opinion. As Hall
et al have noted:
'Assumptions about the pervasiveness of certain public
values and beliefs are moulded by the values and
beliefs of those who do the judging, as well as by
the sources frcm which they obtain their information1.111
The tendency, therefore, was for MPs to utilise and quote that section
of public opinion which did most to support their personal predilec¬
tions. That is why, during the course of the debates, there was such
an abundance of confusion as to the state of Scottish public opinion,
because very often MPs would be using different categories and talking
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at cross purposes.
An expression of Lord Windlesham can be aptly applied to Scottish
opinion at large on the divorce issue:
'In the sense of popular opinions widely held,
public opinion is more of a negative, limiting
factor: a way of estimating what the public
will stand for rather than an expression of
what the public wants '.112
Frcm this standpoint, Scottish MPs appear to have felt, at least in
the early 1970s, that Scottish opinion would not, in this sense,
'stand for' divorce reform.
The positions of the principal pressure groups have been well
aired. Suffice to repeat here that their lack of agreement and the
lack of any sustained lobbying on their part added further to the
confusion over the state of public opinion. In contrast the Scottish
press was more consistent. "Ihe Scotsman', 'Glasgow Herald' and
'Daily Record' all repeatedly drew attention to the anomalies which
existed in the law north and south of the border and urged that par¬
liamentary time be found for a proper discussion of the issue. Ihe
more 'delay' was perceived the more aggrieved became the reports.
The perceptions of those within Parliament also greatly influen¬
ced the course of events. Ihe values of Tarn Galbraith and Willie
Ross, already noted above, were probably the easiest to identify.
But the values of others did impinge upon the political history of
Scottish divorce reform in lesser ways. The opposition, for instance,
of the advocates in Parliament, Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, Nicholas
Fairbairn and Malcolm Rifkind to the amendment to give jurisdiction
to designated sheriff courts concurrently with the Court of Session
has to be understood in relation to their 'assumptive world'. An oppo¬
sition based on professional self-interest, while difficult to prove,
is certainly something which should not go unconsidered. As in the
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other case studies then, values, notwithstanding the methodological
problems associated with their identification, have to be taken into
account when trying to explain why particular policies emerge as they
do.
While there were clear differences in the way in which the
divorce reforms north and south of the border came to be enacted, the
differences in policy content, at least in terms of the general prin¬
ciples, were not so obvious. What differences did exist lay largely
in the technical and legal requirements of Scots Law. The Scottish
divorce reform then, was very much influenced by the norms which
already prevailed south of the border.
Yet, the 'swing in opinion' and, ultimately, the acceptance of
divorce reform resulted frcm changing social and political circumstan¬
ces which effectively increased native awareness of Scotland's
'disadvantages'. A 'sense of injustice' developed in the mid-70s
concerning both the nature of the reform and the procedure available
for obtaining it. Not only was it a case of Scotland not having as
liberal a law as prevailed in England, it was also another manifesta¬
tion of the wider search for a Scottish identity, political and other¬
wise. Scottish business was being brought into question as part of
the much broader debate on constituticoal reform.
Robin Cook has perceptively spotted a paradox in this: that the
pressure for uniformity in personal law should have come at a time
when popular opinion also appeared to want a separate legislature for
Scotland in order that it might pass its own different laws.113 The
demand for divorce reform was in part a product of the new social con¬
fidence and political aggressiveness of the period; but it was also in
part a product of Scotland's historical position within the British
political system.
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It is again being suggested in this conclusion that the 'Scottish
dimension' in this particular reform lies in all of the aspects dis¬
cussed above, that is, in the lack of agreement amongst the principal
interest groups - the churches and the legal profession - and in the
lack of any single issue pressure group pushing for reform; in the
varying degrees of sympathy displayed tcwards the issue by successive
Labour and Conservative administrations; in the actions of individual
MPs and in the values they brought to bear upon the matter; in the
confusion over the state of Scottish public opinion; and in Scotland's
airbiguity towards change. Separate Scottish laws may engender separate
politics and administration, but they need not always engender separate
policies.
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CHAPTER 9
Homosexual Law Reform : A Scottish 'Non-Decision'?
I. Introduction
The substance of this chapter is our third and last case study
which concerns the issue of homosexual conduct. In it the divergent
paths that the legislative reforms took north and south of the border
will be considered. The emergence of the homosexuality question as a
serious matter for debate is traced back to the 1950s, and changing
public attitudes toward the subject, pressures for and against reform,
and incremental policy developments are charted from that point. It
will be suggested that the lack of any legislative reform of the law
pertaining to homosexual relations in Scotland throughout the duration
of the 1970s was tantamount to a 'nan-decision' (or at the very least
the subject constituted a 'non-issue').
Like the preceding study on divorce, this case is concerned with
the way in which Scotland has maintained its cwn legal system requir¬
ing certain kinds of legislation to be framed independently. Further,
it is concerned with the way a distinction in social mores still per¬
sists to a great extent north and south of the border despite the
assimilation in the political realm of Scotland into the United
Kingdom. However, as was noted in Chapter 1, there was an ambivalence
in this assimilation -whereby Scotland could be both dependent and in¬
dependent within the British political system. Aspects of this dual -
ity are evident in this case study where Scotland can be identified
as acting dependently in attempting to cfotain a legislative reform,
but independently in its adnrinistrative interpretation and implementa¬
tion of the prevailing law.
In chapter 2 reference was made to Schattscheider's idea of the
'mobilisation of bias' to explain how some issues come to be organised
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into politics while others are organised out. Also discussed there
was Bachrach and Baratz's phenomenon of 'non-decision-making' . It
was advocated that researchers should interest themselves as much in
those areas where decisions are not made as where they are made. The
issue of homosexual law reform in Scotland offers the chance to exam¬
ine empirically seme of these ideas.
It was of course the homosexuality issue, and in particular the
Wolfenden Report, which sparked off the philosophical debate as to
the relationship between morality and the law and in this respect the
case offers further insights into the Devlin/Hart controversy on self-
regarding and other regarding action outlined at the beginning of
Chapter 3. In the parliamentary debates on the issue there are to be
found many examples of speakers defending Devlin's 'disintegration
thesis' on the grounds that to relax the law to permit homosexual
relations in private amongst consenting adults would invariably lead
to a moral declension which would undermine the fabric of society.
Conversely, others are to be found arguing that the community's con¬
ception of morality has to be placed under careful scrutiny before
an action can be ascribed as being criminal.
In Section II there is a historical perspective on the homosex¬
uality issue which briefly sets out the 19th century origins of the
law. Section III proceeds to take up the debate in the fifties, out¬
lining the pressures for change, the appointment of the Wolfenden
Committee, and the public and parliamentary reaction to its Report.
Developments in the sixties are recorded in Section IV. Here the
changing climate of public opinion is charted together with the various
attempts at legislative reform which culminated in Leo Abse's protrac¬
ted struggle in 1967 to secure the passage of the Sexual Offences Act.
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In Section V the 'Scottish perspective' on the homosexuality
issue is discussed. The opposition of Soots MPs in the late sixties,
the opposition of the Church of Scotland and the separate legal sys¬
tem which allowed for the Lord Advocate's policy of 'no prosecutions'
are some of the reasons expounded for Scotland's exclusion from Abse's
reform Bill. The changing attitude of the Church of Scotland in 1968
is then noted. This paved the way for the emergence in 1969 of the
Scottish Minorities Group and their political development and influ¬
ence in the early seventies is outlined. The section continues by
inquiring into the background of the Sexual Offences Consolidation
measure which appeared before Parliament in 1976, and is brought to a
close with a review of the attempts by Robin Cook and Lord Boothby to
initiate a reform in 1977.
The 'politics' of the 1980 reform then forms the basis of Section
VI. This involves a discussion of the way in which Robin Cook placed
a homosexual law reform clause into the middle of the Government's
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill and in so doing raised a storm of
political controversy.
Section VII discusses the point made above that homosexual law
reform in Scotland demonstrated many of the characteristics of a 'non-
issue' and some reasons why this should have been so are postulated.
Section VIII poses the question, 'Is this the way to reform important
Scottish legislation?'. This question arose in George Younger's
Camions speech and seme responses to it are considered. Finally,
Section IX offers seme concluding remarks.
II. Historical Perspective: The 19th Century Origins of the Law.
The tenor of modem criminal law relating to homosexual conduct
and practices was set in the late 19th century by the Criminal Law
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Amendment Act of 1885. The original purpose of this law was 'to make
further provision for the protection of women and girls, the suppres¬
sion of brothels and other purposes'.1 The Bill was introduced and
passed in the House of Lords without any reference to homosexual act¬
ivity. Until then the criminal law had not concerned itself with
alleged indecencies between adult men committed in private, only puni¬
shing acts against public decency and conduct tending to the corrup¬
tion of youth. Hcwever, in the Commons after a Second Reading without
comment, it was referred to a Caunittee of the Whole House, whereupon
a prominent backbencher of the period, Mr. Henry Labouchere, inserted
into the Bill a clause which was ultimately to become Section II of
the Act, creating the new offence of indency between male persons in
public or private. Section II read:
'Any male person who, in public or private, commits,
or is a party to the commission of, or procures or
attempts to procure the commission by any male per¬
son of, any act of gross indecency with another male
person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being
convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion
of the court to be imprisoned for any term not
exceeding two years, with or without hard labour'.2
There was no discussion except that one member asked the Speaker
whether it was in order to introduce at that stage a clause dealing
with a totally different class of offence to that against which the
Bill was directed. The Speaker having ruled that anything could be
introduced by leave of the House, the clause was agreed to without
further discussion, after an unopposed amendment by Sir Henry James
that the maximum punishment be increased from one year's imprisonment
to two.
Of course such conduct in public had always been punishable as a
criminal offence, but with the insertion of the words 'in public or
private', the new clause completely altered the basis of the lav/.
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Thus, the Labouchere amendment, introducing profound new restrictions
on private personal conduct, became law without any serious consider¬
ation of its implications. The lack of parliamentary discussion has
been explained by Professor Richards:
'Due to the prudery of this period homosexuality was
not a topic that oould be raised in polite conver¬
sation; the subject was buried beneath an oppressive
veil of silence, ignorance, distaste and condemnation.
It is perhaps unsurprising that no MP should be will¬
ing to challenge the Labouchere amendment and so
appear to condone homosexual activities'.3
The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 was applicable to Scotland
as well as to England and Wales and by and large the law relating to
homosexual offences was similar on both sides of the border. However,
there were some important divergences. In England, at the close of
the 19th Century, the Vagrancy Act of 1898 made it an offence for a
male to solicit persistently in a public place for an immoral purpose.
The provisions in Section I of this Act relating to importuning by
male persons were designed primarily to prevent men from trying to
obtain clients for prostitutes. Hcwever, they were used almost exclu¬
sively to deal with males importuning males for the purpose of homo¬
sexual relations. In Scotland, though, the corresponding provision,
the Immoral Traffioe (Scotland) Act of 1902 was never used in connec¬
tion with males soliciting for homosexual purposes, the authorities
taking the view that the Act was not intended to deal with this type
of offence.
Another important difference lay in criminal procedure. Under
the Scottish system criminal proceedings were in practice instituted
only by the Procurator Fiscal, acting in the public interest and sub¬
ject to the control of the Lord Advocate. This ensured a uniformity
in the prosecution of these offences which was absent in England and
Wales. Also, the fact that all but the most serious of these offences
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oould be dealt with summarily in the Sheriff courts, with a limited
maximum penalty, made for greater uniformity of sentence than was
apparent in England and Wales. Cne other important factor was the
need in Scotland to establish corroborative evidence in order to se¬
cure a conviction against a person or persons accused of a homosexual
offence. Since there were obvious difficulties in obtaining evidence
to corroborate offences alleged to have taken place 'in private',
prosecution rates for such offences tended to be substantially lower
in Scotland than in England and Wales.
The first half of the 20th Century saw no major change in the law
relating to homosexuality since the subject was still considered rather
distasteful and unwholesome for public discussion. So it was not until
the 1950s that the position began to change slowly as a greater frank¬
ness on sexual matters gradually became more acceptable, permitting
public re-evaluation of the issue.
III. The Fifties
The early fifties saw some unexpected activity from the Church
of England. Richards has recorded that in 1952 the Church of England
Moral Welfare Council initiated a study into the problem of homosex¬
uality. A report, by a group of clergy, doctors and lawyers, was pub¬
lished two years later in 1954. According to Richards, 'the liberal,
humane tenor of this document caused much surprise',k and indicated
the Church's desire for further and fuller investigation of the subject.
So much so that in conjunction with the Howard league for Penal Reform,
the Church of England formally approached the Hoire Secretary to init¬
iate an official enquiry.
His research also identifies other pressures working in the sane
direction such as the publicity surrounding the prosecution of certain
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public figures; the pronounced variation in police policy in England
on homosexuality which varied greatly between areas and in the sane
area at different times; and the kindling of parliamentary interest
in the matter.
In the Commons in an adjournment debate in April 1954 both
Desmond Donelly (Lab. Pembroke) and Sir Robert Boothby (Cons. Aberdeen¬
shire East) spoke strongly in favour of setting up a committee of
inquiry into the law relating to homosexual conduct. Sir Robert
remarked that 'on the facts as we know them, the case for such an
inquiry is overwhelming' ,5 Home Office acceptance of these demands
was announced by an Under Secretary, Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth, who indi¬
cated that the Home Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of
State for Scotland, had decided to appoint a committee to examine the
question.
In the following month the issue came up for debate in the House
of Lords where the tone of debate was altogether different. A speech
from Earl Winterton introduced the debate. He considered it necessary
'to offer some reason and justification ... for bringing forward this
nauseating subject' ,6 The propaganda which had brought the issue to
the fore, he suggested, had put the matter into a wrong perspective.
He referred to the 'filthy, disgusting, unnatural vice of homosexual¬
ity' ,7 and told their Lordships that in his younger days this type of
thing just was not tolerated:
'In my opinion, there has been a moral declension
... I am convinced that the majority of British
people agree with me that few things lower the
prestige, weaken the moral fibre and injure the
physique of a nation more than tolerated and
widespread homosexualism' .8
This provides a good example of the 'disintegration thesis' referred
to in Chapter 3.
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A similar tack was adopted by the Lords Vansittart and Airman.
Vansittart warned:
'I have an uneasy feeling that the increase in this
vice during the past half century will not be
checked without some balanced revival of the
reprobation with which it was once regarded' .9
While Artmon argued:
'... mere punishment will not provide a solution.
I believe it can be provided only by a rise in
the spiritual and moral nature of the people as
a whole, and we can bring about such a rise only
by shewing our abhorrence and detestation of
these filthy habits'.10
Hcwever, a different view was taken by the Lords Jcwitt, Ritchie
of Dundee and Brabazon of Tara. Jcwitt pointed to the mistake of try¬
ing to make the area covered by criminal law co-extensive with the
area covered by moral law, while Ritchie of Dundee commented upon the
need to consider changing public attitudes to the issue, which he new
felt were much more tolerant. Brabazon of Tara thought the issue to
be more clinical than criminal and therefore the need was to examine
the complicated question of breeding, environment, education and
other factors of this type. And Lord O or ley felt that too much of
the discussion had taken place 'on an emotional rather than on a
scientific level'.11
A Carmittee to enquire into homosexual offences and prostitution
was appointed later that sumier in August 1954 under the chairmanship
of Sir John Wolfenden. Hie Ccmnittee members were drawn from both
Houses of Parliament, both main political parties, medicine, the
legal profession and the main religious denominations in England and
Scotland. Its terms of reference were clear and straightforward:
'To consider (a) the law and practice relating to
homosexual offences and the treatment of persons
convicted of such offences by the courts; and
(b) the law and practice relating to offences
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against the criminal law in connection with
prostitution and solicitation for immoral
purposes'.12
The Committee tock evidence frcm a wide variety of organisations,
government departments and individual witnesses. The evidence was
presented in confidence although same institutions did subsequently
publish their submissions. Richards' research into this area though,
has indicated that 'the balance of influence and argument favoured
change'.13 He has singled out the Church of England Moral Welfare
Council's evidence as 'by far the most influential submission to the
Committee',111 discussing as it did the problems of homosexuals and
homosexuality in compassionate terms.
The approach of Wolfenden to the problem was set out early in
the Report. The Ccmnittee did not consider it appropriate to enter
into matters of private moral conduct except in so far as they dir¬
ectly affected the public good. The Report explained:
'Our primary duty has been to consider the extent to
which homosexual behaviour and female prostitution
should come under the condemnation of the criminal
1 ffyjt 15±GW •
In the field in question the function of the criminal law, as the
Committee saw it, was,
'to preserve public order and decency, to protect
the citizen from what is offensive or injurious,
and to provide sufficient safeguards against
exploitation and corruption of others, particu¬
larly those who are specially vulnerable because
they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced
or in a state of special physical, official or
economic dependence'.15
It was not, they argued, the function of the law to intervene in the
private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pat¬
tern of behaviour, further than was necessary to carry out those pur¬
poses outlined.
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Against this approach the Committee then sought to establish,
within the limitations of its remit, the nature of homosexuality.
The Report stressed the important difference between 'homosexuality'
and 'homosexual offences'. Utilising the dictionary definition of
'homosexuality' as a sexual propensity for persons of one's own sex,
the Report argued that homosexuality was a state or condition, and
as such did not, and oould not, cone within the purview of the crim¬
inal law. There was nothing criminal in being homosexual. That
established, it then remained for the Committee to decide what types
of homosexual activity could reasonably be deemed to constitute
offences.
The Comrdttee, in reviewing the existing provisions of the law
in relation to homosexual behaviour between male persons found that
they were in complete agreement with the great majority of provisions.
There were two categories of offence they wished to see retained.
The Coirmittee believed that it was part of the function of the law
to safeguard those who needed protection by reason of their youth or
some mental defect and therefore they recommended the retention of
offences committed by adults with juveniles. Secondly, since it was
part of the function of the law to preserve public order and decency,
the Committee held that when homosexual behaviour between males tock
place in public it should continue to be dealt with by the criminal
law. However, there was a third class of offence to which the
Committee 'had to give long and careful consideration' , that of homo¬
sexual acts committed between adults in private.
Cn the basis of the considerations advanced concerning the pro¬
vince of the law and its sanctions, and hew far it properly applied
to the sexual behaviour of the individual citizen, the Committee
reached the conclusion that legislation which covered acts in the
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third category mentioned, went beyond the proper sphere of the law's
concern. The Report stated:
'We do not think that it is proper for the law to
concern itself with what a man does in private
unless it can be shewn to be so contrary to the
public good that the law ought to intervene in
its function as the guardian of that public good'.17
While the Committee recognised the weight of arguments which
expressed genuine concern that homosexual acts, even in private,
threatened the public good, they were not persuaded that they warran¬
ted retaining the existing law for this third category and they pre¬
sented a nuirber of counter-arguments to that effect. However, the
counter-argument which the Cormittee thought to be decisive was
'the importance which society and the law ought to give individual
freedom of choice and action in matters of private morality'.18 They
accordingly recommended that harrosexual behaviour between consenting
adults in private should no longer be a criminal offence.
The Wolfenden Report also contained a substantial amount of in¬
formation which had an important educational impact on public opinion.
While the available statistical information was less than adequate it
nevertheless highlighted seme dramatic differences between the rates
of prosecution of homosexual offences in England and in Scotland. In
England and Wales, during the three year period between 1953 and 1956,
480 men aged 21 or over were convicted of offences committed in private
with consenting partners also aged 21 or over. Of these, however, 121
were also convicted of offences in public places, while another 59
were convicted of offences with juveniles. In Scotland, during the
saire period, 9 men over 21 were convicted of offences committed in
private with consenting adults. Of these, one admitted offences in
a public place and one admitted offences with a juvenile. Thus 300
men in England and Wales and 7 in Scotland, guilty as far as was known
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cnly of offences committed in private with consenting adult partners
were convicted by the courts during this period.
The Report noted that the nurrber of men prosecuted in Scotland
for homosexual offences committed in private with consenting adult
partners was 'infinitesimal' in comparison to the number so prosecu¬
ted in England and Wales. It continued:
'Frcm our examination of Scottish witnesses, including
the police and legal and medical witnesses, we are
led to believe that homosexuality and homosexual
behaviour are about as prevalent in different parts
of Scotland as in comparable districts in the rest of
Great Britain, and it seems to us that the disparity
in -the number of prosecutions is due to sane funda¬
mental differences in criminal procedure'.19
These differences in criminal procedure have been touched upon
earlier in a historical context. The Report established the same
essential areas of divergence. Firstly, it was the duty of the
Procurator-Fiscal to initiate and conduct proceedings in the Sheriff
Court in any case in which he considered the circumstances warranted
such action, but he was not bound to institute proceedings in every
case brought to his notice (although he was answerable to the lord
Advocate) . The overriding consideration was the public interest and
since no obvious public interest was discernible in the prosecution
of ' stale offences', proceedings in such cases were rarely instituted
in Scotland. Police did not therefore waste time in pursuing enquir¬
ies into old offences.
Another factor influencing the intensity of police enquiry was
the standard of proof required by law which was higher in Scotland
than it was in England and Wales. By the law of Scotland, no person
could be convicted of any homosexual offence unless there was evidence
of at least two witnesses implicating the person with the commission
of the offence with which he was charged, or corroboration of one
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witness from such proved facts and circumstances as would lead clearly
to a conclusion of guilt. While a written statement by the offender
admitting his offences afforded the necessary corroboration, as in
England and Wales, the rules relating to the admissability of state¬
ments tended to be more strictly interpreted in Scotland than they
were south of the border.
These requirements and differences, of course, operated over the
whole field of criminal law and were not particular to homosexual
offences. Yet it can be seen that the practical consequences of their
operation in the sphere of homosexual offences could produce pronoun¬
ced differences in rates of prosecution. The Wolfenden Report though,
had the slightly misleading tendency to compare these figures for
rates of prosecution between Scotland and England in absolute terms
rather than proportionally. Hcwever, the fundamental problem lay in
the overall statistical information available to the Committee. The
figures obtained were extracted largely from criminal and medical
records and therefore represented only detected offences or knom
cases. The Report conceded:
'it is impossible to determine what proportion of the
persons concerned these minorities represent; still
less on this evidence, what proportion of the total
population falls within the description homosexual'.20
The Wolfenden Report was published in September 1957 but it was
not unanimous in its main recommendation that homosexual behaviour
between consenting adults over 21 in private should no longer be a
criminal offence. Reservations were expressed by one Committee member,
Mr. James Adair, a Procurator-Fiscal from Scotland. The essence of
his reservation was that;
'the removal of the present prohibition from the
criminal code will be regarded as condoning or
licensing licentiousness, and will open up for
such people a new field of permitted conduct with
unwholesome and distasteful implications'.21
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Further,
'the fact that activities inherently hurtful to
oonrnunity life are carried out clandestinely
and in private does not adequately justify the
removal of such conduct from the criminal code'.22
Public reaction to the Report seems to have been divided along
much the same lines. Richards' research into the press coverage has
indicated that the national dailies which supported reform included
'The Times', 'The Daily Telegraph', 'The Guardian' and 'The Mirror',
while 'The Daily Mail' and 'The Daily Express' and most of the provin¬
cial press shared the doubts expressed by Mr. James Adair. He obser¬
ved, 'informed and metropolitan opinion appeared to be ahead of the
rest of the country'.23
Religious opinion was similarly divided. The Church of England
hierarchy generally approved the Wolfenden proposals but support from
the lower echelons was not as forthcoming, and although the Church
Assembly approved the cause of reform it was only by a slim majority
of 155 to 138. The Methodists also supported reform but contained a
dissentient minority. The Church of Scotland, however, came out
against any change in the law.
The Report of the Conmittee on Church and Nation to the 1958
General Assembly noted that Wolfenden was 'an event of urgent impor¬
tance to the Church of Scotland'.2'" Although there was general agree¬
ment within the Church that there were areas of personal conduct into
which the criminal law should not enter, that was not to say that the
criminal law should have no concern with ethical standards. The div¬
ision of opinion between those who accepted the reasoning and conclu¬
sions of the majority Report and those who shared the misgivings of
Mr. James Adair was repeated within the Church and Nation Carmittee
itself. While a special sub-committee on the issue had oome to a
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different conclusion, the majority of the Church and Nation Committee
did not feel able to recommend acceptance of the proposed changes in
the Wolfenden Report:
'In a Christian country, it seems to us, the law
should reflect as far as possible the generally
accepted standards and principles of Christian
ethics; and in the past such principles have
been the basis of many legal enactments. In our
opinion there are certain forms of behaviour that
are so contrary to Christian moral principles,
and so repugnant to the general consensus of
opinion throughout the nation that, even if
private and personal, they should be regarded as
both morally wrong and legally punishable
Homosexual offences seem to us to fall within
this category',25
The Church of Scotland then, adopted the same line as James
Adair, arguing that such a reform would suggest that homosexual con¬
duct was less morally reprehensible than was formerly thought. Thus,
'The General Assembly would regard such legal changes
as inopportune, as liable to serious misunderstanding
and misinterpretation, and as calculated to increase
rather than diminish this grave evil'.26
More favourable reaction came from seme of the secular organisa¬
tions involved such as the Howard league for Penal Reform and the
Institute of Social Psychiatry, who both urged adoption of the
Wolfenden proposals. The first specific pressure group on the issue
was also formed post-Wolfenden with the foundation of the Homosexual
Law Reform Society in 1958. It would seem though, frcm information
again provided by Richards' research, that mass opinion, as reflected
by opinion polls in the press, was only between 40 to 50% in favour
of reform.
The first parliamentary debate en the Wolfenden Report came only
a few months after it was published, in the December of 1957 in the
House of Lords. Again in keeping with the trend of that period the
balance of opinion amongst their Lordships was split evenly dewn the
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middle. Early speakers in the debate like Lords Pakenham and
Moyniham, spoke in favour of the proposals in respect of consenting
adults in private, backed by the Archbishop of Canterbury who, draw¬
ing attention to the differences between the sphere of crime and the
sphere of sin, argued that it was,
'of real importance for the national well-being that
the difference between the two should be clearly
understood, both as to the moral grounds they
respectively cover and as to the sanctions on which
the two spheres respectively rest'.27
The Marquess of Lothian, who had himself sat on the Committee urged
that if a change in the law was clearly and logically put before the
British public, they would see it as a just law, not a weaker law.
Hcwever, the Lord Bishop of Rochester did not agree:
'Ihere is no more baneful or contagious an influence
in the world than that which emanates from homosexual
practice.... Protection is needed here, and homo¬
sexuals should be kept on a leash to prevent them
from practising homosexual vice'.2 8
Similarly, the Lord Bishop of Carlisle contended that the conclusion
which the general public would draw from the abolition of the law was
that the State was condoning what previously it had condemned. Lord
Denning also felt that the lav 'should condemn this evil for the evil
it is, but the judges should be discreet in their punishment of it'.29
He suggested that England should adopt a system (similar to Scotland)
where the prosecution should consult the Director of Public Prosecutions
in cases of persons over 21 in order to ensure uniformity.
The Government's position was given by the Lord Chancellor,
Viscount Kilmuir, who indicated that they were taking careful account
of public opinion.
'There are cases ... when it may well be the duty of a
Government to lead rather than to follcw public opinion,
but in a matter of this kind the general sense of ccm-
munity, particularly as expressed in Statutes which
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have been left undisturbed for long periods, is an
important feature; and the community is entitled
to its view as to what affects society as a whole.
Her Majesty's Government do not think that the
general sense of the oomrtunity is with the Committee
in this recommendation, and therefore they think
that the problem requires further study and consid¬
eration. Certainly there can be no prospect of
early legislation on this subject'.3"
It was not until a year later, in late November 1958, that the
Commons eventually found time to debate the Report. Even after the
lapse of a year for further reflection the pattern of divided opinion
still prevailed. Speaking in favour of the Wolfenden recommendation
Anthony Greenwood (Lab. Rossendale) expressed sympathy for the homo¬
sexual,
'Life is harsh enough for these people without society
adding to their burden. The fact that the law is
largely unenforced, and, indeed, largely unenforceable,
is certainly no reason for retaining it. It seems to
me that one is as likely to cure a homosexual of his
perversion by sending him to prison as one is likely to
cure a drunkard by incarcerating him in a brewery' ,31
Sir Hugh Linstead (Cons. Putney) who had sat on the Vfolfenden Committee,
appealed that 'what consenting adults do in private can be morally re¬
garded as their cwn affair, a matter for their own conscience',32
Also, Mr. Douglas Jay (Lab. Battersea North) felt the existing law to
be obsolete and unjust because it infringed a basic principle of per¬
sonal freedom.
Speaking against the recommendation, Mr. F. J. Bellenger (Lab.
Bassetlaw) , wanted to strip away some of the 'false sentimentality'
and 'false romanticism' from homosexuality. He believed that 'any
arguments which can be advanced an grounds of logic are overwhelmed by
moral considerations and the public interest'.33 Mr. James Dance
(Cons. Bromsgrove) chose to beat his breast in a speech on law and
order:
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'There can be no question that this practice is a
social evil and that it undermines the morals of
the country1 ,314
he warned. Mr. Dance also felt obliged to offer the following sugges¬
tion:
'I do not think it would necessarily work now, but
when a cure is available I suggest that in the
same way as one sees those venereal disease posters
in male public urinals, similar notices should be
put up advising homosexuals that there is a cure
and mentioning the nearest clinic where they can
get that cure'.3 5
With insights like this Mr. Dance's grasp of reality was seriously
brought into question. Mr. Cyril Black (Cons. Wimbledon) , however,
preferred to use historical precedents upon which to base his opposi¬
tion:
"These unnatural practices, if persisted in, spell
death to the souls of those who indulge in them.
Great nations have fallen and empires destroyed
because corruption became widespread and socially
acceptable'. 3°
The arguments, then, had not changed in a year nor had the
Government's position. R. A. Butler, the Heme Secretary, indicated:
'.. .what is clear, after taking this time to think
it over and to receive all the impressions and
consider the perplexities of this problem, is that
there is at present a very large section of the
population who strongly repudiate homosexual con¬
duct and whose moral sense would be offended by
an alteration of the law which would seem to imply
approval or tolerance of what they regard as a great
social evil. Therefore, the considerations I have
indicated satisfy the Government that they would not
be justified at present on the basis of opinions
expressed so far, in proposing legislation to carry
out the recommendations of the Goirmittee'.3 7
IV, The Sixties.
The first vote on the issue came from a Private Member's motion
introduced by Kenneth Robinson (Lab. St. Paneras) in June 1960 calling
on the Government to take early action to implement the Wolfenden
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recommendations en hcmosexuality. Support for the motion came from
a number of prominent Labour members such as Eirene White (Lab. East
Flint) , Douglas Jay, Anthony Greenwood and Roy Jenkins (Lab. Birming¬
ham Stechford). Eirene White made the astute observation that,
'in considering the subject of male homosexuality
a number of men consciously or subconsciously are
moved to vehement condemnation by some feeling
that they have to assert their own virility in
the process'.3 8
A typical example was provided by Mr. Godfrey Lagden (Cons. Homchurch)
who was of the opinion that 'in the general run the homosexual is a
dirty-minded danger to the virile manhood of this country' .39 The
Government, however, remained unmoved and continued its policy of
neutral inaction on the grounds that very great differences of opinion
still persisted. These differences of opinion were manifest in the
division which was hostile to the motion by 213 votes to 99.
Leo Abse (Lab. Pontypool) has commented that whereas the resist¬
ances which occurred in the field of divorce reform came largely from
pressures on Members from outside the Commons, the resistances against
homosexual reform arose largely from the imperfectly resolved homo¬
sexual drives of some of the Members themselves. He has analysed the
mood of the 1959-64 Parliament thus:
'With homosexual impulses inadequately desexualised
and contained, any mention of a change of law meets
resistance. There was too much uncertainty among
too many in the Conservative Parliament. Permitting
more freedom to homosexuals was interpreted as a
personal threat: unknowingly they equated relaxation
of the law with the relaxation of the control which
they were anxious at all costs to preserve over
their own repudiated feelings'.1+0
Against this background Abse did try to put through a modest
reform in the 1959-64 Parliament which would have given effect to
some of the subsidiary recommendations of the Wolfenden Report but
not the main one concerning consenting adults in private. The Bill
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was talked out but it served two main purposes. Firstly, it was
instrumental in getting the Director of Public Prosecutions to ask
chief constables to consult him before prosecuting homosexual acts
committed by adults in private. Secondly, it helped to keep the
issue alive. Abse has indicated that 'the more the repressed material
was levered into public consciousness, the more the taboo cn discus¬
sion was weakened.... (A) fter the return in 1964 of a Labour Government
...honosexuality needed no longer to be spoken about in sanctimonious
whispers'.41
Peter Richards has made a similar observation on changing attitu¬
des to the issue in the early sixties. He has written:
'It is impossible to measure precisely the effect of
an educational campaign but the public attitude
towards homosexuality continued to change slcwly.
No longer was it merely a subject for automatic
condemnation by judges and moralists or for snigger¬
ing jokes about "queers". Increasingly it became a
fit subject for serious conversation...' ,l+2
This change was evident in a debate initiated by the Earl of Arran
in the House of Lords in May 1965. The tenor of the debate had altered
considerably with only two or three out of the score or so lords who
joined in the debate opposing law reform. Lord Jessel was moved to
comment, the reason for this change in atmosphere is, I am sure, based
on an increased knowledge of the subject'.43
Those who spoke in favour of altering the law in respect, of homo¬
sexual acts between consenting adults in private based their case 'on
reason and justice, and on considerations of the good of the community'.
Accepting the law as it stood involved the unjust persecution of a min¬
ority. Parliament oould not go on waiting for a public opinion which
could never be defined in hard and concrete terms. The time had ccme,
it was claimed, for legislation to move into line with the weight of
informed opinion. Administrative tinkering with the law was not an
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answer. Lord Stonhara -
'If the law is to be changed, it must be changed
by Parliament. Neither the Home Secretary, nor
the Attorney-General, nor the Director of Public
Prosecutions, nor chief constables, nor anyone
else, can properly implement the Vfolfenden
recommendations by administrative action or
inaction'.45
Thus, if a change in the law was to be made it must be by a Private
Merrber's Bill with the decision left to a free vote of Parliament.
Hie case against reform was put by Lord Rowallan, supported from
the sidelines by Lord Hdbson. Rcwallan's concern was the effect any
such relaxation in the law would have on the youth of the country and
he deplored 'any attempt to legitimise in any way the practices which
we have tried to bring up our young fellcws to abhor' ,1+6
The weight of opinion in this debate was overwhelmingly in favour
of a reform in the law. However, no division could be taken because
of the nature of the motion, which was a Motion for Papers, a proced¬
ural technique for initiating policy discussion. Nevertheless, en¬
couraged by the favourable response, the Earl of Arran introduced a
Private Member's Bill later in the same :nonth which managed to obtain
a Second Reading by 94 votes to 49. Debate on this occasion was not
so one-sided and Arran had to work hard to smooth troubled waters
when Viscount Montgomery took him to task over the legal position in
the Armed Forces. In spite of seme well entrenched opposition Arran's
Bill did manage to complete its passage through the Upper House and
was passed to the Commons although not until late October, by which
time the end of the parliamentary session was imminent and the Bill
was lost. The exercise though, had served to demonstrate that the
balance of informed opinion within the Lords had swung in favour of
reform.
445
Meanwhile, in the Commons, Leo Abse had taken the opportunity of
introducing a parallel Bill under the Ten-Minute Rule and although it
was defeated by 178 votes to 159, it too marked a watershed. Abse
was later to reflect,
'the majority against the reformers was wafer-thin,
and I knew that the bizarre and unpredicta Le
events of that afternoon, well reported to a be¬
mused nation the next day, meant that never again
would homosexual law reformers be on the defen¬
sive in the Commons'.117
The 1965-66 Parliamentary Session brought with it a high place in
the Private Members' Ballot for Humphrey Berkeley (Cons. Lancaster) , a
Member favourably disposed to homosexual law reform, and his Bill came
before the House for a Second Reading in early February 1966. In a
courageous and persuasive introductory speech Mr. Berkeley argued
intelligently as to why the law needed to be changed. The law, he
said, was not being enforced and that made for bad law. If the law
was bad it should be changed. He was supported by Mr. G. R. Strauss
(Lab. Vauxhall) who argued that in light of the misery and degradation
which homosexuals were forced to undergo, with the constant threat of
blackmail and fear of prison it was up to those opposed to change to
justify their view. Other supporters included Leo Abse and the Home
Secretary, Roy Jenkins, who believed that public opinion was now suf¬
ficiently educated to accept a reform.
Sir Cyril Black hcwever, felt that a difficult problem would not
be helped any by ' the State withdrawing its existing disapprobation
from acts which most people regard as loathsome and debasing' .48
This sentiment was echoed by Sir Cyril Osborne (Cons. Louth) , a self-
styled Victorian, who commented:
'I am rather tired of democracy being made safe
for the pimps, the prostitutes, the spivs, the
pansies and now, the queers. It is high time
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that we ordinary squares had some public attention
and our point of view listened to'.49
He warned that the Bill would open the flood gates, and all but accu¬
sed the sponsors of the Bill of sharp practice, because the Bill had
been brought forward on a Friday afternoon when none of the Scottish
MPs were present to oppose it. A disgruntled Sir Cyril remarked,
'It seems to ire that to bring this important social
measure before the House on a Friday, in the full
knowledge that the good Scottish Socialist Calvin-
istic MPs are away, is cheating'.50
The Bill received a Second Beading by 164 votes to 107, but it
was to make no further progress since a General Election was announced
and Parliament dissolved. The division shewed a quite substantial
movement of opinion as compared with Abse's earlier Bill. Professor
Richards' research into the voting pattern has explained this differ¬
ence as being due to the change in attendance at the two divisions,
rather than individual Members changing their minds.
With a new Parliament reassert)led, Arran once again started a
Bill in the lords. This managed to complete its passage through the
Lords by mid-June, at just about the time Abse gave notice of his
intention to introduce a Bill in the Commons. He was later to reveal
hew events were to unfold:
'Immediately, on his cwn initiative, Roy Jenkins,
then the Heme Secretary, sent for me and assured
me that if I could gain a decisive vote when,
under the Ten-Minute-rule procedure, I was to
ask leave to introduce the Bill, he would insist
at Cabinet level for government time to be given
to me. He was to prove as good as his word, and
my friendship with the Chief Whip, John Silkin,
was to guarantee that Jenkins' private undertak¬
ing to me was able to be fulfilled'.51
Abse duly introduced his Bill and with the help of the changed
composition of the House managed to win convincingly by 244 votes to
100. He continued:
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"Hie Government stance had to be one of neutrality:
but Silkin's assurance to me that, whatever pro¬
cedural obstruction I was to meet, provided I
could maintain a decisive majority, he, by hook
or by crook, would find the parliamentary time,
was to prove decisive'.52
The Bill eventually carre before the House for a Second Reading
in late December just before the Christmas recess. Introducing it,
Abse criticised the existing law for giving homosexuals a brutal
choice, offering them either celibacy or criminality with nothing in
between. He pleaded to those Members who were 'blessed with the
emotional security of a heterosexual life'53 to show compassion to
those whose terrible fate it was to be homosexual. This line was part
of a subtle tactical ploy of Abse who realised that in order to suceed,
the argument would have to be presented in a form which violated his
awn private beliefs, which were based on Freud's idea of the univers¬
ality of bisexuality. He was to remark,
'... to have pleaded Freud would have alarmed too
many in the House, insufficiently secure in their
own heterosexuality to acknowledge their homosex¬
ual dispositions.... But, of course, it was only
by insisting that compassion was needed for a
totally separate group, quite unlike the absolu¬
tely normal male males of the Commons, could I
allay the anxiety and resistances that otherwise
would have been provoked. Homosexuals had to be
placed at a distance, suffering a distinctive and
terrible fate so different from that enjoyed by
Honourable Members blessed with normality, child¬
ren and the joys of a secure family life. Because
of their wealthy endowment, they could surely
afford charity'.5 4
While many Members were persuaded by this theme, a number still
harboured doubts. Strong reservations were expressed by some over
the way in which the proposed reform would operate in relation to the
Merchant Navy. Abse hinted at the possibility of a compromise formula
being found if the Bill was allowed to pass to its Committee Stage.
He was sure that a detailed solution oould be worked out there.
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This hint was enough to reassure the waverers, but more importantly
it was part of his tactical plan to facilitate the passage of the Bill
through Gornxiittee.
The reservations of Sir Stephen McAdden (Cons. Southend East)
concerned procedure. He took exception to the Government allocating
time to allcw the issue to be debated and was most anxious that the
House should be clear en what was happening in the name of Parliamen¬
tary democracy.
'We have before us what is alleged to be a Private
Member's Bill, but it is a Bill to which quite
extraordinary privileges have been accorded'.55
A procedural motion had in fact been passed to allow the Second Reading
debate to continue beyond 10 p.m. In this light he had 'no respect
whatever for people who skulk on the Government Front Bench, unable
to ccne forward openly and say this is a Measure which they support,
but hoping that Private Msmbers will be able to sneak Measures through
the House...'.5 6
The Heme Secretary, Roy Jenkins, describing McAdden's contribution
as a 'somewhat extraordinary effusion', replied in a predictable manner
on behalf of the Government. He indicated that the fact that the
Government had provided time did not mean that the attitude collectively
of the Government was anything other than that of neutrality. It was
felt that since the principle of the Bill had been approved by the
Commons and the Lords on previous occasions, 'it was only right to
give the House the opportunity to accept or reject the change in the
law proposed'. He continued;
'Had we not taken this course, we should have found
ourselves faced with the anomaly that the sanction
of the criminal law continued to apply to acts
which Parliament no longer considered to be crimi¬
nal, and that solely because of the hazards of the
Private Member's Bill procedure the law could not
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be changed. It would clearly have been an unsatis¬
factory position, in which the police authorities
and the courts would have been required to go on
applying a law which had twice been pronounced, by
decisive majorities in both Houses, itself to be
unsatisfactory'.5 7
Having carried the Second Reading, Abse proceeded to put his tac¬
tical plan for the Committee Stage into operation. With the collusion
of John Silkin, he was able to follow up so quickly with a Coirmittee
Stage that opponents to reform were unprepared with their amendments
which would have prolonged the debate. Further, they erroneously as¬
sumed that the seafaring issues would prove to be protracted and that
tiire would later beccme available for them to debate their intended
amendments. However, in the interim between Second Reading and
Conmittee, Abse had reached a compromise solution with members of the
National Maritime Board concerning the position of the Merchant Navy.
Hie agreed clause, which in limited circumstances and with limited
penalties, retained homosexuality at sea as an offence, was put through
the Committee in a matter of half an hour. Since the remainder of the
amendments were of a minor nature, the Bill proceeded through its
entire Committee Stage at a single sitting of two hours. Abse was to
remark of this:
'My tactics, and this particular ruse, enraged my
frustrated opponents whose full fury was to be
flung at me, when the Bill reached its final
report stage on the floor of the House'.58
When the Bill did appear on the floor of the House on the 23rd
June a long series of wrecking amendments awaited it, tabled by Sir
Cyril Osborne, Mr. Ray Mawby (Cons. Totnes) and others. Hie Bill's
opponents embarked upon a series of long speeches designed to talk
the Bill out and they were successful in so far as the Bill had not
completed its Report Stage at the close of the sitting. Leo Abse
was reported in 'The Times' the following day as saying that it was
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sad that 'a small cabal can use the procedures of the House to thwart
the clear intentions of the overwhelming majority'.59 If the Bill
was not new to falter, more time was required. This was forthcoming
by way of a Government allocated all night sitting on the 3rd July.
However, in order to defeat the inevitable filibuster, Abse would
have to keep the strength of his support at a minimum of 100 Members
throughout the night so that he might move and sucoessfully enforce
a closure motion on each amendment, thus curtailing unnecessary
debate. This he managed to achieve on no fewer than nine divisions
throughout the course of the night, although on one or two occasions
he was perilously close to falling short. He later remarked:
'It was not the arguments on each occasion which
I had to counteracrt that caused me any difficul¬
ties: it was the knowledge that if one or two
bored MPs went hare I was totally undone and the
Bill would be killed'.60
With the last remaining hurdle cleared the Bill progressed to
the Lords to complete its passage. Being the third Bill of its kind
in as many years to appear in the Upper House their Lordships passed
it without undue controversy and the Bill became the Sexual Offences
Act on the 27th July 1967.
Peter Richards has argued that there were four main factors
which eventually led to reform: the practical, the psychological, the
moral and the political. To this can be added a fifth: the energy
and astuteness of a number of key individuals.
On practical grounds, the existing law was both unenforced and
unenforceable. Criminal statistics in England illustrated that where
prosecutions were being brought it was in an arbitrary and erratic
manner, varying not only between different areas, but: also at differ¬
ent periods within the same area. Psychologically, evidence sugges¬
ted that homosexuals were not responsible for their cwn condition
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and therefore punitive measures against them were inappropriate.
Morally, the argument was that private conduct should be a matter of
individual conscience provided it did not harm society. The invasion
of privacy to secure a prosecution against consenting adults was a
denial of the individual's right to determine his cwn moral standards.
Lastly, in the political arena there was a qualitative difference in
the arguments of the reformers and the retentionists. The retention-
ist case was based on fear: fear that a more liberal law would 'open
the flood gates' by appearing to approve, or at least condone, homo¬
sexual conduct. As Richards stated,
'... the retentionists were forced back into a
defensive posture and invoked fear of freedom
- a puritan spectre of society consumed by evil
once legal restraints were withdrawn'.61
Consequently, much of their case was eroded when the Church of England
took the view that although sinful, homosexual relations between consen¬
ting adults in private should not be criminal. This, in corrbination
with the reformers' plea for Christian compassion, along with their
tactic of keeping the debate as rational and moderate as possible in
order to avoid emotion and prejudice, effectively defeated the reten-
tionist argument.
That the reformers managed to get their case across in a rational
and unemotive manner was due in no small part to the industry, intel¬
ligence and courage of the Bill's sponsors. Particularly courageous
was Humphrey Berkeley who was a young bachelor representing a marginal
constituency. For an MP to associate himself with homosexual law
reform was to invite electoral trouble, and Berkeley paid the price.
In the March election of 1966 he lost his seat. While it is not p>os-
sible to say that the single issue of homosexual reform cost him the
seat, there can be no doubt that it did cost him a substantial number
of his constituents' votes.
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Although unconcerned about votes, the Earl of Arran was also
subjected to sane highly unpleasant personal vilefication. It was
thanks largely to his industry in the Lords in keeping the issue
alive and in the minds of Parliamentarians that reform was eventually
achieved. Twice he skilfully steered Bills through the Upper House
to demonstrate the swing in informed opinion on the issue. Arran had
had no history of reforming zeal but his tireless efforts on this
matter were prompted by the fact that his older brother had been homo¬
sexual and had received psychiatric aid over a period of years. He
died tragically only a few days after becoming Earl, the title to
which Arran succeeded. Yet whatever the underlying motives for his
actions, there is no underestimating the importance of his influence
in promoting and achieving reform.
The central figure in the issue though, was undoubtedly Leo
Abse. His determination, political astuteness and acerbic wit were
at the very heart of the reform as he single handedly took on all-
carers. He has described the tasks of a Private Member in such a
situation thus:
'A Private Mamber has to coax and cajole his Bill
through its committee and report stages; lacking
official Party support and no enforceable whip¬
ping, he is entirely dependent on the goodwill
and the relationships he is able to establish
with his colleagues if the Bill is to be completed
in the limited Private Members' time available.
He must be ready to yield on inessentials and be
firm on points of substance, but he must alio/
his opponents to believe they are winning a war
when they have gained a little ground in a minor
skirmish. He must never fall into the hands of
a partisan lcbby and must maintain a constant and
sensitive, but non-manipulative relationship with
all the press and TV communicators. He must main¬
tain sufficient passion to mobilize his supporters,
and constantly, at least formally, consult thorn
while presenting a front of reasonableness to
doubters and opponents so as never provocatively
and unreasonably to estrange them' ,62
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Abse, in the course of homosexual law reform, accomplished all
of this if not more. Admittedly he had the ear of some very powerful
figures in the Labour Administration of the period, which, it should
be noted, tended to be favourably disposed towards assisting the pro¬
motion of important social reforms generally. While this must be
borne in mind it should not detract from Abse's parliamentary skills
once time was made available. He always appeared to be one-step
ahead of his opponents and managed consistently to out-manoeuver them,
the coup ccming when the Bill went through Committee in just two hours.
Even at the very last hurdle he was able to mobilise sufficient sup¬
port to see him through the strains of an all-night sitting. While
Abse's modest nature would make him play dcwn his role in homosexual
law reform, his contribution was, nevertheless, of monumental impor¬
tance.
V. The Scottish Perspective.
Scotland (and Northern Ireland) had been emitted from the 1967
Sexual Offences Act. Why? One utterance already noted gives seme
indication. Sir Cyril Black, speaking on the Berkeley Bill, made
reference to the 'good Scottish Socialist Calvinistic MPs'. It will
be recalled that Sir Cyril was suggesting that an attempt was being
made to put the Bill through while Scottish MPs, who could be relied
upon to oppose it, were away in their constituencies. So the opinion
of the majority of Scottish MPs may well have been an important fac¬
tor. Ihere is little doubt that Abse emitted Scotland because he
thought there would be enough trouble getting the Bill through without
adding to his problems by incurring the wrath of Scottish Members.
Speaking in the 1980 debate on homosexual law reform in Scotland he
stated quite plainly his reason for the emission:
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'I had enough trouble on my hands without taking on the Scots' ,63
Abse's penchant for psychoanalysis tended to make him rather wary of
the power and influence of the Calvinist ethos on Scottish Members.
Such was his wariness _n fact, that he has suggested, tongue in cheek,
'even the Jews turn Calvinist up there in Scotland'.64 Understandably
then, he was reluctant to add Scotland. The same would seem to have
applied to Humphry Berkeley. David Steel (Lib. Roxburgh, Selkirk and
Peebles) recollecting a conversation, indicated that Berkeley felt
that since his Bill was being discussed on a Friday, to have included
Scotland in it would have prompted Scottish Msmbers to stay behind and
vote against it. Thus, Sir Cyril was probably not far off the mark in
his analysis.
Another important factor was the attitude of the Church of Scotland
throughout the best part of the 1960s. It will be recalled that in
the late fifties when the Wolfenden Report was published, all the
major Churches in the United Kingdom accepted its recommendations
with the exception of the Church of Scotland. The deliverance of the
General Assembly in 1958 against homosexual law reform remained the
Church's policy until 1968, although the issue was reconsidered in
both 1966 and 1967.
In its report to the General Assembly of 1966, the Committee on
Temperance and Moral Welfare stated that;
'in view of the fact that the attitude of the Church
of Scotland in this subject has differed frcm that
of most other Churches in Britain, and of proposed
legislation currently before Parliament, it was
thought right that a Working Party should again
consider the question. It was agreed, however,
that because of a difference of law and police
procedure in Scotland frcm those obtaining in
England, adequate protection for the individual
already existed here and no amending legislation
was required'.6 5
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Ihe view was therefore adopted that as far as Scotland was concerned
the necormendations of the Wolfenden Report had to all intents and
purposes been put into effect by the simple expedient of not proceed¬
ing against adults who consented to homosexual acts in private. Even
so, the Committee continued to keep the matter under consideration.
In 1967 the Working Party reassessed its acceptance of the status
quo:
'It agreed that the position in Scotland is satisfactory
in so far as the fact that the strict law, with regard
to private homosexual acts between consenting adults,
is no longer being enforced. Since this is so and for
the reasons later to be adduced, it would be better
were the law now to be amended in order to accord with
modern practice'.6 6
The reasons referred to were concerned primarily with the pastoral care
of homosexuals. If homosexual acts between consenting adults in pri¬
vate were no longer a crime, thus making the law in fact what it already
was in practice, it would be easier for homosexuals to approach the
Church and for the Church to offer them redemption.
This report, however, was rejected in no uncertain terms by the
General Assembly in May 1967. Hie deliverance stated:
"Ihe General Assembly, being persuaded that there is a
need for a clear statement of Christian principles in
face of this grave and growing evil, resolve as follows:
1. The General Assembly deplore the prevalence of homo¬
sexual practices as a source of uncleanliness and
deterioration in human character, and of weakness and
decadence in the Nation's life'. 7
In the debate on the report, the Rev. Dr. William MacNicol of Longforgan,
one of the Church's elder statesmen, said that no matter what the
Wolfenden Report recommended, or the law of the land might be, or
other churches might decide, the Church of Scotland should make it
clear where it stood on the issue of homosexuality, and that was for
no covering up of 'filthy and degrading practices' with polite names.
Indulgence in them was a ' grave and growing evil, which had incurred
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God's wrath in the past and would do so again if they were persisted
Therefore, not only was the Church of Scotland hostile to homo¬
sexual law reform throughout the better part of the sixties, it pub¬
licly reasserted its opposition, despite the Moral Welfare Committee
recommendations to the contrary, at the very mime the Abse Bill was
progressing through Parliament. Thus, the attitude and influence of
the Church of Scotland must be viewed as an important factor contri¬
buting to Scotland's amission from the provisions of the Sexual
Offences Act 1967. Nor was the attitude of the Raman Catholic Church
in Scotland much different. Homosexual acts, it said, were condemned
by Scripture and could not in any circumstances receive approval. In
the seventies, hcwever, the Catholic Church, while not condoning
homosexual acts, became imore sympathetic to the problems of homosexuals.
Speaking in the 1967 reform debate in the Lords, Lord Balerno
made the following astute observation about the Scottish perspective:
"There was a minority for the Bill in the Church of
Scotland, as there are minorities against the Bill
in other Churches. Whether that ... indicates a
difference of Presbyterian ethics, ... whether it
is a different system of Church Government, or
whether it is for some other reason than a purely
religious one, it is very difficult to say. It
may be that in Scotland we are not yet ready for
the more permissive society that is overcoming
England and encroaching into Scotland. It certainly
is the case, I think, ... that in this respect we
have a more liberal legal system. It is less hide¬
bound and more easily adjusted to the circumstances
of the period than the system which obtains in
England. On the other hand, my Lords, it may be
merely that we in Scotland suffer from an inferiority
coplex by being the junior Kingdom' ,69
Ihis difference in the legal system, highlighted here by Balerno,
would appear to be another factor accounting for the measure not being
extended to Scotland. Attention has already been drawn to the fact
that in Scotland it is the duty of the Procurator Fiscal, responsible
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to the Lord Advocate, to initiate and conduct prosecutions in the
public interest. The overriding consideration that the prosecution
had to be in the public interest gave the Procurator Fiscal an ele¬
ment of discretion in which cases he brought to court and this allowed
for a policy of 'no prosecutions' against consenting adults who enga¬
ged in homosexual acts in private. In the 1967 debate the Earl of
Dundee tock note of this:
'The Bill does not apply to Scotland and I think the
reason may be that prosecutions in Scotland are con¬
ducted by a different method. I asked the Crown
Office about this, and I was informed that efforts
have been made to find when the last prosecution of
two consenting adult males in private took place, but
ncbody was able to remember a single one. The reason
is that in Scotland prosecutions can only be initiated
by the Public Prosecutor, in this case with the con¬
sent of the Crown Office, and that, in fact, they are
never undertaken, except in cases which would still be
criminal offences under this Bill',70
Thus there would seem to be at least three main reasons why
Scotland was not included in the 1967 measure; viz. the attitude of
the majority of Scottish MPs, the attitude and influence of the Church
of Scotland and the difference in the legal system which allowed for
the Lord Advocate's policy of 'no prosecutions'. Yet even though the
Sexual Offences Act had no validity in Scotland, its successful pas¬
sage through Parliament in the summer of 1967, did have repercussions
north of the border.
Parliament's approval of the reform undoubtedly caused the Church
of Scotland to change its thinking on homosexual conduct in 1968.
Within the Church these events strengthened the hand of the liberal
Moral Welfare Committee while highlighting the short-sightedness of
the more conservative General Assembly. Having studied the whole
matter afresh the Working Party of the Moral Welfare Committee produ¬
ced a memo in 1968 which read:
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'the Garnrdttee new respectfully submits to the General
Assembly its considered opinion that last year's
deliverance has proved unhelpful'.71
The memo proceeded then to demonstrate the ill-effects of the
policy. When the liberal attitude of the Moral Welfare Committee was
first made knewn publicly through the media in May 1967, men suffer¬
ing from homosexual tendencies began to seek help and counsel from
the Church. However, from the day the Committee's proposed deliver¬
ance was rejected by the General Assembly, not one single man had
come forward and those who had been coming never came back. Thus,
the Church's work in rehabilitation and pastoral care had effectively
ceased. The nemo camented:
'it cannot be too strongly stressed that compassion
rather than condemnation is the attitude likely to
bring amelioration into this tragic condition. To
condemn is to increase the guilt of the unfortunate
victim which increases the probability of compulsive
behaviour by forcing the impulses into further repres¬
sion '.72
Taking into consideration the Lord Advocate's policy of 'no pros¬
ecutions ' the memo acknowledged that to change the law would not alter
the situation in practice. However, it was argued that for the Church,
through the General Assembly, to ask for such a change, bringing them
into line with all the other major Churches in the United Kingdom,
would mean that those with homosexual tendencies would be able to
leam more easily of the Church's ccnpassion and sympathy for their
condition.
Accordingly, 'with a real sense of all the issues involved', the
Committee recommended that the General Assembly accept the deliverance
that homosexual acts between consenting adults in private should no
longer be subject to criminal law, even although that law was not
enforced. It was stressed that until this was done any successful
and satisfactory rehabilitation work was doomed to failure because
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practising homosexuals would be too afraid and guilt-ridden to make
any approach.
The 1968 General Assembly received this further report of the
Moral Welfare Ccmmittee more favourably than on previous occasions:
'The General Assembly, whilst not condoning or
approving homosexual acts, urge: (I)that a more
sympathetic understanding of the difficulties and
handicaps of those suffering from homosexual ten¬
dencies is required throughout the community, and
regret the comparative lack of psychiatric and
medical treatment available; (II) that ministers
show special pastoral concern and care of those
suffering from such tendencies; (III) that Her
Majesty's Government consider whether homosexual
acts between consenting adults in private should
continue to be an offence under the Law of Scotland'.73
Thus, by 1968 the official Church of Scotland policy had swung
round tentatively in favour of law reform in order that the Church
might offer pastoral care on a more understanding and less condemna¬
tory basis. Feeling within the Church though, was by no means unani¬
mous with pockets of hard line resistance proclaiming that 'the legis¬
lative battle has been lost... (and) the devil has won'.74 Neverthe¬
less, however tentative the swing of opinion, the Church's revised
thinking was an important turning point in that its acceptance of the
need for law reform opened up the issue for further debate in Sootland.
As a response to both the English reform in 1967 and the revision
of the Church of Sootland's thinking in 1968 a series of meetings were
held by a number of interested individuals to discuss the position of
the homosexual in Sootland and the possibility of setting up a formal
pressure group to push for reform. Frcm these meetings the Scottish
Minorities Group was formed in May 1969. The aims of the SMS were
fourfold - to promote the establishment of legal and social equity as
between homosexuals and heterosexuals; to provide positive help to
homosexuals who were experiencing difficulty in adjusting to their
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orientation; to present facts and information about the everyday life
of homosexuals to educationalists and those engaged in counselling;
and to encourage new thinking about places where homosexuals could
meet socially in a congenial atmosphere. Initially there were bran¬
ches in Edinburgh and Glasgow, but later as the organisation devel¬
oped, a number of other branches opened throughout Scotland operating
semi-autonarously. Administratively it was structured on a relatively
simple basis with an annual general meeting of paid-up members elec¬
ting an executive committee of office-bearers. The executive acted
as a steering committee organising group discussion and action, but
major policy decisions were taken at the annual general neeting.
SMG thinking was that ignorance was at the root of much of the
prejudice and discrimination from which arose many of the problems of
being homosexual and so early activity was designed to dispel this
ignorance and educate public opinion. In an attempt to raise the
level of awareness and secure social equity for the homosexual, the
SMI recommended to the Millar CcmTiittee on Religious and Moral Educa¬
tion in Scottish Schools, that sex education should include reference
to homosexuality, and that the same moral principles should apply to
homosexual as to heterosexual relationships. The Group also liaised
with social work agencies, clergy, psychiatrists and lawyers to dis¬
cuss the problems of homosexuals.
This early activity then, was rather tentative. Ttoo main reasons
would appear to emerge for this. Firstly, the SMG was still striving
to be accepted as a legitimate pressure group, by the public, by the
government and by other pressure groups, and so there was an under¬
standable wariness and hesitancy in their approach. Secondly, in
these early days the SMG still had to decide hew it was going to
operate tactically and politically.
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Come the seventies the activities of the SING began to gather
momentum. Concern was focused not only upon the need for legislative
reform but also upon the development of the SMI itself. The tendency
towards a lew profile and 'keep quiet' attitude gradually began to
change as the SMS began to assert itself more. In 1971 at an impor¬
tant and well attended public meeting in the Heriot Watt University
Union the decision was taken to go ahead and establish 'gay centres'.
The risk though, was that such action might affect the policy of 'no
prosecutions'.
By 1972 the Group had organised the first gay dances in Scotland,
held in Father Anthony Ross's premises in George Square. These were
so successful that people were travelling to them from as far away as
the North of England and the Midlands as well as frcm all over Scotland
and were far in advance of anything that was happening outside of
London. In 1973 the Group organised a major conference on homosexual¬
ity, with a number of prominent guest speakers addressing the meeting.
The Conference focused on the injustice of the homosexual's position
in society and urged change in the law if the homosexual was to attain
the fundamental freedom which other citizens took for granted.
Speaking at this conference was the Rev. L. D. Levison, Convener
of the Moral Welfare Committee, who argued that the law was being
brought into disrepute and ought therefore to be changed:
'The obvious advice to give to responsible citizens in
a democracy is - "If the law is unjust, then work hard
to change it!" - and this is surely the primary advice
in our cwn treasured democratic society.... The Church
of Scotland believes that the law in Scotland needs to
be changed, even though that would not alter the pres¬
ent position in practice. The effort by the Church to
help in the removal of the criminal sanction is in
itself an expression of sympathy of the Church for the
difficulty under which homosexuals have had to exist'.75
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With improved co-ordination of activities at the national level
and improved public awareness of the issue, the mid-70s saw the open¬
ing of the first 'gay centre' at Broughton Street, Edinburgh. By now
the policy of the SNG had become much more hard-line. Even the more
conservative members now accepted that a struggle was going to be nec¬
essary before law reform would be achieved. The aim was to embarrass
the establishment into activity.
To this end pressure was put on MPs. SMG Secretary, Mr. Ian Dunn,
said that MPs were lobbied every year on the issue and conmented that
it was 'a most depressing jcb'. They ever, produced their own Bill
which they hoped to get sponsored. A delegation went down to Parlia¬
ment to see Lord Archibald and Tarn Oswald (Lab. Edinburgh Central)
about legislative action. Oswald's involvement was surprising because
he was in the mould of the 'traditional' Labour MP and tended to be
slightly puritanical about such issues. However, his support was
later explained by the fact that his son turned out to be homosexual.
Ian Dunn reflected on this encounter:
"The SMG learned a lot frcm that experience because
although we didn't realise it at the time, we were
being softened up by the system. We were being
given the line - "yes, we are very sympathetic to
your cause, but for goodness sake don't let extrem¬
ists take over and spoil things". - By the time of
the Sexual Offences consolidation in 1976 we were
much better geared up on the parliamentary process' .76
Contact was also established directly with the Crown Office.
With every new Lord Advocate a delegation was sent to seek assurances
on the policy of 'no prosecutions'. While these assurances were
always forthcoming at first, they were only verbal and not written.
SMG feeling was that the Crown Office in the earlier part of the seven¬
ties was trying to appease the protagonists on both sides of the argu¬
ment. To those hostile to any suggestion of reform the Crown Office
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could say that the law as it stood still allowed for prosecutions,
while to those advocating reform it could say that a 'no prosecutions'
policy was being pursued and that this administrative discretion
placed Scotland on a par with the rest of Great Britain, so reform
was not really needed. Written assurances were eventually obtained
in 1973. By this time Ian Dunn thought the Government had beccme
aware of the quality of the people they were dealing with. Ihey fin¬
ally realised, he said, that 'we weren't irresponsible queers, but
articulate and responsible members of the community'.77
Naturally though, for a group espousing the cause of homosexual
equality the SMG was not without its opponents. In the mid-70s that
opposition focused upon the Broughton Street centre. Both the centre
and its activities were vigourously opposed by the local residents
association and by the Tory district council. Although a certain
amount of stigma remained Ian Dunn felt that the climate of opinion
did change for the better as the seventies progressed with more tol¬
erant attitudes becoming apparent. Despite the localised opposition
to the gay centres, public opinion in general was fairly relaxed
towards them. For instance, he indicated that in London it was not
an uncommon occurrence for gay centres to be violently smashed up by
young fascists, whereas at the Scottish centres there had been no
attacks, with the occasional exception of a Saturday night drunk
throwing a stone at a windcw. That the gay centres were tolerated in
1975 but would not have been at the beginning of the decade was per¬
haps one way of measuring a change in public feeling.
However, not all of the problems or obstacles to reform lay in
the community at large:
'Seme of the major difficulties came not frcm the public
but frcm within the movement itself. Internal disputes
on policy and the "politicisation" of many of the issues
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caused splits and disagreements. By the late seventies
internal politics had caused an evaporation of the con¬
sensus which had prevailed in earlier years'.78
Since the issue was never brought up for discussion, parliamentary
opinion in the early seventies was rather difficult tc judge. Ian Dunn
suggested that the elections of 1974, and the change of some MPs had
made some difference. For instance, George Reid (SNP E. Stirlingshire
and Clackmannan) , Margaret Bain (SIMP Dunbartonshire East) and Rcbin
Cook (Lab. Edinburgh Central) were all sympathetic to reform.
Hcwever, these changes were really only minor he said;
'Of more importance was the decision to change the style
of activity around the mid-70s and to work within
organisations such as the unions and the Labour party
to premote the homosexuality issue. This represented a
more pragmatic approach to the problem'.79
An opportunity for parliamentary debate on the issue did arise
though, in rather unusual circumstances in 1976 when the Sexual
Offences (Scotland) Bill carte before the House. This was an adminis¬
trative measure which was intended to codify existing statutes and was
tantamount to a 'non-decision' on the homosexuality issue in Scotland.
The Bill's principal concern was to consolidate a wide range of het¬
erosexual offences, but also included at Clause 7 was a reference to
homosexual conduct, and it was the inclusion of this section that
caused controversy.
Ihe Lord Advocate at this time, Ronald King Murray, argued that
the Bill was sirrply a consolidation of existing law and as such did
not upgrade,modernise or give added weight to the old statutory pro¬
visions which were being consolidated. The point of the consolidation,
he insisted, was to bring together in one Act the statute law as it
was and not as some people would like it to be. He warned the enthus¬
iasts for reform that the consolidation procedure would be rapidly
destroyed if they abused it or bent it to promote their cwn special
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reforms. 'Consolidation does not prejudice reform ... indeed, it may
be a prelude to it in that it may highlight areas of the law which
may be thought to need review' . Moreover, he added, consolidation
'does not imply any change in prosecution policy. Crcwn Office policy
under successive Lord Advocates ... has been and remains that there
should in general be no prosecutions for homosexual acts carried out
in private between consenting adults'.80
While conceding that the Bill would be of some limited benefit
to lawyers, Malcolm Rifkind (Cons. Edinburgh Pentlands) berated the
Government for the Treasure. If the Government found that they had
sufficient parliamentary time for consideration of the Bill, he said,
then they should have used that time for legislation to modernise the
Scottish law on sexual offences instead of merely consolidating it.
It was one thing to overlook a provision almost ICO years old, but it
was a different matter for Parliament in 1976 to include in a statute
a provision which there was no intention of enforcing. It was unsound
and did Parliament and the public a disservice:
'The basis of my opposition to the clause is that it
is totally wrong as a matter of basic constitutional
principle that Parliament should be asked to approve
in a consolidation measure an activity continuing to
be a criminal offence while at the same time the
Lord Advocate informs the House that the Crcwn has
not the slightest intention of treating such an
activity as a criminal offence despite Parliament so
determining.... (A) s a Parliament we must be con¬
scious not simply of the technical consequences of
what we are doing but of the effect that it will
reasonably have on public attitudes towards the
matter'.8"^
Rcbin Cock endorsed this view and pointed to the progressive
social climate and to the change in the law in England and Wales. He
argued that it would be intolerable if an act which tock place in pri¬
vate and affected only the private life of those taking part was to
be subject to criminal action in Scotland after it had ceased to be
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a criminal act in the rest of Great Britain. Likewise, Leo Abse com¬
mented that whereas Scotland had been in advance of England and Wales
in the sixties with its policy of 'no prosecutions' , it had now sadly
fallen behind. There was nothing worse than maintaining unenforceable
law. He dismissed as 'utter hypocrisy and humbug' consolida¬
ting a provision which was never going to be implemented. George Reid
was also concerned about the possible repercussions of the measure.
He observed:
'Sore members of the Scottish minority groups who have
been left in peace in recent years fear that they are
being stigmatised as cortrton criminals in a piece of
1976 legislation... Its inclusion, while it will not
change the law, is bound to reinforce and buttress it
and give it new prominence in the public mind in
Scotland'.82
These arguments, convincing though they were, did not impress the
Lord Advocate. He stated:
'...I would emphatically refute any suggestion that an
old enactment is somehow less potent than a recent one
and so less qualified for consolidation, or that the
inclusion of an old provision in a current consolida¬
tion revitalises it or gives it new force'.8 3
Of course the passage of the Bill was a formality, but the occa¬
sion did provide a useful opportunity for public debate and those
sympathetic to reform were able to pinpoint sore of the anomalies and
absurdities present in the existing law. Ne\ertheless, the issue
still remained unresolved through this 'non-decision'. This will be
discussed again later.
Determined to keep the issue alive both Lord Boothby and Robin
Cock brought Bills before Parliament the following year in 1977 to
amend the lav relating to homosexual offenoes. Cock's Bill failed to
obtain a Second Reading being deferred on several occasions, but
Boothby nonaged to steer his successfully through the Upper House,
although he had to face seme dogged opposition determined to define
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the issue off the political agenda with a series of arguments which
scarcely disguised their underlying hostility to the subject.
Introducing the Bill, Boothby pointed to the fact that the Lord
Advocate could not bind his successors so that there was nothing to
prevent a future lord Advocate from re-introducing a policy of pros¬
ecuting consenting adults in private if he so desired. However unlik¬
ely this was, homosexuals had to live with this uncertainty. Further,
choosing not to enforce the law was bringing the law itself into dis¬
repute: so the only sensible course of action was to change the law.
This argument though, did not impress Lord Ferrier who suggested
that the matter should be left to a Scottish Assembly to deal with.
'What must be appreciated is that the flagrant existence
of this kind of behaviour in almost any community can
be a profound shock to decent people. My compassion
goes out to this majority, whose voice is so seldom
heard in an increasingly permissive society. What with
X-films, pornography, lewd and even blasphemous gramo¬
phone records, where are we going? In saying this, I
emphasise that I also regard the mentally unbalanced
with sincere compassion.... (I)f the Assembly is con¬
stituted then that will be the proper plaoe for a Bill
of this nature as it is essentially social and entirely
Scottish; not here in Westminster at this time'.84
Other arguments were also produced in an attempt to remove the
issue frcm the agenda. For instance, Lord Strathclyde claimed that
the change was not wanted by the people of Scotland as he knew them,
while Lord Campbell of Crcy also did not see any urgent need for the
Bill since no one in Scotland was being discriminated against or being
unfairly treated.
These arguments, however, were something of a ploy since those
who advanced them did little to conceal that what they really wanted
was the Bill to be thrown out and the issue not to be discussed at all.
It was pointed out by Lord Monson that there was no guarantee that a
Scottish Assembly would actually be established and therefore it was
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up to Parliament, as the only body in the United Kingdom competent to
legislate on the matter, to address itself to the problem. He was
supported in this by Lord Hughes, who pleaded:
'Surely the remedy is to make the law what it ought to
be, and it so happens that in that case the best course
would be to adopt something similar, if not identical,
to the law which now prevails South of the Border. If
that were done then we would at least have done some¬
thing in this House, and in Government, to make certain
that we are not joining with those who choose the laws
which they are going to obey'.8 5
While Lord Boothby successfully guided the Bill through all its
stages in the Lords, there was never any chance of it reaching the
statute book because the Commons rarely finds time for a Private
Member's Bill from the Lords. In this respect Boothby's Bill is best
viewed as a gesture to enable discussion on the issue and the vote in
the Lords, as a vote in principle for the Scottish law to be reformed
to accord with practice. Such a reform though, was not to be achieved
for another three years.
VI. The 'Politics' of the 1980 Reform.
In a move which aroused considerable controversy, Robin Cook, in
July 1980, introduced into the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill, a new
clause to amend the law of Scotland relating to homosexual offences.
The objective of this clause was to remove from the Sexual Offences
(Scotland) Act 1976 that section which made homosexual acts between
consenting adults in private a criminal offence, and thus bring the
law of Scotland into line with that of England and Wales. Cook was
at pains to stress the modest nature of the clause and to keep the
tone of the debate as unemotive as possible. He questioned the curious
constitutional principle of not implementing the law through Executive
decree and argued that 'the fact that no prosecutions are taking place
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does not mean that no damage arises from the fact that homosexuality
is a criminal offenoe in Scotland'.86
Support for the clause was forthcoming frcm a number of different
quarters. Several English MPs spoke in favour of the clause, their
theme being the need for civil rights of this kind to be applicable
on both sides of the border. Mr. Douglas Hogg (Cons. Grantham) could
see no reason why people should have a lesser right in Scotland than
they had in England and Wales. A pledge of support also came from
Gregor Mackenzie (Lab. Rutherglen). He could not see the logic in
keeping a law which was not being implemented. Leo Abse's support was
qualified since he felt the clause did not go far enough. He thought
Robin Cook was 'being far too accommodating to the prissy prudes who
apparently oppose it'.8 7
At issue was not only the substance of the clause but also the
procedure by which it was introduced. The new clause had been moved
by Rcbin Cock at the Report Stage of the Bill after the detailed
scrutiny of the legislation in Carmittee. Hence it was suggested by
his opponents that this was not the proper place or manner in which
to insert a reform clause of this nature, and indeed, it was even
hinted that such action bordered on the unethical. Donald Dewar (Lab.
Glasgcw Garscadden) , however, tock such suggestions to task:
'I have heard the argument in the corridors and the
Lobbies that this Bill is not appropriate for the
purpose and that hon. Members should not have popped
in the new clause at this late stage of major legis¬
lation . I do not sympathise with that view... It
seems appropriate, rather than waiting for Private
Members' legislation, with all the difficulties of
the ballot and the chance of a Scot who wants to take
up this cause against carpeting causes, winning a high
place, that we should take this opportunity.... As
long as we continue this strange position of having a
criminal law that is not enforced, we set up all sorts
of tensions, prejudices, and difficulties for those
who find themselves in this position'.88
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While Dewar was supported in this argument by the Shadow Spokes¬
man on Scottish Affairs, Bruce Millan, the Secretary of State for
Scotland, George Younger, took a less positive view of the clause's
introduction, arguing that the clause was not the ideal way for the
reform to be made. Accepting that the intentions of the promoters
were honourable he nevertheless felt obliged to record that the
clause was 'not perfect, and probably not the measure that we would
enact if we had a chance to do so properly'.89 He expounded his rea¬
soning on this at seme length:
'I refer to a matter which has not been properly
aired. Hon. Members must ask - "Is this the way
to pass important Scottish legislation?". Which¬
ever way they lean, hon. Members should bear that
question in mind. They should ask whether on
any other issue they would be prepared to pass
something so important with as little discussion
as this measure will receive... We often pass
measures about which people feel strongly. When
we do that the measure goes through an elaborate
series of parliamentary occasions when the issues
can be aired. Plenty of time is given for represen¬
tations to be made by bodies that are involved and
others who feel strongly... When passing important
legislation which affects many people Parliament
must convince the people involved that it has given
the public sufficient chance to make their views
known. It is no criticism of the hon. Member for
Edinburgh Central to say that the public have not
had that chance. They have not had that chance
because the new clause was tabled on Report after
the measure had been put through another place...
Therefore, all I am saying is that the House, mind¬
ful of its reputation, of its duty to represent
people in the country, should think hard and long
before it passes something so important without
giving adequate time or opportunity for those whom
we represent to make their views known1.9 0
Needless to say the speech infuriated Robin Cock who made no
attempt to hide his anger and contempt. He found it particularly
frustrating that although the Secretary of State had indicated that
the clause was not defective he had proceeded to offer the opinion
that it was not 'ideal'. Cock remarked sarcastically:
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'I shall pull my socks up and bend my mind to the
matter in future, and attempt to table amendments
that are not merely not defective but are ideal'.91
He went on to criticise vehemently the 'organised hypocrisy' of a
system whereby successive Government could indicate that they would
not implement the law, but simultaneously resisted any attempt to
change it. His response to the Secretary of State was short and
sharp:
'"Is this the way to pass important Scottish legislation?"
Ihe answer is that it is indeed the way. There is no
other way of passing important Scottish legislation'.92
Despite the reservations of the Secretary of State, the division
was left to a free vote and the new clause was carried by the substan¬
tial majority of 205 votes to 82. Of this overall majority there was
a Scottish majority of 34 votes to 16 also in favour. In this new
1979- Parliament the Conservative Party were onoe again in pcwer.
Havever, in Scotland Labour remained the dominant political party
with 45 seats, the Conservatives winning 22, the Liberals 3 and the
SNP 2. The 50 Soots MPs that turned out for this Division represented
just over 70% of Scottish Membership.
47.9% of the total Scottish Membership voted in favour of homo¬
sexual law reform, as opposed to 22.5% who voted against. It can be
seen frcm Table 9.1 that of the 34 votes in favour, 31 came from the
Labour Party. These 31 Scottish Labour MPs amounted to 70.4% of
Labour's strength in Scotland. Only 2 Labour MPs, Ian Campbell
(Dunbartonshire West) and Janes Denpsey (Coatbridge and Airdrie)
voted against. All 3 Liberal MPs, Joe Grirrond (Orkney and Shetland) ,
Russell Johnston (Inverness) and David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and
Peebles) voted for the reform.
The striking feature of the vote against is that all 12 Conserva¬
tive MPs who passed through the Division lobbies registered a "No"
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vote. This can be explained by the 'instructions' issued to Conserva¬
tives frcm the Government Front Bench. While a free vote was allowed
on the issue, George Younger left no doubt that the Government was
unhappy about the inclusion of such a clause in the middle of a
Government Bill. Younger urged that on grounds of procedure the
amendment was best omitted from the Bill. Such a 'directive' was
tantamount to unofficial whipping. This ireant that certain Conserva¬
tives like Malcolm Rifkind, who were kncwn to be sympathetic to reform
and had publicly expressed so in the past, were more or less obliged
by their position on the Front Bench to vote against the clause on
technical grounds. The vote against in Table 9.1 also shews that both
Scottish Nationalists were disinclined to support a reform.
Taole 9.2 (Voting by Age Group) shews that there was a broad
range of support which cut across age groups. Of the 22 MPs under 45
who voted, 16 or 72.7% voted in favour of law reform. Of the 28 MPs
who were over 45 years of age and voted, 18 or 64.2% were in favour.
The voting by Religion (Table 9.3) reveals the small Catholic
vote to have opposed the reform clause by a margin of one. Hcwever,
the residual category of Protestants, Jews and atheists supported
reform by a majority of 19.
The breakdewn of voting by Schooling (Table 9.4) shews a clear
majority of 26 votes to 10 in favour amongst those MPs who attended
a Scottish Secondary. Those who had attended the roughly equivalent
English Grammar also came out in support of reform 3 votes to nil.
Hcwever, those who had had a 'public' education, either north or south
of the border, divided against the proposed reform 6 votes to 3.
Since it is predcminently Tory MPs who have received a 'public' educa¬
tion, this voting pattern is consistent with Table 9.1.
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s.
House of Germans Parliamentary Debate, Vol. 989, cols. 319-322.
Division on Clause concerning homosexual conduct (consenting adults
over 21 in private) introduced by Robin Cook into the Criminal Justice
(Scotland) Bill on 22.7.80.
Figures in Tables include Tellers.
*Party composition at tine of vote: Lab 45; Cons 22; Lib 3; SNP 2.
TABLE 9.1 Scottish Voting by Party*
Lab. Cons. Lib. SNP
Total Scottish
vote vote
Aye 205 34 31 0 30
(47 9%) (70.4%) (-) (100%) (-)
No 82 16 2 12 0 2
(22.5%) (4.5%) (54.5%) (-) (100%)
TABLE 9.2 Scottish Voting by Age Group
Total Scottish
Under 35 35_44 45_54 55_g4 65+
vote vote
Aye 205 34 4 12 9 8 1
No 82 16 1 5 5 5 0
TABLE 9.3 Scottish Voting by Religion
Total vote Scottish vote Catholic Others
Aye 205 34 1 33
No 82 16 2 14
474
















Aye 205 34 2 0 26 2 3 1
No 82 16 0 0 10 3 0 3
Aye
No











205 34 5 1 14 5 8 1
82 16 5 0 3 3 5 0
TABLE 9.6 Scottish Voting by Region
Total Soot. Glasgow Edinburgh High-
vote vote +'west' + 'east' lands
Aye 205 34 2 3 16 4 5 1 3
No 82 16 0 3 3 4 1 2 3
TABIE 9.7 Scottish Voting by Occupation
Total Scot. pj-ofggg-LQj-js Business Forces Workers Unknown
vote vote White
Collar
Aye 205 34 5 22 3 0 3 1
No 82 16 5 2 7 0 1 1
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Table 9.5 on Higher Education shews that those who attended a
Scottish university were in favour of reform by 14 votes to 3. Sim¬
ilarly the categories of 'Other Higher Education' and 'No Higher
Education' came out in support of law reform. 'Oxbridge', however,
remained evenly divided.
Voting by Region (Table 9.6) illustrates that Glasgow and the
'west' came out strongly in favour. This is consistent with Table
9.1 since this area is dominated by the Labour Party. The 5 to 1
vote in favour in Central is also indicative of Labour strength in
this region. The South-West, Edinburgh and the Highlands with more
Conservative MPs voting against remained equivocal.
Table 9.7 shows the overwhelming majority in favour amongst the
category of Miscellaneous White Collar (onoe again mostly Labour MPs) .
Those with connections in Business (mainly Tories) were not disposed
towards a reform, while the Professions split evenly 5 votes for and
5 against.
The inclusion of the homosexual offences amendment clause into
the Criminal Justice Bill placed the Scottish Minorities Group, or
more correctly, the Scottish Homosexual Rights Group as they had now
become, in something of a dilemma. The SHRG had been opposed to
Labour's original Criminal Justice Bill in 1979 and had been in the
forefront of the campaign to stop the Bill which was orchestrated
from their offices in Broughton Street. As the Conservative Criminal
Justice Bill contained a great many of the same provisions, SHRG
policy was still one of opposition. So when Robin Cook informed them
that he thought it possible to get the hcmosexual offences clause
through they were left In something of a quandary. The SHRG were
forced to reply that while the reform would obviously be welcomed, the
Group could not publicly support the clause on two grounds: firstly,
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the SHRG were officially opposed to the Criminal Justice Bill, and
secondly, their policy on the question of the age of consent was now
'over 16', i.e. the same as that for heterosexual relations. However,
while the SHRG did not lend formal support, they did organise a public
meeting in the House of Camions' Jubilee Roan shortly before Cook was
scheduled to move the clause. Seme 23 MPs attended, which they
thought a very good turnout, along with representatives of the
Scottish Council for Civil Liberties. This platform provided a use¬
ful means of getting the issues across to the MPs present without the
SHRG corrmitting themselves formally to backing the provision.
Contrary to widespread belief the clause was not identical to
the English measure. The clause was in fact the Bill which Lord
Boothby had tried to introduce in 1977 which differed in some impor¬
tant respects from the English legislation. Whereas the English
legislation centred around the words 'in private', the Scottish
drafting used the phrase 'not in public'. When this was discovered
it caused considerable controversy and was the subject of amendment
in the Lords. Another significant difference was the retention of
discretion in cases involving under 21s. In Scotland each case was
considered individually so it was unlikely that a prosecution would
follow in a case where, say, the partners were 22 and 20. Critics
complained that Scotland was trying to have the best of both worlds
- legislative protection for the over 21s while maintaining adminis¬
trative discretion for particular cases under 21.
In the interim period between the passing of the Bill in the
Canmons and its debate in the Lords in October, a storm broke over
the definition of 'not in public'. In an article published in the
homosexual magazine 'Gay News' reference was made to the new reform
as 'a licence for orgy'. When a wider public came to realise the
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implications of the legislative drafting there was an outcry which
almost killed the clause.
The clause thus appeared before the Lords amid hostility and
opposition. A series of amendments designed to tighten up the legal
definition of consenting adults in private was tabled. The effect
of the principal amendment was to restrict homosexual acts to two
persons. If there were more than two persons present then the act
would not be treated as having been in private. Hie Earl of Selkirk
felt this a necessary safeguard if the Bill was to proceed. Boothby
however, thought the amendment unnecessary as there was no need in
Scots law for an English definition of privacy. As for the Earl of
Perth, he had his cwn ideas:
'I have one other thing to say, There is not much
one can say on this subject other than what has
been said. But if Amendments No. 101A and 10IB
are passed, I intend as a consequential amendment
to the amendment to the Commons amendment, to
move a manuscript amendment which is really a
drafting amendment'.9 3
It was left to Lord Ross of Marnock (formerly Willie Ross,
Secretary of State for Scotland 1974-76) to bring the debate back to
reality with some plain speaking. He did not think that this was the
right way to legislate in respect of an important piece of social
legislation. There had been no great public discussion on the issue
and no great demand for the reform. Further, he thought that the
manner in which the clause was introduced was an evasion of the close
public scrutiny that Bills were subjected to in Committee.
This line was backed by a number of their Lordships. The Earl
of Lauderdale made the rather start! ing observation that had the
Commons debate occurred with a full House, 'instead of being decimated
by a garden party as it was 1 , then the opposition would have been a
good deal stronger. He felt that there was nothing to suggest that
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Scottish opinion at large was seeking such a change in the Scottish
Law and he wanted quite simply to define the issue off the agenda:
'... it would be better to threw this new clause out
altogether so that on another occasion it may be duly
considered in the light of proper public discussion
in Scotland and still more proper consultation
through the channels that are familiar1.9 4
The Earl, however, could not conceal his personal distaste for the
subject:
'We are talking about a disagreeable subject and
there are those who would rather we did not dis¬
cuss it at all'.95
In his opinion the clause had been 'smuggled in without proper consi¬
deration' ,96
Others subscribing to this view that it had been 'smuggled in'
were Lord Galpern, who suggested that it was 'deliberately slipped in
at that stage by Mr. Cook in another place because the purpose was not
to give it adequate discussion';97 and Lord Ferrier, who regarded the
clause as nothing less than a ' swizz ... got in by some sort of very
successful manoeuver'.9 8 Lore Drumalbyn even went as far as to say
that it was an 'abuse of parliamentary procedure to rush in legisla¬
tion at the tail end of an extremely long session'.9 9
That the clause had been introduced by this 'slick method' caused
them all no end of irritation. However, Lord McCluskey (Solicitor
General 1974-79) queried if this was not the way to introduce the
reform then what was the way? He pointed to the vagaries of the
Private Members' Ballot and argued that the chances of a sympathetic
Scottish Member winning a high place in the ballot and successfully
steering a Bill through Parliament in the following Session were prac¬
tically nil. Further, he drew attention to the Commons vote on the
issue which was 205 to 82. Of the 50 Scots who voted, 34 voted in
favour of the clause and 16 voted against, and this he thought was a
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sufficient majority on which to proceed. Unless the opportunity was
taken to use the Criminal Justice Bill as a vehicle for reform there
would be another long delay before the law was brought logically into
line with practice, he warned.
Lord Foot also took the clause's opponents to task over their
suggestion that there had not been adequate discussion on the issue
and that it was being pushed through the House in some underhand way.
He said:
'That surely is the most artificial of all criticisms
that could be levelled. The fact is that the problem
of homosexuality has been a matter of public discussion
not only in England and Wales, but in Scotland and
Northern Ireland for that matter, ever since we have
had the Wolfenden Report. It has been a subject of
fierce controversy and discussion throughout the whole
of the realm over the last 13 years since the passing
of the Act in this Parliament'.10 0
A rather shrewd assessment of 'popular' opinion in Scotland was
offerred by Lord Taylor of Gryfe. He thought that such was the pre¬
judice and emotion aroused by the issue in Scotland that there would
prcbably be a majority against the clause. However, there were occa¬
sions when the rights of minorities had to be respected and this was
just such an occasion.
At the end of an impassioned debate then, it was a close run
thing. In a free vote the clause, as amended, was passed by 59 votes
to 48. Thus, the Law of Scotland relating to homosexual offenoes was
finally brought into line with existing practice. The reform had
taken some 13 years longer than the equivalent reform south of the
border.
VII. Homosexual Law Reform in Scotland : A 'Non-decision'?
Controversy surrounded horosexual law reform in Scotland right up
until the very last moment of its legislative enactment. Yet the
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subject remained almost a 'non-issue' throughout the duration of the
1970s. What were the reasons for this? Why did it take 13 years lon¬
ger to reform the law in Scotland than it did in England and Wales?
The reasons why Scotland was not included in the 1967 Sexual
Offences Act were noted earlier. Three main reasons were identified:
the opposition of Scottish MPs, the attitude of the Church of Scotland
and the Crown Office's interpretation of the law. This last reason,
that of the non-enforcement of the law was also one of the principal
reasons why the homosexuality issue remained dormant for the greater
part of the seventies. The lord Advocate's policy of 'no prosecutions'
against consenting adults in private had the effect of dis-arming
demand for reform. It was argued that this administrative discretion
placed Scotland on an equal footing with England and Wales. In fact,
it was even claimed that this alloved the law of Scotland to be in
advance of that south of the border since it allowed for sympathetic
discretion in certain cases involving under 21s. The Crown Office
did not regard the issue as a problem and this influenced perceptions
of the need for legal change. Pressure for reform could thus be easily
diffused. As Donald Dewar remarked, 'there was no real pressure to do
anything since the Lord Advocate was adopting a policy of no prosecu¬
tions '.10 1
Organised pressure for reform itself would seem to have been
inchoate. The formation and development of the SMG has been charted
earlier and it will be recalled that its early years were spent gain¬
ing self-confidence and defining its own role as a group as much as
pressing for legislative reform. With a greater level of confidence
came more sophisticated demands and frcm the mid-70s onwards SMC act¬
ivity was directed towards achieving full equality for the homosexual
in the corrmunity rather than merely obtaining legal change. In 1978
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it published a declaration of rights covering aspects of law, employ¬
ment and education which formed the basis of their campaign against
prejudiced attitudes. Somewhat paradoxically, as the group's acti¬
vities became more 'politicised' and the scope of their demands
became more radical, they became less concerned with short term legal
reforms. So much so that when reform was achieved in 1980 they could
not publicly support the clause for fear of contradicting their longer
term objectives. Actual law reform therefore, was not the primary
consideration of the SMS, but was subsidiary to, in its early years,
the successful development of the Group itself, and in later years,
to wider and more far reaching objectives concerning the homosexual's
place in society.
Public opinion generally would appear to be another reason for
homosexuality being a 'non-issue'. The nature of the subject was not
one which stirred the public mind. Reaction to it usually fell into
one of two categories - complete indifference or open hostility. As
Dennis Canavan commented, 'there was still a lot of prejudice in
Scotland, so it was not a popular cause to espouse',102 Harry Ewing
put it down to 'the Calvinistic approach to life found in Scotland'.103
As a result of this public distaste for the subject, MPs were reluctant
to get involved in the issue, 'It was not the type of issue with which
an MP likes to be associated',10 4 said Robert Hughes. It was not a
subject which did a politician any good in electoral terms, consequen¬
tly most MPs would tend to tackle another subject if they were lucky
enough to oome up in the ballot. Malcolm Rifkind thought that majority
opinion was probably against homosexuality and homosexual law reform
throughout the seventies, although he felt it did became more tolerant
as the decade progressed;
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'In the late 60s and early 70s opinion still tended
to be shocked by homosexuality. However, as the
70s progressed, although there inay still be dis¬
approval about homosexuality per se, a more tol¬
erant attitude towards the actual existence of
homosexuals has become more evident'.10 5
Thus, widespread 'popular' opinion was by no means clanmering for a
legislative reform.
One further reason postulated by Neil Carmichael for the inaction
on the issue was that successive Secretaries of State were not enthu¬
siastic about the matter. He believed that in the early seventies
Willie Ross would most certainly not have approved:
'Willie was a nice bloke, very able with a
memory like an elephant. He was a schoolteacher
of course, and had a schoolteacher's attitude
towards the rest of us - puritan, Calvinist; a
"father figure". He didn't really recognise
such a thing as homosexuality - it was an
anathema to Willie'.106
Nor would it seem were successive lord Advocates particularly
perturbed by a situation described in Parliament as 'totally wrong as
a matter of basic constitutional principle'. Ihey appeared content
simply not to implement the law. Yet the inconsistency of the situ¬
ation was highlighted by the Sexual Offences Act in 1976 which, to
all intents and purposes was a legislative 'nan-decision'. Of course,
a consolidation in no way alters the status of the law, but merely
codifies in cue piece of legislation several related statutes. How¬
ever, one of the side-effects of the 1976 Sexual Offences consolida¬
tion was that it appeared to sere as a modern 'endorsement' of the law
and was therefore viewed as being at odds with the publicly stated
policy of 'no prosecutions'. The issue at stake was whether Section
7 concerning homosexual offences should have been included at all.
That it was represented a 'nan-decision' on the part of the Lord
Advocate who, in effect, simultaneously maintained the letter of the
existing law while operating a policy of 'no prosecutions'.
483
The consolidation was multi-departmental involving the Scottish
Law Corrmission, the Scottish Office and the Crown Office. King-Murray
apparently was viewed by his colleagues as an active and hard working
Lord Advocate whose personal style favoured codification rather than
dramatic reform. Normally, consolidations are unoontroversial mea¬
sures which are passed through Parliament formally, but the circum¬
stances of the Sexual Offences consolidation were exceptional enough
to pronpt an unexpected debate, the effect of which was to give a
public airing to the anomalies present in the Scottish law.
When both Cook and Boothby persisted in the later seventies in
highlighting these anomalies they were faced with a cabal of parlia¬
mentary opposition which displayed all the characteristics of the
Freudian repressions encountered by Abse in his earlier struggle to
get the 1967 English reform through. Very similar arguments were pre¬
sented expressing distaste and repugnance for the issue, 'homosexuals
are sick people'; 'Lord Advocate's policy not discriminating against
any one'; 'not wanted by the people of Scotland as I know them'.
These arguments, which were seeking to define the problem off the
political agenda, did little to camouflage the residual fears that
still remained among many politicians, and indeed among certain sec¬
tions of the public at large.
Thus, to summarise briefly: the Lord Advocate's policy of 'no
prosecutions' was the principal factor in homosexuality remaining a
'non-issue' in Scotland for the best part of a decade. Given the lack
of prosecutions there were quite simply fewer 'practical' reasons or
pressures for reform. In conjunction with this the 'nature' of the
subject was not one which aroused widespread interest and significant
sections of opinion continued to view the issue with either distaste
or, at best, considerable caution. It thus fell to a few courageous
484
individuals not only to sustain a campaign for law reform but also to
educate and enlighten the darker areas of Scottish consciousness.
VIII. 'Is this the way to reform important Scottish legislation?'
Given the manner in which the Labouchere amendment of 1885 was
tabled in the House, there was a certain irony in the approach adopted
by Robin Cook in his 1980 reform which effectively revoked that old
clause. Back in 1885 Mr. Labouchere inserted his homosexual offences
clause into the middle of a Criminal Law Amendment Bill; almost 100
years later Mr. Cook inserted his reform clause into the middle of the
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill. Whereas the Labouchere amendment
had taken a sleepy Cannons by surprise during the course of an all-
night sitting, the Cook amendment had the effect of provoking Honour¬
able Members into a procedural uproar. 'Was the clause in order?',
cried opponents to reform; 'was it not a breach of parliamentary
ethics?', they demanded to knew. The answer, in brief, was that 'yes,
the clause was in order', and 'no, it was not an abuse of parliamentary
procedure'.
Before the clause ever came before the House, private consulta¬
tions had taken place off the record between Robin Cock and his sup¬
porters and the Government as to whether the amendment should be moved
in Committee or on the Floor of the House. While the Government ex¬
pressed its reservations over the clause being introduced at all,
they nevertheless indicated that the most appropriate time to move it
would be at the Report Stage. Robin Gock revealed:
'As far as the controversy over procedure was concerned
I had already consulted with Malcolm Rifkind who advised
that the fairest time to introduce it would be on the
Report Stage so that the whole House would be able to
debate the issue'.10 7
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In this respect there was no way the clause was 'smuggled in' because
its introduction was in accordance with Government advice.
None of the clause's supporters were in any doubt as to the
procedural legitimacy of the action. Harry Ewing felt the Criminal
Justice Bill was an 'ideal opportunity to put the reform through',108
while Neil Carmichael stated categorically, 'the clause was in order
and it was a perfectly legitimate way to proceed' ,109 This sentiment
was echoed by Bob Hughes, 'the new clause was in order and that's all
that matters in this place'. Mr. Hughes did admit though to having
been 'taken aback' by Parliament's acceptance of the clause because
'seldom does Parliament shew such initiative and good sense'.110
Others complimented Cook on his astuteness. Bruae Mi 11an thought 'it
was a nice piece of initiative on Robin's part',111 while a distingui¬
shed member of the legal profession, Menzies Campbell, remarked that
'it was good buccaneering stuff and a neat example of parliamentary
tactics'.112
The Minister responsible for the Criminal Justice Bill, Malcolm
Rifkind, confirmed that discussions had taken place concerning the
most appropriate time to introduce the clause. He said it was the
Government view that time should be allowed for representations from
outside bodies, although he could understand Goak's tactics and was
not unduly upset personally at the clause being carried.
At first Cock was doubtful whether such a clause would actually
succeed, but 'the situation really snowballed when the Saunders case
brcke in the press'.113 The case in question involved John Saunders,
a gardener-handyman who was dismissed from his job at Dounans School
Camp, Stirlingshire, on the sole ground that he was a homosexual, and
thus constituted a threat to the children visiting the camp. That
Mr. Saunders failed to win an appeal for unfair dismissal at an
486
industrial tribunal only served to highlight how vulnerable homo¬
sexuals were before the law and how minimal were their rights. The
publicity which the case received was a piece of good fortune for
Robin Cock because it brought to the attention of the public at a
critical moment the fear and oppression under which homosexuals had
to exist.
Hcwever, this fortuitous media exposure apart, the success of
the homosexual law reform in Scotland in 1980 was due in large part
to Robin Cock. Cock though, would be the first to give credit to a
small band of MPs and Peers, among them Bob Hughes, Neil Carmichael,
David Steel and Lord Boothby, who supported and sustained a campaign
for reform frcm very early on. Nevertheless, it was Cock's political
astuteness that finally won the day for the reform lobby. He showed
considerable parliamentary skill and shrewdness in introducing and
guiding his clause through the House, emulating in a remarkable way
many of the qualities demonstrated by Leo Abse over a decade earlier.
Quite simply he recognised and seized the opportunity to legislate.
As one colleague remarked, 'It was a case of opportunism alright, but
certainly legitimate opportunism. That's the way things are done in
this place'.114
The question then, posed by Younger - 'is this the way to reform
important Scottish legislation?' - must be answered in the affirmative.
Robin Cook has demonstrated empirically that this can be the case.
However, if one considers the question as 'ought this to be the way',
then even the reform's most ardent supporters might conaede that,
although technically competent, it was not necessarily the most satis¬
factory way for a Scottish reform to have to go through. Yet it did
go through in this manner because the existing alternatives had failed.
These alternatives were outlined in Chapter 8. Chly the Ballot offers
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a realistic chance but this had failed to yield even a reform attempt,
let alone a reform in the thirteen years following the English enact¬
ment. Even if the view is taken that the reform ought not to have
been conducted in the way it was, Private Members' legislation being
a more appropriate vehicle, experience showed that the chances of a
sympathetic Member winning a sufficiently high place in the Ballot
were remote, and moreover, that there was absolutely no guarantee the
situation would change in the immediate future. If a high Ballot
place cannot be won by a sympathetic Member, and if the Government
decline to assist with parliamentary time, then those seeking impor¬
tant legislative reforms will use whatever legitimate methods are
available to them to have those reforms enacted.
IX. Conclusion
Homosexual law reform, and its 'non-reform' throughout the seven¬
ties, is another case which has to be viewed in the context of Scottish
history and politics. It is a case which highlights Scotland's need,
because of the maintenance of its own legal system, for certain types
of legislation to be framed separately in the idiom of Scots Law.
And it is a case which illustrates the way in which social mores can
vary north and south of the border, despite the increasing assimila¬
tion of Scottish society to that of England.
Ihe original pressures for change, however, came frcm England.
It was the Church of England in conjunction with the Howard League
for Penal Reform which initiated the pressure that led to the setting
up of the Wolfenden Committee, and it was its subsequent Report: that
set the tone of the debate in the late fifties and the sixties.
Later, pressure was to come from the Homosexual Law Reform Society
which had been founded in 1958. It worked in close harmony with Leo
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Abse to change the law, but at no time did Abse ever become its poli¬
tical pawn, insisting on his independence so as to allow himself scope
for manoeuvre. Legal opinion on the matter appeared to be rather
rnuted with no major policy documents or statements featuring promin¬
ently in the English debate. And the role of the medical profession
seems to have consisted of assisting Wolfenden in reaching a more
enlightened definition of the condition of homosexuality than had
hitherto prevailed.
There is little evidence to suggest any pressure for a legislative
reform in the law relating to homosexual conduct north of the border
in the late fifties or for most of the sixties. In fact the reverse
seems to be true. In spite of Wolfenden's recarmendations, a deliver¬
ance of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1958 came
out firmly against any revision of the homosexuality laws, and this
remained the Church's policy for the next ten years until 1968. It
was not until after the success of Abse's Sexual Offences Act 1967,
and after the Church of Scotland had revised its thinking, that ten¬
tative liberal pressure for reform began to emerge. The Scottish
Minorities Group was set up in 1969 with the aim of promoting social
and legal equity between homosexuals and heterosexuals, and it was
this pressure group which more or less single handedly campaigned for
reform throughout the 1970s. Some Church of Scotland ministers lent
occasional support to the campaign but the Church as a body did not
undertake any sustained lobbying of its cwn. The Roman Catholic
Church was also cautious. While it expressed aonoem that homosexuals
should be treated with understanding and sympathy it could find noth¬
ing in its teachings which would give moral justification to homosex¬
ual acts. Neither the medical profession or the legal profession had
much to say on the issue throughout the seventies, although the
489
Scottish Law Commission was responsible for co-ordinating the Sexual
Offences Consolidation in 1976. The Crown Office, of course, was of
critical importance to events.
In the fifties, the Vfolfenden Report identified the lower rate
of prosecutions in Scotland for homosexual offences conmitted in
private and attributed it to the differences in criminal procedure
either side of the border. From at least this time (and perhaps frcm
even earlier) the policy of the lord Advocate in Scotland was one of
'no prosecutions' against consenting adults in private. This admin¬
istrative discretion of the Lord Advocate lay at the very heart of
the matter. It meant that although homosexual acts in private between
consenting adults remained an the statute book as a criminal offence,
the strict letter of the law was not being enforced. Supporters of
this discretion argued that prior to 1967 Scotland was actually in a
more advanced position in relation to England, and that after 1967 it
was at least on level terms. Opponents though, pointed out that such
an arrangement not only brought the law into disrepute, but also
plaoed homosexuals in Scotland at a disadvantage since it was not
possible to guarantee that a 'no prosecutions' policy would be con¬
tinued by future Lord Advocates, Whichever way it is viewed, however,
there can be no doubt that the interpretation of the law in this way
by successive Lord Advocates was one of the main reasons why there
was no parliamentary reform in the 1970s. There had been an adminis¬
trative reform, but no legislative reform.
As with the divorce issue, the attitudes of different governments
were important, the willingness of the 1966-70 Labour administration
to grant additional parliamentary time to Private Members' issues
which were considered in the public interest to warrant full debate
was of crucial importance to the success of Leo Abse's 1967 Sexual
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Offences Act. The Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins and the Chief Whip,
John Silkin, were again the men behind these guarantees. The Con¬
servative and Labour administrations which followed in the 1970s,
however, were not inclined to take such a magnanimous stance, either
tcwards the issue of homosexuality, of which there were few reform
attempts in any case, or towards Private Members' legislation in
general.
Homosexuality, as an issue of morality, is outwith normal party
political squabbles. It is, by its nature, not a subject with which
many MPs of either party wish to be associated. This was especially
true in the fifties and early sixties when to speak in favour of
reform, or even in sympathetic terms, could have serious consequences
for the career of an aspiring young MP. While it would be difficult
to prove that Humphrey Berkeley lost his seat because of his support
for reform, he himself has admitted that it cost him a lot of -votes.
The political parties, then, were not prepared to take homosexual law
reform on board officially as party policy, since they perceived the
issue was distasteful to a majority of the electorate and therefore
a potential vote loser.
Thus, the role of the individual MP was again of vital importance.
In the course of the debates on homosexuality there were many interes¬
ting, often spectacular, contributions both for and against reform.
Influential contributions in favour of reform came from Humphrey
Berkeley, the Earl of Arran and Robert Boothby (later to become Lord
Boothby) . It was their endeavours which were to pave the way for the
1967 reform, and in the case of Boothby, it was his perseverence in
highlighting the anomolies which persisted in Scotland in the 1970s
which eventually led to the successful amendment in the Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. On the other hand, Sir Cyril Osborne
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and Cyril Black in the English context, and Lord Ferrier and lord
Strathclyde in the Scottish context, did their utmost to block the
progress of reform.
These figures, though, are best considered as supporting actors.
The lead roles were taken by Leo Abse and Robin Cock. Although
their influence on events was scare thirteen years apart, there exists
a quite remarkable parallel between these two men. While the respec¬
tive reforms emerged under different procedural conditions it was
largely through their quick-witted opportunism and political alertness
that change was achieved. Both sustained lengthy personal campaigns
to keep the issue alive in Parliament and both encountered the same
type of hostile opposition. This opposition desperately wished to
remove the issue from the agenda, but only succeeded in revealing its
prejudices, anxieties and repressions about the subject. Both Abse
and Cock handled such opposition with similar style and wit to keep
the tone of the debate as calm and as unemotive as possible, and in
so doing managed to shape a climate of opinion conducive to reform.
Their contributions cannot be over emphasised.
Parliamentary procedure was another factor which influenced the
outcome of the homosexual law reform issue both north and south of
the border. As noted above, and as with the divorce issue, the grant¬
ing of extra parliamentary time for debate was crucial to the success
of the English reform. Without such time Abse's reform Bill would
have stood no chance. Even with the additional time the passage of
the Bill was far from plain sailing, Abse having to work extremely
hard to obtain the necessary closure motions to prevent a filibuster.
The procedure in Scotland was nothing if not novel. With no one
in successive Ballots apparently prepared to take up the issue, with
the repeated failure to get the matter off the ground through the
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Hen-Minute Rule procedure and with Bills introduced in the lords fail¬
ing through time, Robin Gook ingeniously put a reform clause into the
middle of a Government Bill. This caused not a little controversy,
but it was nonetheless procedurally in order. While the Secretary of
State, George Younger, questioned whether it was the most appropriate
way to legislate on the issue, he had little option but to accept the
situation and declare a free vote, although not before he had obliquely
directed members of his cwn party not to vote for the clause. This
instruction was obeyed to a man for not a single Conservative regis¬
tered an 'Aye' vote in the Division. There is no doubt that this must
have embarrassed seme Conservatives such as Malcolm Rifkind. A member
of the Government Front Bench he was obliged to vote against the clause
even although he had been an ardent supporter of reform in the latter
half of the seventies. This was perhaps the closest the issue came
to being involved in 'party politics'.
The effect of public opinion on the issue has been rather diffi¬
cult to judge. Homosexuality and homosexual law reform are not mat¬
ters to which the general public are keen to address themselves. When
they do, the responses they give are often highly emotive because of
the nature of the subject. TO recap a point made in the conclusion
to the last chapter, it is sometimes a case of what public opinion
will 'stand for'. In this sense, public opinion in England seems to
have coalesced as the sixties progressed to a point in 1967 when
reform was seen as tolerable; homosexual relations between consenting
adults in private might still be morally wrong, but this was not con¬
sidered in itself to be sufficient reason for classifying the activity
as a criminal offence. In Scotland in the sixties such tolerance
does not appear to have existed amongst the masses, or at least this
was the way parliamentarians interpreted opinion. The irony was that
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while Scottish opinion appeared unwilling to accept reform, it was
already tolerating (perhaps unknowingly?) a policy of 'no prosecutions'
by the Lord Advocate. And this rather ambivalent position was to per¬
sist for much of the 1970s.
The perceptions that parliamentarians had of homosexuality and
of homosexuals were obviously important in influencing their attitudes
and decisions. MPs' and peers' positions on the question of law re¬
form stemmed from the way in which they perceived and conceptualised
the issue. Many of those against reforming the law pertaining to
homosexual conduct between consenting adults in private defended
Devlin's 'disintegration thesis', arguing that to permit such behaviour
would inevitably lead to a moral declension which would undermine the
fabric of society. Advocates of reform on the other hand, tended to
subscribe to Hart's position, questioning the grounds on which moral
feeling about homosexuality was founded. Numerous examples of these
arguments have appeared in the text and do not warrant repetition here.
Suffice to say though, that the issue of homosexuality is another case
where recognition has to be given to the different 'values' and dif¬
ferent frames of reference that arose in determining policy.
When caparisons are drawn between Scotland and England there are
not many differences to be found in the general principles of the res¬
pective enactments. As in the case of divorce, the same considerations
applied: should Scotland be content to 'catch up' and draw itself into
line with prevailing practice in England or should it consider alter¬
native policies to meet its own particular current and future require¬
ments? Glimpses of alternative policies did appear, for example, in
the proposal to reduce the age of consent to the heterosexual norm of
16, but in the end the 'standardisation' approach prevailed, probably
because homosexuality is not a subject which most MPs feel inclined
to be radical about.
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Hie glaring difference between the reforms, of course, was that
they were thirteen years apart. Certainly in Abse's case parliamen¬
tary opinion was more definitely formed on the issue and onoe he
could demonstrate support he was able to extract parliamentary time
from a sympathetic administration, lb recall Roy Jenkins' defence
of this allocation of time:
'Had we not taken this course, we should have found
ourselves faced with the anomaly that the sanction
of the criminal law continued to apply to acts
which Parliament no longer considered to be criminal
and that solely because of the hazards of the
Private Members' Bill procedure the law could not
be changed'.
However, to all intents and purposes that was the situation which
prevailed in Scotland throughout the seventies. Ihe ultimate irony
was that while the anomaly was used to justify parliamentary time for
reform south of the border, in the Scots instance that very anomaly
(an extant criminal statute but a policy of 'no prosecutions') was
subsequently used to deny the need for reform and to justify what was
tantamount to a 'non-decision'.
Cnce again then, the 'Scottish dimension' in this case study lies
in all of the aforementioned points. It lies in what might be descri¬
bed as the politics of a 'non-issue'. Lack of general public interest,
lack of any widespread pressure group activity (with the exception of
the SMS), lack of attention frcm most Soots MPs, lack of a suitable
parliamentary opportunity for reform and lack of any urgency due to
the lord Advocate's policy of 'no prosecutions', all contributed
towards homosexual law reform being perceived in Scotland during the
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The aim of this thesis has been to examine the politics of
Scottish law reform in an attempt to establish what, if anything,
constituted the 'Scottish dimension' in the particular 'issues of
conscience' - liquor licensing, divorce and homosexuality - which
have been under consideration. Through an enquiry into Parliament
and the policy process attention has been focused on various aspects
of Scottish affairs in the 1970s. For instance, in each of the mea¬
sures discussed MPs were free to vote according to individual con¬
science rather than by party whip. Hence they have provided an
interesting insight into some of the social attitudes which prevailed
in Scottish politics. They have also provided the means to explore
in the Scottish context, variations in policy content and variations
in the processes by which policy is formulated.
The scope of the thesis has been wide in so far as it has sought
to investigate seme key concerns about decision-making and policy-
development in Scottish affairs in different cases and at different
levels. In so doing a nuntoer of ccmnon questions, issues and themes
have been raised in the discussion. The purpose of this concluding
chapter is to draw these various themes together by making an overall
assessment of hew the case studies, and the conclusions to the case
studies, can be brought to bear on some of the general issues raised
in Chapter 1, 2 and 3, In order that the thesis might end with a
statement an the 'Scottish dimension' in this particular sphere of
politics, it is proposed here to deal with the matters raised in
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 in reverse order. Thus, the following section
(Section II) will consider the case studies in relation to Parliament
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and procedure, Section III will consider them in relation to approaches
to policy making and Section IV in relation to Scottish culture and
politics.
II.
In Chapter 3 some of the differing conceptions of Parliament's
role in policy making were discussed and some case examples outlined.
Ihere emerged frcm that discussion two principal points of view - one
which might be described as the 'Ashford thesis' and the other which
can be termed the 'Norton thesis'. It was against these tavo analyses
that some of the Parliamentary aspects of the case studies were to be
considered.
Ibe 'Ashford thesis', it will be recalled, was the predominant
ore. It errphasised the primacy of the Executive and its bureaucracy
in the formulation of policy. Ihe increased complexity of the struc¬
ture of government, especially in the twentieth century, had led to
the decline in the importance of direct democratic control through
Parliament. It postulated that the Opposition had relatively few ways
to intervene in lawmaking and policy choices and that even the suppor¬
ters of the governing majority in Parliament were themselves excluded
from policymaking to a remarkable degree.
The 'Norton thesis', on the other hand, questioned the notion
that the initiation and formulation of legislation were largely, if
not almost exclusively, undertaken by Government. While it did not
deny that this was a reasonably accurate description of policy-making
until the end of the 1960s, the thesis doubted its continued relevance
to the analysis of policy formulation in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Instead, the 'Nortcn view' pointed to the pattern of parliamentary
behaviour in the 1970s which revealed that MPs had been more willing
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to dissent frcm the Government line than had previously been the case.
Thus, it was suggested that Parliament retained a basic pcwer to vote
against Government proposals if a majority disagreed. This was not
merely a potential pcwer but an actual power which MPs had already
proved capable of using. Parliament did have a role in policy-making
but it was up to the MPs themselves to put into effect the powers of
scrutiny and influence already available.
What then, do our case studies on Scottish issues of conscience
reveal about these analyses? What do they say about the role of
Parliament? Before any general response is possible, a lock, at some
of the more specific aspects of Parliament in relation to the case
studies is required.
The Scottish Grand Ccrrinittee plays an important part in Scottish
affairs in Parliament. This comprises all 71 Scottish MPs. Until
1979 it also used to include additional (and usually unwilling)
English MPs who were co-opted onto the Committee in order to preserve
the party balance which prevailed on the Floor of the House. It was
a practice used mainly by the Conservatives to overcome Labour's con¬
stant majority in Scotland.
Now the Committee has been given something of a peripatetic role,
sitting in both London and Edinburgh. In the aftermath of devolution
this was the Thatcher Administration's offering to the Scottish people
of more accountable government. Along with the re-instatement of a
Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, which itself was a part of the
Government's general reorganisation of the Select Committee system,
it was presented by the Conservative Government as an opportunity for
Scots to witness at first hand 'Parliament at work'. Critics hcwever,
within the Labour, Liberal and Scottish National parties viewed it as
something of a red herring since it was only a deliverative body with
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no independent legislative powers.
Throughout the seventies however, the Scottish Grand Committee
resided at Westminster. There it dealt mainly with two types of
business - Second Reading debates on the principles of Bills pertain¬
ing solely to Sootland and more general debates on Scottish issues of
current interest. Both these functions were fulfilled in our case
study on liquor licensing. Initially, the SGC provided the forum to
debate the general principles and implications of the Clayson Report.
Here it not only provided the means through which Scottish parliamen¬
tary opinion could be expressed, it also helped to maintain interest
in the issue. This debating facility can be of considerable importance
to Scottish issues which might otherwise be neglected and it was cer¬
tainly a distinct advantage in the case of licensing. Such a facility
does not exist for England and Wales though, sinoe there is no equiv¬
alent to the SGC. So while it is possible for Scottish Reports like
Clayson to be discussed in Parliament in Committee, it is much more
difficult for similar English (or indeed British) Reports to receive
parliamentary attention because they have to compete for time on the
Floor of the House of Commons itself. With such time at a premium it
is only Reports of the very highest importance which can command a
full debate. Perhaps this is another reason why so many Reports
receive scant public attention.
When the Licensing (Sootland) Bill came before Parliament in 1975
the SGC was again used, this time for a Second Reading debate on the
principle of the Bill. If a Bill is declared to pertain solely to
Scotland it can be removed frcm the Floor of the House and debated in
the Grand Committee. Sinoe such a Bill then proceeds to one of the
Scottish Standing Committees, it is not until Report and Third Reading
that it ccmes to the Floor of the CormDns. This can have seme
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interesting repercussions as the Licensing issue demonstrated.
At the Report Stage of the Licensing (Scotland) Bill, the
Secretary of State for Scotland, Bruoe Millan, more or less warned
English MPs not to 'interfere' in the vote on Sunday opening. While
this was admittedly dene in a rather oblique manner, it did neverthe¬
less illustrate a problem that can arise if English MPs ctecide to
vote on issues which pertain solely to Scotland. Hie fear amongst
Scottish Members is that a Scottish majority can be overruled by the
weight of English opinion. It is not only free vote issues which are
susceptible to this problem. For instance, there exists a permanent
difficulty for Conservative administrations when Scotland returns a
majority of Labour MPs but the United Kingdom as a whole returns a
majority of Tories. In face of whipped Labour opposition Conservative
governments have, by necessity, to call upon their English MPs in
order to secure a majority on purely Scottish matters. If they did
not, Tory governments would have great difficulty in passing any
Scottish legislation at all.
Of course, the other side of the coin is the problem of Scottish
MPs voting on matters of concern only to England and Wales since it
is also possible here for Scottish Members to have a decisive effect
cm the outcome in such cases. In the 1970s the issue of Scots MPs
voting on matters of oonoem only to England was to become something
of a 'cause Celebes' to some anti-devolution MPs. They considered it
unfair that after devolution Soots Members would retain the right to
influence affairs particular to England but that the reciprocal right
of English MPs to have their say on Scottish affairs would be removed
by the presence of a Scottish Assembly. This, because it was publi¬
cised so much by Tarn Dalyell, became known as the 'West Lothian ques¬
tion' . The role of Scottish MPs at Westminster then, was a prime
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concern in the devolution debate in the seventies. The issue at
stake was one of equity; what constituted an equitable arrangement
for the handling of Scottish affairs. It is this question of equity
which the case studies on Scottish issues of conscience have tried to
explore.
Che idea which has been suggested to improve the handling of
Scottish business in Parliament, by David Steel among others, is that
the Scottish Grand Corrmittee should take the Report Stage of Scottish
Bills with only a final reserve power (say, at Third Reading) left to
the House. The advantages of this, it is argued, would be twofold.
Firstly, pressures on the legislative timetable of the Floor of the
House would be eased, and secondly, the decisions reached in the SGC
would reflect Scottish parliamentary opinion since they would not be
subject to opinions of any English Members.
Such a scheme, however, would not be without its problems. There
would be party political objections for a start. As noted above a
Conservative Government would have great difficulty in securing the
passage of any contentious legislation in the face of Labour's major¬
ity in Scotland. The Conservatives could of course pack the Cbnmittee
with English Tories to restore an overall majority, but this would
defeat the purpose of a 'Scottish only' debate. So in practice the
scheme would only be feasible when there was both a Labour majority
in Scotland and in the UK as a whole (or indeed a Conservative major¬
ity in both instances, but this is not as likely) . Also there would
be technical difficulties in setting the criteria for the final reserve
powers of the House. For instance, in what circumstances would it be
acceptable for the House to \eto a decision made in the SGC and in what
circumstances would this be tantamount to unnecessary interference in
Scottish affairs?
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These then, are formidable objections to the general use of the
Scottish Grand Committee for Report Stage debates. But what about
its more limited use for free vote issues relating only to Scotland?
This is an altogether different matter since the same party political
objections could not be brought and technical difficulties could be
overcote if it was accepted that, generally speaking, Scottish opinion
en such moral matters should prevail. However, the issue is compli¬
cated when it is realised that these moral concerns are usually the
subject of Private Members' business and even for Scottish 'issues of
conscience' the SGC does not at present have a procedural role. Might
it be possible though, to give it a role?
It has been emphasised throughout the thesis that one of the big¬
gest obstacles facing Private Members' legislation is adequate time
for debate. At both Second Reading and Report Stage, Private Members'
Bills can face bottlenecks and delays. Now hypothetically, if Private
Members' Bills pertaining solely to Scotland were to be heard at
Second Reading and/or on Report in the Scottish Grand Committee, then
aggrieved English Members might justly abject that Scotland would be
receiving an unfair advantage since English Bills would continue to
languish in the queue for time on a Friday afternoon. On grounds of
equity then, such a scheme would appear to be a non-starter, unless
perhaps more fundamental reforms to Private Members' procedure were
contemplated, such as the creation of a separate Scottish Ballot.
Had, of course, the Scotland Act 1978 been implemented and a
Scottish Assembly established, the Scottish Grand Committee would now
be obsolete. It would no longer have any useful function at Westminster
since matters relating solely to Scotland (at least as defined in that
1978 Act) would be the responsibility of the Assembly. How an Assembly
might have handled the topics considered in this thesis and other
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Scottish issues is a matter open to conjecture because the Scotland
Act never set out any definite procedural guidelines for it to follow.
These details were to be worked out by the Assent)ly itself once it
was elected and under way. However, it would be reasonable to assume
that some suitable method for dealing with free vote issues, say
through a Ballot, would have been incorporated into Assent)ly procedure.
The possible role of an Assembly in Scottish affairs is a matter to
which Section IV will return.
The question which requires to be asked here though, is hew use¬
ful the Scottish Grand Corrmittee is in dealing with Scottish affairs.
Che thing that can be stated categorically is that even with its pre¬
sent peripatetic role, the SGC cannot be viewed as any substitute for
devolution. The Scottish Grand Committee has nowhere near the same
standing as an Assembly. It commands neither the power, status or
public interest of devolution. Yet, within the existing parliamentary
structure it is the only forum available to Scottish Members to debate
Scottish issues. In the case study on liquor licensing it was seen
hew the SGC played a useful part in bringing the Clayson Report onto
the agenda for consideration and in assisting with the passage of the
Licensing Bill founded upon Clayson's recommendations. So while
Parliament remains structured along its present lines, the Scottish
Grand Committee will continue to be an important deliberative forum
in which Scottish issues can be considered by Scots MPs.
Another aspect of Parliament which featured prominently in the
case studies was the procedure for Private Members' legislation.
Here some of the problems which were encountered will be considered
in order to see what they might reveal about Parliament and Private
Members' Bills. What were the problems common to all MPs and what
were the problems that might have been particular to Scots MPs?
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An initial problem can lie in getting an issue onto the agenda
and a prime target for criticism in this respect is the Ballot. It
has been criticised for being too much of a lottery, for providing
cnly those with a sufficiently high place with time for debate, and
for paying scant regard to the relative importance of different issues.
These disadvantages though, faced all MPs, so what were the particular
difficulties encountered by Scottish Members?
In the course of the studies several Scottish MPs were found to
have expressed dissatisfaction with Private Members' procedure, espec¬
ially with the Ballot which they felt placed Scots Members at some¬
thing of a numerical disadvantage in the draw. The prevailing per¬
ception seemed to be that the statistical chances of getting a Scots
MP drawn high in the Ballot and then getting him to adopt a Scots
Bill were poor. These assumptions, however, are only partially true.
An analysis of Private Members' Ballots from 1966 to 1980 (see
Appendix I) revealed that of the 336 places available, Scottish Members
won a total of 42. This represented a 12.5% share of the Ballot places
available during these years. Now since Scotland's 71 MPs represent
11.2% of all Menbers sitting in Parliament, Scottish Members appear
to have won a marginally greater percentage of places in the Ballot
than their parliamentary membership. Thus, the widely held belief
that the Scots are disadvantaged in the draw is not in fact true.
However, this takes no account of the position attained in the
Ballot, or the type of Bill sponsored. The analysis further revealed
that of the 42 Scots MPs, 23 chose to sponsor a UK Bill while 19 opted
for a Scottish cne. This does not represent a drastic Imbalance. But
of the 21 Scots MPs who were drawn in the first eight places (and by
implication stood a realistic chanoe of success) only 6 chose to pre¬
sent a Bill pertaining solely to Scotland. Therefore the assumption
see
that it can be a problem to get a Scots MP drawn high in the Ballot
and then to sponsor a Scottish Bill seems much nearer the truth.
This though, would appear to say more about the attitudes of
Scots MPs than about the Ballot itself. It is perhaps unjust to lay
the entire blame on the vagaries of the Ballot when Scottish Meirfoers
themselves have not taken up the opportunities available to present
Scottish Bills. Obviously, the reasons why particular MPs chose to
sponsor particular issues vary in each case, but it does appear as if
Scottish MPs consider it important to retain the option to sponsor non-
Scottish Bills. Indeed, this is one of the main arguments used against
the idea of a separate Ballot for Scottish MPs. For although a sep¬
arate Scottish Ballot would guarantee a Soots MP a place, it would
then be incurrbent upon him to sponsor a Scottish Bill. If he did not
it would defeat the purpose of such a draw since the idea behind it is
to get Scottish issues, not Scottish MPs, onto the political agenda.
Apart from any technical difficulties of establishing what might
constitute an equitable amount of time for Scottish Private fferrbers1
legislation, Scots MPs would be reluctant to be railroaded into pre¬
senting only Scottish Bills. Keating has pointed out that Scots MPs
operate in a dual arena - in the Scottish context and in the UK con¬
text. He has shewn that while most Scots MPs look to Scottish affairs
as their primary concern, and seek to gain as much control as possible
over these affairs, they also look to maximise their influence over
matters of concern to Britain as a whole. This certainly seems to
hold true for Private Members' legislation where Scots MPs feel it
important to retain the right to introduce British measures.
Another obstacle which can confront MPs bringing forward Private
Members' Bills is the problem of getting a decision at Second Reading.
The sponsor of a Bill can often experience difficulty in bringing the
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debate to a close and forcing a vote. In order to overcoire the fili¬
bustering obstructionism of his opponents he must obtain a 'Closure
Motion' if the Bill is to make any further progress. New this ob¬
stacle is camon to all MPs but there are certain specific problems
for Scots MPs.
The promoter of the Bill (or indeed anyone else) can move the
closure by proposing ' that the Question be now put', but he can
succeed in this only if two conditions are fulfilled. The Speaker
must be satisfied that the Bill has been adequately debated, and at
least 100 Menbers must vote for the closure. On Robert Hughes'
Divorce Reform Bill it was seen that although there was a majority of
71 to 15 in favour, 'the question was not decided in the affirmative'
because it fell short of the required 100 votes. While every MP faces
a difficulty with this, the Scots MP has a particularly high hurdle
to surmount since he must deliver 100 votes from a Scottish Membership
which stands at only 71 MPs. He therefore becomes totally reliant on
the assistance of his English colleagues with all the attendant prob¬
lems of maintaining their interest in a Scottish issue on a Friday
afternoon. So as Robin Cook has pointed out, 'this rule is a real
pitfall for the Scottish Private Manber'.1
One of the ironies in the Private Members' procedure is that if
a Scottish Bill can manage to overcome the hurdle of Second Reading
it can then have a distinct advantage over other Bills. This is
because it is possible for Private Members' Bills which relate exclu¬
sively to Scotland to be considered separately by one of the Scottish
Standing Ccumiittees instead of having to queue up for consideration
alcng with the United Kingdom Bills. Scottish Bills then, can proceed
faster to Standing Oanmittee than can United Kingdom Bills. This is
not to say that they will necessarily proceed faster through Committee,
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but certainly having a head start is no disadvantage. The paradox,
then, would seem to be that once on the legislative agenda and under
way, it is possible for a Scottish Bill to progress more quickly
than other Bills, but the difficulty is getting it onto the agenda
for consideration in the first place.
The attitude of the Government, of course, can be of critical
importance to the success or failure of a Private Member's Bill.
This was anply demonstrated in the case studies where there were
numerous exairples of Bills which were assisted with time and Bills
which were not. There appears to be no definite criteria by which a
Government decides whether generosity is warranted. While each case
is judged on its merits sore general considerations have emerged
which can influence a Government's response. These include the state
of the Government's own programre, the progress and prospects of the
Bill in Private Members' own time, and the amount of interest in and
support for the measure. At this point then, attention will be turned
to consider what the cases might reveal about the role of public opin¬
ion and the role of MPs in influencing policy in Parliament.
By their nature, issues of conscience generate divergent opinions.
This however, creates problems in defining and identifying what major¬
ity opinion might be. The Scottish divorce issue illustrated this
point particularly well. In this case MPs' perceptions of public
opinion depended a great deal en their own values and beliefs and on
who or what they took to represent public opinion. There was a simi¬
lar situation with homosexuality where, because of the nature of the
subject, public opinion was, for the most part, reserved and subdued.
Lacking a firm reference point on public feeling, MP's tended to rely
on their own values, and in some instances prejudices, in their evalu¬
ation of the matter. Only in licensing was prevailing opinion more
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clearly defined and this stermed largely frcm the Clayson Gonmittee
of inquiry which distilled the range of views submitted to it into
coherent categories. When the Carrmittee came out in favour of relax¬
ations in the law, its reccrrmendations were taken up and pushed by
sections of the Scottish press, and this did much to solidify public
support for reform. Also since drink has such a prominent place in
the Scottish psyche, it was an issue which readily caught public
interest.
Even when a clear cut majority in opinion can be identified, its
influence on policy in Parliament is still rather uncertain. Take
for instance the issue of capital punishment. It is generally acknow¬
ledged that at the time of its abolition, hanging was supported by a
majority of the populace, and periodic opinion polls since have indi¬
cated that a majority of the British public would not be averse to
the reintroducticn of the death penalty for certain categories of mur¬
der. Yet MPs have consistently refused to be influenced by this
expression of popular sentiment, prefering instead that Parliament
should be seen to lead, not follow, opinion on this issue. On other
issues though, like divorce and homosexuality, Parliament prefers,
and often insists, that it should follcw.
This is cne of the central themes of the Devlin/Hart controversy.
The implication of the Devlin argument is that Parliament should be
more or less obliged to follow popular feeling on such moral issues,
since it is the viewpoint of the 'man on the Clapham omnibus' which
has to be upheld. Hart, on the other hand, would suggest that Parlia¬
ment has to be free to view the general moral feeling not only with
a sympathetic understanding but also with a 'critical intelligence' .
However, this begs the question, who is the man on the Clapham omni¬
bus and what is the general moral feeling?
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The case studies have demonstrated sane of the problems in iden¬
tifying public opinion. It has been suggested that opinion is made
up of a number of component parts, the relative importance of which
can vary over time and over issues. This creates difficulties in
establishing what the general impact of public opinion might be. It
is possible, as the cases have shown, to point to certain aspects of
public opinion, e.g. pressure group activity or media exposure, which
appear to have been influential at a given point in time and on a
given issue. But whether Parliament is leading or following public
opinion is difficult to assess without sore objective data about that
opinion and change in it over time.
Of course one of the aims of the thesis has been to examine any
differences between Scottish opinion and English opinion. This has
proved difficult because there is little firm evidence such as indepen¬
dent Scottish opinion polls on these issues which might reveal varia¬
tions between the two countries. Thus, it was relatively easy for
Scots MPs to invoke whichever part of public opinion most suited their
particular viewpoint. Other aspects of Scottish opinion and morality
will be returned to in Section IV.
The way in which MPs assessed public opinion was another impor¬
tant feature of the case studies. A number of influences were found
to affect an MP's appraisal of opinion, such as mailbags, constituency
pressure, the press, pressure groups, public meetings and surgeries,
and informal social gatherings. Each of these influences affected
individual MPs differently, but the one carrnon feature which oould be
identified was that MPs tended to play up those sources which reinfor¬
ced their personal biases, while playing down those at variance with
them. The case studies threw up numerous examples of this where MPs
drew upcn and quoted that section of public opinion which did most to
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support their personal predilections. Thus, the way in which public
opinion was assessed and presented by MPs was very dependent on their
cwn values and beliefs.
In each of the case studies then, the role of the individual MP
was of considerable importance. In licensing, for instance, the
influence of J. P. Mackintosh in setting the tone of the debate was
noted, and in particular decisions, such as the Sunday opening of pubs
and the restriction of police entry to clubs, the names of Malcolm
Rifkind, Dennis Canavan and Michael Clark Hutchison came to attention.
Hie divorce issue also produced its share of influential individual
contributions on both sides of the argument from Donald Dewar, Robert
Hughes, Willie Hamilton, Robin Cook and Tarn Galbraith. And the homo¬
sexuality issue again saw Robin Cook, along with Lord Boothby and the
Earl of Arran, make significant contributions by periodically speaking
out in favour of a legislative reform.
In our case studies Parliament and individual MPs have had a
rather more important role to play in deciding policy options than
the 'rubber stamp' role with which they are usually associated. In
this regard the studies, being both issues of conscience and issues
of the 1970s, tend to support Norton's view that Parliament is not
always impotent in influencing policy outcomes. Hie innovative roles
of Robin Cock and Leo Abse are particularly good examples of Norton's
idea that channels of influence already exist within Parliament, but
that these channels are only effective if MPs show themselves willing
(and knowledgeable enough) to use them.
However, even Norton concedes that Parliament has ceased to form
a regular part of the decision-making process. Ashford's thesis then,
is not necessarily refuted by these instances. They could be incor¬
porated into his analysis as reasonable exceptions. What Norton's
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thesis demonstrates is that the Opposition in the seventies, because
of the changing balance of power, had a greater opportunity to inter¬
vene in lawmaking and policy choices. In other words through dissent
Government action could be prevented. What our cases have shown are
seme of the difficulties involved when Parliament tries to initiate
policy change or legislation in face of a reluctant Executive. So it
would appear as though the power of veto comes more readily to Parlia¬
ment than the power of initiative. Yet, however limited it may be,
Parliament did exert and does still exert some influence in the decision¬
making process. As Norton has stated, 'the House of Commons certainly
cannot be written off as irrelevant'.2
III.
Chapter 2 reviewed seme approaches to policy analysis and it was
suggested there that more than one account was required to describe
all the different aspects of policy-making and organisational life.
No one clear and simple explanation of policy development in modem
government was thought to be possible; therefore the idea of a single
'policy process' operating identically throughout an individual policy
change or over all policies was cast aside. Instead it was the bal¬
ance of forces which operated in different phases of the process and
in different types of policies that required illumination.
If then, there is no single policy process, hew is the emergence
of policies to be conceptualised and how might our policy studies fit
into this conceptualisation? Here this part of the conclusion will
progress towards a statement cn the utility of the notion of a continu¬
um in which to allow for differentiation of different types of policies.
Cue of the ideas that the case studies have arrply illustrated is
that the making of policy is both an intellectual activity and an
515
institutional process. All three cases have shown that decisions
which influenced policy were the products of individual minds which
perceived and defined problems and created new policies on the basis
of those perceptions. Yet policy formulation was also an institutional
process whereby policy-makers derived authority from, and had to oper¬
ate within, the political institutions of which they were a part.
The cases of divorce and homosexuality in particular have demonstra¬
ted that while policy did alter as a response to changing intellectual
appraisal, institutional realities also affected the extent to which
new ideas penetrated the political world and upon the way in which
they were assimilated into public policy. Take as just one exartple
of this, the premium on parliamentary time for debating Private Meirfoers'
initiatives.
This interaction between intellectual activity and institutional
process underpins the rationalist/incrementalist debate. It was obser¬
ved in Chapter 2 that rationalism promoted a systematic and orderly
(and by implication, intellectual) approach to the study of policy
problems. Through a sequence of rational activities - identification
of problem and objectives; classification of possible options; consid¬
eration of the consequences of those options; and comparison of options
and consequences with original objectives - a policy could be selected
in which consequences most closely matched the desired objectives.
Increirentalism, on the other hand, started not with seme ideal goal,
but with the policies currently in force and decision-making here en¬
tailed considering only marginal change. The policy-marker chose as
relevant objectives oily those which might be achieved through rreans
actually at hand or likely to become available (e.g. institutional
process). Evaluation was not viewed as a separate activity but as
taking place in series with decision-making, so that means were not
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only adjusted to ends, but also ends to means. How then, do these
differing conceptions of policy formulation fit with the case studies?
What is their explanatory value? Do issues of conscience, by their
nature, necessitate an incrementalist policy response?
The answer, and it is equivocal, is that in each of the cases
under consideration there has been both a rational (of sorts) and an
incremental response to the perceived problems of licensing, divorce
and homosexuality. At some juncture in each case there was what might
be described as a 'rational' initiative to set up committees of inquiry
to review the problem. However, these Conmittees varied in approach
as did the quality and impact of their Reports. The Clayson Committee
on licensing and the Wolfenden Commission on homosexuality came closest
to adopting a 'rationalist' perspective by identifying problems and
objectives, reviewing possible options and consequences, and making
policy recommendations accordingly. In contrast, the Morton Commission
an divorce lacked any such clear 'rationalist' objectives and tended
to prevaricate over its recommendations.
After each of the Committees reported, policy development tended
to proceed in an incremental fashion. Options which were perhaps re¬
garded as desirable had to be weighed against those regarded as feas¬
ible. Both politicians and public opinion can place limitations upon
what is politically possible. Thus, not only were means adjusted to
ends, but ends became adjusted to available means. Change was tempered
to suit what was thought to be oormonly acceptable. For example, in
the case of homosexuality the reduction of the age of consent to 16
for consenting adults in private was deemed unacceptable; in divorce
the all-embracing principle of a two year period of breakdown with or
without consent was deemed unacceptable; and in licensing all-day open¬
ing was deemed unacceptable. In each of these examples the changes in
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policy eventually approved were more marginal and 'incremental' in
nature than those originally advocated.
To some extent the cases have illustrated the artificiality of
the rationalist/incrementalist debate which tends to confuse ideal
with real states of affairs. Rationalism is held as an ideal image
of decision-making and one to which, for instance, committees of
inquiry try to aspire. The reality though, is often different as
extraneous factors can impinge upon such rationalist attempts compro¬
mising both options and objectives. So incrementalism has much valid¬
ity as an empirical model of how policies develop. As Smith and May
point out the two models are about different social phenomena. The
problem, therefore, is not to reconcile the differences between them,
but to relate the two in the sense of 'spelling out the relationship
between the social realities with which each is concerned'.3 In each
of the cases then, attempts at a rationalist overview gave way to a
more protracted incremental approach.
Cne factor which affected rational policy making was pressure
group activity. Richardson and Jordan have in fact gone as far as to
contend that such is the pcwer of pressure groups in contemporary
society that we are now living in a 'post-parliamentary democracy'.
In the preceeding section, however, it was suggested that Parliament
was not as weak as was sometimes imagined since it still retained seme
basic pewers through which it could influence the decision-making pro¬
cess . Nevertheless, pressure groups are still an important element in
influencing policy. So what did the cases reveal about pressure group
politics?
The most important and influential pressure groups in each study
have already been recorded and commented upon in the individual con¬
clusions to the cases. Some repetition though is warranted here so
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that more general comparisons can be drawn.
Amongst the most influential organisations that one might expect
to find on issues of conscience would be the Christian churches. Yet
overall their impact cn the cases in question was rather diffuse. A
general decline in religious belief and church attendence can be held
partly responsible for this, as can divisions within the Christian
faith and divisions within particular denominations. ** But more than
this there appeared to be a lacklustre performance from the Scottish
churches in their capacity as pressure groups. There was a lack, par¬
ticularly in the Church of Scotland, of what might be called political
acumen. After the approval of a policy by the General Assembly there
was then little, if any, secular activity from the Church of Scotland
in the way of lobbying. And what lobbying there was often came too
late.
Further, it is interesting to contrast the differences between
the Church of Sootland and the Reman Catholic Church in Scotland on
these issues. In each case they held different positions, sometimes
quite markedly so. Their views perhaps came closest to converging on
the homosexuality question where both churches advocated increased
understanding of, and pastoral care for, homosexuals. Hcwever, while
the Church of Scotland came out tentatively in favour of law reform,
the Catholic Church was reluctant to do the same lest it be misconst¬
rued as in seme way condoning the practice. On the other two issues
there was an even greater divergence in points of view. While the
Catholic Church approved and supported the liberalisation of the
licensing laws, the Church of Scotland were vehemently opposed to any
relaxations especially on a Sunday. The reverse, hcwever, was true
for divorce, where the Kirk took up a very radical position in favour
of reform, while the Catholic hierarchy opposed change. With such a
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divergence of Christian opinion in Scotland is there any wonder that
it lacked political impact?
Medical opinion too was strangely equivocal, although this was
only really relevant to the licensing issue. None of the medical
bodies felt confident about substantiating an opinion on the effect
of licensing laws on the misuse of alcohol due to a lack of reliable
evidence. With this uncertainty their impact on policy was also less
than one might have expected it to be.
Only the legal profession was consistent in its support for the
principle of reform in all three cases. Even h a though there were
skirmishes in the ranks between the Law Society of Scotland and the
Faculty of Advocates over the proposed hearing of divorce cases in the
Sheriff Courts. Their role in influencing policy, ho,/ever, was passive
rather than active. They tended to react to demands for legal advice
on the reforms rather than create the demand for the reforms themselves.
Hall et al. have rightly pointed out that pressure groups do not
each relate to government in isolation. Their interests and objectives
can overlap, compete with and stand in opposition to each other. In
none of the studies though, were there any examples of formal group
alliances, although the Scottish Licensed Trade Association and the
Scottish Tourist Board certainly did work in close co-operation in the
early seventies in c .:rrpaigning for the reform of the licensing laws.
On the other hand there were numerous examples of groups standing in
opposition to each other. The deep divisions between the Scottish
churches on all of the issues have been noted. In licensing reform
there were divisions not only between the temperance lobby and the
licensed trade, but also within the 'trade' itself, where there was a
divergence of opinion between the Brewers' Association of Scotland
and the National Association of Licensed House Managers over the
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effects of extra hours on the working conditions of bar staff. In
divorce too, there were divisions between organisations ostensibly on
the same side, in as much as the Scottish Law Commission and the
Church of Scotland, while both favouring reform, could not reach
agreement on the contents of a reform Bill.
Hie effect of group alliances, or alternatively group competition,
on policy formulation will obviously vary according to particular cir¬
cumstances. But clearly where groups 'on the same side' and in broad
sympathy with a general principle cannot come to a compromise solution
on matters of detail in order that they may present a united front,
then their influenos on policy will be diminished, while the influence
of decision-makers will be augmented. For as Hall et al. noted, in
competing for influence groups may neutralise each other which can give
political leaders the opportunity to select and manipulate the inter¬
ests to which they ultimately respond.
Another factor which can have an effect on a group's influence
is the way in which its demands are presented. Richards has p' Lnted
out that for opinion to matter it must be reasonably specific and be
expressed by persons of authority. And he adds, 'authority may derive
from status or knowledge'.5 There were certainly a number of examples
in the studies which confirmed the general truth of this observation.
In the licensing study especially it was seen how consultation was not
always equitable, those groups with community 'status' having almost
automatic access to decision-makers. Yet access in itself should not
be confused with influence for as Dr. Clayson, Chairman of the Committee
en Scottish Licensing Law, revealed, seme of this consultation 'had
to be seen to be done'.
In the case of licensing, pressure group activity was much more
observable since formalised lines of communication existed between
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groups, the Clayson Carmittee and the Scottish Office. This was
because the issue was the subject of an inquiry and then adopted as
a Government Bill. The Licensing (Scotland) Bill was an example of
one of those rare political configurations - an unwhipped Government
Bill. This meant that there was much more administrative involvement
in the preparation and servicing of the Bill than for other issues of
conscience which would normally proceed through Private Members'
legislation. Of course this is not to imply that Private Members'
Bills are totally devoid of administrative back up - the divorce
Bills, for instance, were drafted by the Scottish law Ccmrdssion.
It is simply to suggest that in the cases of divorce and harosexuality
there were not as many formal points of acoess upon which pressure
groups could bring influence to bear.
The cases have demonstrated that it is the Government, because
of its authority and legitimacy, which ultimately exercises control
over pressure groups, through its management of the legislative
agenda. The sheer volume of demands, in combination with a shortage
of key resources such as parliamentary time, impose upon the Govern¬
ment the need to respond selectively to reduce demands to manageable
proportions. And this regulation of demands can be very much depen¬
dent upon the values of the legislators and adininistrators responsible
for setting the political agenda.
This was never more evident than in the different case histories
of divorce and homosexuality north and south of the border. In
England in the late sixties both Roy Jenkins, Heme Secretary, and
John Silkin, Chief Whip, perceived the issues from a very sympathetic
viewpoint which enabled parliamentary time to be found for their
debate. In marked contrast the Secretary of State for Scotland at
this time, Willie Ross, was totally opposed to any equivalent Scottish
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reforms. Crossman's Diaries in fact, have revealed that Ross might
have threatened to resign if the case for Scottish divorce reform
had been pushed too far.6 There is no indication that upon his return
as Scottish Secretary in 1974 he had become any more enthusiastic
about such matters. And of course, in the Interim there had been a
Conservative administration which had stated its antipathy to assist¬
ing Private Members' legislation of any kind.
Values, then, can affect the way in which the political agenda
is set and the way in which the political agenda is set can affect
Parliament's influence on an issue. As Schattschneider has noted
'seme issues axe organised into politics while others are organised
out'. Every effort was made to organise the English divorce and
homosexual law reforms into politics while a corxesponding effort was
made to organise any equivalent Scottish reforms out. This was espec¬
ially true of homosexual law reform in Scotland which for the duration
of the 1970s was tantamount to a 'non-decision'. It was not only a
case of the issue going through 'some perinatal cbscurity',7 as
Debnam would say, it was also a case of an Executive decree being
made through the office of the Lord Advocate that a policy of 'no
prosecutions' would be pursued, but the law itself would not be refor¬
med. As McManus has noted,
'This renegotiation of the functions of existing
law can take place totally outside the legal
forum or, sometimes, inside but at a lower level
of visibility than is associated with legislative
activity'.8
This is what distinguished the Scottish homosexuality issue from the
other issues. It involved an admiinistrative action which was designed
to pre-empt the need to resort to legislation.
The theme of this part of the conclusion has been that more than
one explanation is required to account for all the different aspects
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of policy formulation. Each of the approaches identified in Chapter
2 has had scare bearing upon at least one of the case studies. With
no single 'policy process' applicable it was suggested that the idea
of a continuum might have some utility in allowing for the differen¬
tiation of different types of policy. So what kind of continuum
could be constructed to explain policy development and where would our
studies fit on this continuum?
L. J. F. Smith has outlined just such a continuum in her study
of the emergence of abortion law.9 Much of what she says is readily
adaptable to the case studies in this thesis. This continuum is
founded on a critical evaluation of the three general models of law
emergence - the consensus, conflict and pluralist models.
In the consensus model certain acts are defined as criminal
because they offend the moral beliefs of the members of society. The
law is seen to represent those values which are regarded as being
fundamental to the social order and which it is in the public inter¬
est to protect. The main criticism, however, is that it is extremely
difficult to point to a monolithic set of values in modern society so
why does the law uphold some moral values and not others?
In the conflict model criminal law is seen as a set of rules
which emerge as a result of class struggle between those who are
' ruled' and those who ' rule'. The outcome of the struggle is that
laws are enforced against those who would try to undermine the posi¬
tion of those who exercise pcwer. The criticism here is that there
are in existence laws vdiich apparently curtail the interests and
activities of the powerful. Also there is a substantial consensus
about some criminal laws.
The pluralist approach suggests that there is a multiplicity of
groups in society holding different values and goals and seeking their
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recognition in legislation. These groups coupete with one another for
the attention of the legislature and any alliances which may be fonred
are dependent on the nature of the specific issue at hand. The criti¬
cism though, is that pluralism assumes that groups operate within a
value-neutral framework. There is a failure to define what constitutes
a social problem or to explain why one area of behaviour, as opposed
to another, is viewed as problematic.
Against this background Smith suggests a continuum in which to
view law emergence. She contends that each model has been helpful to
some extent in furthering our understanding of the emergence of laws,
yet each is convincing only in relation to specific types of issues.
The consensus model provides the most cbvious explanation of law regu¬
lating behaviour whose 'criminal' character is not controversial, for
example, personal assault. The conflict model aids our understanding
of laws regulating activities which involve the pcwer, influence and
material interests of a dominant elite. And the pluralist model appears
applicable to those issues which lie outwith the direct material con¬
cern of a dominant elite such as moral issues which engender deep
divisions of opinion.
Each then can provide a framework for interpreting some examples
of law emergence but none is successful for all cases. Accordingly,
Smith advocates a conceptual scheme which would permit the location
of different laws on a continuum, their position being dependent upon
which model had most explanatory power for that particular example of
law emergence. For the continuum to be constructed certain conditions
have to be accepted. Firstly, it has to be accepted that there is
considerable consensus on sore laws. Secondly, that this consensus
is not inconsistent with the existence of a power elite or of a multi¬
plicity of specialised pressure groups, which although party to such
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general consensus as exists, are on other points concerned to pursue
or sustain their own dominance or to premote issues or causes which
are not consensual issues. Thirdly, that groups, however understood,
do not necessarily always function cohesively for all purposes and
that constituent meirfoers may function, for purposes outwith the par¬
ticular concern of a group, as mentors of other collectivities. If
these caveats are accepted a continuum could be constructed which
would allow particular exanples of law emergence to be placed along it.
The case studies in this thesis, being issues of conscience, have
been characterised by the absence of any identifiable economic elite
(although commercial interest, in the shape of the Brewers and the
Scottish Tourist Board, and professional interest in the shape of the
Faculty of Advocates, was noted in the licensing and divorce issues,
respectively) . Further, in ncne of the cases did there exist an over¬
whelming consensus either supporting or opposing reform of the law.
Instead, the emergence of these law reforms was marked by the activi¬
ties of special interest groups, a divergence in public opinion and
the prominence of Parliament and individual MPs. Thus, our studies
are best situated in the continuum at the point which is closest to
the pluralist model.
IV.
In this final section of the conclusion consideration will be
given to those issues arising frcm Chapter 1 relating to Scottish
culture and politics. The aim here will be to proceed towards a
statement on the 'Scottish dimension' in our case studies by assess¬
ing in what ways Scottish culture and politics came to impinge upon
the emergence and development of policy. In other words, how can
the idea of Scottish particularity be expressed and summarised?
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The Scottish Office, of course, is at the very centre of govern¬
ment in Scotland since it possesses administrative dominance in
Scottish affairs. It has, because of this central position, the power
to regulate the entry of demands into the 'Scottish political system'.
In what way, if any, did this pcwer to regulate affect our case
studies?
Notwithstanding Richards' point that in issues of conscience the
bureaucracy has less overt control over policy development than in
normal government business, the Scottish Office still managed to
exert some influence in the early stages of policy initiation siirply
because of its pivotal role in Scottish politics. In the proceeding
section it was noted that while the licensing reform was a free vote
issue of conscience it was also a Government Bill which meant Scottish
Office involvement in its preparation and drafting. And, of course,
prior to that the issue had been the subject of a committee of inquiry
appointed under the auspices of the SHHD.
The point which was emphasised earlier by both Kellas and Allen
was that this control did not necessarily have to be overt but could
be circumstantial and situational in as much as administrative style
could influence policy. Kellas suggested that 'a focus for the Scot¬
tish ruling elite is to be found in the corridors of St. Andrew's
House',10 while Allen argued that the exclusiveness of the system lay
in the ' restriction of influence over decision-making to a small body
of fairly senior Civil Servants and MPs, and a large but still modest
group of persons regularly oonsulted'.11
For the most part, the case study on licensing reform tends to
substantiate this line of thinking. Both when the Clayson Committee
was sitting and when the Licensing Bill was being prepared and enacted,
those groups with the highest status in the coTrnunity benefited most
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frcm the formalised lines of oorrmanication with the Soottish Office.
For instance, the dialogue between the SHHD and the Association of
Chief Police Officers (Scotland) over those points of the licensing
law which required police enforcement is just one example. Yet it
was noted above that consultation did not always equate with influence.
Pressure groups may influence but they do not necessarily determine.
The decision about which issues merited consideration ultimately
lay with Soottish Office Ministers and their senior officials since
they had the power to select and manipulate the interests to which to
respond. The Secretary of State for Scotland in particular is in a
powerful position to influence what kinds of issues emerge onto the
political agenda for discussion. In the licensing issue there is
little doubt that it was the personal influence of Willie Ross which
kept the provision for the Sunday opening of pubs out of the original
draft of the Licensing Bill. And in the divorce and homosexuality
cases his hostility to reform in the late sixties and mid-seventies
played a large part in these issues not appearing on the agenda for
debate.
Yet, that said, the general influence of the Soottish Office on
the divorce and homosexuality issues is not that clear since these
cases were bona fide Private Members' Bills and here Richards' point
concerning the diminished involvement of the bureaucracy in such
matters is more applicable. Certainly there seems to have been no
great enthusiasm within the Soottish Office over divorce reform and
the periodic official Commons written answer that the Soottish Office
would lend drafting assistance to a Divorce Bill if it should obtain
the necessary parliamentary time neatly evaded the point that it was
the need for parliamentary time which was at issue. And in homosex¬
uality the Scottish Office appeared content not to interfere in the
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Crown Office's policy of 'no prosecutions'. However, it does seem
as though it was caught cn the hep in 1980 when Robin Oook inserted
his reform clause into the middle of the Government's Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Bill. Since the clause was technically in order
the Scottish Office, taken by surprise, had no answer to his ingen¬
uity. Ch this occasion, at least, its control over the agenda was
gently brushed to one side.
The peculiarities of Scotland's historical development within
the context of the United Kingdom has been noted by Nairn. It has
been characterised by assimilation in politics but separation in
social mores. Although assimilated politically into the British
State, Scotland maintained a distinctive 'civil society'. This unus¬
ual juxtaposition had the effect of producing a distorted political
culture, described by Nairn as 'cultural sub-nationalism', which
nanifested itself in popular literature, sport, the Church, and many
other areas of Scottish society. So what, if anything, has been the
effect of Scotland's 'unique historical development' on our three
policy issues?
Perhaps one of the most profound manifestations of this distorted
culture can be seen in Scottish attitudes towards drink. Chapter 6
outlined the social and historical context of drinking and its control
in Scotland and traced the evolution of the different licensing systems
north and south of the border. Culturally, Scotland developed an am¬
bivalent attitude towards the consumption of alcohol. On the one hand
it was seen as a sign of sociability, but on the other it was perceived
as a dangerous drug if taken in excess. Vivid images were used by the
Victorian temperance movements, founded on a strong Calvinist anti-
drink tradition, to condemn the excessive use of alcohol. But alter¬
native imagery, operating simultaneously, portrayed the use of alcohol
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as being of considerable symbolic importance to the self-esteem of
Scots. The modem legacy of this 'cultural neurosis' left Scotland
with a very much higher proportion of alcohol related problems and
disabilities than England and Wales where a more relaxed approach to
the consumption of alcohol prevailed.
Politically, this can be seen in the different responses to the
perceived problem north and south of the border. Both Coirmittees of
Inquiry, Errol and Clayson, were, in part, a response to the Monopolies
Commission Report on the Sale and Supply of Beer. This Monopolies
Commission Report applied only to England and Wales and was concerned
with the 'tied house' system which was widespread there. Its main
purpose was that of consumer protection - to ensure that the English
consumer reoeived a fair deal. Now while both Clayson and Errol had
remits to review comprehensively licensing law, there was a divergence
in the way the issue was approached. Since alcchol abuse was rela¬
tively less serious in England and Wales, Errol was at liberty to
develop the theme of consumer interest more fully. The Clayson Commit¬
tee while admittedly concerning itself with the wishes of the Scottish
consumer, had to take into consideration the severity of alcohol mis¬
use in Scotland. It was therefore under greater pressure to balance
the interests of the consumer against the interests of public health.
The package of pro-liberalisation recommendations were designed as a
compromise solution to this. In comparison to Errol and in the con¬
text of the period, Clayson's rain recommendations were much more
politically realistic.
This seems to be one of the reasons why the Clayson Report was
taken up and implemented while the Errol Report was not. Another was
a greater sense of urgency in Scotland. The existing law was seen to
be hopelessly outdated and ineffective in both the spheres of consumer
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interest and public health. Consequently the pressure to reform was
far greater in Scotland than it was in England, where, by and large,
there was more widespread satisfaction with the way the law operated.
This pressure to reform, fuelled in many respects by a sense of injus¬
tice that England was enjoying privileges being denied to Scotland,
was part and parcel of the more general pressure in the seventies for
fundamental political reform in the way Scotland was governed.
The divorce issue too, was very similar in as much as a sense of
injustice again prevailed when it became widely realised that England
was benefiting frcm 'advantages' which did not apply north of the
border. Historically, Scotland had always taken pride in the fact
that its divorce laws were more liberal and in advance of the statutes
which prevailed in England. Even in the 1930s when the principles of
the law came more closely into line north and south of the border,
traditional differences in legal practice remained. So when in the
mid-seventies Scotland gradually became aware that it was trailing
in the wake of the 1969 English reform, there were once more feelings
of being 'disadvantaged'.
This sense of injustice concerned both the substance of the reform
and the procedure for obtaining it. Not only was the nature of the
divorce measure at issue, Scottish business in Parliament generally
was being called into question as a result of the much broader debate
on constitutional reform. The apparent paradox was that pressure for
uniformity in personal law should have come at a tine when popular
opinion was also demanding a separate legislature for Scotland. The
divorce issue then, was in part a product of the new social confidence
and political aggressiveness in Scotland in the 1970s, but it was also
in part a product of Scotland's historical position within the British
political system.
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On the issue of homosexuality the sense of injustice was perhaps
not as widespread, but it existed nevertheless, certainly within the
homosexual community itself and amongst sympathetic organisations and
individuals. But this pocket of liberal opinion contrasted with a
more general feeling of distaste for the subject. And it was to
appease both sections of public opinion that a policy of 'no prosecu¬
tions ' was pursued. This enabled the Lord Advocate to allay the fears
of homosexuals about prosecution provided their activities were kept
private, and simultaneously to reassure the general public that homo¬
sexual acts remained criminal offences.
Scotland, then, seemed less keen than England to sanction a
legislative reform which would publicly acknowledge the de-criminal i-
sation of homosexual acts between consenting adults in private. Due
to the lack of opinion poll data for Scotland it has been difficult
to assess in what ways Scottish opinion might have differed frcm that
in England. In the case of homosexuality though, there does seem to
have been seme moral conservatism amongst the public at large, which
to sane extent can be seen as a product of a distinctive cultural his¬
tory. In 1975 'Gay News' published an article which postulated that
it was the assertive religious philosophy of Calvin that was delaying
legislative reform,12 Whether this was true or not is perhaps not so
important as the fact that 'Gay New^ perceived it to be the case.
Fran the evidence that is available there do seem to have been
some distinctive characteristics in Scottish opinion on these issues,
characteristics which to seme extent shew signs of having been cultur¬
ally transmitted. Yet, at the same time Scottish opinion appears to
have been influenced by events in England as well. So, while the
political histories of the cases differed either side of the border,
the differences in policy content were not nearly so marked. This
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was the point made by Parry, that Scotland's divergence from United
Kingdom norms was often one of administrative distinctiveness rather
than political substance.13
Scotland's administrative autonomy is a further manifestation of
a 'unique historical development'. It is one of the cornerstones upon
which Kellas founds his idea of a 'Scottish political system'. Che
problematical area though, identified at the outset, was hew the
Scottish system interacted with the British system. What were the
boundaries of each system? What can the cases say about the dependence
or independence of the Scottish system within the British system?
It was suggested in Chapter 2 that seme kind of political system
did persist after 1707 given that Scottish society, for the most part,
remained intact. Yet this system operated in a dual capacity. The
Scottish system could act as a means of communication with the larger
British system in areas which were of 'British' concern, but it could
also act in its own right in those areas which were of concern solely
to the population of Scotland, areas covered by the activities of the
Scottish Office and the Scottish legal system. But as Kellas himself
has pointed out 'what has to be discovered is the range of activity
which is effectively Scottish, despite the formal necessity for legis¬
lation or executive decision at the British level'.11+
Thus, the Scottish system can be characterised as being both
dependent and independent within the British system. The case studies
have illustrated this particular dilemma well. Being issues which
required separate legislation pertaining only to Scotland they have
highlighted the way in which the Scottish political system can, in
certain respects, operate in an independent capacity. Yet, they have
also served to demonstrate that even '/hen operating in this 'indepen¬
dent' capacity, the Scottish political system is often dependent upon
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the larger British political system at critical moments in the policy
process. Many examples frcm the case studies show the political
'dualism' of the Scottish system.
In the licensing study, for instance, the Clayson Carmittee oper¬
ated autonomously under the auspices of the Scottish Heme and Health
Department, taking evidence on a Scottish issue from, in the main,
Scottish pressure groups. Its Report, confined to the problem as it
presented itself in Scotland, was the subject of an 'independent'
debate in Parliament in the Scottish Grand Carmittee. The ensuing
Licensing (Scotland) Bill was drafted within the Scottish Office and
the principles of the Bill, upon reaching Parliament, were scrutinised
once again by the Scottish Grand Ccmnittee. Yet, at the Report Stage,
when the Bill reached the Floor of the House, it began to inpinge
upon the British system. It was at this point that David Steel made
cements about Scottish legislation being 'relegated' to a late debat¬
ing session after midnight, and Bruce Millan highlighted some of the
problems which arose when English MPs were present to vote on purely
Scottish issues. Here then is an example of the 'rather untidy over¬
lap' between the Scottish and British systems at Westminster which at
times both Scottish and non-Scottish MPs find irritating. Of course,
onoe a Scottish Bill progresses to the House of Lords it then beccmes
wholly dependent on the British system, a point which Kellas appears
to overlook.
This overlap between the two 'systems' was even more marked in
the case of divorce. While divorce, because of legal tradition and
practice, was an issue which fell within the activities of the Scottish
system, it was nevertheless heavily dependent on the British system,
both in the formation of opinion and in Parliament itself. As recorded
earlier, the parameters of the divorce debate were very much influenced
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by events in England. The Scottish Law Commission, while framing its
proposals in the idiom of Scots Law, took its cue from the Law
Commission which in turn had been prompted by the Church of England.
Cnly the Church of Scotland can be said to have taken an 'independent'
line. And in Parliament the issue was dependent on Private Members'
procedure which is very much a part of the British system. So again
the Scottish system encroached upon the British at that point in the
policy process where the issue made demands on parliamentary time com¬
mon to both systems. This is not to deny that Scottish Private
Menfoers' Bill could in fact make quicker progress through the use of
one of the Scottish Standing Committees, However, the prcblem lay in
getting the Bill into the legislative machine.
The dependent/independent dilemma also surfaced in the homosex¬
uality issue. Through the discretion of the Lord Advocate a policy
of 'no prosecutions' was pursued which typified Scotland's administra¬
tive autonomy. The Scottish system therefore acted independently in
so far as it had the capacity to waive, by Executive decree, the en¬
forcement of a criminal statute. But when it came to its ability to
reform the statute legislatively, the Scottish system once more became
dependent upon parliamentary time available within the British system.
Indeed, such was this dependency upon 'British' parliamentary time
that it took a procedurally unorthodox, but legitimate and innovative,
maneouvre to accomplish a legislative de-criminalisation of the offence
in question.
Thus, even in those issues which are supposed to fall within the
range of activities upon which the Scottish system is capable of act¬
ing independently, there nevertheless exists a dependency upon the
British system whenever the Scottish system is required, by necessity,
to make demands upon tirre cccmon to both. This was cne of the main
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criticisms made against Parliament in the 1970s by advocates of devo¬
lution. In light of our case studies then, how is this criticism of
Parliament's ability to handle Scottish affairs to be assessed?
It was conceded in Chapter 3 that our case studies were perhaps
not wholly typical of Scottish policy formulation. Nonetheless, they
have provided a means to explore, as compared with the rest of Britain,
what variations might have existed in the substantive policy areas in
question and in the political and administrative processes by which
these policies came to be formulated. Further, it was suggested that
Parliament's handling of these cases became enbroiled in the rhetoric
of the devolution debate. Consider, for instance, an utterance from
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton on the Second Beading of the 1976 divorce
reform:
'It seems that the history of the Bill serves to
highlight the need for a Scottish Assembly.
Although Scotland may have less than 10% of
Britain's population, we need more parliamentary
time allocated to us'.15
One of the things the case studies have tried to demonstrate is
that parliamentary time was only one of many considerations influen¬
cing policy development. However, James Douglas-Hamilton did have a
point. The analysis of the Ballot (see Appendix I) revealed that
Soots MPs were not in fact statistically disadvantaged in the draw.
This, though, bock no account of the position attained in the Ballot
or of the type of Bill sponsored. When this was taken into consider¬
ation it was found that the chances of a Scots MP being drawn high in
the Ballot and then sponsoring a Scottish Bill were indeed rather slim.
Earlier the oonment was made that this revealed much about the atti¬
tudes of Scottish MPs. It also reveals much about the pressures
brought to bear upon them. A Scots MP is not only approached by
Scottish lobbyists but also by UK lobbyists. Generally speaking, an
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English MP will sponsor an English issue or a UK issue, while a Scots
MP will sponsor a Scottish issue or a UK issue. It is rare to find
an English MP sponsoring something purely Scottish, or a Scots MP
sponsoring something purely English. However, it is not necessarily
the case that there are less Scottish issues in need of consideration
than English. The point, therefore, is that a similar number of
Scottish issues have to compete for far fewer available places in the
Ballot.
The problem, though, is political rather than statistical. It
involves the curious juxtaposition of an independent Scottish legal
system and a unitary British state. Scotland's legal system is prob¬
ably one of the few in the world which has no legislative body of its
cwn. In this regard it has been described as a 'constitutional hiccup'.16
Over the years Scots have had to lock increasingly tcwards England,
'scanning the growing flood of UK legislation for matters affecting
Scotland in enactments often framed to suit English law, and watching
warily for the next standardising grenade tossed up frcm Whitehall'.17
The problem is that by reason of proportion Scotland only has a very
limited voice in the UK Parliament, the consequence of which is that
any matter affecting Scots law can be altered by the majority even
although the majority may not be Scottish and may have no knowledge
of, or interest in, Scotland. TWo alternative solutions were postu¬
lated in the seventies - uniformity or devolution.
For issues of conscience the case for uniformity in the law
throughout Britain is strong since in the interests of social justice
there should be general equality before the law. The case studies
have shown that in fact there was a remarkable similarity in the prin¬
ciples in each of the policy areas either side of the border. But
they have also shown distinctive characteristics, particular to
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Scotland's administrative, legal and cultural traditions. The price
of uniformity then, would be high. If taken to its logical conclusion
it would mean the eclipse of Scottish legal and cultural traditions as
Scots law was subsumed within a unified system dominated by English
legal practice. For many this price would be too high to pay. It
would represent a further assimilation of a distinctive feature of
Scottish life to English practice and in the process would erode
Scottish claims to 'nationhood'. Politically, at least in the fore¬
seeable future, it would appear an unrealistic option, since such a
legal unification would engender considerable opposition amongst many
sections of Scottish opinion, not least the Scottish legal profession
whose professional interests would be at stake.
legal patriotism, however, should be founded on more than senti¬
ment or professional self-interest. Cne obvious option for a legal
system without its own legislature is to provide it with one. This
was the devolution option which came to dominate Scottish politics in
the 1970s and of which our case studies were so much a part. So hew
then, might a Scottish Assembly have handled these and other issues?
The simple fact of the matter is that no one knows because the
structure and procedure of the Asserrbly was to be decided by the
Assembly itself once it had been set up. Perhaps though, at this
stage in the thesis, the author may be allowed a paragraph or two to
speculate.
It is likely that in terms of departmental structure the Assembly
would have opted for a limited number of large departments divided on
a functional basis. Three reasons suggest themselves for this.
Firstly, there would have been pressure from senior Scottish civil
servants for as little initial change as possible. Secondly, a small
number of departments would have facilitated central co-ordination.
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And thirdly, departments would have been divided functionally because
these were familar, well established and understood by other official
bodies. Initially then, change would have been minimal in order to
facilitate the transfer of power and to operationalise swiftly Assembly
policies.
However, there would appear to have been more scope for Assenbly
initiative in the sphere of scrutiny and influence where a system of
specialised Select Committees to shadow the activities of each depart¬
ment was a strong frontrunner. As well as shadowing individual depart¬
ments, Committees would also have been concerned to monitor the
Assembly's accounts and proposed expenditure. And in the area of
legislation one idea was for the Assembly to introduce an investiga¬
tive phase in procedure whereby, on or before Second Reading, outside
witnesses, civil servants and Ministers could be called upon to pro¬
vide information and be questioned en various aspects of the Bill in
hand.
It has been pointed out several times in the thesis that our case
studies are perhaps not typical of Scottish policy formulation in so
far as they are not concerned with resource allocation. Therefore it
would be foolish to pretend that they would have been amongst the
Assembly's 'bread and butter' issues, such as finance, health, educa¬
tion, housing, local government or transport. Nevertheless, when these
issues needed to be reviewed the Assembly would have provided an auton¬
omous Scottish forum for debate. Although an Assembly would not have
been able to prevent metropolitan values from the south influencing
opinion within its debating chamber, it would have had the capacity
to legislate independently in Scottish affairs, freeing Scotland from
its dependence on the priorities and timetable of Parliament, and pro¬
viding the 'missing link' which could have transformed a Scottish
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sub-system into the genuine article, that is, a Scottish political
system with its own legislature.
The aim at the outset of this thesis was to identify the 'Scottish
dimension' in our case studies by assessing in what ways Scottish cul¬
ture and politics came to impinge upon the emergence and development
of policy. So hew then, can the Scottish dimension be expressed and
surrmarised? The difficulty in answering this concisely lies in the
multiplicity of factors which go to make up the Scottish dimension.
The individual conclusions to each of the cases have already illus¬
trated this. Scottish 'particularity', then, is multi-dimensional.
It manifests itself in several ways - in the historical development
of Scotland and its effect an the context of each reform, in the way
in which pressure was channelled through Scottish organisations and
pressure groups, in the administrative autoncmy of the Scottish Office,
in the distinctive legislative procedure in Parliament for purely
Scots issues, in the dual role of individual MPs operating in a
Scottish arena and a UK arena, in the values of decision-makers par¬
ticularly those with power over the political agenda, in ambivalent
social mores and public opinion, and in a culturally transmitted poli¬
tical inferiority complex.
Thus, the most striking feature of Scottish particularity is its
dualism - historical dualism in Scotland's assimilation into the
British state while it maintained its 'civil society', political dual¬
ism in Scotland's apparent capacity to operate independently within
its own 'political system' while it remained dependent upon the British
system, and social dualism in Scotland's requirement for separate
legislation in the idiom of Soots law while it adopted substantively
similar policies as south of the border. With such a unique cultural
heritage generating anbivalent tendencies within Scottish society, the
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description of contenporary Scotland as 'an unciassifiable marginal
aberration' may not be so wide of the mark.
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Table 1.1 illustrates the breakdown of the Private Members'
Ballot for the 16 Parliamentary Sessions from 1966 to 1980. This
covers a span of 5 different Parliaments. Column (1) of the table
shews that the total number of Private Members1 Bills introduced by
Ballot procedure during this period was 336. Each Session the first
20 MPs selected in the Ballot are allocated a place to introduce a
Bill of their choosing, although throughout the late 60s a slightly
higher number appear to have been drawn. The short Parliamentary
Session of 1974 hewever, had a reduced Ballot of only 10.
Frcm column (2) it can be seen that of these 336 places Scottish
Members won 42. This represents a 12.5% share of the Ballot places
available during these years. Since Scotland's 71 MPs represent
11.2% of all Members sitting in Parliament, Scottish Members appear
to have won a marginally greater percentage of places in the Ballot
than their parliamentary membership. Certainly on this evidence
there can be no suggestion that the Ballot has in any way operated
against Scots MPs. In each of the 16 Sessions at least one Scottish
MP has won a place, and on three occasions there have been as many as
five.
Columns (3) and (4) shew the type of Bill - that is whether it
applied to Scotland only or to the UK as a whole - which each of the
42 Scots Members introduced. less than half or 45.2% (19) chose to
sponsor a Bill particular to Scotland, as opposed to the 54.8% (23)
who favoured a UK Bill.
Since Private Members' time is so scarce only a limited number
of Bills have any chance of succeeding. Unless a Bill is so uncontro-
versial as to proceed unopposed it is usually only those near the top
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of the Ballot which have a realistic chance. Generally speaking,
the first eight in the Ballot are regarded as having a reasonable
chance of obtaining a Second Reading, although this is by no ireans
cut and dried since Bills lower down the order can, and sometimes
do, succeed because of a combination of factors which may be parti¬
cular to any Session's Private Members' schedule. Column (5) shows
the number of Soots MPs gaining a place in the first eight of the
Ballot. Here it can be seen that exactly 50% or 21 MPs were drawn
in the first eight places. In only 2 Sessions, 1967-68 and 1976-77,
did a Soots Member's name fail to appear in the top eight. In the
particularly lucky year of 1972-73 Scotland's MPs managed to capture
four of those eight positions. More will be said of individual years
presently.
However, if one moves to column (6) it will be noted that of
those 21 MPs who were in the first eight places only 6 presented a
Bill which related specifically to Scotland.
Column (7) shows the total number of Bills which can be classi¬
fied as involving an issue of morality. Included here are the
cbvious examples of abortion and divorce as well as other examples
such as the oontrol of indecent displays and the abolition of live
hare coursing. The criteria for selection in this category was simply
that the issue raised some question of conscience. Thus 49 or 14.6%
of the 336 Bills can be so classified. Of these 49 Bills, 11 (22.4%)
were sponsored by Soots MPs (as shown in column (8)) , 9 relating to
UK wide moral issues, e.g. abortion, and only 2 relating to Scottish
moral issues.
Perhaps the most famous of the 'moral' Bills was David Steel's
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill which was introduced in the
1966-67 Session, Steel having won 3rd place in the Ballot. Three
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years later In the 1969-70 Session, Steel won another high place in
the Ballot, this time 4th, but again chose to introduce a UK Bill,
on this occasion an amendment to the Race Relations Act 1968.
Session 1970-71 saw the first of the Scottish moral Bills,
This was the Divorce (Scotland) Bill introduced by Robert Hughes who
was 3rd in the Ballot. In this same year Norman Buchan was 5th and
he chose to sponsor an Employed Persons (Safety) Bill.
The following Session of 1971-72 was interesting because Willie
Hamilton won 7th place. He had always been a ccnmitted supporter of
divorce reform but for some reason chose to sponsor an anti-sex dis¬
crimination Bill. He persisted with this theme the following Session
(1972-73) when, after winning 8th place, he introduced the same Bill.
Cti 29th November 1972 he again presented the Anti-Discrimination Bill.
Yet only two months later, on 23rd January 1973, he was attempting to
introduce, under the Ten-Minute Rule, a Divoroe Reform Bill. After
having won a reasonable place in the 1972-73 Ballot it seems puzzling
that Hamilton did not introduce a Divorce Reform Bill at that point,
since there is little doubt that he was committed to such a reform.
Cne must surmise that either he rated anti-sex discrimination a greater
priority at the time, or he did not consider 8th place to offer a good
enough chance of success for something as contentious as a Divoroe
Reform Bill.
It was in this Session ('72-'73) that 4 Soots appeared in the top
eight. At No. 1 was Teddy Taylor. He was unsympathetic to divorce
reform so it was no surprise that he should opt for a Bill which sought
to clarify the penalties for murder. At No. 4 Ian MacArthur presented
the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Bill, but this did not seek to
alter the principle of Soots divorce law. Tien, at No. 6, Iain Sproat,
who was sympathetic to divorce reform, chose the rather unimaginative
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sub ject of the protection of wrecks in territorial waters. Willie
Hamilton, of course, was at No. 8 with his anti-discrimination Bill.
Itoo Soots MPs appeared in the top eight of the 1974-75 Ballot,
but James White (3rd) chose to attempt to amend the Abortion Act
1967, and Peter Doig (8th) presented a Bill on dogs.
So when Iain MacCormick came 4th in the 1975-76 Ballot it was
perhaps not surprising he ceremented that he felt there was not much
in the way of alternatives as regards the subject matter of his Bill.
Accordingly, he introduced the Divorce (Scotland) Bill. Thus, both
the moral Bills which pertained only to Scotland were divorce reform
attempes.
Session 1977-78 saw Norman Buchan at No. 5 introduce a Post
Office Workers (Industrial Action) Bill. Then, James White, placed
at No. 8 in the 1978-79 Ballot, presented the Children Bill which
concerned legitimacy. In 1979-80 two Scots Members were at Nos. 1
and 2, John Corrie and Neil Carmichael. John Corrie made another
attempt to amend the Abortion Act 1967, while Neil Carmichael opted
to attempt to legislate cn seat belts. Finally, in the last Session
with which we are concerned, 1980-81, Donald Stewart found himself
in the No. 2 spot and chose to sponsor a Gaelic (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Bill.
Certainly then, in recent Sessions, Scots Members have found
themselves well-placed in the Private Members' Ballot. So the oppor¬
tunity for homosexual law reform did exist. Presumably though these
particular Members could not be persuaded as to the merits of such a
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* This composite table has been compiled frcm information published
by Ivor Burton and Gavin Drewry in the series 'Public Legislation: A
Survey of the Sessions' which appears annually in Parliamentary
Affairs. The format of their information has varied over the years
so that after Session 1974-75 they no longer differentiate as to how
far a Bill progressed, simply classifying those Bills that pass First
Beading as having been debated and progressing. The figures in brac¬
kets then, represent this category of 'Debate or progress'. They
have been entered under 'Failed on 2R' for convenience only.
It should be borne in mind that some Bills may have progressed further.
With the exception of two very successful Sessions in 1974-75
and 1975-76 when 9 Bills (47%) and 11 Bills (55%) were enacted, the
table shows that around 6 to 7 Bills (30-35% in a Ballot of 20) have
a realistic chance of success. While proportions can vary each year
because of the size of the Ballot, a rough rule of thumb would seem
to indicate that approximately one-third of Ballot Bills reach the
Statute Book. That no Ballot Bills were enacted in 1973-74 or 1978-
79 was due to the parliamentary Sessions being interrupted by General
Elections. The table further shows that a great many Bills flounder
very early on, failing to surmount the 'hurdle' of Second Reading,




Table II. 1 illustrates that the general tendency within the
Labour Party was to vote in favour of reform. The most convincing
Labour vote in favour was on the issue of homosexuality where 70% of
Scottish Labour Members recorded 'Aye'. However, it should be borne
in mind that although the vote was a free one, the clause was in the
middle of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill to which the Labour
Party was hostile. Therefore, any chance that the exposition had of
embarrassing the Government would have been gratefully welcomed. Cn
the other hand the Labour vote on the licensing issue was much more
equivocal and this has already been explained as being due to the
dual thinking which existed within the party about liberalisation.
The tendency within the Conservative Party though was to vote
against reform with the exception of the licensing issue where they
favoured relaxation. It should be remembered, ho/ever, that in this
Parliament the Conservatives held only 16 Scottish seats. With more
representation it is conceivable that their vote might have been more
evenly split.
The Scottish Liberal vote tended to fluctuate. All 3 Soots
Liberals voted against the liberalisation of the drink laws in 1976,
but voted for homosexual law reform in 1980. In direct contrast the
SNP voted convincingly in favour of relaxation of licensing hours,
but against relaxation of the criminal law pertaining to homosexual
conduct.
The broad trend within the voting by Age Groups (Table II.2) was
that younger MPs tended to vote for the reforms whereas older MPs
were more inclined to vote against. Both the under 35 category and
the 35-44 category voted in favour on all four divisions. The 45-54
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age group voted for three out of the four. MPs aged 55 and over
were generally disposed to vote against reform, the total number of
votes against in these last two categories outnumbering votes for by
34 to 24.
Ihe difficulty of constructing Table II.3, which shews the
breakdown of voting by Religion, is the lack of reliable information
on MPs' religious convictions. Although the standard sources of
Parliamentary information (e.g. 'Dod's', 'Who's Who', and "Ihe Times
Guide') contain useful biographies of MPs, they make no reference to
the nature of their religious beliefs. The only publication which
appears to ackncwledge MPs' religious persuasions is the 'Catholic
Directory' which publishes yearly a list of Catholic Members and Peers.
Table II.3, therefore, is not particularly informative. Its most
striking feature is the limited impact of the Catholic vote in any
of the issues. This is due simply to the small number of Scottish
Catholic Members in Parliament. As the figures for each Division
shew, the Catholic vote is swamped by the residual group of 'Others'.
It is interesting to note, hewever, that on each occasion the
Catholic vote went against reform.
Voting by Schooling (Table II.4) shews that the old style Labour
MPs who had received only Elementary schooling were rather unfavour¬
ably disposed to such reforms. It is noticeable that their numbers
dwindled as the decade progressed being replaced by the next genera¬
tion of 'new style' Labour Members. Those with a Scottish Secondary
schooling though, were much more favourably disposed to the reforms,
voting for them in all four divisions. The voting of MPs who had
been to an independent school in Scotland fluctuated. They were mar¬
ginally in favour of divorce reform in the early part of the decade,
but marginally against the licensing and homosexual reforms of later
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years. The voting of MPs educated at English grammar or public
schools shewed no particular trend. It can, however, be noted that
the public schoolboys voted, for whatever reason, overwhelmingly in
favour of relaxing the drink, laws.
Table II.5 on voting by Higher Education does not reveal any
clear pattern. Scottish University graduates voted in favour in
three of the divisions and voted only narrowly against in the other,
but apart frcm that there is no apparent consistency in the way the
votes were cast.
Voting by Region (Table II.6) is another table which shows the
voting pattern to fluctuate. Glasgow, perhaps not surprisingly
because of its large Catholic population, opposed divorce law reform,
but supported both the licensing and homosexual conduct relaxations.
Edinburgh opposed the first divorce reform, but swung dramatically
in favour on the second, due to a change of heart by scrre Tory MPs
and to other MPs being replaced after the 1970 Election. Edinburgh
too favoured licensing reform, but was equivocal over decriminalising
homosexual relations between consenting adults in private. The
Highland vote against the relaxation of drinking hours is another
noticeable feature.
Table II.7, voting by Occupation, shows that the largest group,
the Miscellaneous White Collar group, generally voted in favour with
the exception of the licensing issue where it opposed liberalisation.
In contrast, MPs from the world of business voted against the reforms
except on licensing where they voted for relaxation. After opposing
the initial divorce reform, MPs from the professions swung round to
support in 1971. They also supported licensing reform, but remained





Subject Date Parliament Sponsor Reading a T VoteAyes NoesJ Ayes Noes
Divorce
Divorce




22.7.80 (1979- ) Cook
Dewar First 115 84 19 25
Hughes Second 73 17 23 13
Govt. Report 36 57 30 36
Report 205 82 34 16
*This Division refers to the Sunday opening of public houses. It was
selected as being indicative of feeling on Clayson's liberal philosophy.
The vote is on Government New Clause 1 which requires public houses to
remain closed on Sundays. Therefore an "Aye" vote in favour of the new
clause is a vote against Sunday opening. A "No" vote represents a vote
in favour of Sunday opening.
Party composition in Scotland for the four Parliaments**
Parliament Total MPs Lab. Cons. Lib. SNP
1966-70 71 45 21 4 1
1970-74 71 44 23 3 1
1974-79 71 41 16 3 11
1979- 71 44 22 3 2
**at the time of each division.
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Lab. Cons. Lib. SNP
voting in "favour of reform"1

















































































1includes Licensing "No" votes.
2includes Licensing "Aye" votes.
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TABLE II.2 Scottish voting by Age Groups'
Total Scot,
vote vote U3^r 35-44 45-54 55-64
voting in "favour of reform"
65+ Age
Unknown
Div. 1970 115 19 3 4 5 4 1 2
Div. 1971 73 23 3 7 11 1 0 1
Licensing 57 36 5 10 12 9 0 0







Div. 1970 84 25 1 2 9 10 3 0
Div. 1971 17 13 1 3 6 2 1 0
Licensing 36 30 2 8 7 8 5 0
Hcmosex. 82 16 1 5 5 5 0 0






Scottish voting by Religion
Total Scottish _ ., ..
, , Catholic
vote vote
voting in "favour of reform"
voting "against reform"
Others.
Divorce 1970 115 19 1 18
Divorce 1971 73 23 0 23
Licensing 57 36 2 34
Homosexuality 205 34 1 33
84 25 3 22
17 13 2 11
36 30 3 27
82 16 2 14
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TABLE II.4 Scottish voting by Schooling
Total Scot,
unknown Scot. Scot. Scot. English English
vote vote Elem. Seoon. Indep. Grarrmar Public
voting in "favour of reform"
Div. 1970 115 19 1 1 9 4 1 3
Div. 1971 73 23 3 1 11 4 1 3
Licensing 57 36 2 0 23 4 1 6
Hcmosex. 205 34 2 0 26 2 3 1
voting "against reform"
Div. 1970 84 25 4 3 7 2 2 7
Div. 1971 17 13 3 1 6 1 0 2
Licensing 36 30 3 2 16 6 2 1
Hcmosex. 82 16 0 0 10 3 0 3












voting in "favour of reform"
Div. 1970 115 19 5 1 5 2 4 2
Div. 1971 73 23 4 1 10 1 5 2
Licensing 57 36 8 1 15 3 7 2
Homosex. 205 34 5 1 14 5 8 1
voting "against reform"
Div. 1970 84 25 7 1 6 3 5 3
Div. 1971 17 13 3 0 3 1 5 1
Licensing 36 30 5 1 10 4 8 2
Honosex. 82 16 5 0 3 3 5 0
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TABIE II.6 Scottish voting by Region
Total Soot,
vote vote
Div. 1970 115 19
Div. 1971 73 23
Licensing 57 36
Hcmosex. 205 34
Div. 1970 84 25
Div. 1971 17 13
Licensing 36 30
Hcmosex. 32 16














1 5 13 6 5 6 0
2 3 16 4 5 1 3
voting "against reform"
0 4 9 5 4 1 2
0 1 9 0 1 1 2
1j. 3 11 3 5 1 6
0 3 3 4 1 2 3










voting in "favour of reform'
Div. 1970 115 19 3 11 2 1
Div. 1971 73 23 4 13 2 0
Licensing 57 36 9 12 5 2
Honosex. 205 34 5 22 3 0
voting "against reform"
Div. 1970 84 25 5 8 4 2
Div. 1971 17 13 0 6 3 2
Licensing 36 30 5 18 3 1
Hcmosex. 32 16 5 2 7 0
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1
1
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1
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